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The present thesis seeks to understand and explain the rhetoric and 
behaviour of the rejectionist `current' within the Palestinian national 
movement. It proceeds from the view that extant scholarship, primarily from 
within the fields of terrorism and security studies, has profoundly 
misunderstood rejectionist speech and behaviour by ignoring the 
explanatory capacity of Emic-the research subject's perception-as well as 
the influence of the sociocultural milieu within which rejectionism exists. 
The thesis proceeds to set up a `socioculturally sensitive' analytical 
framework drawn from social identity theory, a heuristic, non-reductionist 
model for understanding group interaction and conflict. Emphasizing 
cultural norms and cues identified by anthropologists as salient in the 
eastern Mediterranean, the thesis suggests that the social value of honour, 
patron-client dynamics and a firmly entrenched group orientation must be 
significant elements of a model for understanding rejectionist behaviour. 
The main analytical narrative suggests that for reasons derived from 
ideology, patron-client relations and group dynamics, what has distinguished 
the rejectionists from the mainstream have been a qualitatively different set 
of preconditions for, and objectives of diplomatic negotiations. To the main 
rejectionist factions the goal of liberating Palestine has always been 
inextricably intertwined with the goal of restoring national honour; one 
without the other has been impossible and to claim otherwise would mean a 
depletion of factional and personal honour. To the rejectionists, there has 
never been any question of deviating from the fundamental goals-national 
recognition, repatriation, self-determination and independent statehood, not 
even for tactical reasons. This `higher standard' likely derives from their 
structurally and politically subordinate position within the national 
movement, and the need to creatively enhance their own social status and 
appeal. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION: WHY RE-EXAMINE REJECTIONISM? 
Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal and equals that they may be superior. Such is the 
state of mind that creates revolutions. Aristotle' 
We fight, get beat, rise and fight again. Nathanael Greene2 
PROLOGUE 
In an interview in late 1999, PFLP central committee member Leila Khaled 
remarked: 
The Oslo strategy will not achieve our goals, [it will achieve] only 
autonomy... The Palestinians have struggled for a large part of this 
century, and in many ways, to achieve their goals. Autonomy is not 
that goal. Also, the [Palestinian] Authority is undemocratic and 
corrupt, and the economic and social situation is very difficult. This is 
an important context for envisaging the eruption of violence; these are 
factors that point to violence. Of course I cannot tell how or when, but 
a new intifada will erupt, as Oslo will inevitably fail. 3 
A year later, the so-called al Aqsa intifada erupted, in part a reaction against 
the Israeli authorities' high-handed way of dealing with the Palestinian 
leadership and people, in part an outcome of the deteriorating 
socioeconomic conditions in the Palestinian Authority (PA) administered 
areas, and the increasingly brazen corruption and human rights abuses by 
the PA itself. As a political event, the new intifada was a watershed in many 
ways, releasing pent up popular pressure and channelling it into a viable 
political force. The submissive despondency of the people of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip was transformed into popular struggle, which in turn forced 
the PA and its various security apparata to engage in something resembling 
armed struggle-albeit limited and vain-against Israel for the first time 
Politics, Bk. V 
` Letter to Chevalier de la Luzerne, June 22,1781. 
since Oslo. 4 The intifada also precipitated zealous political work by a range of 
Palestinian and other organizations aimed at bringing international pressure 
to bear on Israeli policy and practices. After years of descent into political 
inertia, the cumulative tragedies of the intifada somehow regenerated 
Palestinian politics. 
As for internal Palestinian affairs, one largely overlooked effect of the 
intifada was that it afforded several of the Damascus-based rejectionist 
organizations the opportunity to reinsert themselves into the mainstream of 
Palestinian politics, in some cases stronger and bolder than they were when 
in 1993 they severed relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO)/PA leadership and created the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF). 
The alliance's ten founding members were the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC); Fateh-Intifada; Sa'iqa; the Palestinian Popular 
Struggle Front (PPSF); the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF); the 
Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party (PRCP); the Islamic Resistance 
Movement (Harnas); and the Movement of Islamic Jihad in Palestine (MIJ). 
The al Aqsa intifada revealed the depth and extent of popular 
Palestinian anger, frustration and humiliation at the hands of not only the 
Israelis but, more importantly, the Palestinian Authority (PA). 5 Yasir Arafat 
was caught unawares by the uprising, but quickly determined to harness its 
strength to gain a better position in negotiations with Israel. Knowing that a 
considerable proportion of the discontent was this time directed against him 
and the PA, he reached out to the ten rejectionist factions, urging them to 
unite with him in directing the increasingly armed struggle-oriented 
uprising. 
The rejectionists-who have opposed the Oslo process and denied the 
legitimacy of the PA since 1993-saw the eruption of the intifada and Arafat's 
request for support as a vindication of their political position. Oslo had not 
3 Leila Khaled, October 23,1999. 
4 For an overview of the despondency and angst preceding the intifada, see Sara Roy, `The Crisis 
Within: The Struggle for Palestinian Society, ' Critique, No. 17 (Fall 2000), pp. 5-30. 
5 For a preliminary analysis of al-Aqsa intifada, see, Kirsten Schulze, `Camp David and the al-Aqsa 
Intifada: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000, ' 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 3 (May 2001), pp. 215-33. 
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led to historic reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, or to a lasting 
and equitable peace settlement. The rejectionists now had the opportunity to 
return to political centre-stage with their heads held high and their honour 
and integrity intact. Shortly after the outbreak of the intifada, several of the 
rejectionist factions joined forces with Arafat in directing the popular 
struggle through the National and Islamic Forces (NIF), an interfactional 
`crisis management forum, ' which increasingly became an opportunity to 
engage the enemy, as well as reinserting the politics of rejectionism into the 
PLO/PA based system. "Oslo is now dead, " said one rejectionist leader in 
Damascus, "and it is imperative that we work within a joint national 
leadership to confront Israeli aggression. "6 
The rejectionist factions, from their offices in Damascus, had made 
clear their solidarity with the popular effort in Palestine from its earliest 
stages, and unceasingly sought to organize political and financial support for 
it from among the close to one million Palestinian refugees in Syria and 
Lebanon. This included lobbying for Syrian support for the effort. They 
employed their printed and electronic media to further the cause of the 
intifada, both garnering support for it internationally as well as seeking to 
morally sustain it. Within three weeks of the uprising's eruption, however, 
the rejectionist coalition was paralysed by divisions and rendered defunct. 
Four of its members-PFLP-GC, Hamas, MIJ and Sa'iqa-joined with Fateh 
in the NIF. Four others-Fateh-Intifada, PPSF, PLF and the PRCP-persisted 
in their refusal to deal with Arafat, and suspended cooperation with the four 
that did join. The PFLP and DFLP had stood outside the formal structures of 
the rejectionist alliance for some time, and were already practicing limited 
cooperation with Arafat's Fateh; they too joined the NIF. 
With the eruption of the intifada, yet another chapter in rejectionist 
history was brought to an end. Nonetheless, understanding what has 
propelled rejectionism as a political current within Palestinian politics-from 
its early days until the present-remains an important task in understanding 
the dynamics of the Palestinian national movement as a whole. Moreover, 
understanding the political and organizational developments that have taken 
place specifically within post-Oslo rejectionism may hold significant insights 
6 Talal Naji, 25 July 2001. 
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into the present and future and trajectory of Palestinian politics. These, then, 
are the two primary objectives of the present thesis. 
OSLO AND THE PATH OF RESISTANCE 
In late August 1993, the rumours that had lingered for months about secret 
peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO were finally confirmed. The 
PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, through the `Oslo back channel' and with the 
complicity of less than a dozen close associates, committed the entire PLO to 
a framework for negotiated, binational settlement with Israel. On September 
9, Arafat wrote to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, stating that 
the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which 
deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which 
are inconsistent with the cornmitments of this letter are now 
inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to 
submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the 
necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.? 
Rabin responded by declaring that "in light of the PLO commitments 
included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence 
negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process. "8 Four days 
later the two leaders met in Washington, DC, for the ceremonial signing of 
the Declaration of Principles (DOP), radically and irreversibly changing the 
face of Palestinian politics. 
The DOP made provisions for an initial Israeli withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho. area, followed by a five-year transition period in 
which the administrational duties in these areas would be transferred onto a 
Palestinian authority. A permanent Palestinian administrational body was to 
be elected after two years, and be responsible for tax collection, schooling, 
social services, policing and the court system, while the Israelis would 
remain in control of external defence, as well as public order among the 
occupied territories' Israeli residents. A joint liaison committee would 
oversee the implementation of the agreement. "Permanent status 
Letter from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin, dated 9 September 1993. 
8 Letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Yasser Arafat, dated 9 September 1993. 
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negotiations" would commence within two years, covering the thorniest 
"remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security 
arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, 
and other issues of common interest. "9 
An international choir of benevolent observers sang the praises of `the 
advent of peace in Palestine, ' prematurely, yet loudly enough to drown out 
those giving voice to a whole range of local and regional concerns and 
criticisms of the DOP. To its critics, as Yezid Sayigh has noted, the Oslo deal 
meant that 
Israel had imposed its terms entirely... it had done so with Palestinian 
acquiescence, the PLO having moreover made a series of unilateral 
concessions and renunciations for which there was no meaningful 
Israeli recompense. The PLO leadership had revealed its 
incompetence and transformed itself from a national liberation 
movement into a small-town government in the occupied territories, 
an enforcer of Israeli policy with no real autonomous power of its 
own. Ultimately, for its critics the [DOP] represented no more than a 
`Palestinian Versailles', an instrument of abject and self-denying 
surrender. 10 
The reaction from the ranks of the Palestinian military-political factions 
other than Arafat's own Fateh was initial disbelief followed by fury. 11 They 
shared in the above-mentioned general criticisms of the DOP, arguing that 
far from restoring national rights and land to the Palestinian people-these 
being the longstanding core objectives of the Palestinian national 
movement-Arafat had managed to institutionalize the subordination of his 
own people's prerogatives and interests to those of Israel. Importantly, they 
also saw the Oslo back channel as a reprehensibly deceitful and 
dishonourable manoeuvre; without any authorization or debate Arafat had 
used that channel to commit the entire PLO to new means and objectives, 
signing away the right of all Palestinian factions to demand comprehensive 
9 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Israel Information Service, 
1993), articles V, III, VI, XV; annexes II and III. 
'0 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949- 
1993 (London and New York: Oxford University Press and the Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997), 
p. 659. 
11 The DOP caused a minor rebellion inside Fateh in Lebanon, whereby the disruptive commander of 
Fateh's militia forces, Colonel Munir Maqdah, attacked Fateh offices and killed two Fateh cadres. 
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satisfaction from Israel for historical transgressions. In a desperate attempt 
to salvage his own political future, they believed, Arafat had bartered away 
the prerogatives of the Palestinian people and that of the various factions, 
allowing himself to be co-opted by the enemy. The PFLP-GC lambasted 
Arafat as a "Palestinian Petäin, "12 and the front page of Fateh-Intifada's 
biweekly magazine, Fateh-the editorials of which had anticipated a secret 
deal for some time-declared "The traitor has given in: He sold Palestine. "3 
Connected to the political unpalatability of the DOP, there was also an 
important sociocultural trigger for the opposition's fury. In secretly 
negotiating and concluding the Oslo deal, Arafat threw down a sociocultural 
gauntlet within the national movement. Understood within the behavioural 
parameters provided by eastern Mediterranean social norms and cues, 
Arafat's behaviour not only challenged the agendas and objectives of the 
other factions, but brought into question their social status and standing 
within the national movement. He dishonoured them by his deception, by 
his failure to consult with peers, and by his preference for dealing with the 
`enemy other' to save the PLO in its time of crisis, rather than with his own 
ingroup of fellow Palestinian strugglers. 
To the opposition factions, Oslo thus represented not only a politically 
disastrous path, but also an affront to their factional honour. The leaders of 
all the factions considered themselves the representatives of the Palestinian 
people just as Arafat did-a self-perception nurtured by the PLO's erstwhile 
preference for decision-making based on consensual rather than 
majoritarian procedures. Combatants from all the factions of the national 
movement had struggled against Israel for decades, and scores had lost their 
lives in combat. Oppositional cadres and leaders had committed their lives to 
the liberation of Palestine, and the factions were integral parts of the 
Palestinian national movement. On his path to the White House lawn, Arafat 
simply ignored them. For sociocultural as well as political reasons, the 
factions had no option but to respond to Oslo forcefully and demonstratively, 
or accept a loss of face, humiliation and dishonour. 
Politically, Maqdah's manoeuvres were of no consequence however, and he was soon brought back 
to the fold by a generous increase in salary. 
'2 PFLP-GC press release, Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, September 30,1093 
13 Fateh, no. 299, vol. 10 (25 September 1993). 
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The response came in the form of the APF, a ten-member assembly of 
factions intended to coordinate its members' efforts at rejecting and 
thwarting the Oslo process. The APF's members were a motley crew in terms 
of ideology, size and importance, as well as in terms of organizational 
characteristics and leading personalities. The PFLP, DFLP and PRCP 
represented a Marxist-Leninist political perspective, while the PFLP-GC, 
Fateh-Intifada, Sa'iqa, PPSF and PLF all espoused a more particularistic and 
narrow Palestinian nationalism. Hamas and MIJ, in addition, brought 
Islamism into the alliance. Internal friction thus seemed inevitable even to 
the members themselves, yet the overriding concern around which they all 
felt compelled to rally was public and demonstrative opposition to the Oslo 
deal. The alliance's first statement asserted that "the present PLO leadership 
does not represent the Palestinian people, nor does it express its views or 
aspirations, "14 taking up the gauntlet, counterchallenging Arafat and, thus, 
redeeming their bruised honour. "As a front, [the alliance] will not abandon 
the armed struggle program, " explained Jibril, "and we are still in a state of 
war with the Zionist existence on the land of Palestine. This struggle and 
fighting will continue until we return to our homeland from which we were 
expelled 44 years ago. "15 
From that point onwards, the new alliance consistently and 
consciously promoted itself as the militant voice of the disaffected, the 
steadfast defender of national unity and honour, whose right to all forms of 
struggle, including armed struggle, could never be signed away by a 
disgraced individual or party. In the event, the APF was soon eclipsed by the 
rising fortunes of the PA and never stood a chance of creating an 
internationally acceptable alternative leadership as it had hoped. The PA's 
rapid development into both centre and framework for post-Oslo Palestinian 
politics was ensured by the efforts of the international community, in 
particular by Israeli and US determination to cultivate an acceptable partner 
in the peace process. 
With its collective headquarters in Damascus, the political 
disadvantages stemming from the APF's embargo on transactions with the 
14 Declaration of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces, Damascus, 6 January 1994. 
15 Interview with Ahmad Jibril, Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, October 21,1993. 
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PLO/PA leadership was partially offset, or so it was hoped, by preferential 
access to the 2.2 million refugees resident in Syria and Lebanon. Not only 
were these refugees those whose dreams and aspirations were most 
immediately and brutally trampled by the Oslo deal, but all the opposition 
factions enjoyed good relations with the Syrian government and had 
extensive political and social infrastructures stretching across Syria and 
Lebanon. Importantly, due to the long-standing animosity between 
Damascus and Arafat's Fateh, all of Syria-and Lebanon north of the `Awali 
River where Syria is in effective control-were off-limits to overt and 
organized Arafatist activity. Out of concern over Arafat's abandonment of the 
refugees, as well as tactical necessity, the refugee communities were 
envisaged as the primary constituency-or, perhaps better, instrument-for 
the rejectionist anti-Oslo effort. 
Post-Oslo commitment to armed struggle has been problematic in 
practical terms, and the impression that they are not serious about 
implementing their rhetoric is widespread even among their own 
sympathizers. The objective and structural constraints under which the APF 
operates, however, has allowed them to obfuscate and get away with their 
inactivity to a perplexing degree. Syria's well-known disapproval of cross- 
border raids, an adverse post-Cold War ideological climate, Arafat's collusion 
with the CIA and Mossad to `crush the resistance' (especially after the 1998 
Wye River agreement), heavy fortifications at the Israeli border, a lack of 
funds and equipment-all these have been offered as explanations for armed 
inactivity. On the other hand, the alliance has been able to refer to, for 
instance, Hamas and MIJ armed attacks on Israeli targets, and the PFLP- 
GC's and Fateh-Intifada's `strategic partnership' with the Lebanese 
resistance movement Hizb'Allah, demonstrating that even in the face of 
overwhelming adversity the alliance has not remained idle. 
BLIND SPOTS AND "MUG-SHOT ORIENTALISM" 
Historically, the vast majority of academic and other literature on the 
Palestinian national movement has emphasized the role, structures and 
ideological development of Fateh-whether as a separate faction or by virtue 
of its dominant position within the PLO-while the rejectionist trend has by 
8 
and large been assigned the role of the `insignificant other. ' Since Oslo, in 
addition, there has been an intense and growing scholarly interest in the 
humanitarian, legal and socioeconomic dilemmas facing the Palestinian 
refugees in the post-Oslo period, while interest in exile-based Palestinian 
politics has been virtually non-existent. Similar to the situation prior to 1973, 
Western scholarly discourse has again come to conceptualize the 
Palestinians outside Palestine as `refugees' rather than as a people; as 
humanitarian wretches rather than politically relevant constituencies 
capable of interacting with, and responding to active political elites. This 
change in researchers' perceptions has been brought on by the fact that the 
centre of Palestinian politics has shifted from the `outside' to the PA-centric 
political system `inside, ' which in turn has precipitated a preoccupation with 
studies of evolving political frameworks and institutions. These studies, 
while useful, have unfortunately been attended by the implication that 
`outside politics' is no longer important-out of sight, out of mind. 
Most scholarly efforts into `the Palestine problem' since Oslo have 
focused on developments inside Palestine, and the only academic fields to 
have expressed an enduring interest in the APF are security and terrorism 
studies. Notoriously prejudiced by their firm cognitive links to Western state 
security establishments, and deploying analytical frameworks desperately 
lacking in contextual acuity, these disciplines have produced a range of 
derisory accounts of the APF. Thus far, therefore, when post-Oslo 
rejectionism has not been ignored it has been thoroughly misrepresented. 
The Received View 
The suggestion that the APF has been a political player of any significance 
defies the received view of its being a collective of failed terrorists and 
ideological has-beens, whose post-Oslo inability to put their militant rhetoric 
into practice has all but nominally relegated them to the dustbin of history. 
This thesis will argue, however, that the alliance has been neither idle, nor 
insignificant. Its determined commitment in the patently impracticable 
rhetoric of armed struggle has served as a socioculturally embedded defence 
mechanism against the PLO/PA leadership's challenge to their social status. 
It gradually became a way for the APF to try to tap into and manipulate 
9 
Palestinian national consciousness through the use of culturally and 
politically resonant symbolism. Once the opposition factions had collectively 
responded to Arafat's challenge by joining together in the APF, the new 
alliance sought to compete with the PLO/PA leadership for the ability to 
construct collective norms and guidelines among the refugee communities in 
Lebanon and Syria. Their tactical aim was to foreclose the possibility of non- 
militant expressions of Palestinianness, while their strategic objective was to 
lessen Arafat's appeal and offset the PLO/PA leadership's `defeatism. ' 
These claims beg a critical question: How is it possible that extant 
scholarship on post-Oslo Palestinian politics has so profoundly overlooked 
and misunderstood the APF? After all, the bulk of its activities has not been 
clandestine. The organizations have published and propagandized widely. 
They have public offices throughout Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere, where 
one can access leaders and cadres. A host of first-rate scholars have studies 
and published on post-Oslo Palestinian politics-so why has the APF 
nonetheless been so misread? 
One reason is the manifest lack of scholarly interest in post-Oslo, 
exile-based Palestinian politics in general-and in rejectionism in particular. 
This reduction of interest has derived from what may be termed the 
hypothesis of comprehensive transformation. An implied conceptual attitude 
rather than a tangible theory, this is the notion that the Oslo accords 
precipitated a close to complete systemic overhaul of Palestinian politics. A 
quarter of a century of exile-based, PLO-led militant struggle was suddenly 
supplanted by a territorially defined, PA-centric political system that both 
expressed and framed a new set of Palestinian aspirations. While issues such 
as national identity, institution building and state formation within the new 
political system are of obvious interest and importance, it does not follow 
that the diaspora and the exile-based political organizations have ceased to 
be relevant to the trajectory of Palestinian politics. 
Barry Rubin has perhaps most clearly articulated the received view of 
the "transitional era between the revolutionary movement and the 
achievement of an independent state" that supposedly began with the Oslo 
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accords. 16 He argues that the extensive and complex post-Oslo 
transformation "undergone by the Palestinian leadership and people" 
prompted them to proceed from "a revolutionary movement toward a state 
trying to meet the needs of over 2.5 million citizens. "17 The leadership's prior 
"dependence on violence" was replaced by "responsibility for stopping 
Palestinian terrorism against Israel. " Similarly, the people's "dream of total 
victory" gave way to "a new goal of creating a Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza with its capital in east Jerusalem. " In addition, Rubin argues 
that the Palestinian leadership and people together underwent a 
transformation from "dispersed exile to restoration in its claimed 
homeland. "18 
That the Palestinian national movement underwent some of its most 
dramatic changes ever as a result of the Oslo accords-including a crucial 
displacement of its centre of political gravity-is indisputably true. That the 
PLO/PA leadership undertook a series of new political initiatives and U- 
turns that directly impacted on the lives of Palestinians in the occupied 
territories and beyond is also correct. However, to suggest that "the 
Palestinian people" experienced a physical, psychological, and attitudinal 
transformation such as that described by Rubin is patently spurious: By 1995 
some 4.6 million Palestinians, out of a total of some 7.7 million, remained in 
exile. 19 They were outside the PA's control and excluded by the boundaries of 
the PA-centric system. They had no new social or economic infrastructures, 
no new PA-induced political goals, nor any new hope or confidence. They 
were, as Jamil Hillal has noted, 
excluded from their innate right to participate in general elections 
[within the new PA-centric system] which would inevitably affect their 
16 Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), preface. For a `prelude' to this 
argument, see his Revolution until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO (Cambridge. MA 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1994). `The Future of Palestinian Politics: Factions, Frictions. 
and Functions, ' Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3 (August 2000) is an 
"update" and further entrenchment of his hypothesis. 
17 Rubin, `The Future of Palestinian Politics, ' p. 1; cf. The Transformation of Palestinian Politics, pp. 
7-9. 
18 Rubin, `The Future of Palestinian Politics, ' p. 1. 
19 Salman Abu Sitta, The Right of Return: Sacred, Legal, and Possible Too (London and Kuwait City: 
Palestine Return Centre, 1996); accessed 13/07/00 on www. prc. org. uk/webpagesibooks-e/a-s/as- 
cover. html 
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political future; and they were excluded, as communities, from taking 
part in the negotiations concerning as vital an issue as the right to 
return, which was left to the `final status' stage of the [PA-Israel] 
negotiations. The fact that the PLO, represented by the Palestine 
National Council (PNC) and the Central Council, was no longer active 
or effective made Palestinian communities in the diaspora feel that 
their interests and aspirations had no venue or forum. 20 
Although the PLO formally remained the diaspora's political leadership, it 
was left to dwindle into obscurity due to its administrators' preoccupation 
with constructing the new institutions of the PA. The PLO/PA leadership 
developed an official nationalist discourse in order to legitimize these new 
institutions, a discourse that reneged on earlier commitments to armed 
struggle and resistance, and by implication also nullified previous 
commitments to the refugees' right of return to their homes inside what is 
now Israel. 21 Thus, even though the official PLO/PA discourse has always 
sought to appear inclusive of the diaspora, the reality of its activities and 
commitments has been to signal that the politically relevant Palestinian 
communities are now those inside the West Bank and Gaza. 
Oslo thus transformed politics for a certain section of the Palestinian 
people-those living in the occupied territories-and the advent of a proto- 
state elevated them to the status of proto-citizens. The flipside of this 
development was that those not benefiting from these developments were, 
conversely, deprived-of dreams, political aspirations and social status. The 
gain of the residents of the PA administered areas was the diaspora's loss as 
the latter's relevance as a primary social constituency within the Palestinian 
political system was all but erased. 
Yezid Sayigh, in his seminal history of the Palestinian national 
movement, has framed Oslo's transformational impact differently-and more 
credibly-by placing it within the PLO's decision-making structures. The 
accord, he argues, brought about a phase in which 
20 Jamil Hillal, `The Effect of the Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian Political System' in George 
Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds. ) After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (London and 
Chicago: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 129. 
21 For a comprehensive analysis of the PLO/PA leadership's emerging official nationalist discourse, 
and the problems it has faced, see Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian 
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the discourse of total liberation, the strategies and tactics of armed 
struggle, and the accompanying organizational instruments and institutional forms had been displaced. The PLO accords with Israel 
were arguably the outcome of a deep crisis of leadership, strategy, and 
mode of politics, but by the same token they signalled `the end of the 
era of the fasa'il-the guerrilla groups based in exile-and the start of 
a new one, in which the centre of national politics, primary social 
constituency, and statist institutions were based in one and the same location, the occupied territories. 22 
Sayigh correctly observes that there was no room for the rhetoric and 
symbolism of armed struggle and total liberation within the new PA-centric 
political system, nor for the tactics of the exile-based guerrillas; their 
displacement was enforced by the emergent official nationalist discourse. 
Furthermore, PLO factions other than Fateh had long since had their 
political influence circumscribed by a combination of their own 
ineffectiveness and Arafat's Machiavellian use of his position as chairman, 
while secular factions not affiliated to the PLO had been denied any real 
significance in Palestinian affairs since the mid-i98os. The Islamists had 
popular appeal, but as far as power within the emergent institutional 
structures went, their rejection of Oslo put them in much the same political 
position as the other oppositionists. In addition, all significant forces 
opposing PLO/PA policy declared both the new system and its leadership 
illegitimate, and imposed an embargo on transactions with it. This, in effect, 
meant cutting themselves off from the structures within which they could 
exercise direct political influence. 
The Systemic Contraction and Palestinian Identities 
Palestinian politics was `transformed' and `normalized' through what Sayigh 
has called "the effective abandonment of the Palestinian diaspora. "23 The 
`transformation of Palestinian politics' is thus better thought of as a `systemic 
contraction, ' a narrowing of boundaries leading to the exclusion of a majority 
of the Palestinian people. Once thought of as the crucial mass base from 
Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1999) 
22 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 663; cf. Maher al-Sherif, Al-Bahth `an 
Kan (Damascus: Dar al-Madi, 1999), preface. 
23 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 660. 
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which the Palestinian revolution drew its strength, the diaspora in general- 
and the refugees in neighbouring Arab lands in particular-ceased being 
treated as politically relevant communities after Oslo-by the PLO/PA 
leadership, and by Western policy makers and scholars alike. They reverted 
to their pre-i973 status as mere humanitarian charity cases and second class 
Palestinians. 
It follows that the Oslo `transformation' did not affect Palestinian 
politics uniformly across the board. Rubin's claims hold true for only a 
section of the Palestinian population and, similarly, Sayigh's analysis applies 
only to a section of the Palestinian political elite, albeit the dominant one. 
Among the refugees in Syria and Lebanon-where the fasa'il dominated the 
political landscape, Arafatist activity was effectively proscribed, and PLO/PA 
institution building had little positive resonance-politics and political 
identities looked set to evolve very differently compared to the occupied 
territories. 
The sheer number of Palestinians excluded from the new order, in 
conjunction with the activity among them of more than a dozen rejectionist 
factions suggests that the post-Oslo systemic contraction did not precipitate 
an end to the relevance of exile-based politics. In the Lebanese and Syrian 
arenas, the fasa'il, their tactics, and eventually their objectives evolved as a 
consequence of Oslo, but did not disappear. 
After Oslo, debates about the future and content of the national ideal 
ensued among the Palestinian communities. Lindholm-Schulz, in what is one 
of the most perceptive and theoretically significant accounts of post-Oslo 
identity politics inside the contracted, PA-centric system has characterized 
its strains thus: 
The most important internal tensions were perceptions of who were 
the `better' Palestinians, who had the right to define national identity. 
The new dispute, then, was about who was the better struggler. Was it 
Fateh, the movement which first introduced the political path of 
`resistance' and `struggle', and the historical legitimacy of which in 
this sense remained spotless? Or was it Hamas, which had recently 
entered the road of struggle, but on the other hand was not ready to 
give it up for poor compromises? Was it the activists in the `interior', 
who triumphed in their `glorious' intifada, enabling a new vision of 
pride and dignity and who suffered in Israeli prisons and through 
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martyrdom? Or was it the 'outside'-the community still in exile-who led the struggle for decades in miserable circumstances and who 
suffered the `exile', the longing and the dispersal? Was it the PNA, the 
ex-exile who always represented the privileged strata with privileged lives in Arab or European capitals or in relative wealth in the `inside', 
who had taken on the lead in the `new struggle' of building and 
construction? Or was it the opposition, who refused half measures 
and insisted on the rightfulness of a legitimate struggle of resistance? 
In this very struggle, new social boundaries were drawn and 
created ... 24 
These were questions open for debate also among the refugee communities, 
but there, the political dynamics and climate were markedly different. The 
various rejectionist factions had their most significant pockets of support in 
the refugee camps. Syrian authority north of the `Awali River restricted 
activities by Arafat loyalists, and in the southern camps the frustration of 
being so near, yet so far from home was felt most acutely. Many of those 
refugees who sympathized with no particular rejectionist faction, and even 
many supporters of Arafat's Fateh, by and large shared the APF's perception 
of the Oslo accord as a monumental betrayal. 25 "[F]or those still outside the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, " Rubin concedes in what amounts to a 
considerable understatement, "the peace agreements triggered more anxiety 
than celebration. "26 
These facts on the ground suggested to the APF leaders that their 
response to the PLO leadership was not intellectually isolated but grounded 
in the realities of refugee existence. The Palestinian people generally, but the 
refugee communities in particular, were thought to share in the shame and 
desperation brought upon the opposition factions by Arafat's Oslo 
manoeuvres, and were thus considered an available and mobilizable social 
constituency. There was an inherent contradiction in this strategy, however, 
as concentrating efforts in one community exacerbated the risk of creating 
distinct Palestinian nationalisms. National consciousness, explains Eric 
Hobsbawm, "develops unevenly among the social groupings and regions of a 
country" and "[n]ational identification and what it is believed to imply can 
24 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 163-4. 
25 While there are no available opinion polls to confirm this, several UN and aid workers have relayed 
this perception in discussions with the author. This is also the author's own distinct impression after 
numerous research visits to the refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria 
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change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. "27 The 
rejectionist leaders, for the most part 1948 refugees themselves, recognized 
that Oslo decisively sharpened the divide between `outside' and `inside' 
Palestinians. They were anxious that this would cause an irreparable 
fragmentation of the nation and destroy the last hopes of a comprehensive 
return to Palestine, thereby relegating the Palestinian people- and them, 
their leaders- to continued deprivation and historical ignominy. Their 
refusal to partake in `mainstream' politics under the auspices of the PLO/PA 
leadership nevertheless consigned them to a balancing act, in which 
safeguarding the concepts of struggle and resistance within the framework of 
a PLO-based political order on the `outside' would interfere with the 
nurturing of a new PA-induced nationalism `inside. '28 
The APF sought to contrast the PLO/PA leadership's betrayal of them 
and the refugees, and its disloyalty to the deeply rooted ideals of resistance 
and liberation, with its own espousal of steadfastness and resistance in the 
face of the new systemic changes. In so doing the APF attempted to 
demonstrate that it was the embodiment of `true Palestinianness. ' The APF 
factions' rhetoric and symbolism thus continued to elevate armed struggle 
and total liberation, not because they considered these viable courses of 
action but because they were antithetical to the platform of the PLO/PA 
leadership. 
Lindholm-Shultz has observed that "[i]t is precisely the process or 
project of creating homogeneity which renders differences more 
important. "29 The diaspora communities could not be homogenized to fit 
into the new PA-centric order, and the post-revolutionary discourse intended 
to legitimize it could therefore not encompass them. In fact, the continued 
and unresolved plight of Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab lands 
served as living proof that the PA-centric political system was an abject 
26 Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics, p. 156. 
`' Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 12 
28 The centrality of armed struggle in the construction of a Palestinian national consciousness is a 
central thesis in Yezid Sayigh's Armed Struggle and the Search for State. 
29 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 10 (emphasis 
original); cf. Katherine Verdery, `Ethnicity, Nationalism, and State-Making: Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries, Past and Future, ' in Hans Vermuelen and Cora Govers (eds. ), The Anthropology of 
Ethnicity: Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994), pp. 33-58. 
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failure measured against the goals set out in the Palestinian National 
Covenant. Far from being restored to their homeland, as Rubin suggests, the 
majority of the Palestinian people had their remaining dreams of return 
shattered as they found themselves not only expelled from Palestine, but also 
excluded from the emerging post-Oslo political system. Walker Connor has 
descriptively referred to such divisive state-building processes as the 
"nation-destroying" project. 3° 
As the PLO/PA leadership became a propagator of official nationalism 
it lost its grip on the legitimizing symbolism through which it previously 
sustained its hegemony within the national movement; herein lay the 
window of political opportunity for the rejectionists. The APF's member 
factions appropriated and monopolized the symbolism of struggle and 
resistance and deployed these in their project to restore factional and 
national honour and, thereby, social status, while attempting to build a 
militant support base among the refugees that could disquiet the PLO/PA 
leadership and discourage negotiated concessions on crucial issues. They 
sought to keep the PLO/PA leadership in check while at the same time 
demonstratively avoiding direct transactions with it. Effectively denying 
itself access to the West Bank and Gaza Strip through its own rejection of the 
new system-with the exception of the unilateral activities of the PFLP, 
DFLP, Hamas and MIJ-the APF's only collectively accessible social 
constituencies in this struggle were the refugee communities, primarily those 
in Syria and Lebanon. Headquartered in Damascus, the APF has been 
considered remote and inaccessible, working on the margins of Palestinian 
politics. If the centre of politics is taken to be Ramallah, then Damascus is 
indeed a marginal and isolated place. If, on the other hand, the centre of 
one's political activity is in exile among the Palestinian refugees in Syria and 
Lebanon, Damascus immediately appears more central. 
The Spectre of Palestinian `Terrorism' 
Scholarly preoccupation with developments inside Palestine has caused 
these developments in exile-based Palestinian politics to pass virtually 
30 Walker Connor, `Nation-building or Nation Destroying, ' World Politics, vol. 24, no. 3, (April 
1972), pp. 319-55. 
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unnoticed. The APF's representatives have obviously never advertized 
themselves as anything but a bastion of militant struggle, honour bound to 
carry on the struggle against Israel and Palestinian `liquidationism'; the 
project of restoring honour has been implicit, and its use of rhetoric in order 
to manipulate political identities officially denied. Added to the sporadic 
military attacks unilaterally carried out by some of the alliance's constituent 
organizations, the official posturing of the APF has compelled some 
observers' attention and served as the foundation for the charge that the 
alliance has been nothing more than a terrorist cabal. The persistent 
depiction of APF efforts as, essentially, Syrian and Iranian-backed terrorism 
has pushed the study of the alliance and its constituent members into the 
field of terrorism studies, which in turn is a little more than a hub for the 
perpetuation of this account. If the present thesis aims to redress the general 
neglect of post-Oslo rejectionism by legitimate scholarship, it also needs to 
confront the vilifications produced within terrorism studies. 
Terrorism studies' general absence of cogent theoretical approaches 
has converged with an inherent hostility towards its research subjects, 
damaging scholarly understanding of the APF and its constituent members. 31 
Focus on terrorism has reduced all other aspects of rejectionist activity to 
peripheral and suspect distractions and `support activities. ' Within terrorism 
studies, the APF's militant rhetoric and symbolism, and its irreconcilable 
posturing towards Israel and the PLO/PA, have been taken at face value 
rather than contextualized and approached as instances of socioculturally 
meaningful communication. The alliance's close ties to Syria and Iran-both 
`anti-Western rogue states'-have simply made matters worse, and the 
common notion that the APF organizations have been either unable or 
unwilling to innovate and evolve politically in the post-Oslo period has 
further buttressed these gross misrepresentations. 32 
31 For a comprehensive critique of the inappropriate practices and assumptions affecting the academic 
study of `terrorism', see David W. Brannan et al., 'Talking to `Terrorists': Towards an Independent 
Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Sub-State Activism', Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 1 (January-February 2001), pp. 3-24. 
32 The notion of ideological rigour leading to rejectionist decline is the central hypothesis in Harold 
M. Cubert, The PFLP's Changing Role in the Middle East (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1997). 
This doctoral dissertation-turned-book is firmly entrenched in the field of `terrorism studies' and 
illustrates the full range of shortcomings identified above. See also Barry Rubin, The Transformation 
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As a consequence, a crude one-dimensional picture of Palestinian 
politics has gained widespread currency in the West, in which the PLO/PA 
leadership is thought to champion the process of peace against the onslaught 
of terrorists and fanatics whose barbarism forces them to take refuge in exile. 
The miraculous rehabilitation of Yasser Arafat from `arch-terrorist' to Nobel 
peace price winner has stood in sharp contrast against the seemingly wanton 
carnage of Hamas and MIJ, and the political inflexibility of ideological 
sticks-in-the-mud such as PFLP and PFLP-GC-all members of the APF. 
Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill's The Deadly Embrace, a comparative 
study of Palestinian and Israeli rejectionism and the only extant academic 
book to deal at length with the APF provide an illustration of this distorted 
view. 33 Apart from this one volume and one article34, the APF has received 
no scholarly treatment exceeding throwaway statements or, at most, the odd 
paragraph in books and articles dealing with other aspects of Palestinian 
politics. Kass and O'Neill situate their study within "a framework for analysis 
of terrorism and insurgency which has been extensively used by analysts and 
practitioners in both the Western national security community and 
academia, " refusing point blank to acknowledge the significance of non- 
violent rejectionist activity. 35 Issues pertaining to identity politics, nationalist 
discourse, sociopolitical dynamics in the diaspora, cultural determinants and 
so forth are not approached. Narrowly focusing on the `terrorist threat' to the 
peace process, the authors ignore the APF's inter-organizational dynamics 
and even fail to see its location in exile as meaningful. Citing Centre for 
Palestine Research (CPR) opinion polls taken in the West Bank and Gaza as 
evidence of rejectionist political marginality, the authors indicate their 
of Palestinian Politics, passim. Cf. Edward Said `The Campaign against `Islamic Terror, " in The End 
of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), pp. 44-50. 
33 Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian 
Rejectionism on the Peace Process (Lanham et alibi: National Institute for Public Policy and 
University Press of America, 1997). 
34 Anders Strindberg, `The Damascus-based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer, ' Journal of 
Palestine Studies, vol. 29,115 (Spring 2000), pp. 60-76. 
35 Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace, preface. Although this framework is never 
further identified it appears to be Alexander L. George's "structured-focused approach. " Cf 
Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison, ' in P. G. Lauren (ed. ) Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1979). 
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unawareness of both the geographic and political context of post-Oslo 
rejectionism. 36 
In the case of Hamas, Saul Mishal and Avraham Sela have lucidly 
argued that violence has been an intermittently employed tactical instrument 
among many others, not a defining organizational feature. 37 This hypothesis 
can easily be extended also to the other APF factions-in so far as they have 
at all engaged in acts of violence. In fact, while Hamas and MIJ have carried 
out numerous armed attacks against Israeli targets since Oslo, there is no 
evidence of a single such attack by at least four of the other APF factions- 
PLF, PPSF, PRCP, and Sa'iqa-in the same period. When held up against the 
backdrop of other APF activities-social and educational work, 
propagandizing, and so forth-'terrorism' has in fact been a rare occurrence 
that cannot plausibly be posited as a defining feature of the APF project. 
`Terrorism studies' has brought agenda driven and intensely hostile 
frameworks to bear on its studies of post-Oslo Palestinian rejectionism, but 
by default these studies have come to constitute academic `orthodoxy' on the 
subject. The work of these "mug-shot orientalists"38-scholars combining 
threat assessment and intelligence/law enforcement concerns with 
stereotypes of supposed Arab and Islamic characteristics-has thus served 
little purpose other than to malign the APF and, importantly, its Syrian and 
Iranian benefactors, ensuring their continued status as terrorists beyond the 
pale of dialogue and reason. It has given academic credibility to a view of the 
conflict between the PLO/PA leadership and the opposition as, essentially, a 
struggle between good and evil; between the `reformed terrorists' who have 
seen the errs of their ways and made amends, and the `unrepentant 
terrorists' who persist in their anti-Israeli, anti-Western wickedness. 
Captives of their own hermeneutic of crisis management, terrorism scholars 
have analysed rejectionist activities within frameworks based on models of 
36 Ibid., pp. 257-8. 
37 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Harnas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Another excellent contribution calling for similarly nuanced 
understanding of Hamas is Khaled Hroub, The Palestinian Hamas (Washington, DC: Institute 
for 
Palestine Studies, 2000). 
38 The phrase was coined by Helena Cobban. See her review of Harold Cubert, The PFLP's Changing 
Role in the Middle East (London: Frank Cass, 1997), in Journal of Palestine Studies, XXVII, no. 3 
(Spring 1998), Issue 107, pp. 107-8. 
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regional security, terrorism or insurgency, forcing a continuous revalidation 
and perpetuation of the APF's terrorist image. 
REJECTIONISM DEFINED 
In spite of scholars' frequent use of the term `rejectionism, it is a curious fact 
that in the secondary literature consulted for this thesis, no author seems 
ever to have attempted a rigorous definition. Over the years the term has 
acquired connotations rather than definitions, and often the literature is not 
even clear on what rejectionism is supposed to reject. One of the term's 
connotations is `militant rejection of Israel, ' as exemplified by the Palestinian 
and Arab position in the wake of the 1967 war: "no peace with Israel, no 
recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it... "39 According to this view, 
`rejectionism' simply implies rejection of the Jewish state's right to exist, and 
the significant other towards whom rejectionist actions, symbolism, and 
rhetoric are thought to be projected is Israel. Another connotation is the 
refusal of factions within the Palestinian national movement to acquiesce in 
its own leadership's attempts to alter or moderate the means and goals of the 
struggle. In this sense, the term implies rejection first and foremost of forces 
within the Palestinian movement, and only secondarily of Israel. 
Whether rejectionism focuses primarily on Israel or on perceived 
deviants within the Palestinian movement is no mere hair-splitting exercise. 
Its external focus determines whom it considers its interlocutor, for whose 
attention displays of defiance and militancy are staged-with whom 
rejectionists seek to communicate. 4° This in turn determines the crucial issue 
of establishing within which relational context we should analyse and 
interpret their activities. After all, threatening to mobilize the refugees of 
southern Lebanon and "march on Palestine, " as PFLP-GC secretary general 
39 'Resolution of the Fourth Arab Summit Conference, Khartoum, August 29-September 1,1967, ' 
quoted in Bernhard Reich (ed. ) An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Westport, 
CT and London: Aldwych Press, 1996), p. 514. 
40 Throughout this thesis, `communication' is treated as a process through which one party seeks to 
affect the behaviour or state of mind of another, rather than the mere production and exchange of 
meanings. Thus, it follows what has been called the "process school" of communication rather than 
the semiotics approach. See Philip F. Esler, Galatians (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 
5-9. See also C. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Champaign, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1949); Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistic 
(London: Fontana, 1974, [1915]). 
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Ahmad Jibril did in April 2000, takes on different meanings depending on 
whether the message is intended for Ramallah or Tel Aviv. 41 
The literature suggests that the former connotation is more common, 
that rejectionism is about rejection of diplomacy as a tool for dealing with 
Israel, propelled by the refusal to accept any other means than armed 
struggle as efficacious in the liberation of all of Palestine, from the river 
Jordan to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, a prominent 
encyclopaedia of Middle East politics defines "rejectionist" as an 
Informal description of a group of Arab states and Palestinian groups 
that coalesced in the wake of the October 1973 War to propound a 
hard line of opposition to any Arab-Israeli peacemaking, whether 
direct, or internationally mediated ... 42 
Most scholars appear to subscribe to this analysis of rejectionism, viewing it 
as an outwardly unified, Israel-focused phenomenon, the internal dynamics 
of which is largely irrelevant. For instance, Kass and O'Neill suggest that the 
phenomenon hinges upon the "struggle against political settlement and 
territorial compromise on religious/ideological grounds, "43 adding that 
"Palestinian rejectionism is as old as the Zionist movement. Its essence is not 
just the refusal to accept particular tacit or formal agreements with Israel, 
but a denial of the very idea of a Jewish state. "44To be sure, rejectionist 
rhetoric and symbolism have always highlighted irreconcilability towards, 
and confrontation with `the Zionist enemy, ' and done so in a highly 
demonstrative manner. Few political phenomena should be taken at face 
value, however. 
This thesis contends that rejectionism as a political current revolves 
around a continuous effort to frustrate `deviationist tendencies' on the part 
of the PLO/PA leadership, and that its pattern of manifesting itself in 
sporadic and demonstrative `bursts' of militant symbolism has its roots in a 
struggle within the national movement. This struggle has run parallel with 
the national struggle against Israel. It has sought to achieve two main 
41 A1-Safir, April 8,2000. 
42 Avraham Sela (ed. ), Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (New York: Continuum, 1999), p. 
636. 
43 Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace, preface. 
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objectives: the construction of positive social identities for the structurally 
subordinate PLO factions, and the defence of factional and national honour 
against perceived challenges from the PLO leadership. At its core, then, 
rejectionist politics has not `been about' violence and destruction but, rather, 
a struggle against the PLO/PA leadership for social status, attended by 
symbolic speech and behaviour conditioned by the prevailing background 
expectancies and cultural milieu within which this struggle has taken place. 
To say that rejectionism is part of an internal Palestinian struggle for 
social status is not to deny that at least some of its adherents have been, not 
only vehement but also consistently sincere in their unwillingness to 
acknowledge Israel's right to exist. This issue, however, has been secondary 
to the raison d'etre of every major rejectionist assembly-the 1974 Front for 
Rejecting Capitulationist Settlements (better known as the Rejection Front, 
RF), the 1985 Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) and the APF. 
Looking at rejectionism as `rejection of Israel' misses the point. Israel has 
been a `backdrop, ' an external variable against which the rejectionists have 
publicly and demonstratively contrasted their own politics of `honour and 
steadfastness' against the PLO/PA leaderships `shameful liquidationism'; 
this contrast has served a purpose in the internal struggle for social status. In 
fact, as the main narrative of this thesis will demonstrate, rejection of 
diplomacy, negotiation and co-existence with Israel has not been a constant 
for several of the major rejectionist factions. What has been a constant, 
however, has been the perceived necessity to guard against challenges to 
their social status from the PLO/PA leadership. 
DEMYSTIFYING THE `REJECTIONIST CURRENT' 
It is intensely human to react to treachery and deceit-real or perceived- 
with anger and disappointment, and to translate such emotions into action. 
Our particular social and cultural contexts frame and affect cognition and 
agency, however, issuing in the countless particular patterns of speech and 
behaviour with which human beings across the globe perceive, internalize, 
react to and deal with situations at hand; these patterns are part and parcel 
of cultural differentiation. Failure to take cultural differentiation seriously 
44 Ibid.. p. 213 
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results in ethnocentricity, the belief that the rest of the world is like us or, at 
any rate, ought to be. When appreciated and accounted for in a balanced 
manner, however, social and cultural specificity can add significant 
dimensions to the study of human relations and interactions-politics being 
one category thereof-resulting in new and sometimes unexpected insights. 
"Cultures, " after all, "are maps of meaning through which the world is made 
intelligible. "45 
There has always been more to rejectionist politics than the received 
wisdoms of political science and Middle East studies have recognized. Its 
isolation from the PLO, and later PLO/PA framework has been mistaken for 
utter marginality, its closeness to external actors such as Syria, Iraq, Libya 
and Iran has been thought an indicator of rogue state minionhood and its 
militant rhetoric and symbolism have been considered mere signs of 
irrational extremism. This thesis proceeds from the viewpoint that what 
seem like determined efforts at ignoring and stereotyping Palestinian 
rejectionism should be replaced by attempts to understand it on its own 
terms and within its own context. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to disinter 
the historical and contemporary manifestations of the rejectionist current 
from the graveyard of `received wisdoms' by reinterpreting its rhetoric, 
symbolism and behaviour within a previously neglected sociocultural 
framework. 
There are a number of obviously important catalysts of, and motors 
for political action, such as ideological concerns, power rivalries, economic 
interests, rational choices and intergroup and interpersonal dynamics. 
Whatever these catalysts and motors may be, their specific expressions in 
practical politics are socioculturally contingent. In fact, not even state-level 
Realpolitik-that most abstracted and universalized of political concepts- 
can ever be played out in a vacuum, but is always given specific expression in 
and through social and cultural environments. In this context it is important 
to acknowledge, then, the boundedness of human cognition and agency, 
including principles of rationality. In micro-level political research it is 
inadequate to simply refer to a formal rational actor model, psychological 
' Peter Jackson, quoted in `Global Culture, ' National Geographic, vol. 196, no. 2, (August 1999), pp. 
4-5. 
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model or economic-structural model of political behaviour because the 
catalysts, features and effects of cogency and agency within these models are 
inextricably tied to contingent background expectancies within the actor's 
sociocultural context. The acknowledgment that politics cannot be fruitfully 
treated as a universal science, but should instead be viewed as a mode of 
socially conditioned communication, may prove effective in addressing and 
understanding the trajectory of rejectionist assemblies. Thus, this thesis' 
basic contention is that when rejectionist rhetoric, behaviour, statements, 
speeches and activities are framed within relevant sociocultural explanatory 
contexts, it can be understood as meaningful, purposive and considered, 
rather than merely extremist and irrational. Principles of power politics, 
intergroup conflict and rational agency fall into place. 
It should be mentioned at this point that in holding up the APF 
against a sociocultural backdrop, the thesis is obliged to level substantial 
criticism against customary `political culture theorizing. ' Generally, these 
essentialist efforts have not only been singularly unhelpful in illuminating 
political phenomena, but moreover managed to stigmatize balanced and 
legitimate deployment of cultural variables in political research. In 
contradistinction to such efforts-and this is a vital point-the present thesis 
does not seek to construct and apply a `cultural model' for how politics in the 
eastern Mediterranean may work, nor is it trying to extrapolate the elements 
of such a model from the specific case of the APF. Rather, the present thesis 
is limited to holding up a specific set of cultural norms or cues-identified by 
anthropological research as salient features of social interaction in the 
eastern Mediterranean-to a specific social phenomenon, in order to re- 
examine and reinterpret its dynamics and meanings. In so doing, it 
endeavours to uncover purpose and meaning where, currently, scholars 
acknowledge very little of either one. The thesis claims neither immutability 
for cultural `crucibles, ' nor their capacity to comprehensively determine 
speech and behaviour, simply their salience in understanding political 
behaviour. 
This thesis is intended as a further instalment in our cumulative 
understanding of the Palestinian national movement. While its focus is 
firmly political, its conceptual and methodological approaches may be 
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thought of as political anthropology, the study of a particular set of political 
dynamics within a particular sociocultural setting. While anthropology has 
traditionally centred on the study of pre-industrial societies it has recently 
branched out to offer fruitful, if not uncontroversial insights into the social 
affairs of modem societies. 46 The approach of the present thesis is 
interdisciplinary, and it is hoped that a synthesis of political, sociological and 
anthropological models for understanding human behaviour can offer 
valuable insights into issues previously neglected and misunderstood. Within 
anthropology there exists a useful notion called "practical relativism" defined 
as the "suspension of inquiry into the divine or objective truth of particular 
customs. "47 It is reminiscent of Edmund Husserl's concept of epoche, 
suspension of judgment, and has been described as a "practical attitude 
adopted in the face of fieldwork encounters. "48 Having noted how previous 
examinations of the APF have suffered from their dogmatic hostility towards 
the research subject, it is perhaps obvious that this thesis strives to stand 
above condemnation and prescription, to suspend judgment. "I endeavour to 
have no conviction, and so my dear brother regards me as lacking 
conviction, " wrote Ernst Jünger, and continued: 
`Being free of conviction' would, of course, be the better term. I set 
great store not by conviction but by a free disposition of myself. Thus, 
I am at someone's disposal to the extent that I am challenged, whether 
to love or to war. I value not the conviction but the man. Je regarde et 
je garde. 49 
CONTEXT AND CULTURE 
There is today widespread scholarly acceptance throughout the social science 
disciplines that research on social and political phenomena must somehow 
46 See, for instance, J. McIver Weatherford, Tribes on the Hill (New York: Rawson and Wade, 1981); 
Martin King Whyte, `Bureaucracy and Anti-Bureaucracy in the People's Republic of China, ' in 
Gerald M. Britan and Ronald Cohen (eds. ), Hierarchy and Society: Anthropological Perspectives on 
Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1980); q. v. Ted C. Lewellen. 
Political Anthropology: An Introduction, second edition (Westport, CT, and London: Bergin and 
Garvey, 1992), pp. 183-97. 
47 M. Jackson, `Introduction: Phenomenology, Radical Empiricism, and Anthropological Critique, ' in 
M. Jackson (ed. ), Things As They Are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 10. 
48 Roy Dilley, `Introduction, ' in Roy Dilley (ed. ), The Problem of Context (New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn. 1999), p. 12. 
49 Ernst Jünger, Eumeswil, p. 160. 
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be done `in context, ' that is, analysed with reference to internal or external 
features that can `give sense' to them. The implications of context and 
contextualization for political science and international relations have not 
been adequately problematized, however. 
Both context and culture are notoriously difficult concepts. Roy Dilley 
tells us that even within anthropology-the social science discipline that not 
only deals most intimately with issues of culture, but where context has the 
most prominent function-"the [contextualization] process has been seen as 
unproblematic. " He continues: 
We should appeal, conventional wisdom has it, to features and 
characteristics surrounding a phenomenon in order to illuminate it 
and to understand or give sense to it. The idea is that anthropologists 
who interpret social and cultural phenomena do so with reference, 
therefore, to something called `context'. This apparently simple notion 
that it is context that gives form to our interpretations raises 
important questions about what a context is, how it is defined and 
selected, and by whom. 5° 
Present contexts for studying the APF, as indicated above, range from ill 
fitting to phoney. They nevertheless share the characteristic of being entirely 
constructed and imposed by the Etic, the social scientific researcher, with 
little or no reference to the way the Emic, the research subject, perceives its 
milieu, speech and action, and with even less reference to the perceptions of, 
and impact on social groups in its immediate environment. 51 Not 
surprisingly, then, extant scholarly approaches to rejectionism have failed to 
make sense of it, seemingly because they have refrained from addressing 
exactly its human and sociocultural dimensions; this, again, quite likely 
stems form the profound lack of field research that is the hallmark of 
writings on the APF factions. 
Viewed always as a political and security threat, the sociocultural 
embeddedness of pre and post-Oslo rejectionist rhetoric and behaviour has 
never been addressed. Even in that part of post-Oslo Palestinian politics that 
so Roy Dilley, `Introduction, ' in Roy Dilley (ed. ), The Problem of Context, p. 1. 
51 For an introduction to the Emic/Etic debate see Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer (eds. ), 
Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 
180-3. See also Thomas N. Headland, Kenneth L. Pike and Marvin Harris (eds. ) Emics and Etics: 
The Insider/Outsider Debate (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990). 
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has interested scholars-West Bank and Gaza Strip institution building and 
identity formation-the linkage between the cultural and the political has 
been largely ignored. Researching Palestinian society has-with some 
notable exceptions-been the preserve of political scientists and sociologists, 
rather than individuals with anthropological aptitudes and inclinations. One 
can but hypothesize as to the reasons for political scientists' avoidance of 
culture: Palestinian and Arab writers may take their own cultural cues for 
granted and therefore omit mentioning them in their political analyses. 
Alternatively they may not wish to appeal to cultural `particularism', thereby 
giving credence to the quasi-racist notions of `the Arab mind' that riddle 
political culture theorizing. Western writers are likely to want to avoid being 
branded as `orientalists' by stressing the explanatory value of culture, a 
conscious or subconscious reaffirmation of the unfortunate fact that Western 
intellectual traditions tend to view `difference' as `deviance, ' according it 
normative dimensions to be evaluated relative to an accepted norm. 52 
The present thesis is written from the general viewpoint that political 
speech and behaviour can be `given sense' only when located on a `cultural 
map, ' which-although fluid and transient-allow us to find our way through 
the norms, cues and idiosyncrasies of a given place at a given time. Much, or 
perhaps even most of the worlds political behavioural patterns may be easily 
recognizable to the Etic researcher, but there are cases were the researcher's 
own sociocultural frames of reference are simply inadequate. For Western 
scholars, the rejectionist trend-and perhaps more so than ever the post- 
Oslo APF-appear to have been such cases. 
Rejectionism's particular cultural location and contextual frames may 
be found within the ambient eastern Mediterranean or circum- 
Mediterranean cultural sphere. Drawing on anthropological research in the 
region, the present thesis posits a number of cultural `crucibles' as salient 
variables within its analytical framework. These include honour as a pivotal 
social value, the centrality of patron-client dynamics and a firmly entrenched 
group orientation. The analytical framework, in turn, is provided by social 
identity theory, a heuristic, non-reductionist model for understanding group 
52 For Western approaches to the problem of difference, ' see, for instance, Charles Taylor, The 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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interaction and conflict. Social identity theory emphasizes the significance of 
the subject's hermeneutic situation and the importance of understanding 
group rhetoric and collective behaviour as at least in part aimed at sustaining 
group member's internally constructed social identity. It also gives careful 
consideration to the context in which a cohesive group consciousness is 
installed in the minds and hearts of the members. Importantly, rather than 
forcing the subject into externally constructed and in fitting analytical 
frameworks, social identity theory offers a means of integrating insights from 
a variety of analytical models within an intercultural framework that rests 
ultimately on the research subjects' own perception of their sociocultural and 
political milieu. 
In essence, when processed through what might be termed a 
`socioculturally sensitive model of intergroup relations, ' the rejectionist trend 
can be understood as not only as an important part of the social, intellectual 
and tactical dialectic within the national movement, but as a considered and 
consistent political current. The positive (that is, constructive) content of 
rejectionism has heretofore gone largely unnoticed by scholars and policy 
makers alike, yet has shaped the intellectual and political position of the 
national movement as a whole and contributed to its tactical regeneration, 
progress and survival. 
STRUCTURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Chapter two comprises a review and critique of the limited extant scholarly 
research on the APF and post-Oslo Palestinian exile politics, as well as an 
overview of literature on pre-Oslo rejectionism. The chapter goes on to 
outline a theoretical and methodological framework, the central components 
of which are borrowed from anthropology and sociology, exploring the 
concepts of context, culture and group identity/interaction, and 
incorporating these into a balanced framework for analysis of the rejectionist 
phenomenon. 
Chapter three supplies a history of the Palestinian national movement 
between 1948 and 1973, focusing in particular on how early ideological and 
organizational rivalries laid the foundation for the more or less permanent 
`rejectionist-mainstream' fault line that followed after the October War. The 
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main purpose of this chapter, which is based largely on secondary sources, is 
to adumbrate the context for the following chapter. 
Chapter four re-examines the historical trajectory of rejectionist 
politics after 1973, demonstrating the efficacy of the theoretical model and 
the appropriateness of conceptualizing rejectionism as a socially and 
politically contingent `corrective movement' (to borrow a phrase from the 
Syrian political dictionary). By examining historical rejectionist endeavours 
within the theoretical framework constructed for this thesis, it is hoped that 
new light may be shed on `old facts. ' The chapter argues that the three major 
rejectionist assemblies-the RF, PNSF and APF-all revolved around the 
fulfilment of two objectives. First, the assertion of a positive social identity by 
the structurally subordinate opposition within the Palestinian national 
movement by thwarting specific political manoeuvres by the PLO leadership 
perceived to run counter to the aims set out in the Palestinian National 
Charter. Second, to demonstratively and vigorously `counter-challenge' the 
PLO leadership, which in each instance had acted in a way perceived to 
shame the opposition and the Palestinian people generally. The chapter 
furthermore argues that these assemblies were not always or primarily 
motivated by wholesale rejection of peace and diplomacy, but that the 
mechanisms of the challenge-response game attending the honour-shame 
dichotomy within eastern Mediterranean cultures made it socially imperative 
for the rejectionists to be seen to confront peace altogether. In fact, the 
formation of each assembly was preceded by discreet but clear peace 
overtures by leading rejectionist factions, but these were rendered void and 
obsolete by the need to demonstratively distance the rejectionist factions 
from `Arafatist' policies. 
The same chapter also suggests that the 1983 rebellion within the 
ranks of Fateh, which led to the split between `Fateh-Arafat' and Abu Musa's 
Fateh-Intifada, was a far more significant development for the long-term 
trajectory of rejectionism than the subsequent creation of the interfactional 
PNSF. Not only did the events surrounding the split tie the rejectionist 
current almost inextricably to Syria, but, at its core, Fateh-Intifada is an 
institutionalization of rejectionism. For existential reasons-which again are 
linked to the honour-shame dichotomy and the struggle for a positive social 
30 
identity-Fateh-Intifada can never accept reconciliation with the 
`mainstream' of the national movement. Because it is a significant political 
force within Palestinian politics in Syria, and a well-endowed organization in 
terms of finances and infrastructure, Fateh-Intifada's very existence has 
become an important impetus for the perpetuation of rejectionism. 
Chapter five goes on to examine in detail the political work of the APF 
factions from 1994 and onwards. It explores the alliance's lack of military 
capabilities and its extensive, Damascus-based information and propaganda 
network, arguing that collective military action was never on its agenda. The 
various factions' awareness of their own limited capabilities prompted them 
not to entertain the military option for any other purposes than symbolic 
politics. Instead, the APF sought to use a variety of instruments to 
manipulate and control Palestinian national identity among the refugees, in 
direct competition with the PLO/PA leadership, and to shore up the 
increasingly negative social identities of its member factions. Relying chiefly 
on primary sources collected during a series of seven field trips to Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan between 1998 and 2001, the chapter argues that the 
APF attempted to fill its symbolically charged, militant defiance of the 
PLO/PA leadership with positive content by tapping into-in a generative 
sense-Palestinian national consciousness. Manipulation of the refugee 
communities' public discourse and the management of its meanings and 
perceptions-aimed at strengthening the militancy that has become 
entrenched in Palestinian national identity over the last several decades- 
was the APF's sole collective purpose. 
This ties in with the above mentioned twin objectives of rejectionist 
assemblies: Rather than signifying delusional belief in the possibility of 
liberating Palestine from the river to the sea-or fanatical intent to launch 
collective armed struggle no matter what the cost and outcome-the 
alliance's patently impracticable rhetoric has been an instrument in its 
practice of political struggle. Its `tactical objective' has been to foreclose the 
possibility of the refugees' imagining non-militant and non-radical 
expressions of Palestinianness; its `strategic aim' has been to shut out Arafat 
from the realm of the politically acceptable, thereby minimizing his popular 
appeal and ability to do further damage to the goals of the national 
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movement as they perceived them. Their project necessitated projecting an 
image of themselves as principled advocates of national honour, 
steadfastness, sacrifice and armed struggle. 
Chapter five also shows how each faction has had different stakes in 
the `honour-restoration project, ' and thus approached the management of 
meanings and perceptions with different levels of enthusiasm and success; 
the APF was set up to coordinate efforts, not direct and regiment them. Thus, 
the alliance has never been a monolith and understanding the situation, 
agenda and instruments of each factional part is crucial in understanding the 
development of the collective whole. Moreover, due to differing abilities and 
capabilities, different ideologies and modes of interaction with constituents 
and the PLO/PA leadership, each faction incrementally developed and 
entrenched its own role-conception and identity, bringing the APF as a 
collective to the point of fragmentation shortly prior to the outbreak of the 
al Aqsa intifada. The analytical narrative ends with events in July, 2001. 
Chapter six ties together the theoretical and empirical elements of the 
thesis, drawing on observations made within the analytical narratives of 
chapters four and five. It concludes that without thinking seriously about the 
issues of context and culture, political science is likely to continue to 
misinterpret micro-level social phenomena such as rejectionism. 
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CHAPTER II 
TOWARDS A BALANCED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world... This disclosure of `who' in contradistinction to 
`what' somebody is-his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings-is implicit in everything 
somebody says and does. Hannah Arendt' 
SUMMARY INTRODUCTION 
Seeking to recontextualize rejectionism within an explanatory framework 
comprising significant elements of culture, ideology and intergroup- 
dynamics, the present chapter sets out by exploring some ways in which 
context and contextualization have been problematized in neighbouring 
disciplines, primarily in anthropology. It examines some insights arrived at 
and their implications for the present thesis, suggesting that the articulation 
of a contextual framework should first and foremost be seen as facilitating a 
new mode of knowledge; offering a new perception of a phenomenon rather 
than a definitive and objectively determinable setting. The most that can be 
said about articulating a `correct' context is that optimal interpretation of a 
social phenomenon is achieved when there is some congruence between the 
researcher's cognitive framework and that of the research subject, ideally 
established through conversation and dialogue. 
The chapter proceeds by discussing the issue of culture, arguing that 
its utility as context in political research derives from its being an ever- 
evolving arena within which agents' speech and behaviour are ascribed 
immediate meaning. Culture signifies the particular and distinctive, the 
community-at-hand that shares, negotiates and transforms assumptions and 
norms. In group-oriented and collectivist cultures, such as those located 
around the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, the influence of cultural 
determinants may be stronger than in atomistic, individualist cultures such 
1 The Human Condition (Chicago and London: University of Chicago press, 1958), p. 179. 
as those on either side of the North Atlantic. An outline of social identity 
theory and its attendant models for understanding intergroup conflict is 
followed by a discussion of the salient features of rejectionism's cultural 
referential context, most significantly the honour-shame dichotomy, patron- 
client dynamics and pronounced collectivism. A final section seeks to 
adumbrate a macro-political framework within which to situate the 
Palestinian national movement, making particular use of Michael Barnett's 
insightful use of constructivist theory. 2 
CONTEXT AND CONTEXTUALIZATION 
By situating analyses of the APF within defective analytical frameworks, 
extant scholarship has misinterpreted its speech and behaviour, and as a 
consequence misrepresented their agendas and objectives. The factions' 
activities have been examined within contextual frameworks that have been 
either ill fitting, such as those referring to regional security and balance of 
power issues, or specious, such as frameworks for studying terrorism and 
insurgency. As mentioned previously, this thesis submits that an appropriate 
and fruitful contextual framework can be constructed by taking seriously the 
research subjects' own perceptions in combination with an emphasis on 
salient features of the ambient culture. What, then, underlies this assertion? 
Political science and international relations have not spent much time 
problematizing the issues of context and contextualization. It is the forte of 
both these disciplines to formulate and apply macro-level models and 
paradigms capable of explaining political behaviour and processes across 
social and cultural boundaries. The focus is thus set at a high level of 
abstraction, and micro-level idiosyncrasies are important primarily because 
of what they tell us about the whole, through their ability to validate or 
correct paradigmatic models. Because of this instrumental approach to social 
and cultural specificity, international relations paradigms-such as realism, 
neo-realism, pluralism and so forth-are clearly inadequate for micro-level 
social research. They, quite literally, take social phenomena out of context in 
'` Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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order to study and/or establish universal features of human behaviour, 
viewing agency and cogency across a range of sociopolitical variability. 
Terrorism studies, which does engage in micro-level commentary, 
makes use of similar paradigmatic approaches. `Terrorism' is viewed as 
having essential behavioural, psychological, social and/or organizational 
qualities that are extrapolated from, and transcend their socioculturally 
specific instances. This is an approach that is loosely analogous to Levi- 
Strauss' anthropological work on myth, which removes the processes of oral 
accounts from their preformative contexts in order to establish pan-cultural 
features of the "savage mind. "3 Dilley's description of Levi-Strauss' efforts 
could easily be transposed onto terrorism studies: 
The specificity of local cultural contexts becomes the object of his 
generalizing project that seeks certain kinds of symbolic phenomena 
in particular localities, seen simply as moulds which give shape to 
fundamental principles. 4 
The central manoeuvre here is not so much taking phenomena out of 
context, but to deny that context as relevant to the alleged `essence' of the 
social phenomenon under investigation. 
Context and its correlative activity, interpretation, are concepts that 
are generally invoked as part of an analytical strategy that stands in 
contradistinction to universal, formal and generalizing tendencies. When 
context is brought into play, the emphasis is invariably on the local, unique 
and particular rather than the global and broadly applicable. 5 In political 
science this is considered an appropriate approach for case studies, which 
can then go on to take their place in generalized or generalizing theoretical 
schemes. However, micro-level study of political dynamics is usually the 
remit of sociology and anthropology; in the latter, context and 
contextualization have long been centrally important concepts. These 
disciplines have benefited from, and contributed to the debate about context 
3 See, for instance, C. Levi-Strauss, `The Structural Study of Myth, ' in C. Levy-Strauss, Structural 
Anthropology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979); The Raw and The Cooked-Introduction to the 
Science of Mythology: I (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986); cf. J. Sturrock, Structuralism and Since: 
From Lew-Strauss to Derrida (Oxford et alibi: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
4 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 21 
5 Ibid, pp. 6,3 9-40 (n. 8). 
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in other disciplines, including philosophy, linguistics, literary criticism and 
history. As the conceptual perspective of the present thesis has already been 
identified as substantially influenced by anthropology, the present discussion 
serves as a `trans-disciplinary excursion' aimed at considering various 
perspectives on context and contextualization produced in these 
neighbouring disciplines, and examine what their relevance for the present 
thesis may be. 
Context in the Humanities 
The act of interpreting the significance and meaning of social phenomena 
has been described as "creating connections. "6 Roy Dilley has suggested that 
A phenomenon is connected to its surroundings; contexts are sets of 
connections construed as relevant to someone, to something or to a 
particular problem, and this process yields an explanation, a sense, an 
interpretation for the object so connected.? 
Context has been further described by Scharfstein, a philosopher, as "that 
which environs the object of interest and helps by its relevance to explain 
it. "8 Another philosopher, Culler, has noted "the unboundedness of 
context, "9 the infinite regression involved in the contextualizing enterprise 
which leads to limitless inclusion and, thus, conceptual emptiness. 
Scharfstein, again, has similarly observed that "the attempt to be thorough in 
understanding context leads to total contextualization, in which everything 
becomes the context of everything else. "10 
Exacerbating the problematique of infinite regression is the problem 
of `contextual direction, ' as scholars working within philosophy of language 
have identified three distinct spheres of context. First, the external context, 
which is created by making a connection between one domain of phenomena 
(say, language) and another (the world). On this view, language can be 
6 See G. L. Ormiston and A. D. Schrift (eds. ), Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From 
Nietzsche to Nan cy (Buffalo, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990) 
Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 2. 
8 B. A. Scharfstein, The Dilemma of Context (New York and London: New York University Press, 
1989), p. 1. 
9 J. Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1983) 
10 B. A. Scharfstein, The Dilemma of Context, pp. xii-xiii. 
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ascribed meaning insofar as it relates to or describes `objective reality. ' 
Second, the internal context, which is created by making a connection not 
with things outside the object of inquiry, but internal to it. Here, meaning 
involves connections and significant relations within language itself. " Third, 
the mental or psychological context, 12which involves focusing attention on 
the minds of the individual agents whose particular use of language we 
study, their intentions and inner states. 13 "The mind, it could be suggested, 
becomes a particular kind of context that environs the object of study... "14 
These originally philosophical distinctions have had repercussions 
throughout the contextualization debate; in anthropology, they are roughly 
the content of universalism, contextualism and psychologism, distinct 
models for interpreting and understanding behaviour and custom. For our 
immediate purposes, these three contextual spheres could be considered 
analogous to interpreting rejectionist speech and action with reference to its 
significant other, the PLO leadership; with reference to its internal inter and 
intrafactional processes; or with reference to the psychology of the 
rejectionist leaderships. As will be demonstrated in the narratives of the 
following chapters, each of these contextual spheres have been relevant, and 
appreciating their interconnection is a crucial part of understanding 
rejectionism. 
In linguistics, J. L. Austin has further developed the notion of context 
as setting, seeking to shift the focus from analysis of words and sentences to 
conceive of language as a mode of action, investigating "how people use 
words to accomplish action. "15 Setting, "a set of recognized conventions, " 
gives certain words and sentences particular meaning, such as `I do' at a 
" For usage and fu ther explanation of these terms, see M. Hobart, `Meaning or Moaning? An 
Ethnographic Note on a Little Understood Tribe, ' in D. Parkin (ed. ), Semantic Anthropology 
(London et alibi: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 39-64; Sändor G. J. Hervey, `Context: The Ghost in the 
Machine, ' in Roy Dilley, pp. 61-72. 
12 The term "psychological context" was first used in C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning 
of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language Upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism 
(London; Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1938 [1923]). 
13 See R. L. Gregory (ed. ) The Oxford Companion to the Mind (Oxford and New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1987), pp. 450-54. 
14 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 13 
15 C. Goodwin and A. Duranti, `Rethinking Context: An Introduction, ' in C. Goodwin and A. 
Duranti, Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon (1992), p. 17; cf J. Culler, On 
Deconstruction, pp. 110-34. 
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marriage ceremony. 16 This is reminiscent of Habermas' concept of `lifeworld', 
the immediate environment of an individual person in which individuals 
ideally can find recognition for the validity of their communication. 17 On this 
view, the creation of rejectionist assemblies could be seen as attempts to 
establish political spheres in which the discourse of each part is affirmed and 
validated by others within a political whole. A similar view could be 
expressed of state patronage, which tends to involve the creation of a 
`discursive universe' in which the parties come together to validate and 
reinforce each other's speech and behaviour. As the discussion of patronage 
that follows below will demonstrate, this does not necessitate espousal of 
identical ideologies or political objectives by patron and client, merely that 
they are mutually bolstered and intellectually comforted by common 
discursive parameters. 
Goodwin and Duranti, on the other hand, argue for an interactionist 
view of context, which places the social person on centre stage and reflects a 
view of language and interaction as context. Their basic premise is "the 
capacity of human beings to dynamically reshape the context that provides 
organization for their actions within the interaction itself. "18 Context is both 
constitutive of social 'action and itself the product of social action; "it is both 
a generative principle and a resulting outcome. "19 This view has distinct 
parallels also in sociology and political science, where symbolic 
interactionism20 and constructivism21 have become many researchers' stock- 
in-trade. Goodwin and Durand furthermore argue that the definition and 
16 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 18. 
17 Ibid., p. 20. 
18 See Roy Dilley, `Contesting Markets: A General Introduction to Market Ideology, Imagery, and 
Discourse, ' in Roy Dilley (ed. ), Contesting Markets: Analyses of Ideology, Discourse, and Practice 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1992), p. 5 
19 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 19. 
20 For a foundational text in this field, see Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and 
Method (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969) 
21 For constructivist approaches to international relations, see Alexander Wendt, `Anarchy Is What 
States Make of It: Anarchy and the Social Construction of Power Politics, ' International 
Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-426; `Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State, ' American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-96. See 
further Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Press, 1959); 
Strategic Interaction (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969); Relations in Public 
(New York: Harper Books, 1971); Frame Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1974); `The Interaction Order, ' in American Sociological Review, vol. 48, no. 1 (February 1983), pp. 
1-17. For a constructivist approach to Middle East politics, see Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in 
Arab Politics. 
38 
deployment of context is also part of actors' strategies wherein "individual 
participants can actively attempt to shape context in ways that further their 
own interests. "22 Context can thus be analysed as "an interactively 
constituted mode of practice, "23 which implies that the research subjects too 
are interested in the use of context to create effects and outcomes. On this 
view, the rejectionist trend in general and the APF in particular could be seen 
as not only trying to manipulate their own context through politically 
charged rhetoric and symbolism, but also contributing to the creation of a 
new and continuously evolving context in which their activities and rhetoric 
can better resonate and be sustained. 
The notion of historical context is generally neglected in philosophy, 
linguistics and (most glaringly) politics and international relations. It was 
first developed in the work of R. G. Collingwood, who came to believe that 
the historian's task was to inwardly relive the actions of historical agents "in 
the spirit of imaginative sympathy, with a view to rendering intelligible their 
behaviour and the products of human endeavour. "24 Collingwood's view of 
the interpretative enterprise was influenced by, and largely analogous to 
Weber's concept of Verstehen (understanding), as contrasted with-but also 
complemented by-the `Durkheimian' project of Erklärung, explanation. 
Verstehen and Erklärung are distinct approaches to sociological method; the 
former is a method of inquiry aimed largely at reconstructing meanings from 
the subject's point of view, asking how the subject understands itself and its 
actions and, thus, placing an emphasis on the explanatory capacity of the 
Emic. Erklärung, by contrast, places the explanatory emphasis on the Etic by 
ascribing greater significance to the formal and abstract models of social 
scientific knowledge relative to Emic perceptions of its actions and place in 
the world. 
A proper balance between Emic and Etic perspectives is difficult to 
achieve. Hobart has described how too much knowledge can be brought to 
bear on study of a phenomenon at the expense of local exegesis. 25 In a 
22 A. Goodwin and C. Duranti, Rethinking Context, p. 6. 
23 A. Goodwin and C. Duranti, Rethinking Context, p. 22. 
24 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946). 
25 Mark Hobart, `As They Like It: Overinterpretation and Hyporeality in Bali' in Roy Dillev, The 
Problem of Context, pp. 105-144. 
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similar vein, Holy has argued that "we are much more aware of context in 
practice than in theory, " that is, when during fieldwork we find ourselves 
visitors within the subject's contextual frame, thus experiencing it first 
hand. 26 Although Verstehen and Erklärung were once considered polar 
opposites, both Collingwood and Weber have argued that social scientific 
inquiry must incorporate elements of both in order to be fruitful. 27 
Bronislaw Malinowski pioneered the treatment of context within 
social anthropology, 28 and the practice of cultural contextualization became 
rooted at the heart of the discipline largely due to his work. Malinowski 
coined the phrase "context of situation"29 in order to address the pragmatic 
circumstances in which "the context of words, " language, as a mode of 
action, was used and articulated. He argued that "the meaning of a word 
must always be gathered... from an analysis of its functions, with reference to 
the given culture. "3° In his later writings Malinowski restated the "context of 
situation" as "the context of culture, " arguing that textual translation must 
take place against the "cultural background of society. "31 
Malinowski's cultural context, then, include both the general setting 
and the immediate situation in which a word is used, and in which, for our 
purposes, action takes place. Both the immediate and general `contextual 
spheres' are of great importance in this thesis' efforts at understanding the 
dynamics and trajectory of rejectionism: Statements concerning issues such 
as armed struggle, the legitimacy of the PLO/PA leadership, peace with 
Israel and relations with patrons must be interpreted within an immediate 
political setting-intergroup relations, internal factional dynamics, events 
and developments in the direct environment-as well as within their more 
general sociocultural milieu. 
26 Ladislav Holy, Kinship, Honour and Solidarity: Cousin Marriage in the Middle East (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 3. 
2' See Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology (London: Peter Owen, 1962). 
28 Most particularly in `The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages, ' in C. K. Ogden and I. A. 
Richards (eds. ), The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and 
of the Science of Symbolism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935 [19231); Coral Gardens and Their 
Magic: A Study of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of Agricultural Rites in the Trobriand Islands 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1935). 
29 Malinowski, `The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages, ' p. 53 
30 Ibid., p. 309. 
31 Malinowski. Coral Gardens and Their Magic, pp. 17-18. 
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Towards a Relevant Context for the Study of Rejectionism 
While the preceding discussion may have articulated a sense of what kind of 
activity is involved in articulating an analytical context, we have still not 
found any solution to the difficult problem of how to determine a `correct' 
context for the purposes of this thesis. A possible answer can be found by 
looking at another philosophical problem, that of the so called `hermeneutic 
circle. ' An enduring problem within the field of hermeneutics-which is 
concerned with the interpretation of texts and human understanding32-the 
hermeneutic circle has been explained thus: 
We understand the meaning of an individual word by seeing it in 
reference to the whole sentence; and reciprocally, the sentence's 
meaning as a whole is dependent on the meaning of the individual 
words... By extension, an individual concept derives its meaning from 
the context or horizon within which it stands; yet the horizon is made 
up of the very elements to which it gives meaning. 33 
Accordingly, Honderich has suggested that "comprehension can only come 
about through a tacit foreknowledge that alerts us to salient features of the 
text which would otherwise escape notice. "34 Transferring this 
problematique to social anthropology, Dilley restates it by suggesting that 
"... interpretation in context require the pre-interpretation of the relevant 
context, that in turn informs the subsequent interpretation. "35 This view is 
embraced and applied by Holy and Stuchlik's work on native folk models, 
which embody "common-sense knowledge necessary for any competent 
social interaction. "36 
In relation to the present thesis, we do appear equipped to say 
something about the appropriateness of interpretative processes, if not about 
their specific parameters. It seems that the notion of encounter between the 
Etic and Emic-between the researcher and the rejectionist research 
d 32 See R. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, an 
Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969) 
33 Ibid., p. 87. 
34 Ted Honderich (ed. ), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 353. 
35 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 15. 
36 Ibid., p. 16; cf. L. Holy and M. Stutchlik (eds. ), The Structure of Folk Models; ASA Monographs 
20 (London: Academic Press, 1981); L. Holy and M. Stutchlik, Actions, Norms, and Representations: 
Foundations of Anthropological Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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subjects-is crucial to the ability of the former to interpret and understand 
the meaning of the speech and behaviour of the latter; to make connections 
relevant not only to a research agenda but to on-the-ground realities, and to 
internal features of these organizations that may be obscured without first- 
hand contact. In particular, the implications of the `hermeneutic circle' is 
that in order to know which are the relevant connections to make as regards 
a research subject's rhetoric and behaviour, we need to first have some 
understanding about its relevant milieu and setting, which in turn requires 
us to have some prior understanding of the subject's rhetoric and behaviour. 
In asking how such pre-understanding can be achieved in practice, two 
features emerge as prerequisites for a relevant contextualization effort. 
First, absorption of anthropological literature. Initial secondary 
source knowledge of a political phenomenon such as the APF should not be 
based on political and historical literature only (as is often the case), but 
must rest on a familiarity with social and cultural cues and norms, which are 
often subtle and unarticulated. Combining political and anthropological 
literature affords the researcher an understanding of both the general and 
immediate settings in which political speech and behaviour arise and are 
deployed. Because cultural norms and cues lie outside the normal remit of 
political science they are often overlooked; this makes them no less 
important. The issue of culture as context is returned to in the following 
section. Suffice it for the moment to note that cultural context, as 
conceptualized by Malinowski, imputes meaning to our speech and 
behaviour; following Goodwin and Duranti it may also be deployed by Emic 
agents as a vehicle for their political endeavours. 
Second, primary encounters resulting in conversation and 
constructive dialogue are essential to political contextualization. The need 
for field research is well established within political science and international 
relations, but `encounter' and `dialogue' are still largely alien concepts. 
Encounter goes beyond field research and interviews, signifying an attitude 
towards the research enterprise that, once adopted, becomes also the 
methodology. It implies a willingness to intellectually cross cultural and 
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political boundaries in order to establish a mutually respectful dialogue. 37 
Respect is not meant in the sense of deference but, rather, as willingness to 
suspend ethnocentric judgment, enabling the notion of "practical relativism" 
mentioned in the preceding chapter. Such encounters are fruitful when they 
centre on creating constructive dialogues, allowing the research subject to 
communicate relevant concerns and opinions, and the researcher to take 
those concerns seriously and to incorporate them as an integral part of any 
explanation. `Pre-understanding' is thus an evolving achievement, as is 
understanding, and the two should ideally enrich each other in a continuous 
feedback loop. 
Sperber and Wilson, however, have challenged the notion that mutual 
knowledge or pre-understanding is the essence of context. They propose that 
the concept of `relevance' instead be placed on centre stage. It is, they claim, 
the intention to be relevant on the part of the speaker and the imputation of 
relevance on the part of the hearer that allow meanings to be generated; "It is 
relevance which is treated as a given, and context which is treated as a 
variable. "38 Sperber thus suggests a view of "meaning as recognized 
intention, "39 which, consequently, makes the relevant context the 
psychological state and shared background expectancies of the speaker and 
his/her audience. `Background expectancies' have been defined as cognitive 
mechanisms by which individuals "typify their experience and make it 
comprehensible"; "intersubjective norms which are shared by members of a 
socio-cultural milieu. "4° This is a valuable insight for our purposes, in that 
the recognition and ascription of meaning inheres precisely in the cultural 
and social sphere, which can only be known to the political scientist through 
the above mentioned absorption of political and anthropological literature, 
plus encounter and dialogue. 
"Relevance, " states Dilley, "can be linked to the diverse purposes, 
interests, reasons and concerns of interpreters who invoke contexts as 
37 This is a parallel to the concept of `play' in Gadamer's aesthetic hermeneutics. See Hans Herbert 
Kögler, The Power of Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault; trans. Paul 
Hendrickson (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1999). 
38 B. A. Scharfstein, The Dilemma of Context, p. 189 
39 M. Hobart, `Texte est un con, ' in R. H. Barnes et al (eds. ), Contexts and Levels: Anthropological 
Essays on Hierarchy (Oxford, JASO, 1985), p. 42. 
43 
legitimizing devices of the meanings they make. Indeed a relevant context for 
one interpreter might be irrelevant for another... "41 Culler similarly suggests 
that "The meanings we determine are generally sufficient for our 
purposes. "42 The problem of indeterminacy does not stop activities and 
endeavours in other fields with similar problems, such as mathematics and 
the `hard sciences. ' Contextualization generates new accounts that can be 
discussed, opposed, added to, altered, improved, or discarded. Determinacy, 
in fact, would stop academic debate while indeterminacy generates new 
views, new ideas, and new thought. Positing a context, then, is the 
articulation of a particular mode of knowledge and a set of connections 
relevant to one's present project. Dilley concurs: 
There can be no definitive conclusion to the problem of context, only a 
heightened sense of awareness about the articulations and 
connections that we ourselves make in the process of anthropological 
contextualization... A frame implies a disjunction; it excludes as much 
as it includes. This process of inclusion and exclusion is a process of 
power. It is our sense of relevance, driven by our theoretical outlooks 
and practical dispositions towards the world, that defines where these 
frames are to be placed. Moreover, to sharpen our own sense of the 
way we fabricate contexts in the processes of our own analyses might 
help us to become aware, in turn, of the interpretative practices and 
contextualizing moves used by others situated elsewhere and outside 
the academy. 43 
CULTURE AS POLITICAL CONTEXT 
In all cases where substate groups, such as those in the APF, originate in a 
nation other than that of the researcher, and even in cases where they do not, 
it is inevitable that the issue of culture-in particular the cultural difference 
between the investigator and his or her research subject-assumes a critical 
significance. There is a growing literature on intercultural communication, 
which models the difficulties and processes involved. 44 Within political 
40 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology: the Key Concepts (London 
and New York, Routledge, 2000), pp. 57-8. 
41 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 17. 
42 J. Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 133. 
43 Roy Dilley, The Problem of Context, p. 38. 
as See, especially, William B. Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim, Communicating with Strangers: An 
Approach to Intercultural Communication, 2°d Ed. (New York et alibi: McGraw-Hill, 1992); Stella 
Ting-Toomey, Communicating Across Cultures (New York: Guilford Press, 1999)); Philip F. Esler, 
Galatians (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 10-21. 
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science and international relations, however, attempts at introducing culture 
as a behavioural determinant have ranged from unproductive to 
counterproductive. `Political culture theorizing' has lacked in utility because 
of its close presuppositional linkages to political science theory and 
international relations paradigms more generally; globalizing and 
universalizing tendencies have led to postulation of `cultural spheres' on far 
too large a scale to be meaningfu1,45 or else sought to essentialize the concept 
of culture based on determinist assumptions about its nature and content, 
leading to cultural stereotyping. Johannes Fabian has noted that 
conversation based on mutuality and respect-prerequisites for encounters 
and dialogue-is impossible within a cognitive model that fixes on difference 
and exoticism. 46 To be sure, political culture theories have tended to 
homogenize and reify `the cultural other' by reducing human agency and 
cogency to objects, rather than subjects of inquiry. In Western intellectual 
traditions, it is part of the definition of an object that it can neither speak, 
nor think or know; thus, the cultural other has had nothing to say, and 
dialogue between Etic and Emic has been superfluous or even impossible. 
In 1977, the noted political culture theorist Gabriel Ben-Dor observed 
that political culture theorizing came into vogue within Middle East and 
Islamic studies in the 195os and 6os due to the explanatory inadequacy of 
earlier structuralist approaches. 47 Ben-Dor himself believed that the 
common Arab and Islamic heritage from Morocco to the Persian Gulf 
suggested the utility of the Islamic nation as a unit of analysis. Studies of this 
unit, he suggested, would be able to yield unchanging political precepts if 
only scholars ceased concentrating on issues "temporary and particular 
rather than the lasting and general. "48 Ben-Dor thus provides an illustration 
of the approach Lisa Anderson criticized when she noted that 
45 Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations hypothesis is, arguably, an instance of this kind of 
political culture theorizing. See Samuel P. Huntington, `The Clash of Civilizations, ' Foreign Affairs 
(Summer 1993), pp. 22-49; `The West Unique, Not Universal, ' Forei Affairs 
(November/December 1993), pp. 29-46; `If Not Civilizations, What? ', ibid., pp. 186-94. For possibly 
the most comprehensive critique of the invention and use of macro-cultures, see Edward Said, 
Orientalism. 
46 J Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983) 
a' Gabriel Ben-Dor, `Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics', in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 8, no. 1,1977. 
48 Ibid., p. 52. 
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... the implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that attitudes and beliefs born in the desert in the era of the Prophet are timeless, 
unchanging, and overwhelmingly powerful... is a reflection of an inability 
to think critically about change. 49 
Determinist and essentialist accounts have also been versatile tools* in the 
hands of those who have sought to create blanket stereotypes of `outgroups, ' 
the Arab and Islamic `incapacity' for democracy being a case in point. Note 
for instance Elie Kedourie's remark that "... there is nothing in the political 
traditions of the Arab world-which are the political traditions of Islam- 
which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of 
constitutional and representative government. "5° David Pryce-Jones' 
assertion that "at present, an Arab democrat is not even an idealization, but a 
contradiction in terms" is a further example. 51 It is nothing short of puzzling 
that such conceptualizations of culture survive within political science and 
international relations to this day. 52 
In anthropology, by contrast, such ideas were largely discarded in the 
196os just as they were being discovered by political scientists-having 
been in vogue since the early days of the twentieth century. Towards the late 
nineteenth century, Franz Boas had suggested that culture should be thought 
of as an "integrated spiritual totality, " a proposition that was subsequently 
developed into the idea of culture as a "systematically harmonized whole" 
comprising "a shared and stable system of beliefs, knowledge, values, or sets 
of practices. "53 On this view, cultures have objective reality over and above 
individual agency and cogency, which fitted well with Durkheim's idea that 
the object of the social sciences was "the social fact. "54 For the past several 
decades, however, anthropologists have tended to view culture as an ongoing 
and creative process through which people continuously incorporate and 
49 Lisa Anderson, `Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach, ' in 
Rex Brynen et al (eds. ), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World; Vol. 1, 
Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 89. 
50 Democracy and Political Culture (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
1992), p. 15 
51 David Pryce-Jones' The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1989), p. 406 
52 For more recent arguments based on essentialist political culture reasoning, see, for instance, Jean 
Leca, `Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa', Government and Opposition, vol. 32, no. 4 
(1997). 
53 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 93. 
54 E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 1966 [1895]). 
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transform new and foreign elements into their cognitive systems. As 
"structures with symbolic meaning", culture may be understood "to consist 
of a shared system of mental representations, "55 "of elements which are 
defined and differentiated in a particular society as representing reality-the 
total reality of life within which human beings live and die. "56 The focus of 
anthropology, then, is the diversity of ways in which human beings establish 
and live their social lives in groups; each culture pertains to a specific, 
historically contingent way of life, which is "expressed through its specific 
ensemble of artifacts, institutions and patterns of behaviour. "57 
In every human culture, then, there are sets of behaviours, some of 
which are (more or less) predictable and regular and thus capable of being 
accounted for in generalized and, admittedly, stereotypical patterns. These 
are social norms or cues that help members of a culture to know how to 
interact with one another and with strangers, but they do not imply that we 
are in some way "cultural dopes who act unconsciously in accordance to 
underlying structures of shared symbolic meaning"58; they do not acquire the 
status of social law, which would bring us back to the view of culture that 
inheres in political culture theories. 59 Rather, to talk of sociocultural norms 
and cues entails only the observation that whenever we speak and act in life, 
we do so from within a context of cultural conditioning, from an inculturated 
sense of how and why we function as human beings and relate to one 
another, the roles we adopt and the values by which we are motivated. It 
follows that speech and behaviour arising within a particular cultural setting 
is best understood when analysed with reference to that context. 6° 
Ingold has correctly pointed out that when a fieldworker investigates 
cultural parameters, "what we do not find are neatly bounded and mutually 
exclusive bodies of thought and custom, perfectly shared by all who 
subscribe to them, and in which their lives and worlds are fully 
ss Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 95. 
56 D. Schneider, `Notes Toward a Theory of Culture, ' in K. Basso and H. Selby (eds. ), Meaning in 
Anthropology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 206. 
57 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 93. 
58 Ibid., p. 96. 
59 Philip F. Esler, Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts: The Social and Political Motivations of 
Lucan Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 6, p. 226 (n. 28). 
60 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 93. 
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encapsulated. "61 It must be emphasized that the present thesis is not trying 
to construct a model for `understanding the eastern Mediterranean mind, ' 
nor is it making a claim about social norms followed by any and all members 
of that cultural sphere. Instead, the thesis is holding up a particular social 
phenomenon to scrutiny against the background of a particular set of social 
cues, identified by anthropologists as salient in the ambient culture, arguing 
that they can be useful in better understanding that particular phenomenon. 
Any more ambitious a use of cultural contexts for political research is likely 
not useful. 
In recent years there has been a great deal of research done to develop 
a taxonomy of national cultures. 62 Most useful for our purposes is the line of 
investigation begun in 1980 by Geert Hofstede, who analysed ioo, ooo 
questionnaires filled out by the employees of a particular multi-national in 
fifty countries around the world. 63 On the basis of his survey data he was 
able to isolate a set of five variables used for characterizing national cultures. 
These were (a) the respective significance of the individual and the group; (b) 
the differences in social roles between men and women; (c) the manner of 
dealing with inequality; (d) the. degree of tolerance for the unknown; and (e) 
the trade-off between long and short-term gratification of needs. While 
Hofstede's study has limitations (due primarily to the nature of its target 
group) it has been well received as a `quantitative validation' for other more 
specific and/or theoretically based studies, and its utility has been 
demonstrated and validated in more recent research. 64 
Subsequent work has shown that the most important of Hofstede's 
variables was his allocation of every culture to some point on a continuum 
from pronounced individualism at one end to strong group-orientation, 
61 T. Ingold, `Introduction to Culture, ' in T. Ingold (ed. ) Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology: 
Humanity, Culture and Social Life (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 330 
62 One example is the collection of hundreds of world cultures included in the Cross-Cultural Coding 
Centre at the University of Pittsburgh. For use made of this taxonomy, see George P. Murdoch. 
Theories of Illness: A World Survey (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980). 
63 Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values 
(Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980); see also Cultures and Organizations: Software of the 
Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival (London: HarperCollins, 1994). 
64 See Peter B. Smith and Michael H. Bond, Social Psychology Across Cultures: Analysis and 
Perspectives (New York et alibi: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 38-46. 
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collectivism, at the other. 65 By individualism Hofstede means a social 
condition where ties between individuals are weak, while collectivism 
implies individual integration into strong, cohesive groups, which provide 
protection in exchange for loyalty. Individualist cultures-found on both 
sides of the north Atlantic, but most pronounced in North America- 
emphasize interpersonal 'competition, individual achievement, enterprise 
and innovativeness, and easy separation from kin and other groups, while 
collectivist ones prefer collective achievements, close ties with ingroup 
members and a disinclination to diverge from established ways. Markedly 
individualistic cultures are atypical in the world, with collectivist attitudes 
being far more common. 66 
Over the last several decades anthropologists working in the 
Mediterranean region, including the Levant, have developed a general 
understanding of circum-Mediterranean and eastern Mediterranean cultures 
that has allowed them to identify a number of their salient features. These 
include, most pre-eminently, the status of honour as the pivotal social value 
(with its rough opposite being shame), the importance of patron-client 
relations, and a pronounced . collectivism. Early researchers 
in this area 
included Peristiany, 67 Pitt-Rivers, 68 Campbell, 69 and Bourdieu. 7° More recent 
research in the region has reflected the above-mentioned shift in researchers' 
perception of culture, and as a consequence tended towards less 
deterministic and essentialist accounts. 7' While previous ascriptions of 
65 Ibid. This continuum does not preclude exceptions to the basic pattern, and must also be understood 
as a generalization, that is, a statement that allows for exceptions but does not specify them. 
66 The individualistic sense of self which characterizes North Atlantic cultures is so distinctive, in 
fact, that it has even been possible for philosopher Charles Taylor to chart its historical development 
over the last few centuries; see The Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (op. cit. ). 
67 J. G. Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965). 
68 Julian Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); (ed. ), 
Mediterranean Countrymen: Essays in the Social Anthropology of the Mediterranean (Paris and La 
Haye: Mouton & Co, 1963); `Honour and Social Status', in Peristiany (ed. ), Honour and Shame, pp. 
19-77; and The Fate of Shechem or The Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the 
Mediterranean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
69 J K. Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a 
Greek Mountain Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
70 Pierre Bourdieu, `The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society', in Peristiany (ed. ), Honour and 
Shame, pp. 191-241. 
71 M. Herzfeld,. `Honour and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems', Man. 
vol. 15, pp. 339-51; "`As in Your Own House": Hospitality, Ethnography, and the Stereotype of 
Mediterranean Society', in D. D. Gilmore (ed: ), Honour and Shame and the Unity of the 
Mediterranean (Washington DC: American Anthropological Association, 1987), pp. 75-89; Lila Abu- 
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immutability to cultural traits have been substantially revised, however, the 
general parameters of the earlier research have not been overturned, and the 
recent application of such findings in classical studies72 and biblical 
research73 may illustrate the historical depth and resilience of these eastern 
Mediterranean sociocultural norms and cues. 
We are here talking' about culture at a fairly high level of generality, 
which allows for exceptions and local variations as we move in to examine 
data closely. This thesis suggests that by taking into account an aggregate of 
the honour-shame dichotomy, patron-client dynamics and a pronounced 
group-orientation, we are able to better understand the political efforts of the 
rejectionist current; behaviour that may otherwise seem extremist and 
erratic can be ascribed both meaning and reason within a larger project and 
framework. This larger project, then, has been their morally and ethically 
grounded commitment to the liberation of Palestine, and the return of 
Palestinians to their homeland. 
Singling out three sociocultural features that condition political 
behaviour within a larger ethical framework may seem a textbook example of 
cultural essentialism, of adopting the very position so vehemently 
condemned above. However, as already stated, it is important to note that 
the rejectionists are not considered to be `locked in' to, nor are their actions 
comprehensively determined by, these cultural crucibles. This thesis 
assumes that culture is a "network of polyvalent practices, texts, and images 
generating meaning, "74 rather than a closed, contained system capable of 
being determined, or determining individuals and groups, in all essentials. If 
it were otherwise, the creativity and innovative agency herein ascribed to the 
rejectionist assemblies would be utterly impossible. 
Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honour and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (Berkeley et alibi: University of 
California Press, 1986); Anne Meneley, Tournaments of Value: Sociability and Hierarchy in a 
Yemeni Town (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1996); J. G. Peristiany 
and Julian Pitt-Rivers (eds. ), Honour and Grace in Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
72 See, for instance, Jon E. Lendon, The Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman 
World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). 
73 The biblical research in this area began with Bruce J. Malina's indispensable work The New 
Testament World: Insights From Cultural Anthropology in 1981; revised edition (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox, 1993). 
74 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, p. 25. 
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CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL IDENTITIES 
Before looking more closely at the issues of honour and patronage it is 
necessary to say something about how and why human beings adopt 
characteristics as part of collectives, that is, construct social identities. This, 
then, is related to the issue of group orientation. "Palestinian identity and 
nationalism, " argues Lindholm-Schulz, "are constantly constructed and re- 
created in the very meeting point between external and internal factors, in 
the intersection where structures, processes, and actors convene. "75 A 
substantial body of work dealing with various theoretical, historical, and 
political aspects of Palestinian national identity has accumulated over recent 
years. Excellent contributions include those of Rashid Khalidi, 76 Baruch 
Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, 77Muhammad Muslih, 78 Helena Lindholm- 
Schulz, 79 Glenn E. Robinson, 8° and Rosemary Sayigh. 81 
In examining rejectionism's expressions of eastern Mediterranean 
cultural norms and cues, this thesis draws on the theoretical framework 
provided by social identity theory, a heuristic model of the way human 
identity develops in and between groups through interaction and 
communication. 82 As a non-reductionist theory of group behaviour, social 
identity theory emphasizes the significance of the subject's hermeneutic 
situation, the group members' internally constructed social identity, and the 
cultural context in which a cohesive group consciousness is installed in the 
75 Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 2. 
76 Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997). 
" Palestinians: The Making of a People (New York: The Free Press, 1993). 
78 The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
79 Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism 
80 Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: 
University of Indiana Press, 1997). 
81 Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 1979). 
82 See for instance, Henri Tajfel, `La categorisation sociale' in S. Moscovici (ed. ) Introduction ä la 
Psychologie Sociale, vol. 1 (Paris: Larousse, 1972); Tajfel (ed. ) Differentiation between Social 
Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (London, New York, and San 
Fransisco: The Academic Press, 1978); Tajfel and J. C. Turner, `An Integrative Theory of Intergroup 
Conflict, ' in W. G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds. ) The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations 
(Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1979), pp. 33-47. See also Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, 
Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1988). Rupert Brown, Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between 
Groups (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). For coverage of more recent developments in the field, see 
Peter Robinson (ed. ) Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Taifel (Oxford: 
Butterworth Heinemann, 1996); Stephen Worchel et al. (eds. ) Social Identity: International 
Perspectives (London: Sage Publications, 1998); and Esler, Galatians, esp. pp. 29-57. 
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minds and hearts of its members. Social identity theory has not previously 
been applied in the context of Palestinian politics but bears some similarities 
to constructivism, which has been applied and is returned to below. As has 
been suggested above, framing a well-known but little-understood social 
phenomenon within `fresh' theoretical parameters may yield significant new 
insights. 
It is unnecessary for our present purposes to attempt a rigorous 
definition of a group: the simplest, and perhaps the ultimate, statement that 
can be made about a group is that it is a body of people who consider that 
they are a group. Nevertheless, in describing the experience of belonging to a 
group it is helpful to follow Henri Tajfel, the originator of social identity 
theory, in differentiating three components. First, a cognitive component (in 
the sense of the knowledge that one belongs to a group); second, an 
evaluative component (in the sense that the notion of the group and/or one's 
membership of it may have a positive or negative connotation); and third, an 
emotional component (in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative aspects 
of the group and one's membership of it may be accompanied by emotions- 
such as love, loathing etc. -directed towards one's own group and towards 
others which stand in certain relationships to it). 83 
Tajfel defines `social identity' as that part of an individual's self- 
concept deriving from his or her knowledge of membership of a social group 
(or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to 
that membership. "84 The extent to which group membership contributes to a 
sense of self varies depending upon the level of group orientation present in 
the ambient culture. As noted above, anthropologists have suggested that the 
eastern Mediterranean region offers fertile soil for strongly entrenched group 
behaviour. 85 
Social identity theory adopts a distinctive position in relation to the 
continuing problem of the relationship between the individual and the 
group. Its central idea is that being categorized as members of certain groups 
83 Henri Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups, p. 28. 
84 Henn Tajfel, `La categorisation sociale, ' p. 31. 
85 See particularly Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences; Cultures and Organizations, Software of 
the Mind. See also Peter B. Smith and Michael H. Bond, Social P chology Across Cultures: 
Analysis and Perspectives (New York et alibi: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993) and George P. Murdoch, 
Theories of Illness: A World Survey (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980). 
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provides an important part of the self-concept of individuals. To an extent, 
we learn who we are from the groups to which we belong, and in becoming 
members of a group we redefine who we are. Moreover, since we internalize 
our group memberships as part of our self-concept, it follows that any value 
associated with those groups will have implications for our feelings of self- 
worth. 86 From this perspective the critical question is how, that is, through 
which psychological processes, are societal and group-specific norms and 
cues (such as those attending the honour-shame dialectic) able to install 
themselves in the minds and hearts of individuals, and to affect their speech 
and behaviour. 87 
Understanding Social Conflict 
What makes social identity theory particularly pertinent to the present study 
is its attendant models for understanding intergroup relations and conflict 
(schematically illustrated in fig. 1.2). Group dynamics are strongly affected 
by whether a comparative or non-comparative ethos or ideology permeates 
the group. Again, social competitiveness is part of the delineation of the 
agonistic cultures of the eastern Mediterranean. "The coexistence of the 
pivotal nature of honour and the limited good provides a strong stimulus to 
the development of ideologies and occasions of intergroup comparison. "88 
Groups need to provide their members with a positive social identity- 
establish a positively valued distinctiveness from other groups-in order to 
maintain their existence. This group consciousness can operate on a number 
of levels (e. g. Palestinian, refugee, PFLP member, etc. ). Within these groups, 
normative evaluations define acceptable and unacceptable attitudes and 
behaviour for group members, thus maintaining and enhancing group 
identity. 89 These norms, and the politicization of these norms, are supplied 
by group elites. "Without the discontents, " argues Seton-Watson, "there 
86 Rupert Brown, Group Processes: Dynamics within and between Groups (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1988), pp. 20-2. 
87 Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications, pp. 12-16. 
88 Philihp F. Esler, Galatian s, p. 48. 
89 Rupert Brown, Group Processes, pp. 42-48. This notion of values is roughly akin to Marx's 
concept of ideology, a social relationship that underpins and sustains structural relationships. See 
Maximilien Rubel (ed. ), Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy; trans T. 
B. Bottomore (Harmondsworth: Penguin books, 1963), p. 28. 
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would have been no movements; but without the nationalist elites the 
movements would not have been nationalist. "9° 
SOCIAL MOBILITY 
(Exit from group is 
possible) 
Defection of a Defection 
few members en masse 
SOCIAL CHANGE 
(Exit is difficult or 
impossible) 
SOCIAL CREATIVITY SOCIAL COMPETITION 











Figure 2.1 Intergroup conflict within the social identity theory framework; after Tajfel in Philip Esler, 
Galatians p. 55 
"In all (or most) national/nationalist movements... there are 
competing nationalist discourses, informed by relations of dominance and 
power. "91 When a group finds itself in a position where it has a lower social 
status than another group with which it interacts, its ability to make a 
positive contribution to its members' social identities is diminished. In such 
situations, two broad responses are open to those group members who are 
unhappy with their negatively charged social identities. 
One response is social mobility, which occurs when individuals 
leave their group to join the other. The feasibility of this option depends on 
the permeability of intergroup boundaries, 92 external constraints (e. g. 
negative evaluations of one's ideological tradition in the group to which 
access is sought), and internal constraints (e. g. disapproval of splitters). 
The second response is social change, an attempt at a positive 
revaluation of the ingroup in relation to the dominant outgroup. This 
response assumes impermeability of intergroup boundaries and 
90 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 10. Cf. Lindholm-Schulz's 
remark that "National politicisation is often defined by `cultural brokers', or a political leadership, 
capable of providing mobilizing resources. "; The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 14. 
91 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 4. 
92 Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications, p. 54. 
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overpowering internal and external constraints. Change, then, can be 
brought about through social creativity or social competition, or a 
combination of both. 93 
Social creativity entails redefining and altering the premises of the 
comparative or competitive situation, and seems to be an appropriate 
response when the negative balance cannot be redressed. This may involve 
the redefinition of the value of some existing comparison, turning a 
weakness into strength (e. g. `we are not in control of the national movement, 
but this leaves us unfettered by imperialism to truly struggle for the masses'). 
It may furthermore entail the proposition that true positive values are per 
definition the antithesis of those espoused by the outgroup. This, as will be 
demonstrated in the following chapters, is exemplified by the `bursts' of 
militancy following the establishment of every rejectionist assembly. Finally, 
while not immediately applicable to the present thesis, an ingroup may fix its 
gaze on some outgroup other than the dominant one, seeking to bring about 
a more favourable comparative situation. 
Social competition refers to the efforts by the subordinate group to 
improve its actual social status vis-a-vis the dominant group. Esler has 
suggested that direct competition of this sort presupposes that an alternative 
arrangement is possible and that the comparative relationship is thus 
unstable. 94 It seems, however, that all that is needed is a perception of that 
possibility in the subordinate group, causing them to undertake the 
competitive venture. In any case, "any threat to the distinctively superior 
position of a group implies a potential loss of positive comparisons and 
possible negative comparisons, which must be guarded against. "95 Herein 
lies the key to rejectionist behaviour. 
Social Identity and the Alliance of Palestinian Forces 
The dishonour brought upon the opposition factions by Arafat's manoeuvres 
in connection with the DOP diminished their social status and, thus, their 
ability to supply members with a positive social identity. By issuing a 
counterchallenge and setting up the APF, a process of social creativity and 
93 Philip F. Esler, Galatians, p. 52. 
94 Ibid., p. 54. 
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competition according to the pattern suggested by social identity theory was 
set in motion. These mechanisms have prompted the genesis of every 
rejectionist assembly. As the rejectionist assemblies have gone on to compete 
with the PLO/PA leadership for social status, popular support and, 
ultimately, for the ability to define Palestinianness, they have found 
themselves in a dynamic competitive relationship that has prompted them to 
continuously revaluate and redefine their sense of purpose. Social identity 
theory thus gives us a behavioural model within which to analyse the 
rejectionists' struggle for factional and national honour. Specific behavioural 
and ideological adjustments have come about as a result of changes in group- 
identity and role conception, which in turn have hinged on the dynamics of 
group interaction. 
Through its symbolism and rhetoric, the APF has been in constant 
interaction with the PLO/PA, challenging its hegemony by entering into 
social competition in the belief that a change in the balance of social status is 
possible. Seeing participation in the post-Oslo political order as shameful, 
the APF has also resorted to social creativity, seeking to alter the content of 
the refugees' self-concepts, making them anathematic to the positions of the 
PLO/PA, and thus affect their long-term political loyalties. 
The APF enterprise has been profoundly affected by its internal 
intergroup dynamics, with dominant groups such as Hamas and the PFLP 
being the targets of efforts at social change by smaller groups, whose 
membership has enjoyed a relatively marginal social status and political 
influence within the alliance. The processes of interfactional competition, on 
the one hand, and the dynamics of the alliance's collective relationship with 
the PLO/PA, on the other, have impacted on each other in a continuous 
feedback loop; alterations in one relationship have enabled changes in the 
other. 
Overpowering external and internal constraints have effectively 
prohibited individual members' social mobility between the various factions. 
Nevertheless, there has been some degree of factional mobility between the 
APF and the PLO/PA camp. Arafat has continuously tried to poach the 
factions to side with the PLO/PA, offering its leaders political positions and 
95 Henri Tajfel and J. C. Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, ' p. 45. 
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generous subsidies, which would lead to improved social status for their 
members within the PA's official discursive universe. Indeed, largely because 
it was attracted by the social status benefits of being in the PLO/PA camp, 
the DFLP defected from the APF in 1997. Nonetheless, disapproval of 
splitters has been extremely strong as joining the Arafat camp has been seen 
as not merely a sell-out, but an act of dishonouring oneself and the APF 
collective. The attacks on DFLP offices and supporters in 1999 served to 
shame the DFLP by violating its physical space (returned to below). 
Added to the relationships that obtain between the alliance's factions, 
and between the alliance and the PLO/PA, is the relationship between the 
factions and their primary social constituents, the refugee communities of 
Syria and Lebanon. None of the factions have attained large individual 
followings among the refugees as a result of the APF effort. While this could 
be taken to indicate their abject failure, it must be understood that the 
factions have sought to communicate to rather than with their constituents, 
to produce discourse rather than engage in dialogue. Their activities have 
thus been primarily intended to garner support for their collective 
interpretation of Palestinianness and of the purpose of Palestinian politics, 
not to gain members. In fact, the ossified organizational hierarchies of all of 
the fasa'il have lead to a reluctance to recruit. Seeing themselves as well- 
situated pressure groups with the power to affect popular discourse, the APF 
factions have striven for collective `mass sympathy' rather than mass 
membership. This point is illustrated by the dynamics of interfactional 
patronage and its resultant `altruism': When two of the smallest factions- 
PRCP and PLF-ran out of funds in the mid-9os, the PFLP put their leaders 
and cadres on the payroll. When the PFLP partially withdrew from the 
alliance shortly thereafter, Fateh-Intifada picked up the bill. 96 Rather than 
trying to absorb the members of the smaller factions and so enhance their 
own positions, the larger groups have seen it as imperative that as broad a 
front as possible continue to exist within the discursive universe of 
rejectionism. While the PRCP and PLF are of very little consequence as 
individual factions, their participation in the APF collective has given them a 
symbolic significance that allows them to transcend their ideological 
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marginality and historical idiosyncrasies. APF membership in itself boosts 
their social status. 
Dialogues are sites of norm creation and historical change. While the 
factions may have intended to produce meanings without engaging in 
dialogue, they have in fact been engaged in a dynamic process of interaction 
with the refugee communities. Through political rallies, humanitarian work, 
educational activities, and so forth, they have not only been able to affect, but 
also been affected. They have gauged the repercussions of their own 
activities, the effects of the policies of the PLO/PA leadership, and the impact 
of Syrian, Lebanese, and other external actors' involvement. This has 
resulted in an incremental revaluation and redefinition of factional identity 
and role-conception within the APF collective, leading to political divergence 
and, ultimately, fragmentation. 
HONOUR AND SHAME IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
Honour is a claim to worth that is socially acknowledged, and is traditionally 
defined in terms of the social outcomes of the confluence of power, gender 
status and religion. 97 Put differently, honour is "the value of a person in his 
or her own eyes... plus that person's value in the eyes of his or her social 
group. "98 In a society where the value of honour is a central concern, there is 
a constant dialectic between the idealized norms of socially sanctioned 
speech and behaviour, and the way in which an individual seek to reproduce 
those norms. When a person perceives that his or her actions do in fact 
reproduce those idealized norms he or she expects the other members of that 
society to acknowledge this fact. Such an acknowledgement is a `grant of 
honour, ' or, as Malina tells us, 
96 Tahsin al-Halabi, 24 May 2000. 
97 Bruce J. Malin, The New Testament World, p. 30. Power is the ability to exercise control over the 
behaviour of others, a symbolic reality not to be confused with physical force. Gender status entails to 
sets of duties derived from biological gender differentiation. Religion entails the attitude one must 
have, and the behaviour one is expected to follow relative to those who control one's existence; 
Malina, p. 31. For comprehensive discussions of honour in the eastern Mediterranean, see J. G. 
Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame; see also David D. Gilmore (ed. ), Honour and Shame and the 
Unity of the Mediterranean (Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 1987): 
`Anthropology in the Mediterranean Area, ' Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 175- 
205. 
98 Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World, p. 31. 
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a grant of reputation. To honour a person is to acknowledge publicly 
that his or her actions conform with social oughts. Honour as a pivotal 
value in a society implies a chosen way of conduct undertaken with a 
view to and because of entitlement to certain social treatment in 
return. Other people not only say that a person is honourable; they 
also treat that person in the way that honourable persons are 
treated. 99 
Honour can be individual or collective, the latter pertaining to a social 
`ingroup' such as a family, clan, tribe or (more relevant to this thesis) 
political or military organizations. Even nations are considered to posses 
honour, by virtue of being `kinship writ large. ' Just as the head and face is 
symbolic of personal honour (which is why bowing, taking one's hat off, 
slapping someone in the face, etc, are symbolically meaningful actions) the 
person who heads a social group or organization is symbolic of that group's 
collective honour. He is accorded honour and reverence by ingroup 
members, and is in turn responsible for that group's collective honour 
relative to outsiders. In the case of the rejectionist factions, the devotion and 
reverence accorded, for instance, to George Habash and Abu Musa within 
their respective organizations-the PFLP and Fateh-Intifada-could easily 
appear absurd to outsiders. Habash is known to PFLP members as `the sage 
of the revolution' (al-hakim al-thawra) and is even directly addressed as 
`sage' (hakim). Such deference-quite bizarre to individuals whose 
socialization experiences have taken place within individualist cultures with 
little or no emphasis on collective honour-must be understood with 
reference to the social display and recognition of honour. 
Challenge and Response 
The challenge and response `game' is the social process whereby honour is 
acquired, challenged, protected or lost. The constancy and pervasiveness of 
this process in eastern Mediterranean cultures have caused anthropologists 
to refer to them as `agonistic cultures', from the Greek ayov, meaning contest 
between equals. These are cultures where virtually every instance of social 
interaction outside the immediate family is seen as a contest for honour. '°° 
99 Ibid., p. 32-3. 
loo Ibid., p. 37. 
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c. nauenge (a Claim o en er 
the social space of 
another; can be 
positive or 
Positive Negati"egative) 
Word of praise Insult 
Gift Physical affront 
Request for help Threat 
Promise of help Threat and attempt at 
fulfilling it 
Receiving individual perceives the message in terms of claim to 
self-worth, in terms of potential dishonour to self-esteem, in a 
range running from simple questioning of self-esteem, to attack 
on, or denial of, self-esteem 
The individual/group must evaluate the challenge in terms of 
common, r)ublicly acknowledaed criteria/norms for iudaina 
Positive rejection Acceptance; Negative 
response which refusal/no 
requires counter- response 
Scorn/ isdain chall nge 
Dishonour 
Requires Exchange/game 
vengeance by continues 
original 
Figure 2.2 The Challenge-Response Game; after Bruce Malina, The New Testament 
World, p. 36 
The essence of the challenge and response game lies in 
communication between individuals or groups that are (or consider 
themselves to be) each other's social equals. These communications are 
necessarily public as honour is a socially acknowledged claim to status, and 
all attempts to alter or maintain that status must be socially evaluated. 
Challenge and response is a process that has at least three elements. 10' First, 
a challenge consisting of some action or utterance on the part of the 
challenger. Second, a perception of that message by both the individual or 
10' See ibid., pp. 34-7. 
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Receiving individual/group must respond, assured that a 
public verdict will immediately follow, resulting in a grant or 
rejection of honour 
group against which the challenge is directed, as well as by the public at 
large. Third, the response by the receiving individual/group together with 
the evaluation of that reaction by the public; even non-action will be socially 
interpreted as a sort of response meriting a grant of honour or its withdrawal 
(see the schematic overview in fig. 2.2). 
Physical space, be it one's body, territory or property, is a repository 
of honour. Physical affronts and violence symbolise the breaking of social 
and personal/intergroup boundaries, leading to resentment, 
the psychological state of feeling distressed and anxious because the 
expectations and demands of the ego are not acknowledged by the 
actual treatment a person receives at the hands of others... In brief, 
others refuse to recognize my honour and prestige, and their physical 
effrontery symbols that refusal. 102 
This kind of challenge requires a response that seeks to evict the challenger 
from the usurped physical space, thus delivering satisfaction. Failure to 
redress the balance and restore the status quo ante may mean leaving one's 
honour in a state of desecration, thus rendering oneself socially dishonoured 
and dishonourable. On the other hand-and this point must be emphasized- 
the mere attempt to restore one's honour, even if ultimately unsuccessful, 
may constitute the restoration of one's honour, the public reassertion of 
oneself as a person of honour, valour and standing. In all of this, as noted 
earlier, the publicity of the challenge, response and result is essential. 
Honour, Shame and the Palestinian National Movement 
These observations have consequences for our interpretation of the raison 
d'etre and behaviour of the Palestinian national movement on a number of 
levels, first of all with reference to the nakbah of 1948. The displacement of 
over 750,000 Palestinian Arabs from their homes and homeland must be 
understood not only as a disaster in its humanitarian and political 
consequences, but also in terms of its impact on the victims' sense of self- 
worth. The nakbah was an event that symbolized Zionist contempt for the 
Palestinians' social status by taking away their physical space, consigning 
102 Ibid., p. 40. 
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them to the ignominy of exile and homelessness. The Arab refusal to accept 
the 1947 partition plan, as well as the hyperbole and posturing attending the 
Arab states' unsuccessful attempt to respond militarily to the Zionist 
challenge, was as much an attempt to preserve honour as was the actual 
campaign. The Palestinians themselves, however, were defenceless and, as 
an emergent national community, found themselves at the mercy of other 
players for their most basic social and political needs. Their 
conceptualization as `refugees' rather than a people proper in UNGAR 194 
underscored their imposed social inferiority relative to both Israelis and 
other Arabs. Restoring physical space and national honour through 
resistance and struggle against imposed sociopolitical subordination thus 
became an important motor for the emergence of modern Palestinian 
national identity. 
The emergence of the fasa'il, the political guerrilla groups, a decade 
later constituted concrete attempts to restore Palestinian collective honour. 
"To declare Palestinian identity no longer means that one is a `refugee' or 
second-class citizen. Rather, it is a declaration that arouses pride because the 
Palestinian has become the fida'i or revolutionary who bears arms. "103 The 
destruction of Israel was from the outset an integral part of the national 
movement's response to the Zionist challenge; viewed within the framework 
of the challenge-response game, total opposition to Israel's existence was a 
sociocultural imperative. This is not to deny the political and ideological 
principles, nor the full range of human emotions involved. The honour- 
shame dialectic is, as noted above, nothing more than a culturally contingent 
manner in which to frame such emotions and passions, and the ideological 
principles involved were (often explicitly) conceived of as serving the end of 
"restoring the nation. "104 Accordingly, the language in which the various 
Palestinian organizations have presented their strategic objectives has been a 
fusion of ideological accounts with references to concepts that all serve the 
restoration of honour-return, independence, statehood and justice. Such 
references have never been mere throwaway phrases, although researchers 
103 Shihada Yussef, Palestinian Reality and the Union Movement (Beirut: n. p., 1973), pp. 39-40. 
Quoted in Yezid Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State. 
104 This expression has been used repeatedly by Palestinian rejectionists leaders and cadres in 
conversations and interviews with the author. 
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have often treated them as such; within terrorism studies, scholars have 
tended to see this symbolic language as mere self-rationalization of immoral 
crimes, 105 or else as semantic devices whereby more sinister intentions and 
rationales are obscured. 1o6 Nonetheless, caving into the `reality' of Zionist 
occupation would enforce the collective dishonour brought upon the 
Palestinians in 1948, and would moreover bring collective and individual 
shame on the factions and persons who dared contemplate it. Resistance, 
total liberation and return have thus been sociocultural, as well as political 
imperatives. 
The honour-shame dichotomy has also been crucial as regards the 
intergroup relations internal to the Palestinian national movement. While 
the honour restoration project has been an integral, even foundational 
rationale for almost every major faction within the movement, different 
ideologies, patrons, personalities and organizational dynamics have led to 
diverging approaches to the optimal way in which to realize that restitution. 
Moreover, the different organizations have arisen out of distinct ideological 
concepts, the proponents of each wanting to demonstrate that their tactics 
and strategies are the optimal ones. Within each group, subsequent internal 
socialization experiences-the internal construction of social realities-have 
given rise to diverging notions of what exactly is the minimum requirement 
for satisfaction of national honour and what are the best ways to attain it. 
Chapter four analyses the history of the rejectionist current within the 
Palestinian national movement with reference to its conception of national, 
factional and individual honour. It argues that a combination of maximalist 
patrons (very much concerned with their own social status, power and 
honour), revolutionary ideologies and structural subordination within the 
national movement, compounded by inherently antagonistic intergroup 
relations vis-a-vis Arafat's Fateh movement, caused the rejectionist factions 
pos For an insight into the use of textual sources within terrorism studies, see Bonnie Cordes, `When 
Terrorists do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature, ' in Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 10, 
no. 4 (December 1987); cf. Jerrold M. Post, `Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a 
Product of Psychological Forces, ' in Walter Reich (ed. ), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies. 
Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (New York et alibi: Cambridge University Press, 1990); see 
also his `Notes on a Psychodynamic of Terrorist Behaviour, ' in Terrorism, vol. 7, no. 3 (1984), pp- 
241-56. 
106 See Paul Wilkinson, 'Ethical Defences of Terrorism-Defending the Indefensible, ' Terrorism and 
Political Violence, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1989), pp. 7-20. 
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to place their conception of the acceptable minimum requirement for 
satisfaction at a much higher level than the PLO/PA leadership. Several of 
the rejectionist factions, if one is prepared to listen to and take seriously their 
own statements and accounts, are not now, nor were they in the past 
inherently opposed to peace and diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution. 
They have differed from the PLO/PA leadership in their analyses of the 
utility of particular diplomatic instruments (such as the Geneva conference, 
the Reagan plan and Oslo), and of diplomacy that is not backed up by 
military force-but not of diplomacy per se. They differed on the issue of 
necessary prerequisites for participating in diplomatic negotiation. They also 
differed on the question of how to use diplomacy and to what end. These 
were qualitative differences that, ultimately, were connected to their views of 
the restoration of national honour; not wanting to be perceived by the 
Palestinian people as selling out and dishonouring them, as well as 
themselves. 
PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
The necessity to get satisfaction for the dishonour of 1948 has been an 
important motor for the Palestinian national movement as a whole from the 
196os until the present; differences in perceptions of the implications of 
restoring honour has been an important catalyst for the rejectionist- 
mainstream dialectic. Related to the honour concept, a further salient feature 
of eastern Mediterranean social affairs with a profound impact on 
Palestinian interfactional relations lies in the region's entrenched patron- 
client dynamics. Not only have many or most of the factions within the 
national movement, at one point in time or another, found themselves 
clients of states in the region, but the national movement's larger factions 
have acted as patrons of the smaller ones. Thus, because of the relevance to 
the present thesis of patronage and clientilism on several levels, this is an 
issue that requires close examination. Unfortunately, like culture generally, 
patron-client relations have given rise to a number of spurious analytical 
models within Middle East studies, which have then been put to dubious 
uses. A brief overview and critique of what patronage and clientilism are 
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generally considered to entail is therefore necessary before we can articulate 
a positive understanding of the concept. 
Political science and international relations are no strangers to 
patron-client dynamics. East Germany, Syria, Iraq and Cuba under Castro 
were but a few clients of the Soviet Union, just as Chile, Israel, Indonesia and 
Cuba under Batista have been clients of the United States. In the context of 
Cold War superpower rivalry, patronage and clientilism were issues of global 
significance, and thus became areas of intense scholarly examination. This 
global perspective issued forth into a view of `the patron-client dynamic' as a 
matter of universalizable, functional power politics based on rational choice; 
it was, after all, an integral part of the global balance of power, supposedly 
determined by pure reason and rationalism. Clients-an overarching 
category of actors extrapolated from a wide range of cases-were 
essentialized into actors that "have attached themselves to [powerful 
patrons] for reasons of ambition or in order to use them to protect or extend 
some particular interest. "107 A patron, in turn, was considered an actor that 
protects and assists less powerful ones, expecting them to reciprocate by 
sustaining the patron's political hegemony. It is "a two-way process-patron 
and client both need each other-and... it is also something that has to be 
worked at, attended to, over time. "b08 
In a patron-client relationship, both states normally expect to gain: 
although the patron gives up economic or military goods, its benefits 
may include access to new markets for its exports and a broader 
international political coalition (or, perhaps, a narrower coalition for 
its primary adversary). [... ] The client's costs in such a relationship are 
often rather small. In fact, the smaller member of the patron-client 
often has a bargaining advantage because of its ability to turn to 
another patron if it is unsatisfied with its current level of support. 109 
107 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modem Middle East (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 46. 
108 Ibid.; cf. I. William Zartman, `Political Dynamics in the Maghrib: The Cultural Dialectic. 
' in 
Halim Barakat (ed. ), Contemporary North Africa (Washington. DC: Centre for Contemporary Arab 
Studies, 1985), pp. 28-9 
109 Gerald L. Sorokin, `Patrons, Clients, and Allies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, ' Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 20, no 1 (March 1997), p. 49. 
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The Middle East regional political system has offered fertile ground for 
scholarly studies in which patron-client relations have been central. 110 The 
literature evidences the specious assumption, however, that just as the 
superpowers entered into rational choice-based, instrumental patron-client 
relations with the Middle Eastern state actors, so these links were replicated 
on a micro-level in the- bonds between regional states and substate 
organizations, including those within the Palestinian national movement. 11' 
Thus, conceptual models constructed for analyses of interstate politics were 
transferred to substate level. Although they continue to be deployed by 
scholars, these models' total divorce from sociocultural realities and 
contingencies render them inherently unable to offer meaningful 
understanding of substate level patron-client dynamics. 112 
The alternative to such universalized abstraction can be found in 
equally dissatisfying political culture theorizing, which typically tends to 
examine Arab states' domestic patron-client relations with reference to 
patriarchy within traditional kinship-based social ingroups, the asabiyya. 113 
To be sure, the historical depth and persistence of asabiyya dynamics have 
served to entrench patronage and clientilism throughout the eastern 
Mediterranean, 114 but this observation is a far cry from arguing that it forms 
the basis for a deterministic model of political behaviour-115A representative 
110 See, for instance, Seth P. Tillman, The United States and the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana. University Press, 1982); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers, 
and the War in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1987); Pedro Ramet, The Soviet-S rr 
Relationship Since 1955 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990); Efraim Karsh, Soviet Policy Towards Syria 
Since 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1991); David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of 
Israel (New York et alibi: Oxford University Press, 1993); Shibley Telhami, U. S. Policy in th e 
Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Emirates Lecture 7 (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for 
Strategic Studies and Research, 1997). 
I" See, for instance, Aaron David Miller, The PLO and the Politics of Survival: The Washington 
Papers/99 (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1983); Kemal Kerisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study 
of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986) 
112 Question marks attend game theories' and rational choice models' applicability also to 
international politics. See Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, ch. 1. 
113 For a somewhat speculative overview of the contemporary effects of the asabiyya, see Hisham 
Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, 2°d edition (New York et 
alibi: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
114 For the significance of these concepts within the Hellenistic cultural sphere see, for instance. J. K. 
Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage. 
115 These quasi-racist models of cultural essentialism have an interesting dual use. Partly they are 
deployed to demonstrate how Arab and Islamic tradition render those within its sway hostile to 
democracy and democratization, partly they reinforce and legitimize the arguments of Arab neo- 
traditionalists-primarily the Emirs of the Persian Gulf-that democratic governance is not the `crab 
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example of such a model, however, can be found in the work of Olivier Roy, 
who has distinguished between three types of substate patron-client 
relations in the Middle East-116 First, the "purely instrumental and 
temporary. This is built up around one man invested with a certain power 
and does not survive after he loses this position. " Second is the traditional 
asabiyya model, which "precedes the setting up of a state society and which 
then dominates the field of politics. " The third type is the `modern solidarity 
group, ' "which did not exist prior to the state or rather which only acquired 
cohesion from the existence of the state. Such a body is formed in a modern 
political situation and functions thereafter as a `solidarity group' according to 
modes of inter-personal relations identical to those of the traditional 
asabiyya, namely endogamy, patronage, nepotism. " After correctly 
observing that the first type is ephemeral and has no sociological reality, Roy 
goes on to argue that the dynamics and functions of the latter two types are 
"identical" because Arab politics, quite simply, is about asabiyya dynamics; 
he approvingly quotes Seurat's remark that "The modem state in the 
Machrek is an asabiyya which has been successful. "117 
In Roy's approach, the sociocultural heritage of which the asabiyya is 
part forms not a cultural lens that may aid in our understanding of a 
particular social phenomenon-such as, for instance, `Alawi or Tikriti 
political hegemony in Syria and Iraq respectively-but a determinate model 
for how domestic politics and state building works in the Arab and Islamic 
world, from Morocco to Tajikistan. 118 This amounts to what Rapport and 
Overing have referred to as the "politics of exotica, " the use of cultural 
concepts for the purpose of "distancing ourselves-politically, 
epistemologically, morally, technologically, mentally-in time and space 
from all other peoples of the world. "119 Gellner made this exoticism explicit 
by remarking that "we may as well admit that [patronage] appeals to our 
way. ' See Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political 
Authority in an Arab State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
116 See Olivier Roy, `Patronage and Solidarity Groups: Survival and Reformation, ' in Ghassan 
Salame (ed. ), Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London 
and New York, 1994). 
1" Ibid., p. 272; the quote is taken from M. Seurat, L'Etat de barbarie (Paris: 1989), p. 131. 
118 Roy takes his case studies form Morocco and Tajikistan "at both extremes" of the Arab-Islamic 
cultural sphere, and implies that whatever occurs in between will conform to the same pattern; p. 272. 
119 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 100. 
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political voyeurism. We like to observe a political relationship which we 
suspect of being illicit. "120 According one's research subjects all the dignity of 
a political peepshow, there is no underlying recognition of human 
commonality but a mere dissection of the `cultural other'-as usual conceived 
of as merely an object of inquiry. 
These approaches reflect a lack of critical thought about social change, 
its catalysts, implications and effects. While the concept of asabiyya may aid 
us in understanding instances of patronage and clientilism, their various and 
specific appearances in the world of human interaction are not only 
socioculturally but also historically contingent, and, ultimately, in a state of 
constant evolution. To paraphrase Heraclitus of Ephesus-we step, yet do 
not step into the same cultural rivers twice. 
Patron-Client Dynamics: The Centrality of Reciprocity 
For a more nuanced and realistic understanding of patron-client dynamics, 
this thesis turns yet again to contemporary anthropology. Here, patronage 
and clientilism tend to be approached with neither the formalizing and 
abstract tendencies of international relations, nor references to generalized 
explanatory models Of `the Arab mind. ' Utilitarian functionalism based on 
rational choice is acknowledged as central to the patron-client relationship, 
but so is sociocultural contingency. Anthropology's focus is the `cognitive 
glue' that holds these relations together; this `glue' is what, for our purposes, 
is most interesting. 
Accepting that there is a measure of instrumental, goal-oriented 
choice involved in patron-client relationships, as well as a measure of 
cultural contingency, the next question to ask is, `what holds the parties 
together? ' At the heart of the bond between patrons and clients in the eastern 
Mediterranean, argues Malina, lies reciprocity, 
a sort of implicit, nonlegal contractual obligation, unenforceable by 
any authority apart from one's sense of honor and shame. By means of 
this principle of reciprocity, the honorable person selects (or is 
120 Ernest Gellner. `Patrons and Clients, ' in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (eds. ) Patrons and 
Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London: Duckworth and the Centre for Mediterranean Studies of 
the American Universities Field Staff, 1977), p. 1. 
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selected by) another for a series of ongoing, unspecified acts of mutual 
support. 121 
Returning to the honour concept is not a means of establishing a tidy 
analytical framework to serve the present thesis, but a reflection of the fact 
that eastern Mediterranean patron-client relations are utterly 
unenforceable-and would be practically impossible-without a range of 
social norms and codes related to honour and shame. These "dyadic 
contracts"122 are initiated by means of a positive challenge (see fig. 2.1 
above), which signals the start of an ongoing reciprocal relationship. A 
gesture, petition or gift may set the patron-client process off. When a helping 
hand is extended, Malina points out, it is important to remember that "in 
reality there are no free gifts, just gifts which mark the initiation or 
continuance of an ongoing reciprocal relationship. "123 If the two parties have 
the same social status one can talk about a "colleague contract. " A patron- 
client contract, however, is distinct because the "relationship is asymmetrical 
since the partners are not social equals and make no pretense to equality. "124 
"What patrons offer is `favors. ' A favor refers to some object, good, or 
action that is either unavailable at all or unavailable at a given time. "125 
Patronage and clientilism in the eastern Mediterranean are intimately 
connected with the idea of the limited good, the perception (emanating from 
peasant society) that all social, economic and natural resources exist only in 
limited, finite quantity and are always in short supply. This perception arose 
out of the fact that individuals' existences were limited by the resources of 
their village or immediate area, which were also very much the limit of the 
world as verified by their experience. Describing clients' search for social 
security in historical eastern Mediterranean peasant society, Malina 
explains: 
Their approach was pragmatic and eclectic, based on trial and error, 
and in a spirit of `nothing ventured, nothing gained, ' so typical of 
121 Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World, p. 100. 
122 George M. Foster, `The Anatomy of Envy: A 
Anthropology, vol. 13 (1972), pp. 165-202 
"Bruce J. Malin, The New Testament World, p. 101. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., p. 102. 
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traditional peasant society. Thus honorable persons looked for ways 
to interest and obligate potential partners whom they felt could help 
them, and in so doing committed themselves to carry out the terms of 
the contract with those who, in effect, accepted their offer. [Thus they] 
maximized their interests and security posture in the uncertain world 
in which they lived. 126 
As eastern Mediterranean societies have `moved on' in terms of societal 
structures, modes of production and so forth, goods that were once limited 
and finite are no longer so. Even today, however, certain goods only exist in 
finite quantities and are subject to intense competition; in such situations, 
traditional patron-client processes are eminently appropriate to address the 
problem. As regards Palestine specifically, physical space-that is, land-and 
honour have intermingled so as to become inseparable, and both of these are 
limited goods. 127 Within the Palestinian national movement, the ability and 
power to affect the trajectory of the collective political effort-issuing in 
social status-has always been limited and subject to fierce competition. 
Land, honour and political power have thus been at the heart of Palestinian 
factional politics and the source of the search for patrons. 
Patron-Client Dynamics as `Proximity of Discourse' 
If reciprocity enforceable by honour lies at the heart of patron-client 
dynamics, which are set in motion by a positive challenge-what determines 
the choice of whom to challenge? As regards the Palestinian national 
movement specifically, its various factions have entered into such relations 
with a host of states, including Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and 
Iran. Within the rejectionist current, smaller factions such as the PRCP and 
PPSF have found important patrons in more prominent factions such as 
PFLP, PFLP-GC and Fateh-Intifada. In the case of state patronages, these 
have often been mutually exclusive due to interstate rivalries and conflict, 
and the patron-client relations may have served to deprive another state of 
clout, or to deploy the Palestinian factions to strike against Arab foes. This 
thesis does not seek to obfuscate the fact that for much of the 1970s and 8os, 
several of the factions within the Palestinian national movement served as 
'261bid., pp. 102-3. 
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proxy combatants for their various Arab patrons. The question at hand is 
`why? ' Should their clientilism be understood as simply being `guns for hire, ' 
or have there been other significant dynamics at play? 
Robert Paine has defined a patron as someone whose power lies in 
having his own values affirmed by others, who come to identify themselves 
as clients. 128 It is patron-client relations in this sense, as converging 
discourse rather than as pure rational choice, that can shed light on its 
prevalence in the eastern Mediterranean and, more specifically, as regards 
the historical and current bonds between regional state actors and factions 
within the Palestinian national movement. At its broadest, discourse can be 
understood to mean ways of speaking that are commonly practiced and 
specifically situated in a social environment, "speech in habitual situations of 
social exchange. "129 Within these situations there are relations of social 
power and dominance, which condition not only agents' speech, but also 
their behaviour, objectives and allegiances. Dell Hymes has stressed the 
regularity of ways of speaking practiced by human beings in particular times 
and places, and the close ties between modes of speaking, behaving and 
interacting. Within what Hymes terms the "speech-community, " there are 
shared rules concerning the conduct and interpretation of speech. 130 The 
ability to set these rules marks out a patron. A brief overview of some 
insights from discourse analysis can illuminate how this is so. 131 
Discourse finds a useful conceptual parallel in Wittgenstein's notion 
of the "language-game, " a mode of speech-making in which people habitually 
engage, accompanied by particular habitual actions. 132 Language-game is an 
attempt to convey the embeddedness of speech-making in routine social 
relationships and behaviours, the "formulaic way in which speech 
accompanies everyday social interaction and amounts to a whole form of 
127 Honour as limited good has been a subject of close anthropological scrutiny for the past several 
decades. For some of the more significant works in the field, see note 97 (infra). 
128 Robert Paine, `A Theory of Patronage and Brokerage, ' in Robert Paine (ed. ), Patrons and Brokers 
in the East Arctic (St John's, Canada: ISER Press, 1971). 
129 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 117. 
130 Dell Hymes, `Models of Interaction of Language and Social Life, ' in J. Gumperz and D. Hymes 
(eds. ) Directions in Sociolinguistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). 
131 For an insightful and cutting critique of the elevation of discourse to form the parameters of social 
scientific inquiry, see Brian Palmer, Descent Into Discourse (Temple University Press, 1990); c£ G. 
Brown and G. Yule Discourse Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
132 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). 
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life. "33 "What the concepts of discourse and language-game share is their 
insistence on intrinsic ties between speech and behaviour, between the 
linguistic and the socio-cultural, and between individual speakers and social 
conventions. "134 Garfinkel has emphasized the ways in which everyday 
conversation is mediated by a set of common background expectancies 
shared by the speakers; an engagement in habitual discourse maintains and 
reinforces a common world-view and a common set of social structures in 
whose terms speakers lived. 135 
An important insight for our purposes has been offered by Paine, who 
distinguishes rhetoric as a particular kind of discourse, arguing that while 
most speech-acts concern "speech about something" the kernel of rhetoric is 
that "saying is doing. "136 Hence, rhetoric as an activity most closely 
resembles music or drama, where act and effect are indissoluble. The effect 
which rhetoric most often intends is persuasion, most obviously, perhaps, in 
the realm of politics. 137 While the persuasion of an audience by a speaker is 
the most apparent rhetorical `direction, ' a speaker may also be persuaded by 
his or her own words. Rhetoric may thus serve to persuade both the 
transmitting and receiving party.. 138 In either case, 
Rhetoric can be seen as an instrument by which a speaker gains or 
increases control over a political environment. And once this control 
becomes routinized, institutionalized, then control over language, 
over the right to speak, may be defined as an essential base of power 
and authority. 139 
133 Nigel Rapport, Talking Violence: An Anthropological Interpretation of Conversation in the City 
(St. John's, Canada: ISER Press, 1987), p. 170. 
134 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthopology, p. 118. 
135 Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967). 
136 Robert Paine, When Saying is Doing, ' in Robert Paine (ed. ) Politically Speaking (St John's 
Canada: ISER Press, 1981), p. 9. 
137 An important critique of this view of rhetoric can be found in the work of Lisa Wedeen, who 
argues, in the case of Syrian official rhetoric, that is serves to generate public dissimulation rather 
than persuasion. 
138 Robert Paine, `When Saying is Doing'; cf. Rapport and Overing, Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, p. 199 
139 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 119. 
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Austin has characterized speech as having meaning, force and effect. 140 In 
particular, an important range of speech-acts-`preformative utterances'- 
does not merely describe the social world, but give it form and content too. 
This is speech with the `illocutionary force' to create social happenings, 
"speech as an instrument of social action with significant social 
consequences. "141 Lastly, Burke has observed that symbolically mediated and 
interactionally coordinated forms of behaviour-such as speech, gestures and 
ways of dressing-could be studied for the ways they are used artfully so as to 
influence other beliefs and attitudes. 142 The effects of the successful use of 
rhetoric may be to cause an audience to achieve a state of identification with 
a speaker, "whereby aspects of the social identity or being of the people 
involved in the rhetorical encounter come more closely to approximate one 
another. "143 
At this point we can return to Paine's suggestion that a patron is 
someone whose power is to have values of his own express choosing affirmed 
by others. This, then, is not true only for a patron of the arts, but also for a 
political patron; according to Burke there may be no significant difference 
between the two. 144 
Discursive Patronage and the Palestinian National Movement 
Following Paine and Burke, we may view patronage and chentilism as based 
on rational choice, enforced by honour and sustained by the discursive 
proximity of the two parties. This, then, can offer significant insights into 
previously unacknowledged dynamics within the Palestinian factions' 
relations with the region's state actors. 
140 See, in particular, J. L. Austin, `Performative-Constative, ' in J. Searle (ed. ) The Philosophy of 
Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975). 
14' Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 119. 
142 See K. Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1973). 
14' Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, p. 119. 
144 At this point some mention need be made of the conspicuous absence of references to the work of 
Michel Foucault, from which virtually any discussions of discourse set forth in the past couple of 
decades are considered inextricable. While those sympathetic to the Foucauldian method and modes 
of thought would invariably disagree, Foucault's relevance to the present thesis is minimal. His 
disregard for human agency and cogency, and for the culturally and individually specific, together 
with a deterministic view of social affairs (signified by his replacement of individual mentalities with 
collective "governmentalities") places his work far beyond the pale of the theoretically useful for a 
project such as the present. 
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Kazziha tells us that "the relationship between the Arab regimes and 
the Palestine question has, since the First World War, been a continuous 
theme in Arab politics. "145 Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, the 
Palestinian Arabs' failed attempts to retain their land and limit Zionist 
settlements elicited strong sympathy and solidarity throughout the Arab 
world. The nakbah consolidated the emergent pan-Arab currents outside 
Palestine, and presented the Arabs with a tangible example of the 
transgressions of Zionism and Western imperialism. As noted above, the 
Zionist endeavour amounted to an encroachment on Arab physical space. 
Importantly, it was in the struggle for Palestine that the generation of 
Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi military officers that were to subsequently shape 
Arab politics gained their first substantive taste of `Arab brotherhood. '146 It 
also gave them a common rallying point, and the failures of the Egyptian, 
Syrian, and Iraqi monarchies to successfully aid the Palestinians in 1948 
were major catalysts for the subsequent nationalist revolutions in those 
countries, which in turn ensured that the liberation of Palestine became a 
focal point of regional politics and synonymous with the restoration of Arab 
honour-147 
The ability to have decisive influence on the struggle against Zionism 
and thereby be seen to lead the effort to restore national Arab honour 
became an important motor for Arab regional politics and relations in the 
decade following the nakbah. Accordingly, each state sought to manipulate 
the collective, interstate discourse, to excel in embodying pan-Arab ideals, 
and in championing the cause of Palestine. 148 As the fasa'il emerged and 
grew stronger, developing into independent political entities with their own 
agendas and objectives, discursive hegemony within the Arab state system 
came to necessitate patronage of factions within the Palestinian movement. 
Prospective clients were approached by the various states-issued with a 
"positive challenge" consisting of weapons, training facilities, funding, and so 
gas Wed Kazziha, 'The Impact of Palestine on Arab Politics', in Luciani & G. Salame (eds. ), The 
Politics of Arab Integration (Croom Helm, London, 1988), p. 213. 
146 For Gamal `Abd al-Nasser's own account of serving as an officer for Palestine, see his Toute la 
Verite sur la Guerre de Palestine (Cairo: Direction des Relations Publiques des Forces Armdes, 
1955). 
147 See Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades 
from Nationalism to Marxism (London and Tonbridge: Charles Knight, 1975), ch. 1. 
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forth-insofar as they were considered attuned to the patron's cognitive 
approach to dealing with the Palestinian problem and fitted within its 
discursive parameters. The intended client would respond to the approach 
according to its perception of the tactical utility of the alignment, on the one 
hand, and the appeal of the potential patron's official discourse, on the other. 
Chapters four and five deal with the various specific relations between 
patronage and discourse throughout the history of the rejectionist trend. It 
suffices for the moment to note that durable patron-client relationships have 
required discursive compatibility, which is not to be equated with political 
sameness. Within the parameters of a given discourse there is scope for 
diverging views and ideas. The proximity lies in the rhetorical devices-the 
communicative symbols, the ways in which those symbols are deployed and 
the contexts within which they are meant to be interpreted by audiences. For 
example, it is widely accepted that the PFLP-GC is one of Syria's most 
entrenched clients, yet their ideological, tactical and strategic visions have at 
times been widely divergent (as will be seen in later chapters). Nonetheless, 
the rhetorical devices by which they have sought to justify their positions, the 
`objective political backdrop'. against which they have presented their 
activities to their audiences, and the means and methods they have 
considered legitimate or required in their political struggle have been 
virtually identical. Syria and the PFLP-GC have been a patron-client `success 
story, ' not because they have pursued the same political end, but because 
they have co-existed within the same discursive universe. 
At this juncture it seems warranted to point out that the wish to 
control the Palestinian arena and compete in the regional balance of power 
game should not be equated with mere cynical manipulation of the 
Palestinian factions, as power political ambition in no way precludes the 
existence of idealistic ambitions or ideological aspirations. Moreover, for 
states, the principal importance of acquiring clients has not been to attain 
proxy combatants but to have their discourse validated. Such validation has 
boosted their status within the Arab states system by enabling them to 
influence the direction of the Palestinian national movement. For the 
individual factions, similarly, a patron has never been merely a supplier of 
148 See Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 87-98 
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arms and funding, but a state within whose discursive universe they could 
feel politically comforted and comfortable. This power relation has not been 
as asymmetrical as is often assumed, however. While the patron sets forth its 
official discourse and `offers' it to a prospective client, the client has the 
freedom of choice to respond to such overtures in a number of ways. 
Furthermore, should a discursive dissonance develop within a patron-client 
relation, the client can at any time terminate the ongoing reciprocity 
(preferably in accordance with the norms of the challenge-response game), 
and seek out another, more suitable patron-149 If all goes well, however, 
patron and client both reaffirm and validate each other's claim to honour 
and social status-within their respective sociopolitical spheres-and 
reinforce the soundness of each other's discourse. What may begin as a 
marriage of convenience may lead to a durable working relationship, 
sustained by commonality of discourse and enforced by the parties' sense of 
honour and obligation. Moreover, as rhetorical discourse within the patron- 
client relation becomes routinized and institutionalized, it may be 
internalized by both parties to the extent that they come to identify with each 
other. Convinced by the force of their own rhetoric, so to speak, the parties 
develop loyalties towards one another, which may be difficult and even 
disagreeable for either to extricate itself from. In this way, rational choice, 
discourse and honour may converge to form durable patron-client relations. 
A MACRO-FRAMEWORK OF ARAB STATE POLITICS 
The three significant levels of intergroup dynamics-between factions within 
the rejectionist assemblies, between the rejectionist assemblies and the 
PLO/PA leadership, and between the rejectionist assemblies and the refugee 
communities-take place within a wider framework provided by the 
`objective constraints' of the regional and international balance of power. 
Michael Barnett has offered a constructivist model for understanding the 
processes of Arab politics that is of great relevance to the present thesis. 15° 
He views Arab politics as "a series of dialogues between Arab states 
regarding the desired regional order, " an ongoing debate about the norms of 
149 Cf. Sorokin's remark, note 133 (infra). 
"50 Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. 
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Arab politics and the relationships of those norms to their Arab identities. '51 
Practical politics in the Arab state system, he argues, has thus been an 
expression of the parties' positions on the preferred political order. Providing 
an important macro-parallel to our present study, Barnett argues 
persuasively that "Arab states competed through symbolic means to control 
the foreign policies of their rivals and determine the norms of Arabism... 
their weapons of influence and control have derived from the symbols of 
Arabism. "152 What Barnett aptly terms "presentational politics" is, in fact, 
key to understanding the rejectionist project. 153 "The tools of [inter-Arab] 
conflict did not come from a military arsenal. They came from a cultural 
storehouse. "154 
A cautionary caveat must be inserted at this point. While the 
structures and processes of the regional and international systems may be 
constructed through the interaction of powerful actors, less powerful ones 
stand in a different relationship to these structures. For actors such as the 
various rejectionist assemblies, and for the Palestinian national movement as 
a whole, the international and regional environment has presented-to all 
intents and purposes-a number of `objective realities. ' The ability of these 
overpowering contexts to affect the movement has not been dependent on 
the movement itself; the APF, for instance, has never been engaged in 
constructing the regional balance of power but constantly been made subject 
to it. Thus, while the structures and processes of the international and 
regional systems may well be contingent constructs, whether or not they 
function as such to any given actor is subject to that actor's own power 
capabilities. 
As we examine the history of the rejectionist movement, there are 
three areas of `objective reality' that emerge as particularly significant 
through their continuing impact on the Palestinian national movement. The 
changing international and regional balance of power has affected issues 
such as the level of Soviet support and US attitudes towards the PLO as a 
negotiating partner. Fluctuations in Israel's domestic balance of power have 
151 Ibid., preface. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid., p. 2 (n. 5). 
154 Ibid., p. 11. 
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affected Israeli principles of interaction with the Palestinian national 
movement, ranging from warfare to negotiations. Relations between the 
Arab states have impacted on the crucial matters of state patronage, 
operational abilities and levels of political independence. These are all areas 
in which the Palestinian groups have been the subjects of constraints and 
opportunities, not partners, in creating them. 
Even so, Barnett's approach integrates systemic structures with 
sociocultural processes and notions of power political instrumentalism. "The 
challenge, " he suggests, "is to acknowledge this social character [of Arab 
politics] without forgetting that actors are frequently strategic and 
manipulative. Indeed, they could not be strategic and manipulative if there 
were no social foundations or normative expectations to exploit and use for 
ulterior purposes. "155 Barnett provides a model for understanding the 
processes through which important regional actors have integrated genuine 
political idealism with cynical power politics, producing seemingly erratic 
political behaviour that is difficult to comprehend through the application of 
traditional models of international relations. When contextualized within 
socially and culturally meaningful frameworks, however, they emerge 
lucidly. 
Barnett clearly shows that projecting unfavourable reflections on a 
rival in order to manipulate his behaviour is a well-entrenched tactic in Arab 
politics. He also points to the symbolic and essentially negotiated 
significance of `objective' political processes and constraints, an insight that 
affects the present study of rejectionist efforts. As events and developments 
beyond the control of the Palestinian national movement occur, these are 
likely to gain both `objective' and `subjective' significances. The movement's 
encounters with the world around it are incorporated into the national 
mythology and lore, and acquire deep symbolic and normative values. Thus, 
they become matters of interpretation and not infrequently establish 
themselves as pivotal to intergroup competition. The `Black September' 
calamity, for instance, had a direct impact on the Palestinian national 
movement as its fighters were expelled from Jordan, depriving them of their 
most advantageous base of operations. The event was quickly incorporated 
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into the national lore and a process of interpretation ensued, which has 
contributed to shaping intergroup conflict within the Palestinian movement 
ever since; the normative dimensions and implications of Black September 
reverberated long after the movement had recovered from the loss of its 
bases in the Jordan Valley. The 1967 defeat, the Battle of Karameh156, Syrian 
intervention against the Palestinians during the Lebanese civil war, Israel's 
invasions of Lebanon, the 1983 split within Fateh, the siege of Tal al-Za'tar- 
all these have been significant events both in terms of practical impact and 
symbolic reverberation. 
SUMMATION 
This chapter has outlined why and how the significant other towards whom 
rejectionist efforts are directed is the PLO/PA leadership, not Israel. To be 
sure, rejectionist rhetoric and symbolism have always highlighted 
irreconcilability towards, and confrontation with `the Zionist enemy, ' and 
done so in a highly demonstrative manner. The reasons for such behaviour- 
and why this demonstrative rhetoric cannot be taken at face value-have 
been described in this chapter. Rejectionism is not a term describing virulent 
anti-Israeli fanaticism but a primarily inter-Arab or inter-Palestinian 
political category. Every Palestinian rejectionist assembly has coalesced in 
reaction to perceived deviance and lack of `steadfastness' (sumud) on the 
part of the Palestinian leadership. In this context it is instructive to note that 
the lexicographical meaning of the word sumud, derived from the root 
samada, is "to raise one's head proudly. "157 It is a term that has become 
saturated with political connotations, equating resistance with the 
preservation of honour. 
`Rejectionist ideology' has not been Marxism-Leninism, socialist 
nationalism, Islamism, or any other faction-specific interpretation of the 
national heritage, but a generalizable nationalism based on honour and 
resistance, thus accessible to all Palestinians regardless of factional 
155 Ibid., preface. 
156 Karameh's use for the construction of myth within the Palestinian national movement is lucidly 
discussed in W. Andrew Terrill, The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karameh', Middle East 
Journal, vol. 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 91-111. 
15' Hans Wehr, ed. J. Milton Cowan, Arabic-English Dictionary. (Ithaca, NY: Spoken 
Language Services, 1994), p. 500. 
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preference. As a political concept, rejectionism stands apart from traditional 
political opposition by virtue of its general withdrawal and isolation from 
what it considers the offending parts of the movement. Thus, while 
rejectionism shares with opposition "the unusual characteristic of being 
defined partly by what it opposes, " it seeks to not "[develop] within and in 
opposition to an ideological and institutional framework...... 158 Instead, its 
institutional frameworks have grown out of the ideologies it encompasses 
and the patron-client relations that sustain it, and they have been erected in 
contradistinction to the frameworks of the PLO/PA leadership that it rejects. 
Engagement, it is thought in rejectionist circles, cannot be constructive but 
necessarily validates the interlocutor's errant ideas. 159 This is a divisive 
tendency, and some factions, notably the PFLP and DFLP, have consistently 
been torn between the principles of opposition-which place value on 
national unity under the PLO umbrella-and rejection-which implies 
factional severance from that unity, for the sake of `a higher purpose. ' 
This thesis suggests that we should understand rejectionism as, 
essentially, a structurally subordinate `counterculture' within the Palestinian 
national movement, which seeks to demarcate the difference between its 
oppositional nationalism and the PLO/PA's official nationalism by 
reference to an outside `other, ' Israel. It is only in relation to the `other' that 
identifying the `self becomes meaningful160 and the content of the `self is in 
part determined by its relationship to the `other. ' By demonstratively and 
ceaselessly contrasting the national leadership's positions vis-a-vis Israel 
with its own adherence to the culturally resonant ideals of armed struggle, 
total liberation, and comprehensive right to return, the objective of 
rejectionism has been to assert social status, offset the leadership's 
`defeatism' and restore factional and national honour. 
Asa Lisa Anderson, `Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism' in John L. Esposito 
(ed. ) Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 
18-19. 
's9 It is possible to argue, although beside the point for the purposes of the present thesis, that this 
attitude stems from another set of culturally embedded norms identified as salient in the eastern 
Mediterranean-purity codes and practices. For foundational literature, see Mary Douglas, Purity and 
Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1966); Jerome H. Neyrey, `Unclean, Common, Polluted and Taboo, ' Forum, vol. 4, no. 4 (1988), pp. 
72-8. 
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Thus, rejectionist politics has not been about violence and 
destruction, but, rather, about competing with the PLO/PA leadership in 
constructing collective norms and guidelines, forging the national identity. 
Wedeen has pointed out that successful use of rhetoric and symbols can 
produce, among other things, legitimacy and the ability of "political leaders 
to win support for themselves and their policies by fostering collective 
ethnic, national, or class identifications. "161 The notion that nationalism 
creates the nation rather than vice versa would reinforce the prima facie 
viability of the rejectionist project. 162 
Rejectionism's `essence' lies in its behaviour rather than its agenda; it 
reacts to perceived transgressions against social norms, in accordance with 
patterns of behaviour described above as attending the challenge and 
response game. Cutting ties with the PLO leadership, adopting 
demonstrative positions that are the antithesis of those of Arafat and 
proclaiming the inadmissibility of Israel's existence are all part and parcel of 
this behavioural pattern. Far from being `kindergarten politics, ' this 
behaviour is rooted in the socioculturally entrenched honour-shame 
dialectic; the preservation of honour and enhancement of social status 
should be seen, not contrary to rationality but as a socioculturally contingent 
instance of rational agency. Because of the rejectionists' and the PLO/PA 
leadership's divergent perceptions of what is required for the restoration of 
honour, this dialectic has accompanied their dealings since prior to the 
guerrillas' take-over of the PLO. 
The rejectionist trend sees itself as the guardian of the national 
movement's intellectual heritage, and the PLO/PA leadership sees itself as 
the de facto motor of the movement; as the following chapters will 
demonstrate, both views have considerable justification. Viewing 
rejectionism as a dynamic force whose behaviour is conditioned by a mixture 
of rational choices, cultural cues and intergroup dynamics-rather than a 
160 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 12. See also Edward 
Said, Orientalism; Stuart Hall, `Introduction: Who Needs Identity? ' in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay 
(eds. ) Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996). 
161 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, pp. 5-6. 
162 See Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780; Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
81 
static rejection of peace and diplomacy-allows us to make sense of its 
otherwise perplexing features. In this context it is important to recall that 
restoration of honour does not require one to be successful in one's response, 
simply to not let the challenge pass without confrontation. Talal Naji, deputy 
secretary general of the PFLP-GC, has hinted at the ongoing dynamic: 
Realistically, nobody can ignore the fait accompli situation... There is 
a victim and an oppressor-we are the victim. Always you [Europeans] 
used to ask us `what is your opinion about the oppressor? Do you 
recognize your oppressor? ' I am the victim and the oppressor is still 
[triumphant]. Let the oppressor first recognize me, give me mercy, 
allow me to live, to survive. When I get those things... this question 
could be asked. When you find my neck under the guillotine and ask 
me `what is your opinion about the executioner? ' I would tell you `I 
would like his head to be in the guillotine, not mine'... I don't deny or 
ignore the possibility of coexistence but I don't agree to [be forced into 
it] while I am still a refugee, outside and with no rights. If I am not to 
survive, I would not accept their survival; if my children would be 
refugees without peace and with miserable lives, I would not agree for 
their children to have peace and good lives... This is the main 
question: If the Israelis would accept to live in peace... I want to call to 
implement the resolutions of the United Nations-partition of 
Palestine and right of return of the refugees. And this, as I said, would 
not represent all ambitions but it is the minimum that would be 
acceptable by the majority of the Palestinian people. 163 
163 Talal Naji, 28 May 2000. 
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CHAPTER III 
SETTING THE STAGE: A PRE-1973 HISTORY OF THE 
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
As a historian, I infer the existence of a still aimless movement that could be called the 'pre- 
current'-a spiritual disquiet that spreads out before tangible things appear. Parties have not yet 
formed, but are adumbrated. Something is going to happen. Even nuclear fission was preceded by 
whispers. Ernst Jünger' 
SUMMARY INTRODUCTION 
The interfactional divide among the fasa'il in the form of the rejectionist- 
mainstream divide is deeply rooted in the earlier history of the Palestinian 
movement, an overview of which is necessary in order to grasp its depth and 
pervasiveness. 
Rejectionism is rooted at the heart of the Palestinian national 
movement. Due to the manner in which the various guerrilla groups 
emerged, their diverging ideological agendas, different state patronages, 
different trade-offs between ideal goals and practical objectives, conflicting 
characters and clashing personalities, a `rejectionist-mainstream' dichotomy 
was virtually guaranteed from the movement's earliest days. The rejectionist 
trend has always been a structurally and politically subordinate minority 
within the movement, and almost always unable to control PLO decision 
making. The organization's key positions, the majority of PNC delegates and 
the bulk of Palestinian military capabilities have always been in the hands of 
Fateh. Even so, the rejectionists have been fully aware of the popular 
resonance of their maximalist principles and the emotional and political pre- 
eminence of their calls for `liberation from the river to the sea' over calls for 
`a Palestinian entity. ' Moreover, while Fateh is rightly credited as being the 
progenitor of the use of armed struggle for identity formation, the 
rejectionists would later-when Fateh and its allies were readying themselves 
1 Eumeswil; trans. Joachim Neugroschel (London: Quartet Books, 1995). 
for negotiations-appropriate the armed struggle ethos and place themselves 
as its true guardians; "armed struggle provided the `currency' in which 
political competition among the Palestinians was conducted. "2 The ability to 
resonate among, and reflect the human aspirations of a dispossessed people, 
have not only given the rejectionist current political weight unwarranted by 
its small size, but moreover the self-esteem and vigour to press on against 
seemingly insuperable political obstacles. 
1948-1968: FORMATIVE DISILLUSIONMENT 
The mass-expulsion and flight of Palestinian Arabs from Palestine in 
connection with the creation of the Israeli state in 1948 was a monumental 
event and a watershed in Palestinian history. Between April and October 
1948 between 700,000 and 8oo, ooo Palestinian Arabs were forced into 
exile, adding to the circa 40,000 that had fled a few years earlier as a result 
of British counterinsurgency measures after the `Great Revolt' of 1936-9.3 
This "collective trauma of immense and devastating proportions, " as one 
scholar referred to it, defined subsequent Palestinian politics: "The salvation 
of the Jews had come at the expense of another people, and in that tragic 
encounter were laid the seeds for another 45 years of bitter and unremitting 
conflict. "4 
The first fifteen years following al-nakbah was a period of 
disillusionment for those that had hoped neighbouring Arab states would 
take charge-or even decisively assist-in wresting Palestine from Zionist 
control. The absence of a credible Palestinian institutional actor, such as an 
exile government, meant that the states under whose jurisdictions the 
refugees found themselves were free to appropriate the Palestinian issue for 
their own political needs and schemes. This they did; the Palestinian 
problem quickly became entangled in the political agendas of the 
`confrontation states' in particular, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. 
z Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 196 
3 See ibid., pp. 2-5. 
4 Ibid., p. 4. It is worth noting that Zionism in general, and its consummation through the 
establishment of Israel in particular, are secular alternatives to the eschatological salvation of the 
Jews. A majority of traditional Torah orthodoxy has always found Zionism errant at best, heretical at 
worst. See Emil Marmorstein, A Martyr's Message (London: Otzer Ha'Emunah Publishing, 1975); 
Anon., Exile and Redemption: The Torah Approach (Money, NY: Neturei Karta, 2000). 
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Lebanon had received between ioo, ooo to 130,000 refugees by 1949, Syria 
between 85,000 and 100,000, Jordan 360,000 to 500,000 (in the East and 
West Banks), while Egypt received some 7, ooo. The relatively smooth social 
and economic assimilation of the politically conscious, Palestinian modem 
middle class meant that they lacked any real socio-economic incentive to 
engage in nationalist politics. 5 
The political trends that attracted followers among the Palestinian 
refugees in this period were primarily those that built on concepts of pan- 
Arab unity. In this the Palestinians succumbed to the general mood 
prevailing in the region at the time; they lived, after all, among their fellow 
Arabs and were exposed to the same sociopolitical currents. The main 
available ideological trends in the first half of the 1950s were Islamism, 
Ba'thism, communism, and Arab nationalism, none of which espoused a 
specifically Palestinian agenda. Islamism was primarily represented by the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and, from 1952, by Shaykh Taqi al-Din al- 
Nabhani's Islamic Liberation Party. Ba'thism-Syrian-sponsored pan-Arab 
socialism-was also able to draw a following among the refugees, but 
remained a relatively marginal political force until the late 196os. 
Communism, in the -form of the West Bank Organization of the Jordanian 
Communist Party and the Palestinian Communist Party in Gaza, proliferated 
inside Palestine but was unable to attract any significant following among 
the refugees. It is estimated that between 1949 and 1967 the West Bank 
communists could count some 2,300 active supporters compared to, for 
instance, the MB's following of between boo and 1, ooo individuals. 6 
The Emergence of the ANM-Fateh Rivalry 
The most influential political movement to emerge in the early 1950s was the 
Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM). The ANM took shape in 1951 around 
George Habash, a Palestinian medical student at the American University of 
Beirut (AUB), and a number of his student colleagues-Hani al-Hindi, Wadi' 
Haddad, Ahmad al-Khatib and Muhsin Ibrahim. Habash and Hindi had 
since 1949 been active in the literary nationalist student society The Firmest 
5 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 39-40. 
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Bond (al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa), which had provided them with a cover under 
which to recruit students for the ANM. Together with Haddad, Habash had 
also been a central figure in The Battalions of Arab Sacrifice (al-Kata'ib al- 
Fida' al-Arabi), a nationalist underground group set up in 1949 as an anti- 
Zionist and anti-colonialist strike force. The Kata'ib proved unable to 
"respond to the zeal of young Arab students at the American University of 
Beirut"7 and was dissolved in 1950, giving way to the ANM. 8 
Organizationally, the ANM developed a strict hierarchical structure-"the 
classic pyramid of communist parties"9-and set up offices around the Arab 
world. Its guiding ethos was one of discipline, secrecy, and obedience; 
ideologically, the organization has been described as a "fascistic organization 
with vague ideas of Arab unity. "10 
The ANM's initial ideological inclinations are of utmost importance 
for the present thesis, as they laid the foundation for the development of its 
subsequent position and relations within the wider national movement. 
Heavily influenced by the political thought of Constantine Zurayk and `Ali 
Nasir al-Din, revenge (tha'r) aimed at restoring Arab national honour was a 
central theme. " Following Zurayk, the ANM believed that the Zionist 
movement and the Israeli state aimed at extending its hegemony beyond the 
borders of Palestine in order to dominate the entire Arab Middle East 
region. 12 The ANM thus posited the destruction of Israel as a primary goal, 
along with the struggle against imperialism and the prevention of further 
Arab fragmentation. '3 The liberation of Palestine was a central objective, but 
6 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-67 (New York: 
Ithaca, 1982), p. 55. 
As'ad AbuKhalil, `George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists: Neither Unity nor 
Liberation' in Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 28, no 4 (Summer 1999), p. 93. 
8 For possibly the most exhaustive available account of al-Kata'ib and its links to the ANM, see 
Muhammad Jamal Barut, Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab: al-Nash'a, al-Tatawwur, al-Masa'ir 
(Damascus: Markaz al-'Arabi lil-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya, 1997), ch. 1. See also Hani al-Hindi Harakat 
al-Qawmiyyin al-`Arab, Vol. I (Beirut: Dar al-Awal, 2000). For an English language history of the 
ANM's development into the PFLP, see Walid W. Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the 
Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism (London and Tonbridge: 
Charles Knight & Co, 1975). 
9 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 73. 
10 As'ad AbuKhalil, `George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists, ' p. 94. 
" For a succinct expose of the thought of Zureyk, see A1-`Uruba al-Filastin: Hawar Shamal ma` 
Qustantin Zurayk (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997). 
12 Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World, p. 3. 
13 Ibid., p. 11. 
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thought to be contingent upon the defeat of imperialism and the 
achievement of Arab unity. 
The ideological centrality of Palestine set the ANM apart from other 
political currents at the time and facilitated the achievement of a relatively 
wide support base among Palestinian refugees. Soon, however, the ANM 
became ever more closely identified with Nasser and the Egyptian regime, 
and at the same time drifted further away from focus on the liberation of 
Palestine. Initially suspicious of the Free Officers coup in Egypt in July 1952, 
the ANM was soon won over by Nasser's anti-Western stance. His opposition 
to the Baghdad Treaty in 195514 and his nationalization of the Suez Canal in 
1956 propelled the ANM into full official identification with `Nasserism, ' 
although some of the movement's leaders, notably Habash, represented a 
`rightist' pro-Iraqi trend within the movement, and were wary of Nasser's 
virtues and abilities. Accordingly, and in keeping with the function of 
political patron-client relationships, the ANM offered its military and 
political capabilities to Egypt for use in confronting pro-Western and anti- 
Nasser governments, not Israel. 15 
By the late 1950s, the. National Movement for the Liberation of 
Palestine, Fateh, had emerged as a serious political alternative to the 
increasingly Cairo-focused ANM, not only challenging but also, in fact, 
eclipsing the ANM's dominant position in Palestinian politics. Its ideological 
position was fresh and, at the time, unique. Fateh was founded on principles 
of Palestinian parochial nationalism (wataniyya), in direct contradistinction 
to the prevalent tendency towards pan-Arab nationalism (gawmiyya). 16 The 
organization coalesced around a group of Palestinian students at Cairo 
University 1956, among them Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). 
[W]hen the [US-UK-Israeli] tripartite invasion took place and the 
[Zionist] enemy occupied the Gaza Strip, the foremost question in our 
minds was how to involve a large number of Palestinians in the Strip 
14 The Baghdad Pact sought to institute a US-aligned alliance of Arab states to contain the regional 
influence of the USSR. 
15 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 75. 
16 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 32, Helena Cobban. 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 24. 
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in our armed activity? And how to form a focus of support for the 
popular resistance groups in Gaza? 17 
Soon it became apparent to the future founders of Fateh that the main 
problem was not how to elicit support for armed activity but, rather,. how to 
respond to the absence of autonomous Palestinian organizations. 18 The MB, 
to which the founders of Fateh had close ties, had been shattered in 1948, as 
had the credibility of Palestine's political parties. Significantly, the ANM- 
notwithstanding its commitment to Palestine-had by 1956 turned into an all 
too pliant Egyptian instrument, and its commitment to qawmiyya rendered 
it ineffectual in the eyes of the Fateh leaders. 
"The experience of al-nakbah made for a distinct Palestinianness, but 
not necessarily for Palestinianism. "19 The pent-up Palestinian particularism 
that existed among increasing segments of both the diaspora and the 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had no appropriate channels and 
remained substantially unattended and untapped. Properly Palestinian 
politics, it appeared, was in a state of suspended animation. Thus, in mid- 
1957, a group of six individuals-including Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and 
Salah Khalaf -met in Kuwait to form a clandestine organization, Fateh. The 
first cell was likely formed sometime in the following year. 20 
Organizationally, the movement consisted of "loosely interconnected 
underground cells" for the first several years, 21 which hampered its ability to 
tap into the ferment of Palestinian politics. 
Even so, Fateh was insightful and boldly innovative. The movement's 
leaders realized that a cohesive group action requires a group to think of 
itself as a group; that its members recognize the group as a source of a 
shared positive identity rather than merely observe it as a matter of 
`objective' fact. Subjective group status, and therefore the possibility of group 
action, was absent among the Palestinians until the late 1950s. "Refugees, " 
Sayigh points out, 
" Quoted in Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 83 
18 Ibid., p. 83. 
19 Ibid., p. 666. 
20 Some sources suggest that the formal establishment of Fateh took place at a later time, 1959,1960, 
or even 1963. See Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and 
Their Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 287 and 386 (notes 2,3, and 4). 
21 Ibid., p. 287. 
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generally do not form a social force so much as a disparate group, and 
are consequently less able to turn themselves into an organized 
political force... [P]olitical organizations formed by refugees tended to 
simple nationalism with little or no ideological depth; Fateh and the 
Palestinian Liberation Front were foremost examples... 22 
This is surely true, but Fateh's innovative skill lay not in the introduction or 
adoption of some exciting new ideology, but in explicitly feeding on the 
refugees' wretchedness to produce the movement's raison d'etre. Indeed, 
Sayigh has also conceded that 
The driving force in the philosophy and ideological outlook of Fateh, 
to the extent that they existed, was profoundly existential. It derived 
overwhelmingly from the physical circumstances and deep alienation 
of the majority of uprooted and exiled refugees rather than the 
minority of Palestinians who still resided in their homes after the end 
of the 1948 war. The same existential drive imbued Fateh's notion of 
`revolution'. `With revolution we announce our will [hence existence], 
and with revolution we put an end to this bitter surrender, this 
terrifying reality that the children of the Catastrophe [of 1948] 
experience everywhere... With revolution we will restore our people's 
self-confidence and capabilities, and restore the world's confidence in 
us and respect for us. '23 
In terms of applied philosophy, these sentiments are easily recognizable as 
pure existentialism, developed into a cohesive model for anti-colonial 
struggle by Franz Fanon some ten years later24; it was, in fact, quite an 
appropriate mobilizing ethos for the Palestinian situation. It brought with it 
the need, however, for sharp differentiation between ingroups and 
outgroups, between Palestinians and non-Palestinians, including other 
Arabs. As Hani al-Hassan put it, "Fateh refused the confiscation of the 
Palestinian Self and its melting in the wider circle of Arab nationalism. "25 
The elevation and consecration of wataniyya over and above qawmiyya 
served that very purpose. 
22 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 56. 
23 Ibid., p. 88. The document quoted within the quote is Fateh, Revolutionary Lessons and 
Experiences (n. p., n. d. ) pp. 100-103. 
4 See Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1965). Sayigh discusses 
the existentialist foundation of Fateh but does not acknowledge it as an innovation or achievement. 
See Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 88-92. 
2' Hani al-Hassan, `Fath bayna al-nazariyah wal-tatbi: al-itar al-nazari' (Fateh Between theory and 
Practice: The Theoretical Framework, Shun Filastiniyah, no. 7 (March 1972), p. 17. 
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There was no immediate `rediscovery' of Palestinian identity 
associated with the launch of Fateh's political program, but it did begin the 
process of narrowing the focus of Palestinian politics. Fateh articulated 
positive social and political identities for what had become merely a 
scattered group of Palestinian Arabs. In delineating a group with a recent, 
tangible, and meaningful shared past experience it drew from this a shared 
political goal. It appealed to this group through the rhetoric of revolution and 
armed struggle, offering the remedy to the collective affliction of `the 
generation of the revolution' (al jil al-thawra), those Palestinians born after 
the loss of Palestine. Lindholm-Schulz tells us that "Palestinian identity was 
reinvented from an exile experience. " This reinvention sought to endow this 
generation with a positive social identity by turning humiliating weakness 
into assertiveness, action and strength. This accords with the pattern of 
social creativity within the social identity theory model. 
A basic dichotomy of `struggle/resistance' and `suffering/sacrifice' 
gradually came to embody a Palestinian narrative of selfhood and 
history. Palestinian identity was formed out of the trauma of loss as 
well as the active creation of al-Fateh. Struggle now became a 
fundamental core ingredient of Palestinian national identity. 26 
This, then, contributed to the ANM's gradual political reorientation. In order 
to safeguard its sociopolitical status, its ability to provide members and 
constituents with a meaningful social identity, and its ability to reflect 
Palestinian political aspirations, the ANM was forced into competition with 
Fateh. Reconciling its ever-increasing emphasis on Arab unity while still 
paying special attention to the liberation of Palestine had become a growing 
problem. Nasser's admission in May 1959 that he had "no plan for the 
liberation of Palestine"27 coincided with the growth of Fateh, in response to 
which a shell-shocked ANM set up a `Palestine Committee' and began to 
discuss military options for the liberation of Palestine. Still at the end of the 
195os, however, the ANM refrained from drawing real distinctions between 
Palestinians and other Arabs; not even its Palestine Committee differentiated 
26 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 37-8. 
,' Moshe Shemesh, The Palestinian Entity, 1959-1974: Arab Politics and the PLO (London: Frank 
Cass, 1988), p. 3. 
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between Palestinian and other members until 1963, when it set up the 
Palestinian Action Command (PAC). This entrenched wataniyya now 
hampered the ANM's ability to compete with Fateh. 
The confrontation states, in whose affairs the Palestinian issue had 
become intimately embroiled, discouraged political expressions that were 
beyond their grasp, including Palestinian particularism. It was in this 
environment that Fateh now addressed the consciousness of the suffering 
Palestinian refugee, going against the general political mood as well as the 
tactical and strategic preferences of the confrontation states. Fateh 
furthermore had the political nerve to argue that the Arab governments had 
a duty to assist in the destruction of Israel, while at the same time insisting 
on its absolute organizational independence. From the beginning of their 
interface, the ANM and Fateh were thus set on a course of intergroup 
competition and conflict. 
Fighting the Battles of Others 
Throughout the 195os, all actual attempts at liberating Palestine by the force 
of arms had been hampered by the agendas of the confrontation states, and 
their control of all Palestinian armed units. Egypt controlled the fida'iyyun 
(men of sacrifice'), originally a Palestinian reconnaissance unit employed by 
Egyptian military intelligence for scout missions into Israel. The Palestine 
Border Police, redesignated the 11th Battalion Palestine Border Guards in 
1954, was employed to protect Egypt's borders against unauthorized 
Palestinian infiltration. Similarly, Syrian military intelligence operated the 
68th Reconnaissance Battalion, deployed against Arab enemies but under 
strict orders to avoid combat against Israel. 28 Iraq for its part set up the 
Palestine Liberation Regiment (PLR) in November 1960, an attempt by 
General `Abd al-Karim al-Qassam to up the stakes in his contest with Nasser 
over regional leadership. After Qassam's overthrow in February 1963, the 
PLR was disbanded and some of its Palestinian officers were incorporated 
28 For instance, the 68th was used to assassinate Ghassan Jadid, the man who shot `Adnan al-Malki in 
April 1955, and were dispatched on sabotage operations in Jordan after the fall of al-Nabulsi's 
government in 1957. After the 1963 coup in Syria, the 68th was used primarily for surveillance of 
Palestinian refugees in Syria, as the new government was weary of pro-Nasser sympathies among 
them. The 68th saw very little action in Israel, but virtually none after 1963. 
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into the regular Iraqi army, deployed primarily in Kurdistan; none of them 
saw action against Israel. 
It was clear to those concerned with the liberation of Palestine- 
including the Fateh leadership and the ANM's Palestine Committee-that the 
confrontation states' use of Palestinian fighters was not conducive to the 
liberation of Palestine, nor was it designed to be. Increasing disenchantment 
with ideologies that did not adequately address the Palestinian issue caused 
a proliferation of small and short-lived `liberation groups' in the early 196os, 
as well as an increase in popular support for the ANM and Fateh. 
One notable exception to the transient nature of the liberation groups 
was the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), set up in 1959 by a Palestinian 
former captain in the Syrian Arab Army's Corps of Engineers, Ahmad Jibril. 
The PLF recognized the divisive and essentially sedative effect of ideological 
discussions, and considered them counterproductive to actual practical steps 
towards liberating the homeland. Based on an initially rather crude fusion of 
nationalist socialism and Palestinian particularism, the PLF argued that 
properly addressing the Palestinian problem meant transcending (or 
ignoring) ideological divides and simply getting on with armed struggle. Not 
unlike Fateh, the PLF believed that the practical concerns of armed struggle 
should be impaired by a minimum of ideological discussion. The PLF's 
action-oriented Palestinianism was rooted in a view-common particularly 
among refugees hailing from northern Palestine (as did Jibril)-that 
Palestine was historically part of Greater Syria. The PLF leadership's close 
personal ties with the Syrian authorities and the pro-Syrian content of their 
Palestinian particularism allowed them to forge close ties with the regime in 
Damascus, but limited their appeal among wider segments of the Palestinian 
people. Notwithstanding its daring-do attitude to politics, the PLF grappled 
with great organizational difficulties for the first several years, and did not 
initiate armed struggle until 1965. This delay was partly due to pressures 
from Syria, on whose territory most of the organization's infrastructure was 
based. 29 
The activities of Fateh, the emergence of the PLF and Nasser's 
`defeatism' catapulted the ANM into the complexity of interfactional politics 
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that has since characterized the Palestinian national movement. In late 1963 
the ANM leadership approved the formation of the Palestinian Action 
Command (PAC) with authority, albeit nominal, over Palestinians in the 
movement's various branches. The decision was primarily Haddad's (Habash 
was still in hiding in Syria following an abortive pro-Nasser coup earlier that 
year) and represented the wishes of the Nasserite trend. Despite protests 
from a growing leftist segment within the movement, the leadership moved 
decisively; after Habash's escape from Lebanon in early 1964 the PAC 
became a fully autonomous branch. 3° 
The division between a leftist `pan-Arab Marxist' trend, represented 
primarily by younger non-Palestinian cadres such as the Lebanese Muhsin 
Ibrahim and Jordanian Naif Hawatmeh, and a relatively rightist, more 
Palestinian-focused trend within the ANM widened during the movement's 
1963 conference. Muhsin Ibrahim, the ANM's ideologue, presented a report 
to the conference in which class conflict was given primacy. There was to be 
no distinction, argued Ibrahim, between national struggle and class 
struggle. 31 The old guard reacted strongly against the plans of the left. 
Haddad suggested to Habash that he should bomb the offices of al- 
Hurriyya, the ANM's mouthpiece over which the leftists had established 
firm control. This never came to pass, but the report was suppressed and 
debate on the issue of ideological orientation was suspended. 32 The 
establishment of the PAC, to the distress of the leftists, was the rightist's own 
attempt at giving the ANM a distinct profile in an increasingly competitive 
Palestinian political environment. Until 1969, there was to be competition 
between not only the ANM and Fateh, but also between the left and the right 
within the ANM. 
In late 1963 or early 1964, Haddad oversaw the establishment of the 
Struggle Apparatus (al-Jihaz al-Nidali), a paramilitary intelligence- 
gathering unit operating under a central military committee headed by 
Haddad himself. It reported to the ANM leadership but was kept strictly 
secret from the regional commands. As PAC convened its first conference in 
29 Fadl Shurnru, November 9,2000. 
30 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 108. 
31 As'ad AbuKhalil, `George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists, ' pp. 96-97. 
321bid., p. 97. 
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Beirut in September 1964 a central question was whether the committee 
should cede the initiative to the newly formed Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) or to promote its own political and, ultimately, military 
agenda. Still true to Nasser, the leadership under Habash urged caution, 
while delegates from the West Bank and Gaza called for urgent action. 33 The 
decision was taken to strike a balance: To conduct reconnaissance missions, 
recruit Palestinian citizens in Israel, and develop the Struggle Apparatus 
while refraining from initiating combat, waiting to see what the PLO would 
do. The slogan to express this balancing act, coined by Ghassan Kanafani, 
was `above zero and below entanglement' (fawq al-sifr wa taht al-tawrit). 
The Creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
Introducing another contender in Palestinian politics, a Palestinian assembly 
in Jerusalem decreed the establishment of the PLO in May 1964. Convened 
by the Palestinian representative to the Arab League (AL), Ahmad al- 
Shuqayri-who was selected as the organization's chairman-the assembly 
reconstituted itself as the Palestinian National Council (PNC). "The statist 
ambition of the PLO founders was unmistakable, as was their conception of a 
distinct Palestinian variety of the broader Arab national identity. "34 The 
PLO's conception of Palestinian national traits was more conventional than 
those formulated by Fateh; they built on ideas of social and cultural 
rootedness rather than shared existential angst. It was a socially 
conservative organization, which clearly favoured and supported the 
traditional social and political elite of the pre-1948 era. 35 
From its conception, the PLO was inextricably tied to state interests. 
Although the rhetoric of Shuqayri would sometimes give the appearance of 
an independent Palestinian forum, the PLO was hamstrung by Egyptian and 
Jordanian agendas. This subservience caused the ANM, Fateh and the 
liberation groups to raise objections against the new body, arguing that it 
would be unable to wage war on Israel. Here, the intellectual and ideological 
turmoil within the ANM was painfully obvious: Until the ANM established 
the Palestine Committee and the PAC, it had opposed any moves to 
33 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 110. 
31 Ibid., p. 98. 
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`Palestinize' anti-Zionist politics, partly on grounds of Arab unity, partly 
because of its worry that a Palestinian `entity' would allow the confrontation 
states to abdicate responsibility for the Palestinian struggle. Now, as the 
ANM itself had Palestinized its organization it came to see the PLO as a 
political rival and social competitor, fearing that its increasing social status 
within the Arab and Palestinian arenas might detract from its own standing. 
Nasser's support for the PLO chairman could not win the ANM over but, 
rather, worried the ANM leadership, as the closeness to Egypt had previously 
been the ANM's political privilege and asset. Thus, in order to issue a 
counterchallenge, the ANM promptly declared that the PLO "has no relation 
to the Palestinian masses and [lacks] the foundation of a military 
organization. "36 The ANM's initial caution turned into total rejection for fear 
of diminished social and political status, a behavioural pattern that would 
later be repeated by the various rejectionist assemblies. 
To the much more radical and revolutionary Fateh, the PLO had even 
less appeal. The upper class backgrounds of the PLO leadership, their ties to 
Egypt, and a strong clash of personalities between Wazir and Shuqayri boded 
ill for PLO-Fateh relations37. Even so, Fateh's official attitude towards the 
PLO was more accommodating than that of the ANM. The reason was that 
Fateh had itself argued for the creation of a Palestinian political and military 
entity since 1959. Fateh rejected Shuqayri's suggestions of a merger, 
primarily because it still entertained plans to convene a national conference 
of its own, turning Fateh into the Palestinian national entity and taking 
command of the armed conflict with Israel. Fateh was aware that "the PLO 
enjoyed Arab legitimacy, and this was important. "38 Fateh planned to take 
control of the PLO and its institutions or else establish an alternative front by 
setting up parallel unions, associations, and mass organizations. If this was 
done in alliance with other liberation groups, Fateh believed that such an 
Arab alliance would be in a position to issue demands for assistance to the 
Arab governments. 39 
35 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 36 A1-Huriyya, 15/6/1964; as quoted in ibid., p. 100. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Hussam al-Khatib, The Palestinian Revolutionary Experience (n. p., 1972), p. 99. The words are 
Wazir's, as quoted in ibid., p. 101. 
39 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
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When the Arab League (AL) recognized the PLO and its military wing 
the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) in 1964, the appeal of the PLA to 
Palestinian youth posed a threat to Fateh's own viability. As a consequence it 
decided to steal PLA thunder by launching the armed struggle itself. Aligned 
with Syria-where suspicions that the PLO was an Egyptian tool abounded- 
Fateh began to discuss concrete military options. The leadership was 
divided, falling into `the rational wing' (al-`aglaniyyun) led by `Abd al-Karim, 
urging caution, and the `madmen' (al-majanin) led by Arafat and Wazir, 
urging immediate action. 4° Kuwaiti and Algerian sponsors threatened to 
withhold funding until they saw some military action, and the Syrians - 
Fateh's principal state ally at the time - wanted to see Nasser, Shuqayri, and 
the PLA embarrassed. After failed initial attempts, New Year's Day 1965 saw 
the first official armed attack against Israel, carried out by Fateh in the name 
of the General Command of al-Asifa Forces. 
A team of infiltrators from the ANM's Struggle Apparatus had, in fact, 
been intercepted by Jordanian patrol as early as November 2,1964 and lost 
one of its members, Khalid `Aysha al-Haj. Although Haj could be said to be 
the armed struggle's first martyr, the ANM did not publicize its operations at 
the time. In any case, Fateh's `launching' of the armed struggle and the 
military activities of the ANM stole the political and military momentum 
from the PLO, which in turn was jolted into action. The PLO appointed a 
military committee to head up the PLA and stepped up the process of 
establishing and consolidating the PLA structure, as well as recruiting. 
There were now three principal competitors in the Palestinian arena: 
The ANM, Fateh, and the PLO. As each vied for public and state support and 
legitimization they came to compete among themselves as well as within 
themselves. Seeking to enhance its own standing and status relative to the 
others, each group resorted to social creativity-redefining and altering the 
premises of intergroup comparison-and competition-improving social 
status vis-a-vis the dominant group on existing premises-which lead to a 
proliferation of revolutionary, militant factions within a few years. 
40 Ibid., p. 106. 
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Fateh 1965-7 
The competition between the ANM and Fateh, and their vying over 
hegemony in the Palestinian arena was also expressed through, and 
entrenched by their conflicting military doctrines. Fateh's military doctrine 
rested on the concept of `consecutive detonation' (al-tafj'ir al-mutasalsil), 
aimed at setting off an Arab political chain reaction. It hoped to be able to 
provoke the Israelis into counterattacking with sufficient force to ignite the 
fury and solidarity of the wider Arab masses. This, in turn, was expected to 
force the Arab governments to support the Palestinian cause. If they did not 
they would go against their own people and risk revolutions. 41 Influenced by 
the Cuban foco concept42, a revolutionary nucleus would practice political 
propaganda through military action. The educative, not tactical aspect was 
paramount; "Effectiveness was not a priority. "43 
In May 1966 the Syrians arrested Arafat and a number of other Fateh 
leaders after an internal gun-battle in Damascus. Defence Minister Hafez al- 
Asad took charge of the prisoners and sent them offers of cooperation. 
Eventually an agreement was reached regulating the presence and activity of 
Fateh in Syria, and Arafat began a close working relationship with Syrian 
military intelligence. 44 On the recommendations of the Bath Party's 9th 
congress in September 1966 `Adnan Abu Ahmad led a handful of disaffected 
followers out of Fateh to form the Organization of the Pioneers of the 
Popular War of Liberation-al-Sa`iga ('The Thunderbolt'). The new 
organization was virtually stillborn but even so an expression of the interests 
of Asad's enemies within the party, who were guarding against his moves. 
Hafez al-Asad had already identified Fateh as contrary, not complementary, 
to his view of Syria's and the Bath Party's interests; there was nothing but 
temporary convenience to their relations. Asad also began evidencing an 
41 Ibid., p. 120. 
42 For literature on the Cuban revolution and the foco doctrine, David Deutschmann (ed), Che 
Guevara Reader: Writings on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics and Revolution (Melbourne and New York: 
Ocean Press, 1997), pp. 63-72. 
a3 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 120. 
44 Ibid., p. 128; Yezid Sayigh, oral communication. 
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extraordinary personal animus towards Arafat that has never been 
adequately explained. 45 It has been suggested, however that 
[Hafez al-]Asad was very much a `straight arrow. ' As such, he always 
needed to know whom he could trust and whom he could not. Arafat, 
on the other hand, has always been a fixer, a man that gets out of 
binds and agreements with great ease and without qualms. Asad 
simply could not stand this type of personality, especially as [in 
Arafat's case] it concerned the Palestine question, which was... too 
important to him. 46 
Even so, in the period leading up to the 1967 June War, Asad encouraged 
Fateh to resume activities in order to offset Salah Jadid's formation of Sa'iqa. 
Syrian support for Fateh enabled the organization to grow within its borders 
and ranks swelled in both the cities and the camps. In Jordan and Lebanon, 
however, the situation was relatively unfavourable. A series of government 
crackdowns and arrests of virtually any and all politically active groups in 
Jordan shattered much of the Fateh infrastructure and increased its 
dependence on Syria. Syria, meanwhile used its influence over Fateh to 
encourage it to carry out operations across the Jordanian border, thus 
destabilizing the kingdom. In the period between January and June 1967 
Fateh carried out a further 37 raids across Jordanian and Lebanese borders. 
The extent of its relationship with Syria is illustrated by the fact that Fateh 
operations increased fourfold in March and April, coinciding with 
intensification in Syrian-Israeli border skirmishes. Cognizant that Syria and 
Fateh were ultimately incompatible, Fateh was forced to approach Egypt for 
support in order to avoid becoming a Syrian satellite. 
AN M 1965-7 
The ANM did not possess a military doctrine properly so called, but was 
forced to develop one in the context of competition with Fateh, as well as in 
the context of severe internal ideological strife. Immediately preceding the 
1967 June War, the internal debate about ideological orientation intensified, 
as did preparations for military action. The movement's leadership had 
as Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics, 
p. 281. 
46 Syrian academic, interview with author, Damascus, July 2001. 
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proposed to Nasser that he take charge of a "wider revolutionary socialist 
coalition" within which the ANM would merge. Nasser declined, prompting 
the ANM to finally start its own preparations for sustained and sustainable 
armed struggle. With a newfound focus on Palestinian rather than Arab 
liberation, and renaming the PAC the Revolutionary Youth Organization 
(RYO) the ANM began recruiting and training guerrillas. Two PAC members 
were seconded to the editorial board of al-Hurriyya to balance against the 
leftist inclinations of editor Ibrahim. This had little effect on al-Hurriyya's 
ideological orientation, however, which was increasingly turning into a 
hotbed of leftist dissent, more specifically of a Maoist bent. As a 
consequence, the ANM leadership established Filastin, a weekly supplement 
of Lebanese pro-Nasser daily al-Muharrir, using it to counter Fateh calls for 
immediate and autonomous armed action, as well as checking the leftist 
agenda of al-Hurriyya. The ANM leadership would not give up its faith in 
the eventual intervention of Nasser. 
Within the ANM there was now a three-way political balance 
comprising the `old guard, ' the leftists, and the rightists. The right, which had 
its centre of gravity in the Jordanian regional command, demanded 
immediate military action against Israel. The left, meanwhile, urged caution 
and argued that because the Palestinian struggle was part of a much greater 
Arab workers' and peasants' struggle against imperialist oppression, there 
needed to be more training and preparation. In between the two opposing 
views were the ANM's core leadership, known as the Centre, comprising 
primarily Habash, Hindi and Haddad, whose task it had become to arbitrate 
and reconcile the opposing factions. 
An ideological reorientation did take place at this time, driving the 
ANM to the left but also towards further Palestinian particularism. A 
statement issued in March 1965 read "our struggle for Palestine is at the very 
heart of our struggle for the realization of the [Arab nation's] objectives: 
unity, liberation, socialism, and the redemption of Palestine. " Partly derived 
from its competition with Fateh, partly because of a crisis in the relationship 
with Egypt, the ANM had come to believe that liberation of Palestine was the 
means to Arab liberation, rather than vice versa. The internal ideological 
debate intensified, and the movement's general conference in 1966 
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"condemned `bourgeois bureaucracy', implicitly that of Egypt, and moved 
decisively towards a brand of socialism more radical than that of Egypt. "47 
The ANM branches in Syria and Iraq were at the same time instructed to 
withdraw from the pro-Nasser Arab Socialist Union (ASU). 
The leftist surge was accommodated by the old guard, which "found it 
expedient to give way to the left on these issues, in order to concentrate on 
the conflict with Israel. "48 The ANM leadership had come to believe that 
Israel stood to gain from the passage of time due to its atomic weapons 
program, and that time was running out for the Arabs. ANM and PLO began 
military cooperation in setting up a guerrilla group officially under the 
command of the PLA, Abtal al-Awda ('the Heroes of Return'). The new 
group was based on the ANM's Struggle Apparatus "and had no independent 
existence, although it performed new functions... "49 Firmly under ANM 
control, Abtal al-Awda was used to forge ties with Syria where the ANM was 
still banned, and on October 19,1966 the group carried out its first attack. 
Until June 1967 the group, in effect an armed extension of the ANM, carried 
out a further seven attacks on Israel from the West Bank. The ANM still 
argued that "controlled escalation" rather than "deliberate entanglement" 
(Fateh's concept) was the better way to proceed, and despite the rift with 
Nasser carefully cited his support for the guerrillas as a basis for their own 
position. Nasser's increasing praise for the guerrillas emboldened (or 
prompted) the ANM leadership to take a more militant stance, and the 
organization soon came to follow Fateh thinking and assessments. 5° 
Writing in al-Hurriyya in February 1967, As`ad `Abd al-Rahman gave 
expression to a view of armed struggle that Sayigh suggests is representative 
of the leadership at the time and, in any case, became the kernel of military 
thinking for several years to come. 51 `Abd al-Rahman viewed guerrilla action 
as a means of asserting the Palestinian cause in the international arena, 
causing an outburst of Arab potential and revitalizing the Palestinians while 
weakening and striking fear into Israel. Although guerrilla action was 
47 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Stniggle and the Search for State, p. 136. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
so Ibid., p. 140. 
51 Ibid., pp. 140-41. 
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insufficient to achieve liberation it could be used to overturn reactionary 
Arab governments and promote Arab unity in order to provide the power 
necessary to attain the ultimate objective-liberation. This was not a very 
different conception of the purpose of struggle from that of Fateh's 
`consecutive detonation, ' although the latter did not directly prescribe or 
require the fall of `reactionary' Arab governments. In addition, ANM 
thinking still lacked Fateh's deeply rooted existentialist perspective 
Since January 1965 the various guerrilla groups had carried out 113 
attacks on Israel (according to the Israeli count), killing eleven and 
wounding 62. While the guerrillas in no way posed a direct threat to Israel 
they did serve to heighten Israeli threat perceptions. In June 1967, the RYO 
was authorized to commence raids against Israel in its own name; on June 5 
it issued a statement announcing its first two attacks. 
THE POST-WAR PROLIFERATION OF THE FASA'IL 
After the June War, both Nasser and King Hussein reached the conclusion 
that "Israel was here to stay. "52 The war furthermore shattered the 
Palestinians' faith in `progressive nationalist' Arab governments and 
prompted a sharp and decisive turn towards parochial Palestinian 
nationalism. Palestinians felt that they had suffered the loss that was the 
Arab armies' military defeat. The guerrillas gained widespread popular 
support in the West Bank and managed to carve out sanctuaries in Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan due to weakened government control in the wake of 
the war. The war furthermore contributed to the discredit of PLO chairman 
Shuqayri, who was forced to resign in December 1967. From March 1968 
there were intense confrontations between the guerrillas and the Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF), which by February 1969 had generated enough 
support for them to have the Palestinian National Congress elect Yasser 
Arafat chairman of the PLO. 
With the 1967 defeat, the Arab states' repressive abilities were 
reduced. This gave the guerrillas the opportunity to build on Chinese, Cuban 
and Vietnamese experience, creating a revolutionary entity with a defined 
territorial base. The newly occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip offered such a 
101 
base. Fateh transferred its leadership cadres to the West Bank in June and 
July 1967. Arafat was chosen as field commander and, after consultation 
with other guerrilla groups they set September 1 as the date on which to 
initiate combat operations. 
Attacks on Israel intensified and throughout 1969 there were several 
hundred operations per month. Syria and Egypt provided vital military and 
logistic assistance in order to divert Israeli attention from their own military 
reconstruction. Crucially, both helped in securing a sanctuary for the 
guerrillas in Lebanon. Fateh, which immediately came to dominate the PLO, 
received support from both `progressive' and `reactionary' Arab states, as 
well as from China, North Vietnam, North Korea and, later, the Soviet Union 
and Cuba. There was an inherent and pressing paradox involved in state 
support for the guerrillas, however, as 
[i]ts slogans of `people's war' and `total liberation of Palestinian soil' 
could only be attained through the total involvement of the Arab 
confrontation states and beyond, yet these aims sat ill with host 
governments and moreover clashed with the pragmatic requirements 
of securing wider recognition of the PLO as a statist actor with 
international character. That serious changes in Arab state power, and 
even sweeping social revolution, were required in order to remove the 
obstacles to full involvement only intensified this tension. The result 
was a contest between the guerrilla groups-carried out at every level 
of politics, ideology, and organization [ ]-based on the false premiss 
that these were all real options among which they could make free 
choices (in the historical sense). 53 
Ideological developments and organizational politics before 1967 laid the 
foundation for the proliferation of Palestinian political-military 
organizations in the immediate aftermath of the June War. The appeal of 
revolution and armed struggle-"not only political strategies but... crucial 
identifying principles of nationhood and [its] main discursive strategies"54- 
led to the establishment of a host of liberation groups, representing a range 
of ideological inclinations and espousing a multitude of tactical preferences. 
Ideological developments and organizational politics prior to 1967 
also cemented a basic division between these groups on the issue of armed 
52 Ibid., p. 143. 
53 Ibid., pp. 147-8. 
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struggle. Fateh's conception of armed struggle had initially hinged on the 
existentialist notion that it served to foment Palestinian group and national 
cohesion, aiming to construct a strong enough group identification to keep 
the scattered communities unified until a solution, possibly diplomatic, 
could be found. As we will see below, when Fateh managed to achieve a 
dominant position within the PLO-and believed itself to be in a position to 
pursue that diplomatic solution-its radicalism gave way to statism, seeking 
to preserve, rather than upset, the regional status quo. `Consecutive 
detonation' was thus a highly contingent concept. This transformation was 
an obvious way to enhance ingroup social status within the national 
movement, with most of Fateh's main rivals espousing revolutionary 
ideologies that led them to seek the subversion of Arab governments and 
pursue class struggle. In addition, the majority of Fateh's rivals saw armed 
struggle in a different light. They probably agreed that armed struggle was 
necessary to foment group cohesion, but saw it as serving more 
straightforward military-strategic purposes. Some of them wanted to 
militarily exhaust Israel, while other strove to confront `reactionary' Arab 
states, bringing about revolutionary change in the Arab arena that could then 
be channelled against the Israeli enemy. An important belief, which has 
defined the radical segment of the national movement to this day, has been 
that armed struggle is not contingent, that it could not be replaced by other 
forms of struggle, merely augmented and enhanced by them. Given the 
agonistic ambient culture and the intensity and significance of their political 
competition, the factions' differing conceptions of politics and armed 
struggle gradually became badges of honour, each of them contending that 
their particular path to liberation was ideologically and tactically superior to 
others. 
GENESIS OF THE FACTIONS 
The origins and emergence of each faction, and their early relations with 
other groups within the national movement had significant impact on their 
subsequent ideological and tactical stances. While it is commonly assumed 
that splits and rivalries occurred due to ideological commitments, also the 
54 Helena Lindholm-Schulz. The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 38. 
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reverse was true: Interfactional rivalries fundamentally conditioned the 
ideological and tactical positions of the groups' in their quest to enhance 
their positions within the movement. An overview of the emergence of each 
of the movement's significant groups provides an insight into how the 
foundation for a specific pattern of intergroup alignment was laid. 
From AN M to PFLP 
The leftist-rightist rift within the ANM became acute after the June War. The 
movement was losing recruits and support due to its sluggishness in 
responding to the reality of Arab defeat, which prompted the Centre, the PAC 
and the Palestine Military Action Committee (PMAC) to-yet again-agree 
on the need for autonomous military action. The ANM's Executive 
Committee met in late July 1967, but rather than signalling an eagerness for 
combat, the meeting revealed the influence of the left-wing. Arab defeat was 
blamed on bourgeois fear of the masses and subsequent failure to mobilize 
them, whereas Israel's supremacy was identified as an outcome of its place 
within the world capitalist and imperialist scheme. 55 Under the outwardly 
unison barrage of left-wing cliches, there was still heated internal ideological 
debate. The left urged caution and continued preparation to mobilize a 
united Arab front. The right feared that passivity would play into Israeli 
hands, giving the enemy the opportunity to create new political and practical 
obstacles. The Centre took a middle position once again, and argued that 
although military action is urgent, the objective conditions for achieving 
popular mobilization were not yet present. 
Still in keeping with Egyptian policy, the ANM opted for further 
preparation and caution. The Executive Committee meeting made Habash 
responsible for organization, while Haddad and Hindi began military 
preparations, setting up a new Special Apparatus that a year later was to 
carry out a series of aircraft hijackings in accordance with the July-meeting's 
resolution to "strike at the enemy everywhere. "56 The Centre also went on to 
create a Jordanian support command to facilitate mobilization, within which 
ss Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 159. 
56 Arab Nationalist Movement, After the Colonialist Zionist Aggression (Political report by the 
National Committee of the ANM., July 1967). 
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the predominance of traditionalists and rightists was resented by the leftists 
and caused further friction. 
The ANM meanwhile was losing ground to Fateh as well as to Jibril's 
PLF, and began to rebuild its West Bank branch in late July; the ANM field 
command had barely been formed when Fateh announced what it referred to 
as its "second launch" on August 28. On a fundamental level, the ANM still 
did not believe that the Palestinians could liberate Palestine without Arab 
assistance "but accepted that that they should conduct selective guerrilla 
action and disrupt the occupation until Nasir could bring Arab power to 
bear. "57 
Fateh's launch of military operations in August was followed by PLF's 
on October 13 and the ANM began to feel the financial cost of inaction as 
donors withheld funds until the ANM showed some militant initiative. As a 
means of boosting public morale and achieving "comprehensive armed 
resistance" the ANM Centre responded by calling for guerrilla unity. It set up 
bases in the Jordan Valley and in October gained access to the PLF training 
camp in Syria. At the same time the ANM, the PLF, Abtal al-Awda, and a 
group of pro-Nasser Jordanian exiles agreed to form a united front. 
Characteristic of ANM pandering to Nasser, his urging the movement to 
guerrilla action tipped the scales and an eager ANM Centre communicated to 
the more cautious field command that "the battle might start without us... 
Fateh and Jibril will be the only ones to reap the credit... and that will finish 
us. "58 The new united front launched a series of raids into Israel, beginning 
with an attack on Ben Gurion Airport on 11 December. A statement released 
in Beirut the same day announced the new grouping as the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 
The PFLP as originally composed was troubled and short-lived. On 
the basis of tactical and ideological differences, Jibril lead his PLF cadres out 
of cooperation with the ANM in April 1968. In February 1969, after a year 
that saw left-wing dissension grow into an outright rebellion within the 
ANM, leftist cadres headed by Naif Hawatmeh announced the formation of 
the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). 
57 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 165. 
58 Ibid., p. 166. 
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
The PLF cadres had entered into cooperation with the ANM with serious 
doubts as to the enterprise's feasibility. 59 The PLF had carefully kept its 
members, cadres and fighters separated from those of the other groups in the 
coalition, and retained training camps for its own exclusive use. The PLF 
contingent's eventual exodus was connected to two primary factors: The 
Battle of Karameh, and the rise of the left within the ANM. 
On March 19,1968, Habash and a number of other PFLP members 
were arrested by Syrian military police, a measure taken to forestall their 
plotting of a coup d'etat, together with Syrian dissidents. 60 The arrests took 
place two days before the Israeli attack on Karameh, an event that has since 
become one of the key points in Palestinian political mythology. Some three 
hundred Palestinian fighters joined with Jordanian infantry in repelling the 
assault of a numerically superior Israeli force. The contribution of the 
Palestinians was, in tactical terms, minor but in subsequently constructed 
national lore, the spectacular victory of Karameh (meaning `dignity' in 
Arabic) belonged to the fida'iyyun. The only ftda'i forces to participate at 
Karameh, however, belonged to Fateh and a smaller group known as the 
Palestinian Popular 'Struggle Front (PPSF, returned to below); the PFLP 
never participated. In Habash's absence, PFLP military commander Jibril 
took the decision-apparently believing PFLP forces to be inadequately 
prepared-to withdraw from the theatre of conflict the day before the battle. 
Fierce recriminations ensued, particularly accusations from an increasingly 
vocal left-wing against Jibril for incompetence and ideological unsoundness. 
Accusations of incompetence sorely offended Jibril's deeply ingrained 
sense of personal pride, and incensed other PLF leaders and cadres that felt 
implicated by attacks against their leaders. Accusations of being ideologically 
unsound were of a different order; they did not so much offend as exasperate 
the PLF contingent. The PLF had never been given to ideological debate and 
the rise of the left within the ANM now forced them to cohabitate with a set 
of individuals for whom ideological discussion was an integral part of any 
and all endeavours. The PLF people were witnessing the ideological debate 
59 Fadl Shururu, November 9,2000. 
60 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 227. 
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getting entirely riotous within the ANM as military matters were turning into 
ideological issues when the left-wingers brought the writings of Mao, Che 
Guevara, and Frantz Fanon to bear on tactics and strategy. The ANM itself 
was crumbling as its Jordanian and Lebanese branches were incrementally 
but decisively taken over by the leftists and turned against the comparatively 
`rightist' Palestinian branch. The fact that the appropriateness of PLF's role 
in the PFLP was part of the dispute between the ANM's left and right made 
matters all the more poignant for Jibril and his comrades. 
In August 1969 the Palestinian branch of the ANM held its national 
conference in which the leftists won massive majorities in the leadership 
elections. The left also secured the approval of its Basic Political Report, 
which lambasted Egypt's role in the 1967 war and Arab acceptance of UNSCR 
242. More importantly, the report indicated a preparedness to intervene in 
the sociopolitical affairs of Arab countries, accusing the PFLP leadership of 
having hankered after Fateh's policy of non-interference. 61 The left moreover 
believed that the Special Apparatus' first hijacking operation, which took 
place on 23 July, was timed to impact on the conference by enhancing the 
stature of the old guard. 62 
Jibril and the PLF had had enough. The recriminations after 
Karameh, the subjection of PFLP military tactics to ideological talking shops, 
and the implementation of external operations for `internal effect' were 
"unbearable. "63 Having disclaimed ties with the ANM already in April, 
October 1968 saw Jibril leading the PLF contingent out of the PFLP (possibly 
encouraged by Syrian intelligence), assuming the name PFLP-GC. While the 
exodus of political cadres from the PFLP conglomerate was relatively minor, 
the PFLP-GC attracted some 200 guerrillas, one quarter of the PFLP's total 
combat strength of circa Boo fighters. 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
As Jibril left, tensions within the ANM continued to mount. Habash was 
sprung from prison in November, but was unable to placate the left. 
61 See 'Ali Badwan Al-Yasar Al-Filastini Al-Musallah (Damascus: Al-Ahali, 1999), pp. 94-7.; cf. 
Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organistion, p. 48. 
62 According to Hani Hindi in Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 229. 
63 Fadl Shururu, November 9,2000. 
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Following probes from the leftist leadership, Syrian Ba'th Party Chairman 
Salah Jadid ordered Sa'iqa to provide the ANM left with military support, 
while Fateh pledged financial and other material assistance. The war of 
words turned violent as the rightists realized that the leftists were about to 
break away; in mid-February 1969, rightists attacked leftist offices in Jordan, 
killing at least one of their cadres. 
It is in this context that we should understand the spate of external 
operations conducted by Haddad's Special Apparatus in this period. Its 
attack on an El Al aircraft at Athens airport on December 26, and a further 
attack on an El Al plane in Zurich on February i8,1969, were both intended 
to demonstrate rightist strength and tenacity in its internal rivalry with the 
leftists. Fateh came to the leftists' aid, and stepped in with supplies, arms 
and funds. This generosity was in part based on a wish to both embarrass 
and divide the PFLP en bloc, the latter being Fateh's most serious political 
rival. Emboldened by this support, the leftists under the leadership of the 
Jordanian Naif Hawatmeh announced the formation of the PDFLP on 22 
February 1969. 
Hawatmeh's group was initially relatively small, mustering some 150 
civilian members and likely less than fifty fighters. 64 It was, however, a 
youthful organization; the leftist cadres that rebelled against the ANM 
leadership had been a younger generation, most of them born in the 1940s or 
early 1950s. Similarly, its popular appeal lay with a young constituency, 
particularly among refugees in Syria and Lebanon, and in the West Bank. Its 
small size and lack of political and military clout indubitably affected its 
members' feelings of self-worth, as the organization's status within the 
movement was marginal. In order to overcome this impediment, the PDFLP 
came to portray itself as the movement's revolutionary vanguard, the 
spearhead of genuine Marxism-Leninism in the Palestinian arena. Through 
al-Hurriyya, over which the PDFLP retained control, it began to propagate 
elements of both Trotskyism and Maoism. Going in the absolute opposite 
direction of the PFLP-GC, the PDFLP sought (but failed) to democratize its 
military apparatus, introducing the concepts of elected officers and the 
abolition of the military rank system. Its absorption of the small but radical 
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Maoist group, the Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine 
(POLP) more than doubled the PDFLP's membership and reinforced its 
radical tendencies. 
The organization quickly took to proselytizing its principles within the 
national movement, as well as outside. 65 Needing to demonstrate its ability 
to stand on its own two feet, the PDFLP turned on Fateh as well as the PFLP 
for `collaborating with reactionary regimes. ' Needing to consolidate its 
position within the movement-carve out a niche-the PDFLP's 
revolutionary enthusiasm soon offended or unsettled virtually every Arab 
government. As for the PDFLP's attitude to Jordanian politics and the 
Hashemite monarchy, its slogan "no authority over the authority of the 
resistance" would subsequently prove particularly portentous. 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
With the PFLP-GC and PDFLP gone, the PFLP was substantially weakened. 
The two splits had cost the organization in terms of membership and 
fighters, and its political prestige was seriously damaged. In addition, the 
shame of not having fought at Karameh was an ignominy that continued to 
be associated with the PFLP, rather than with the disaffiliated Jibril. 
Accordingly, the PFLP had difficulties in recruiting, was getting increasingly 
strapped for funds, thus running the risk of military-political 
marginalization. It opted for a boycott of the PLO as a sign of its displeasure 
with what it saw as the other factions'-particularly Sa'iqa and Fateh's - 
conspiracies against it. 
The PFLP found the solution to its dilemma in a combination of social 
creativity and competition. Creativity, by a temporary stress on external 
operations whereby it carved out a distinct profile for itself; competition, by 
turning to the left in order to gain access to the PDFLP's small but steadily 
growing constituency. The feud with the leftists within the ANM had already 
64 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 231. 
65 During a visit to Moscow in the early 1970s, Hawatmeh offended his Soviet hosts by seeking to 
explain to them why they should rehabilitate Trotsky. "I told him: `What do you think you are doing? 
It is not your place to teach socialism to the Soviet Union! ' Hawatmeh always thought he could work 
political miracles. He always had great faith not only in his revolutionary principles, but also in his 
own abilities. ". `Abd al-Rahman al-Nu'aimi, interview with author, May 2000 (Al-Nu'aimi visited 
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prompted the PFLP to adopt a "scientific revolutionary" model of ideology 
along quasi-Maoist lines. 66 The PDFLP's turn to the left, as well as its stress 
on Palestinian territorialism prompted the PFLP to follow suit in order to not 
be outdone. 67 "The split [with the PDFLP] was an incentive towards 
Marxism"68 At its second general conference in February 1969, the PFLP 
resolved to transform itself into a "proletarian party" onto which it grafted a 
communist-style politburo and central committee. Habash was elected 
secretary general, and the old guard leadership of the erstwhile ANM all took 
up positions in the politburo. Thus, a radical ideological reorientation was 
embarked upon with no changes whatever in the leadership, making it 
obvious that the change was purely tactical. 69 In fact, those who had most 
fiercely opposed the leftism of Hawatmeh and his comrades-including 
Haddad and al-Hindi-were now busy vying with the PDFLP over which 
organization was the superior adherent to Marxism-Leninism; the PDFLP 
cadres were denounced not merely as traitors, but as bourgeois splitters and 
enemies of the revolution. The PFLP's new organ (set up after the leftists 
retained al-Hurriyya), al-Hadaf ('The Target') proclaimed support for Mao 
and the Chinese model of Marxism-Leninism. More importantly, the PFLP's 
initially mild criticism of the Hashemite monarchy hardened into aggressive 
hostility after the split with the PDFLP, and soon the organization advocated 
uprising in Jordan in order to establish an `Arab Hanoi' in `Amman. The 
early relationship between the PFLP and the PDFLP thus provides a textbook 
example of social competition in accordance with the social identity model, 
in which ideology not only led to interfactional conflict, but was seriously 
affected and altered by that conflict. 7° 
Haddad's Special Apparatus intensified its external operations- 
armed attacks against `Zionist and imperialist' interests outside the region- 
in this period. On July 17,1969, two London department stores were 
Moscow together with Hawatmeh as a delegate of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and 
the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). 
66 Helena Lindholm-Schulz, The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 35-6. 
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bombed, followed by the August 25 attack on the London offices of an Israeli 
shipping company, and the August 29 hijacking of a TWA aircraft en route to 
Tel Aviv. September 8 saw simultaneous grenade attacks on buildings owned 
by Israel in Bonn, The Hague and Brussels, and in October the PFLP 
attempted to blow up a US pipeline carrying Saudi oil across the Golan 
Heights. Often seen as contrary to the PFLP's ideological transformation, it 
seems that these external operations were in fact attempts to creating a 
distinct profile and appeal for the PFLP, parallel to engaging in ideological 
competition with the PDFLP. To be sure, the audacity of these external 
operations attracted recruits as well as attention to the Palestinian cause. In 
terms of the social identity theory model, it is interesting to note that these 
actions produced outcomes in both the PFLP-GC and the PDFLP. Both 
denounced the activities of the Special Apparatus as deeply flawed, 7' the 
former basing its stance on military tactics and the latter on ideological 
grounds, yet, soon thereafter, the PFLP-GC began `external operations' of its 
own. 
Palestinian Popular Struggle 
. 
Front 
Announcing its existence on July 15, a month after the end of the June War, 
the Palestinian Popular Struggle Organization (later renamed the Palestinian 
Popular Struggle Front) undertook its first military strike on November 25, 
against an Israeli radio station in the Bethlehem area. It set up its limited 
military and political infrastructures in Jordan's East Bank, from whence it 
infiltrated across the border with ill-equipped militants drawn primarily 
from the West Bank. The efficacy of its strikes was marginal, yet the group 
saw itself as serving an example of militant, rather than military, aptitude to 
the other organizations. 72 Its activities attracted a small stream of members, 
among whom was Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya-a member of the PLO's executive 
and military committees-whose membership in turn boosted the status and 
appeal of the nascent grouping. Mostly, its early leadership was composed of 
former or current members of the ANM, including its first secretary general, 
Subhi Ghosheh. 
" See Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 234. 
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Ghosheh was disturbed by the ideological chaos within the ANM, and 
took the opportunity provided by the ANM's period of post-war shell shock 
to leave the movement and set up the PPSF. 73 This was little more than an 
annoyance to the ANM leadership; the PPSF's lack of a distinct group profile 
and its poor military capacity rendered it harmless. Also, the PPSFs 
ideological orientation was Arab nationalist, in effect reinforcing the ANM's 
own position, which prompted the ANM to initially cooperate with the PPSF. 
So too did Fateh, which supported the new group with arms, funds and 
intelligence support. The underlying reason was the same as provided the 
rationale for Fateh's support of the PDFLP, that is, the wish to challenge and 
embarrass the PFLP. 
PPSF's participation together with Fateh at Karameh boosted its 
status, and the organization spent most of 1968 forming its institutions and 
bureaucracy, which were ad hoc and rudimentary in its first year. 74 Bahjat 
Abu Gharbiyya took over at the helm, and led the PPSF until his resignation 
in 1972, when the secretary generalship was assumed by Samir Ghosheh, 
Subhi's brother. The group's lack of a distinct profile was problematic, 
however, and, unable to supply its members with a meaningful social 
identity, the PPSF had difficulties in keeping its membership up. It thus 
decided to latch on to the external operations escapades of the PFLP's 
Special Apparatus, bombing an El Al office in Athens on November 29,1969, 
and hijacking an Olympic Airways flight on 22 July 1970 (to secure the 
release of its two operatives responsible for the November bomb). 75 This 
apparently did impact positively on the faction's ability to recruit. 76 
Organization of the Pioneers of the Popular War of Liberation-al- 
Sa'iqa 
As mentioned previously, the Syrian Ba'th Party established Sa'iqa in 
September 1967. The organization remained inactive until early 1968, 
however, when it was reactivated as an element in the power struggle 
between the party chairman Salah Jadid and Defence Minister Hafez al- 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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Asad. Jadid saw the creation of a militia within the party as a counterweight 
to Asad's ever-firmer control of the Syrian Arab Army. Thus, the 
organization was set up within the Bath Party itself, and soon became its 
Palestinian section; the head of Sa'iqa, initially Dafi Jumay'ani, was a 
member of the party's national command. All Palestinian members of the 
party automatically became members of Sa'iqa and were required to undergo 
military training. Through ample financial and intelligence support from the 
party, and through cooperation with the PLA, Sa'iqa was able to accumulate 
some 400 guerrillas by October 1968, growing further to some 1, ooo by late 
1969, by which time its firepower was on par with that of Fateh. 77 
Ideologically, Sa'iqa followed the development of Jadid as he ventured 
ever further to the left during his intensifying struggle with Asad. In its first 
year of activity it had enjoyed generally good relations with Fateh, due to 
Fateh's and Syria's shared interests, particularly vis-a-vis the ANM and 
Egypt. It propounded a Ba'thism that was rather orthodox, that is, adhering 
to the principles of Michel Aflaq. 78 The internal situation in Syria prompted 
it leftwards, however, and by early 1970 it had come to view itself as a 
Marxist-Leninist organization. Accordingly, it abandoned its political and 
military alliance with'Fateh and realigned itself with the Palestinian left-the 
PFLP and PDFLP-and supported the emergence of the Jordanian 
Communist Party's guerrilla force Quwwat al Ansar ('The Partisan Forces'). 
During the Correctionist Movement of November 1970-Hafez al- 
Asad's ousting of Jadid and suppression of the Marxist-Leninist trend within 
the party-Sa'iqa was brought firmly into line with Asad's worldview. During 
the final and hopelessly asymmetrical showdown between Jadid and Asad, 
Sa'iqa provided the only armed units to rally behind Jadid. After extensive 
purges in its top echelons, Asad handed Sa'iqa's leadership to Zuhayr 
Muhsin. 
After Asad had brought the objectives of the Syrian armed forces and 
those of the party apparatus into relative congruence-unifying Syrian policy 
towards Palestine-Damascus has deployed Sa'iqa to do its bidding within 
the PLO. Hence, the difference between Sa'iqa's relationship with Syria and 
" Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 185. 
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those of other factions merely aligned with Syria has always been vast: 
"Sa'iqa is the spearhead of Ba'th party policy in the Palestinian arena. "7() 
Arab Liberation Front 
After its 1968 coup, the new Bath Party regime in Baghdad sought to 
enhance its regional status by establishing its own faction, the Arab 
Liberation Front (ALF), under the leadership of `Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayali. 
Its existence was announced on April 11,1969. Like Syria's establishment of 
Sa'iqa, Iraq set up the ALF as the Palestinian section of its Ba'th Party. 
Unlike the Syrian situation, however, ALF was set up primarily because Iraq 
wanted to benefit from the popularity and enthusiasm engendered by the 
emergence of Palestinian factions, rather than for reasons of domestic power 
politics. 
Also unlike Sa'iqa, ALF's appeal has remained relatively minor 
throughout its existence. Although there was a sizeable Palestinian 
community in Iraq, there were no refugee camps. 8° Hence, the Iraq-dwelling 
Palestinians' "generally higher level of skill afforded them a broader range of 
professional opportunities than that open to many of their compatriots in 
Syria. "81With no significant unskilled and politically desperate refugee pool, 
the majority of ALF's personnel came to be drawn from non-Palestinian 
Arabs. 82 The Iraqi army began training courses for tentative ALF recruits in 
November 1968, and by its formation the following April, its combat strength 
was a sizeable 300 guerrillas. 
The new Iraqi regime gradually came to distrust Fateh's close ties to 
Egypt and Syria, and its activities in Iraq were thus restricted. When Syria 
retaliated by placing heavy restrictions on ALF activities in Syria in July 
1969, ALF and Fateh underwent a limited rapprochement. Iraqi-Fateh 
relations soured decisively in September 1969, however, after Fateh had 
secured an amendment to the PLO charter (originally proposed by the 
PDFLP), calling for the establishment of a "secular, democratic Palestinian 
state, " in which Muslims, Christians and Jews were to enjoy equal rights. The 
79 Farhan Abu al-Haija, November 10,2000. 
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Iraqi Ba'th-and thus ALF-as well as the PFLP and the PPSF saw this as a 
potential danger. The PFLP promptly became the recipient of ample Iraqi aid 
as a result, and the ALF refused to join the PLO. 
The ALF's ideological orientation, quite naturally, has always been 
that of the Iraqi Ba'th Party. Unlike Sa'iqa, the ALF's relationship to the 
Palestinian national movement has tended to be rather distant. Largely 
because of its demographic makeup, and (again) the policy orientation of the 
Iraqi Ba'th, ALF has tended to eschew Palestinian particularism. This- 
unlike Sa'iqa-has precluded it from contending for a position of significant 
influence within the national movement. 83 The ALF holds that "the 
Palestinian question always has been and always will be a primarily Arab 
question. "84 While Sa'iqa, by virtue of its mass following among Palestinian 
Ba'thists in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan was able to quickly establish itself as 
a central player within the national movement, ALF was not. It is possible to 
suggest, as members of other factions have, that "while Sa'iqa was a Syrian 
extension with its foundation in Palestinian aspirations, ALF was an Iraqi 
extension with its foundation chiefly in Baghdad's objectives. "85 Because of 
this, those Palestinians with affinities towards ALF's pan-Arab socialism and 
secularism tended to affiliate themselves with the PFLP, 86 which, at any, rate 
enjoyed Iraqi support. 
Fateh-The Sorcerer's Apprentice 
Having encouraged splits and divisions within other factions in order to 
enhance its own social status, the political arena soon became uncomfortable 
for Fateh. While it should be noted that the proliferation of the fasa'il never 
actually threatened Fateh's organizational and political hegemony, the 
multitude of contenders-and their state patrons-came to restrict Fateh's 
ability to manoeuvre. 
The ability to manoeuvre was important to Fateh because-as noted 
above-its rationale for armed struggle was different than that of most of its 
rivals. With the exception of the diplomatically inclined PDFLP, all of the 
83 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp. 163. 
84 Mahmoud Abu al-'Abbas, Rashidiyyeh, November 5,2000. 
85 PFLP-GC Central Committee member, interview with author, Damascus, May 2000. 
86 Helena Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 164. 
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emerging factions viewed armed struggle as an inherent and essential part of 
the national struggle, while Fateh had come to view armed struggle as a card 
in a larger diplomatic game. Nasser brought Arafat to Moscow in July 1968, 
introducing him to, among others, Foreign Minister Kosygin, Chairman 
Brezhnev, President Podgorny and Central Committee member Kyril 
Mazurov, whose responsibility it was to liase with national liberation 
movements. 87 Arafat was thus being introduced into non-Arab diplomatic 
circles in a way that the other factions were not, notwithstanding PFLP and 
PDFLP visits to both Peking and Moscow. This laid the foundation for 
Fateh's realization that the instruments and forums of international 
diplomacy might offer a means of recovering Palestine. In this context, Fateh 
was willing to replace armed struggle with negotiations, while the other 
groups-in part due to their lack of diplomatic channels-were not prepared 
to make such a concession. Thus, while the proliferation of the fasa'il was 
facilitated by Fateh's divide and rule policy within the national movement, its 
`rule' was becoming increasingly contested. Following the status boost it 
received after the Battle of Karameh, Fateh had decided to renew its contacts 
with Arab governments, most notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia; the former 
for arms, training and diplomatic support, the latter for finances. 
In the immediate aftermath of the June War, most Arab governments 
appreciated the appeal of the fasa'il, and viewed alignment with them- 
although often at arms length-as a cost effective way to shore up their 
damaged political prestige. In Jordan and Lebanon, however, the 
governments were alarmed by the growing power of the fasa'il. In both 
countries there were large Palestinian communities. The growth, success and 
prestige of the fasa'il were part and parcel of the increase in the refugees' 
feelings of self-worth, issuing in a surge in Palestinian nationalist fervour 
"which threatened to set the delicate power balance in each of these pro- 
Western countries swinging wildly. "88 Because of the extent of their shared 
borders with Israel, both countries were attractive bases from which the 
fasa'il could strike at Israel. This meant that these countries, in turn, could 
expect to be held accountable for fasa'il activity. For instance, after the 
87 Ibid., p. 46. 
88 Ibid. 
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above-mentioned PFLP attack on Athens airport in December 1968, Israel 
retaliated by sending commando units to blow up thirteen Arab-owned 
airliners at Beirut airport. 
The late 196o's saw an increase in confrontations between the various 
groups and the government troops in both Lebanon and Jordan. In Jordan, 
however, the situation spiralled out of control, particularly as the leftist 
factions had joined political forces with Jordanian nationalists, calling for 
the overthrow of the monarchy. In early September of 1970, the PFLP 
mounted a multiple hijacking operation. Although significant sections of the 
operation failed, by September 12 the PFLP had managed to bring three 
hijacked airliners-one American, one Swiss and one British-to a secure 
airfield-"Revolution Airstrip"-in the Jordanian desert near Zarqa. The 
planes were blown up in an effort to "embarrass the Jordanian monarch 
acutely, both in the eyes of his own people as well as of his Western 
friends. "89 King Hussein responded by forming a military cabinet on 
September i6, and by dawn the following day, the Arab Legion began 
encircling and attacking guerrilla positions in and around Amman, "fully 
prepared and possibly encouraged, if not pressed, by the Nixon 
administration, which tended to see Russians behind every sand dune in the 
Middle East... "9° The PFLP was reinstated in the PLO, and its central 
committee called for a general strike in order to force the resignation of the 
military government. This proved too little, too late. Civil war broke out, and 
by September 26, between three and four thousand Palestinians were killed, 
some 10,000 were wounded, and around 50,000 displaced-91 Palestinian 
military losses have been estimated at between 9io and 960 dead, of whom 
over 400 belonged to Fateh, some 200 to the PLA, 80-9o to Sa'iqa, 70-8o to 
the PFLP and 30-45 to PDFLP. 92 
s9 Ibid., p. 147. 
90 Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics, 
290. 
Ibid., p. 290. 
92 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 267. 
117 
CHANGING FORTUNES 
Bitter recriminations followed between the fasa'il over responsibility for 
Black September, with the left accepting the thesis that they had been overly 
arrogant toward the Jordanian authorities, yet blaming ultimate defeat on 
opportunists and defeatists in PLO ranks. 93 Regardless of internal wrangling, 
the early 1970s brought a sharp turn in the fortunes of the fasa'il. A crucial 
development was Asad's assumption of power in Syria, which heralded the 
primacy of raison d'etat in Syrian policy towards the Palestinians. Jadid-on 
ideological grounds-had been extremely enthusiastic about the fasa'il in the 
aftermath of the June War; Syrian official rhetoric had been replete with 
belligerent far-leftist remarks catering to the fasa'il, such as the famous 
statement on Damascus Radio that "Arab Damascus is no less heroic than 
Hanoi. "94 Conversely, Asad-on political-strategic grounds-was very 
cautious and considered Jadid's policy both unsavourily leftist as well as 
reckless. After 1970 the Syrian position became more guarded and in March 
1972 Asad stated his willingness to accept UNSCR 242, signalling Syria's 
final acceptance of Israel's existence. 
Also Egyptian authorities imposed severe restrictions on the 
guerrillas, and the situation in Lebanon was also getting ever more difficult. 
In the same period, the US-Israeli `special relationship' developed into a 
strategic alliance, hardening attitudes towards the guerrillas in the 
international arena. 95 Intense Israeli counterinsurgency campaigns as well as 
Israeli and Jordanian attempts to create their own leadership structures in 
the occupied territories coupled with Lebanese insistence on suppression of 
guerrilla activity were the catalysing factors for Fateh's own incursions into 
`external operations' between 1971 and 1973. At the same time these were 
also the factors that convinced the PLO leadership that the time was right for 
a peace conference. 
93 In conversations with the author, leading DFLP and PFLP officials, including Hawatmeh, continue 
to claim that ultimate responsibility lay with the Fateh dominated PLO leadership, as well as Iraq for 
failing to come to the Palestinians' rescue. For official DFLP historiography concerning the event, 
see `Irrad `Abd al-Latif Nidaf (ed. ) Naif Hawatmeh latahaddath (Damascus, Dar al-Katib, 1996), pp. 
91-107. 
94 Quoted in Patrick Seale, Asad: the Struggle for the Middle East, rev. ed. (Berkley and Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 1995), p. 147. 
95 See Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish 
Suffering (London and New York: Verso, 2000), pp. 11-39. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A STUDY OF THE CHALLENGE-RESPONSE GAME: FROM 
REJECTION FRONT TO ALLIANCE OF PALEST/NAN 
FORCES 
A little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in 
the physical. Thomas Jefferson' 
SUMMARY INTRODUCTION 
Having set the scene for the coexistence and rivalry of the fasa'il, we can now 
go on to examine the emergence and rationale of the sequence of rejectionist 
assemblies, beginning with the 1974 Front for Rejection of Capitulationist 
Settlements, known as the Rejection Front (RF). Through the various 
factional positions as they emerged in the late 196os and early 1970s, a 
political and tactical dichotomy placed itself at the heart of the Palestinian 
national movement. From 1973 onwards, it has formed a dialectic 
mechanism without which the movement likely would not have survived or, 
at any rate, remained a viable political force. While Fateh created and 
sustained the concept of armed struggle as the `cognitive glue' of 
Palestinianness and thus as the foundation of Palestinianism, it eventually 
came to replace its slogan "revolution until victory" with an attitude of 
`revolution until negotiation'. 
The RF and subsequent rejectionist assemblies have all been ascribed 
the inability to compromise and a hatred for negotiated settlement as their 
fundamental rationale. This image, which already prima facie is overly 
simplistic, does not square with the political statements and actions of the 
groups in question. The major rejectionist factions have never eschewed 
negotiation with the enemy as a possible solution to the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, but have insisted that diplomatic instruments could never replace 
military struggle, but could envisage situations where armed struggle would 
be used to augment and enhance diplomatic instruments. Exacerbating the 
political divisions emanating from this different view on diplomacy, the 
factions that have tended to coalesce in rejectionist assemblies have also set 
themselves different standards from those of Fateh as to when and how 
diplomatic instruments are admissible. Rejectionism has functioned, as 
mentioned earlier, as a `correctionist movement' in that it has sought to 
prevent the movement's leadership from veering away from its original-and 
collectively agreed upon-commitments. It has sought to hold the leadership 
to the Palestinian National Covenant, as well as to its word to them as fellow 
strugglers. 
For reasons derived from ideology, patron-client relations and group 
dynamics, what has distinguished the rejectionists from the mainstream 
have been a qualitatively different set of preconditions for, and objectives of 
diplomatic negotiations. To the main rejectionist factions-in particular the 
PFLP and the PFLP-GC-the goal of liberating Palestine has always been 
inextricably intertwined with the goal of restoring national honour; one 
without the other has been impossible and to claim otherwise would mean a 
depletion of factional and personal honour. To the rejectionists, there has 
never been any question of deviating from the fundamental goals-national 
recognition, repatriation, self-determination and independent statehood, not 
even for tactical reasons. This `higher standard, ' as hypothesized earlier, 
likely derives from their structurally and politically subordinate position 
within the national movement, and the need to creatively enhance their own 
social status and appeal. If these fundamental goals were taken seriously and 
accommodated by the enemy camp, the rejectionists too could sit down and 
parley. Otherwise, they would "continue fighting for dozens of years, 
whatever is involved. "2 
These standards, which have been based on ideological, tactical and 
personal perspectives different from those of the PLO leadership, have 
caused the rejectionists to view Fateh's statist pragmatism as 
`liquidationism, ' `deviationism' and a sign of `bourgeois predispositions. ' In 
Letter to James Madison, January 30,1787. 
Statement by the PFLP Announcing its Withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the PLO. 
Beirut, 26 September, 1974; quoted in Yehuda Lukacs (ed. ), The Israeli -Palestinian Conflict: A 
Documentary Record 1967-1990 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1992), p. 313 
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addition, as indicated by Talal Naji's statement that concluded chapter two, 
the Israelis have been expected to take the first step by virtue of being the 
original transgressor. Likewise, Muhammad Muslih noted in 1975, that 
From the standpoint of the PLO, the injured party cannot be expected 
to grant recognition to its victimizer. Thus the Palestinians seem to 
believe that the onus of recognition falls on Israel. 3 
Given the ambient cultural framework, it is thus perfectly natural that the 
onus of both recognition and initiative should fall on the original 
transgressor, that is, Israel. As a consequence, Arafat's pragmatism and 
willingness to initiate diplomacy-based on Fateh's particular patronages, 
constituencies and views of armed struggle-have therefore been seen by the 
rejectionists as a violation of socially and culturally acceptable norms and 
codes, according to which, in the eastern Mediterranean, the injured party 
brings nothing but further shame upon himself by approaching the 
transgressor for reconciliation. To add injury to insult-quite literally- 
Arafat's diplomatic overtures vis-a-vis Israel as head of the PLO have been 
seen as bringing shame not only to himself, but upon the PLO as a whole, as 
well as upon the Palestinian people. In addition, but perhaps co-incidentally, 
the political games that have preceded the establishment of every rejectionist 
assembly have involved manoeuvres on the part of Arafat perceived by the 
other fasa'il as direct challenges to their honour and social status. Without 
seeing the difference between rejectionists and mainstream behaviour in this 
context, there is little hope of making sense of the chronologies of events 
preceding and following the establishment of rejectionist assemblies. This, 
presumably, is why they are usually not properly accounted for and 
explained 
THE 1974 REJECTION FRONT: MOBILIZING AGAINST GENEVA 
Scholars routinely claim that the RF was set up in order to oppose "any 
participation in a peace process"4 or due to a total refusal to accept the PLO's 
3 Muhammad Y. Muslih, `Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organization'. 
The Middle East Journal, vol. 29, no. 3 (Summer 1975), p. 14 
4 Ibid., p. 7 
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transitional program. 5 These claims disregard the fact that three of the four 
RF members-the PFLP, the PFLP-GC and PPSF-actually signed the so- 
called ten-point agreement, returned to in detail below. What followed was 
not a change of heart on behalf of the rejectionists, but, rather, their 
realization that they had been tricked into conceding to a dishonourable 
political trajectory. For the sake of national and factional integrity, and in 
order to safeguard their vision of national objectives, they broke off to form 
the new Front. 
Political and Tactical Anxieties 
After the October War, all factions grappled intellectually with the problems 
presented by a forthcoming peace conference. The war had, ostensibly, 
achieved some measure of strategic parity between Israel and the Arabs, and 
a peace conference might be a venue at which at least some Palestinian land 
could be regained. The horns of the dilemma were these: If the PLO were to 
sit down at the negotiation table, it would thereby recognize Israel as an 
interlocutor and, thereby, as a de jure entity. If it did not sit down to 
negotiate, the PLO would invariably miss any opportunity to regain occupied 
land through diplomacy. What was worse, however, rejection of diplomatic 
instruments would afford Jordan's King Hussein the opportunity to go ahead 
with his plans for a United Arab Kingdom, in which the West Bank would be 
merged with Jordan. The Geneva conference, proposed by the US and USSR 
in the immediate aftermath of the October War, was the tangible expression 
of this opportunity. It was fraught with problems for the fasa'il, however. 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who announced the conference plans, 
claimed that the Palestinians would be represented, but failed to specify by 
whom. Furthermore, the conference was based on UNSCR 242, consistently 
rejected by the PLO because of its reduction of the Palestinian people from 
nationhood to refugee status. 6 
At the same time, and as the regional arena was getting more 
difficult-due to Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon all seeking to restrict the 
5 As`ad AbuKhalil, `Internal Contradictions in the PFLP: Decision Making and Policy Orientation', 
The Middle East Journal, vol. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 378. 
6 For the original text, see Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Isarel-Arab Reader: A 
Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, 6th ed. (New York et alibi: Penguin, 2001), p. 116. 
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activities of the fasa'il-the international arena was showing signs of 
improvement. Fateh and PDFLP were cognizant of a change in the 
international balance of forces, and Fateh's diplomatic connections made it 
acutely aware of the significance of such a change. These two pragmatist 
factions were particularly heartened by a joint US-USSR statement that 
referred to "the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. "7 So too was 
Sa'iqa, which, in harmony with Syrian policy more generally wanted to make 
the most of the new global situation. As these three factions saw it, then, the 
October War had reduced the necessity for armed struggle. The October War 
had eliminated the feeling of powerlessness that had once necessitated 
armed struggle as an instrument of identity formation, and it had brought 
about a climate favourable to the launch of diplomatic initiatives; it was time 
to get on with the diplomatic programme and formulate realistic aims and 
objectives. 8 The primary problem the pragmatic troika faced was that it 
could find no way of reconciling attendance at a peace conference with the 
aims and objectives of the Palestinian National Covenant. 
The rejectionist factions were no less aware of the potential of the sea 
change in international politics, and they too grappled with the problems 
presented by the peace conference concept. By the time of the 12th PNC in 
Cairo, held in June and July 1974, the rejectionists had decided to accept 
political struggle as a supplement to armed struggle, a decision that 
prompted them to sign the ten-point agreement. 9 They were adamant, 
however, that the current situation did not allow for the fruitful launch of a 
diplomatic initiative, and that the Geneva conference format was absolutely 
unacceptable, both on grounds of UNSCR 242 and the issue of 
representation. Furthermore, and more importantly, the rejectionist factions 
believed that the national authority concept propagated by Fateh and the 
PDFLP-the establishment of a Palestinian entity on all territory gradually 
retrieved from occupation-evidenced destructive short-sightedness on 
behalf of the pragmatists. The PFLP-GC believed that a national authority in 
the West Bank and Gaza would have no military value whatsoever, that it 
William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1967- 
1976 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1977). p. 160. 
8 See Zuhayr Muhsin's remarks in Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 331. 
9 Fadl Shuniru, November 9,2000. 
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simply could not be used as a forward base. '° The PFLP emphasized that a 
mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza would be a means of pre-empting, 
rather than launching, a liberation war. The PFLP also believed that if the 
PLO gave up armed struggle-incrementally or abruptly, stealthily or 
overtly-it would forfeit its status as the Palestinians' legitimate 
representative. " 
Introducing the Diplomatic Option 
The PDFLP had come to pioneer the notion of participation in a peace 
process by introducing the idea of a two-state solution. While its language 
was guarded and it approached the idea in terms of "liberation in stages, " it 
nonetheless paved the way for diplomacy and negotiation. "In August 1973, 
two months before the war, we became the first Palestinian organization to 
call for the first peace program, " Hawatmeh later recalled. "It was... a 
realistic policy to solve the Palestinian issue, the Israeli issue and issues 
related to Palestinian-Israeli relations. "12 Because of its distinct 
revolutionary ideological profile, the PDFLP came under a barrage of 
criticism from the PFLP and PFLP-GC, who asserted that `mini-statehood' 
would cancel out the revolution because a Palestinian entity currently has no 
future. It was these `opportunistic' rejections that Hawatmeh addressed 
when he declared that 
We are fighting to end occupation and to stand effectively against 
imperialist solutions. We are fighting for our people's right to 
establish their national authority on their own land after the 
occupation has been ended... These opportunistic forces do not have a 
leg to stand on. At times they claim that a national authority would 
not have the means necessary for economic subsistence and would not 
be able to survive on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. To these 
opportunists we answer that we are not at the stage of searching for a 
homeland. Over there is our homeland ... 13 
10 Fadl Shururu, November 9,2000. 
" AI-Hadaf, November 10, December 8,1973. 
12 Naif Hawatmeh, June 16,1999. 
'3 Statement by General Secretary of the PDFLP Naif Hawatmah Defending the Establishment of a 
Palestinian National Authority in Territories Liberated from Israeli Occupation, 24 February. 1974, 
quoted in Yehuda Lukacs (ed. ), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 307-8. 
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As each camp was condemning the other in terms of opportunism, defeatism 
and lack of tactical understanding, perceptions of the function of armed 
struggle emerged, yet again, as the central fault line. To the pragmatists, the 
October War had produced international and regional conditions favourable 
for diplomatic advances. For those that came to take a rejectionist position, 
armed struggle no matter how inadequate the resources was part of a 
national effort to evict the occupier and restore national honour. It could not 
be superseded, merely strengthened, by diplomacy, and then only under the 
right conditions. The October War success suggested to the PFLP, PFLP-GC 
and, not least, the Karameh veteran PPSF that military victory was possible. 
The confidence and self-esteem among Arab nationalists generated by the 
war was seen as an indicator that further military victories might well lie 
ahead. Thus, while the October War impacted heavily on the utility of armed 
struggle as the pragmatists saw it, it had a very different impact on the 
rej ectionists' distinct perception. 
Negotiations ensued within the PLO in order to hammer out a viable 
compromise formula that would satisfy all parties' political and military 
minimum requirements. On June 8, the 12th PNC unanimously adopted the 
so-called ten-point agreement, clause two of which read: 
The PLO will struggle by all possible means and foremost by means of 
armed struggle for the liberation of Palestinian lands and the setting 
up of a patriotic, independent, fighting peoples regime in every part of 
the Palestinian territory to be liberated. It affirms that this will only be 
accomplished through major changes in the balance of forces to the 
advantage of our people and their struggle-14 
This acceptance of a prospective diplomatic solution was signed by all 
rejectionist factions apart from the PPSF, which nevertheless gave its verbal 
endorsement through Samir Ghosheh. It affirmed the PLO's willingness to 
participate in a peace conference, but only if it was recognized as the sole 
legitimate representative. This was a claim to being the head of the 
Palestinian people, the symbolic significance of which was already discussed 
in chapter two. Without such recognition of status and honour, the PLO 
would not initiate negotiation. Recognition as head of the Palestinians, then, 
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was the positive challenge required for the PLO to respond. Having made 
that demand, again within the challenge-response game, there was no way of 
backing out without shaming oneself. Also within the framework of the 
challenge-response game, a peace conference would be an opportunity to 
break the deadlock and gauge the willingness of the enemy to counter- 
challenge the Palestinians' positive challenge. The rejectionist factions thus 
agreed to this use of diplomacy, presumably seeing it as an optimal balance 
between political pragmatism and the satisfaction of factional and national 
honour. In an attempt to compromise neither ideological imperatives nor 
factional integrity, the ten-point programme could not be seen to make any 
concessions to Israel. Its language was thus guarded and militant, and its 
scope was necessarily limited. 
Problems loomed large, however. It was well known to all parties at 
the time-and the formulation of the last sentence of the clause makes it 
plain at any rate-that the PLO's leadership intended to use this agreement 
to insert itself into diplomatic negotiations. By their approval of the 
agreement, the rejectionists in fact endorsed these intentions, but made clear 
that the specific formula provided by the Geneva conference-at which 
Arafat was known to have set his sight-was deemed humiliating, shameful 
and entirely unacceptable. The PLO would not go to Geneva-this was the 
understanding that allowed the PNC to adopt the ten-point agreement nem 
con. 
The Compromise Falls Apart 
The ten-point compromise was short-lived. On September 26, Habash 
announced the PFLP's resignation from the PLO Executive Committee, and 
within three weeks, the PFLP-GC, PPSF and ALF followed. Due to the need 
to decisively and clearly disassociate themselves from the PLO leadership, 
the rejectionists' official rhetoric claimed that their defection resulted from 
the repugnance of the transitional program, lambasting the notion as a 
deviation from the true path of the revolution. This was politically astute 
since it resonated with large segments of the Palestinian diaspora, especially 
those refugees hailing from within Israel's 1948 borders, who felt that the 
14 Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 162. 
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transition program placed the realization of their rights in a state of 
suspended animation. 15 The RF's wholesale condemnation of both the 
transitional program and any and all peace initiatives were also social 
counterchallenges to the PLO leadership, intended to detract from the 
legitimacy of its enterprise. 
What so offended the rejectionists was their well-founded suspicion 
that Arafat was not only interested in inserting the PLO into diplomatic 
negotiations, but to do so specifically within the Geneva conference format, 
thus violating the explicit understanding between the rejectionists and the 
mainstream that had made possible the unanimous adoption of the 
agreement. Announcing its decision to leave the PLO Executive Committee, 
the PFLP made clear that it 
gave its approval to the ten points, although in fact they were a 
compromise and a threadbare formula for national unity, after having 
placed on the record in the minutes of the session our understanding 
of them to the effect that they involved rejection of the Geneva 
conference and set the Liberation Organization outside the framework 
of the liquidationist settlement. At the end of the twelfth session of the 
Palestine National Council it was clear what the surrenderist 
leaderships intended by their acceptance of the ten-point programme. 
They regarded it as legalizing their pursuit of the course of deviation 
and surrender. 16 
The rudiments of the RF thus took shape immediately after the closing of the 
PNC, and suspicions of Arafat's motives and potential political trajectories 
grew ever stronger. Until the break on September 26, the rejection front was 
envisaged as a corrective counterbalance existing within the PLO. This was 
made clear by Habash in an interview on in early August, in which he yet 
again made clear that the object of rejection was not negotiations per se, but 
the present format for negotiations: 
In fact, what is called the rejection forces is nothing but an expression 
of Palestinian and Arab forces that emerged from an analysis, 
summarized as follows: the Palestinian revolution is strained and 
ends when it becomes a part of the political settlement presently 
15 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 62. 
16 'Statement by the PFLP Announcing its Withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the PLO. 
Beirut, 26 September, 1974'; quoted in Yehuda Lukacs (ed. ), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 314. 
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proposed, and the continuity of the revolution is only ensured by 
resisting and fighting the proposed political settlement plans. These 
forces now work as though they are one front. But such a front did not 
arise until now. It is the duty of these forces to organize one front that 
has its own political programme, a list of specified organizational 
interrelationships and consolidated struggle programmes. Presently it 
is the duty of this front to work within the framework of the 
Liberation Organization to prevent its complete deviation, so that the 
Liberation Organization does not become part of the settlement. But 
in the event that the PLO goes to Geneva, the rejection front becomes 
the sole representative of the continuity of the revolution. 17 
Thus, the RF did not centre on rejection of peace, but of what was perceived 
as the PLO leadership's intolerable acceptance of an inadequate and 
ignominious peace deal. The RF's members failed, moreover, to see how the 
Geneva conference could be considered compatible with the political 
program of June 8,1974 which stated, inter alia, that 
our Palestinian people [is]... determined to continue the struggle, to 
escalate the armed struggle and to strongly resist the Zionist 
occupation, the Jordanian reactionary monarchical regime's plots 
represented by the united Arab kingdom plan, and the imperialist 
schemes parallel to it. 18 
"What was Geneva if not an imperialist scheme? " one PFLP-GC cadre later 
asked. "It went completely against the [ten-point] agreement. "19 Similarly, in 
its detailed official statement announcing the PFLP's withdrawal from the 
PLO Executive Committee, it was asserted that 
The Front has made every effort to ensure that this period should 
provide an opportunity to strengthen the revolution and consolidate 
its national unity on the basis of the unambiguous and definitive 
rejection of the Geneva conference and the liquidationist conspiracy, 
and of continuing the line of revolution. But the leadership of the 
Organization has persistently evaded defining any attitude... 
On the eve of the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council 
which was held in Cairo last June, the leadership of the Liberation 
Organization started talking about national unity and its importance 
at this stage. It showed that it was prepared to move from an attitude 
17 7 'Interview with George Habash, August 3,1974' in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The 
Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 168-9 (italics added). 
18 Palestine National Council, Political Program, June 8,1974. 
19 Tahsin al-Halabi. November 2.2000. 
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which was no attitude to an attitude of (temporary) refusal to attend 
the Geneva conference... 
At the end of the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council it 
was clear what the surrenderist leaderships intended by their 
acceptance of the ten points programme. They regarded . it as legalizing their pursuit of the course of deviation and surrender. They 
started to interpret it as they wished, later making statements as they 
wished, in a manner incompatible with the Organization's charter and 
with the resolutions adopted at the sessions of its National Council, 
including those adopted at the eleventh and twelfth sessions... 
The leadership of the Liberation Organization started to represent the 
possibility of its attending the Geneva conference-'the conspiracy'- 
as a great victory won by it over Jordanian reaction and Israel. They 
also started to talk of the possibility of coordination with the 
reactionary subservient regime in Jordan if certain conditions were 
met, thereby coming into conflict with the resolutions of previous 
sessions of the National Council which insisted that the regime should 
be overthrown... 
Nor is this all. The leadership of the Liberation Organization has 
denied that any secret contacts have been made with America, the 
enemy of peoples. But we have established that such secret contacts 
have been made, without the knowledge of the masses... In the light of 
the above, how can we continue to bear any responsibility within the 
framework of the Executive Committee? 20 
A New Perception of Armed Struggle 
In the aftermath of the Cairo PNC, the rejectionist fasa'il had intensified 
their guerrilla attacks from southern Lebanon for the purpose of 
demonstrating resolve. Through armed struggle they sought to "challenge 
the PLO leadership politically and demonstrate opposition to the peace 
process. "21 The primary arena in which armed struggle was intended to have 
an impact was the political, and spectacular attacks such as the PFLP-GC's 
taking of several dozen hostages in Kiryat Shmona on April 11,1974, sought 
to demonstrate the rejectionists' ability to nip any `deviationist' peace talks in 
the bud. 22 
20 `Statement by the PFLP Announcing its Withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the PLO. 
Beirut, 26 September, 1974'; quoted in Yehuda Lukacs (ed. ), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 
313-7. 
21 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 339. 
22 Ilal-Amara, March 5.1976. 
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It was in this period that the rejectionist trend began viewing armed 
struggle from an existential perspective previously associated almost solely 
with Fateh. Armed struggle became a "defining and indispensable" feature of 
what it meant to struggle for the homeland, and struggling for the homeland, 
in turn, was a defining feature of what it meant to be Palestinian. 23 Without 
armed struggle, no fasa'il; without the fasa'il, both Palestinian identity and 
the Palestinian dream were in peril. This position was similar to that 
espoused by Fateh since the early 1960 but had now abandoned, and was 
clearly developed (or adopted) for reasons of social competition with the 
PLO leadership. By defining as an indispensable element of Palestinianness, 
something that the leadership was now seen to renege on, the rejectionists 
posed a formidable social challenge. Cobban has noted that the rejectionist 
effort had significant popular appeal, suggesting that 
opposition to the 'national authority' scheme voiced by the Rejection 
Front represented a widespread grass-roots phenomenon, especially 
in the refugee camps of the Palestinian diaspora which were Fateh's 
traditional political base. 24 
Thus, through social competition based on the efficacy and therefore 
honourability of the proposed peace conference, the rejectionists came to 
redefine their own stance on armed struggle. This rejectionist position- 
while espoused by various factions over time-has remained intact and 
become the way in which to politically challenge the PLO (and more recently 
PA) leadership. 
Syrian Support for the PLO 
At the end of October 1974, Arafat led a large PLO delegation to the Arab 
Summit in Rabat and secured, on the basis of the ten-point program, Arab 
endorsement of PLO's claim to being the "sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people. "25 On November 13, thanks to Arab intercession, 
Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly. Aware of the rejectionist 
agenda's ability to resonate with the Palestinian people, and of the 
23 Talal Naji, May28,2000. 
2' Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 62 
25 Ibid., p. 62. 
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uncertainties involved in the diplomatic effort, Arafat never mentioned the 
national authority scheme in his UN address, talking instead in vague and 
general terms of a future Palestinian return to the homeland. 26 At that 
session, the PLO was accorded observer status at the UN, a major political 
victory and giant leap forward on the path to diplomatic negotiations. 
Despite Syria's wariness of Fateh and Asad's dislike and distrust for 
Arafat, and despite its abhorrence at the extreme left positions of the PDFLP, 
Syria was a major supporter of the PLO leadership against the charges of the 
rejectionists. It wanted the PLO to attend the post-October War peace 
conference, and had together with Egypt fought for Arab League recognition 
of the PLO's status as the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative. Syrian 
attitudes to the Palestine conflict were clearly reflected in the policy of Sa'iqa. 
In this period, Sa'iqa Secretary General Zuhayr Muhsin repeatedly and 
lucidly articulated the PLO leadership's statist ambitions, arguing that the 
establishment of power structures in liberated areas were a fundamental 
prerequisite for the continued success of the Palestinian revolution. 27 Syria's 
support for this position-apart from Muhsin's apparently significant policy 
input into PLO policy28-was primarily predicated on its rivalry with Jordan, 
and it was loath to see King Hussein regain control over the West Bank. 
Pushing the PLO towards participation in a peace conference would ensure 
that that would not happen. 
Iraqi Support for the RF 
Within two weeks of leaving the Executive Committee, Habash had travelled 
to Baghdad together with Jibril, PPSF's Ghosheh and ALF's `Abd al-Wahhab 
al-Kayyali, plus a delegation of senior cadres. In a joint communique, the 
four groups and the National Command of the Iraqi Ba'th Party stated that 
they 
condemned the deviationist trends in the Palestinian arena aimed at 
enticing the Palestinians to participate in the liquidationist 
settlements. They agreed that these proposals must be opposed and 
26 For the full text of the speech, see Yehuda Lukacs (ed. ), The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 317- 
33. 
27 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 334. 
28 Farhan Abu al-Haija, May 21,2000. 
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combated and not be allowed to be pushed through. They also agreed 
that this requires the establishment, on a firm scientific basis, of a 
unified front comprising the sections of the resistance, all mass bodies 
and organizations and patriotic persons that reject surrenderist 
solutions-29 
This was the formal birth of the RF, on lo October, 1974, the purpose of 
which was "to undermine the evolving policy of the PLO. "3° The four factions 
in the RF found succour in Iraq's confrontational and aggressive discourse, 
but just as the Syria-PLO alliance, this one too was a temporary expedient 
rather than a developing bond. Aside from the ALF's organic linkage to Iraq, 
the RF's relationship with Baghdad was rocky because it was utterly 
transparent to the factions that Iraq's primary reason for backing the RF was 
to challenge Syria and Egypt, both of whom backed the PLO leadership. For 
the PFLP, ever entangled in political analyses of the present phase, objective 
political conditions and so forth, this presented an intellectual problem: Iraq 
was handing out funds and arms to the cause, but was essentially as 
bourgeois and non-progressive as Syria and Egypt. "We operated at that time 
on the principle that beggars can not be choosers, " one PFLP member later 
remarked. 31 
The relationship with Iraq was particularly troublesome for the PFLP- 
GC, however. The organization's leadership harboured substantial loyalties 
towards Syria; Jibril had served in the Syrian army, it had received financial 
and material support from Damascus since inception and Asad personally 
had been supportive of the PFLP-GC's non-ideological approach to 
combating Zionism. The PFLP-GC and Syria tended to function well 
together, even though their strategic visions for Palestine were far from 
compatible. These factors combined to make alignment with the Iraqi Ba'th 
unpleasant for Jibril and the PFLP-GC leadership. 
As far as the model of patron-client relations outlined in chapter two 
goes-which argues that such relationships are ideally able to establish a 
common discursive universe-the Syria-PLO and Iraq-RF patron-client 
relationships were in some sense mismatches; alliances dictated solely by the 
29 International Documents on Palestine, 1974, p. 513; quoted in Helena Cobban, The Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation, p. 149. 
30 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 339. 
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power political necessities of the present rather than long-term discursive 
and political compatibilities. This is clearly reflected in the PFLP-GC 
behaviour during the Lebanese civil war. The PFLP-GC leadership wanted to 
escape from the Iraqi orbit, and to realign itself with its erstwhile Syrian 
patron. Given prevalent sociocultural frames of reference, this required a 
positive challenge from Jibril, a political offering that would clearly 
demonstrate the PFLP-GC's continued bond to Syria. From the beginning of 
the war, in April 1975, the RF sided with the leftist Lebanese National 
Movement (LNM). Syria saw the radical stance of the LNM as threatening 
Lebanese stability, thereby jeopardizing what was a cornerstone of the Syrian 
national security doctrine. Ostensibly neutral, and initially deploying Sa'iqa 
as a peacekeeping force, Syria nevertheless sided with the Maronite forces 
against the LNM. While this further entrenched Syria's position as an enemy 
of the RF, the PFLP-GC openly supported the Syrian position, and even 
launched into several skirmishes and battles on the Syrian side, against its 
supposed LNM allies. The PFLP-GC had `made good' and, politically 
speaking, had returned home. 
The Palestine Liberation Front 
One of Jibril's longstanding aids and one of the organization's more 
prominent military commanders, Muhammad Zaydan Abu Al-Abbas, was by 
the mid 1970s getting increasingly disturbed by what he saw as the PFLP- 
GC's continuing failure to formulate a solid ideological vision. The above- 
mentioned PFLP-GC attack on Kiryat Shmona in April 1974 had gained the 
organization prominence, and attracted scores of new recruits. This allowed 
the organization's leadership, which had remained in place with very few 
changes since 1959, to stave off and suppress burgeoning leftism within its 
ranks, a process that had begun already in the late 196os. In September 1970 
Jibril unilaterally dissolved the central committee, which preserved the 
structures of the organization but fuelled further leftist discontent. As in the 
ANM, leftist dissent came primarily from younger members who had joined 
the civilian organization after 1967, and from the well-educated cadres that 
31 PFLP-GC Central Committee member, interview with author, Damascus, June 2000. 
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manned the information bureau in Damascus. 32 The arrival of `Abd al-Fattah 
Ghanim and Tal'at Ya'qub in 1970, who had been inducted into the PFLP-GC 
central committee on their militant credentials, had strengthened the leftist 
trend. Jibril, with his primary support base in the might of the anti-leftist 
guerrilla cadres, suppressed the trend but was unable to root it out. 
The PFLP-GC's official endorsement of Syrian support for the 
Maronites led Abu al-Abbas, Ghanim and Ya'qub to break off in May 1977, 
forming the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). They brought with them 
roughly a quarter of the PFLP-GC's members and cadres, substantially 
weakening the mother organization. Jibril's prioritizing a militarily 
alignment with Syria, over and against the ideologically grounded interests 
of the LNM, was a decisive catalyst. 33 Assuming the PFLP-GC's pre-1967 
name, the breakaway faction wanted to show that they were guarding the 
original ethos of the organization. 34 It was thus a highly militant group, but 
also one that placed an emphasis on formulation of, and adherence to, 
coherent left-wing ideology. 
It was hypothesized at the time that Iraq had encouraged Abu al- 
Abbas to break away in order to punish Jibril for his pro-Syrian stance; it 
was also thought that Fateh, with which Abu al-Abbas had enjoyed good 
relations, was yet again trying to assert its hegemony by dividing its 
opponents. 35 At any rate, the PLF immediately joined the PLO and also came 
to replace the PFLP-GC within the RF framework. The outraged PFLP-GC 
leadership, whose political clout and social status was thus weakened, 
immediately launched into a vicious feud with the PLF, with internecine 
violence soon becoming the order of the day. In August 1978, an entire eight- 
story apartment building in Beirut, which housed the PLF headquarters, was 
levelled in a massive bomb attack, killing just under 200 individuals. With 
that, even the warring factions themselves realized that things had gotten out 
of hand, and it was resolved by all factions that internal Palestinian quarrels 
should not be settled by force of arms. 36 
32 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 339. 
33 Abu Nidal al-Ashgar, October 28,1999. 
34 Abu Nidal al-Ashqar, October 28,1999. 
35 DFLP cadre, interview with author, Beirut, October 2000; cf. Helena Cobban, The Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation, p. 162 
36 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 162. 
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The End of the Rejection Front: Saved by the Bell 
The announcement of the Camp David accord in September 1978 is said to 
have sounded the death-knell for the RF37, but its final phase had begun a 
little less than a year previously. In November 1977, Sadat had travelled to 
Jerusalem in his efforts to make peace with Israel and regain occupied 
Egyptian land; in so doing he managed to completely reshuffle the political 
deck of the Middle East and, inter alia, render the RF redundant. 
On several levels, things were going badly for the RF. Iraq was 
resolving its differences with the `reactionary' Arab states, particularly Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf emirates, which threatened to deprive the RF of much 
needed state support. At the 13th PNC, convened in Cairo in March 1977, the 
PLO leadership had been able to resolve the ten-point-program debate in its 
favour. The RF, severely weakened by the war in Lebanon, and by the fact 
that that war had made a Palestinian entity an attractive prospect-managed 
to collect only thirteen votes against the 194 that voted in favour of Fateh's 
formula. The RF delegates themselves boycotted the meeting and, thus, 
could not vote against. 38 On March 16, US President Carter issued a call for 
an inclusive Geneva conference, and for a short period the PLO's 
participation appeared a foregone conclusion. 
Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, Libya and the PLO came together in the 
Steadfastness Front, initiated in early December 1977 in Tripoli as a response 
to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Apart from the closing statement that, among 
other things, denounced Sadat as a traitor, there was also a "Unity 
Statement, " signed by both the PLO and the various individual factions. 39 
This statement contained a blanket rejection of UNSCR 242 and 338 and the 
Geneva conference, and reiterated that there could be no peace, no 
recognition and no negotiation with the Zionist enemy. It was a major 
setback to the PLO leadership's pursuit of the Geneva conference formula. 
Both Fateh and the PLO were compelled to sign the document, although 
Arafat delegated the odious task to Khalaf (for Fateh) and Hamid Abu Sitta 
(for PLO), thus not associating himself personally with its contents. The RF 
factions now claimed to have been vindicated. The document, and the fact 
37 See, for instance, ibid., p. 151. 
38 Ibid., p. 150. 
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that it was signed by the PLO as well as its main state patrons, Syria and 
Libya, was such good news that the PFLP announced that it would be ending 
its three-year boycott of the PLO Executive Committee and Central Council. 
The RF anti-Geneva effort had, if not met with success, at least not been 
defeated. 
The DFLP (the PDFLP had dropped the word `Popular' from its name 
in 1975) was also becoming openly critical of what it saw as the Fateh 
dominated PLO leadership's pandering to US wishes, and sided openly with 
the rejectionists in May 1978. On May 24, the DFLP and the RF factions 
signed a joint memorandum roundly condemning the PLO leadership on a 
number of issues, including its lack of resoluteness vis-a-vis US 
machinations and failure to take the Steadfastness Front and the Unity 
Statement seriously. 4° The latter point was also steering the PLO leadership 
towards confrontation with Syria. While Sadat's visit was considered a 
political disaster, it strengthened the RF's position and afforded it the 
opportunity to move closer to Syria and Libya, thus offsetting the imminent 
loss of Iraqi support. 
After Sadat's advance towards Israel, the RF accused PLO leadership 
of trying to use the Egypt-Israel rapprochement for its own diplomatic gains, 
but it soon became evident that Sadat had no intention of including the 
Palestinians at all. Thus, the threat of a peace conference a la Geneva, based 
on UNSCR 242, was averted and with it the rationale for the RF. 
Immediately following news of Camp David, the PLO executive Committee 
convened to consider the PLO's response to these developments. For the first 
time since 1974, the PFLP attended. In October, the rejectionist members of 
the PLO Central Council-who had never formally resigned yet not attended 
for four years-participated in that body's meeting in Damascus to endorse a 
proposal to amend the 13th PNC's program. These amendments made the call 
for a Palestinian state unconditional, that is, not tied to any other political or 
tactical considerations. The rejectionists approved this prescription. 
39 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 425. 
40 Ibid., p. 433. 
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Conclusion: Focused Rejection and Self-Esteem 
Generally seen as an ignominious step down, the dissolution of the RF and 
the factions' re-entry into the PLO mainstream was in fact a success. As this 
thesis has argued, the RF was set up specifically to respond to the PLO 
leadership's deceit in using the ten-point program to insert the organization 
into the Geneva format against its explicit promises. Thus challenged, the 
rejectionist factions set up their alliance in order to thwart that particular 
transgression. The fact that they had signed the ten-point program in itself 
serves as evidence that they did not oppose diplomatic instruments as such, 
only those instruments that they perceived would defeat the point of the 
national liberation effort. In the heat of the challenge-response game, and 
through the dynamics of intergroup alignment and radical state sponsorship, 
the rejectionists' rhetorical devices came to incorporate wholesale 
condemnation of any and all negotiations with the enemy, although this was 
not the actual standpoint on which the RF was predicated. These were 
nevertheless rhetorical devices deemed necessary in order to isolate the 
`righteous remnant' from the policies of the `capitulationist transgressor, ' 
comprehensively challenging the PLO leadership's diplomatic aspirations. 
Once Camp David superseded the Geneva formula, the rejectionists returned 
to the PLO fold and approved a range of diplomatic efforts, including the 
unconditional demand for a Palestinian state. "The national cause suffered 
from [Camp David, but] we... had accomplished our main task and could 
fully join the [institutions of] the PLO again. "41 
THE INTIFADA WITHIN FATEH AND THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL 
SALVATION FRONT: STEADFASTNESS, HONOUR AND SYRIAN 
PATRONAGE 
By early 1981, the Palestinian national movement found itself in a complex 
situation of contrasting strengths and weaknesses. While the Camp David 
accords had been a harsh diplomatic setback for the PLO leadership, the 
total factional unanimity in rejecting it had consolidated the structures of the 
organization. It had also gained it renewed support inside the occupied 
territories. 42 The PLO had also gained some strength vis-a-vis a chronically 
41 PFLP-GC Central Committee member, interview with author, Damascus, November 2000. 
42 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 108. 
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divided and fragile-looking Arab League (AL), whose pitiful state meant that 
the Arabs were unlikely to be able to negotiate a deal with Israel that would 
satisfy Palestinian demands. This also gave the PLO room for inter-Arab 
manoeuvring. 
By the time of the emergence of the next rejectionist coalition in 1985, 
the Palestinian arena had evolved considerably, as had the regional political 
environment. Camp David had stirred everything up and the region's power 
relationships and alignments were very different from 1978. In the early 
198os, three interconnected, major political-strategic developments 
contributed to changing the trajectory of Palestinian politics: Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon, the Reagan Plan and the split within Fateh. Each of 
these pushed the various components of the PLO further apart on the 
political and strategic level, eventually issuing in the rejectionist Palestinian 
National Salvation Front (PNSF). The argument presented here, however, is 
that the most significant rejectionist effort of the period was the 1983 split 
within Fateh. At its core to this day, Fateh-Intifada-the group that emerged 
as a result of the uprising within Fateh-is institutionalized rejectionism; its 
genesis was a model of social identity concerns at work. 
Originally, the rebellion was a sign of internal dissent as Fateh's 
military cadres were concerned that their social status was being adversely 
affected by Arafat's diplomatic manoeuvres; manoeuvres that the Fateh 
officers at any rate thought contrary to the goals of the movement. The split 
was encouraged by other factions that shared the rebels' concerns. They, in 
turn, were encouraged by the rebellion to violently confront what they saw as 
Arafat's renewed liquidationism. Because the Fateh dissidents' maintenance 
of a distinct group identity required them to adopt positions in 
contradistinction to those of Arafat, and because Arafat was firmly set on the 
path of diplomacy from the early 198o's onwards, their emphasis on armed 
struggle ossified, turned into a constant from which they could not extricate 
themselves even if they wanted to. The Intifada within Fateh had serious 
political repercussions within the whole of the Palestinian arena, one of 
which was to give rejectionism a lasting `discursive home' in Syria, where it 
has remained to this day. 
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Operation `Peace for Galilee' 
The subterfuge that the Israeli government had used to justify its invasion 
was retaliation for the assassination attempt on its ambassador in London, 
on June 3,1982. The attack was carried out by Abu Nidal's FRC, which was 
not PLO affiliated, but on June 4 Israeli bombers attacked refugee camps 
and other targets in Beirut, as well as Palestinian and Lebanese targets in the 
south. Palestinian artillery responded by shelling targets inside Israel for the 
first time following a ten-month cease-fire. Two days later the full force of 
the IDF was brought to bear in Lebanon. 
When the Israeli army launched its massive invasion of Lebanon on 
June 6, the general battle plan had apparently been ready for over a year. 
Deploying in total 75,000 to 78,000 troops, the Israeli tactics hinged on a 
sophisticated coordination of air, naval and ground forces. 43 Progressively 
seizing strategic points northwards towards Beirut, the Israelis were able to 
link up with the Phalangist-dominated Christian militias within the Lebanese 
Forces (LF) that had been their local allies since 1976, on June 14. The 
Palestinians, who fought alongside the Lebanese resistance within the 
framework of the so-called Joint Forces (JF), were now trapped inside West 
Beirut. On a strategic level, the Palestinian response was by and large 
unsuited for the Israeli tactics. The guerrillas were unable to engage in 
guerrilla warfare, and found themselves defending a static frontline around 
the perimeter of Beirut. 
The IDF found Beirut a tough nut to crack, and it was clear to the 
Israeli leadership that the city would not be taken without heavy Israeli 
losses. Given the balance of forces, the guerrillas did not do badly in the task 
that had been thrust upon them. Importantly, however, there were fierce 
recriminations about the performance of two of the key commanders in the 
south-al-Hajj Ismail and Abu Hajim, who had abandoned their command 
posts as the Israelis advanced. Many within the PLO, in particular some of 
their fellow Fateh officers and the PFLP-GC, believed that this had 
contributed to the speed with which Israel was able to advance toward 
Beirut; this was to become a catalytic issue in the split that was to break up 
Fateh. 
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On June 8, US veteran mediator Philip Habib returned to the region 
to try to ameliorate the situation. Suspicious of the US-Israeli relationship, 
the Palestinians refused to deal with him directly. Instead, they relayed 
messages to him via Lebanese Premier Shafiq al-Wazzan, who took the 
message to President Sarkis, who in turn informed Habib, who then relayed 
the Palestinian position to Israel. 44 
Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon proceeded to demand the PLO's 
unconditional and unarmed evacuation, which was rejected by the 
Palestinians, who saw this as amounting to unconditional surrender. Being, 
in every political and military sense of the word, the underdog, the PLO 
leaders managed to get only their absolute minimum demand satisfied. Yet, 
they tried to save Palestinian gains and face by an exhibition of audacious 
and dogged negotiations. Their first demand was to evacuate the city only if 
there was a disengagement of forces through a balanced troop withdrawal by 
both sides, When Israel refused, they demanded to be allowed transfer to 
another part of Lebanon. This was also refused. The PLO then tried to get 
recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination through the UN, 
as that would be considered "an appropriate political gain from the Battle of 
Beirut, worth our leaving Beirut for. "45 The US vetoed the proposal. The 
Israelis also refused a subsequent demand for an overland evacuation of PLO 
forces to Syria. The PLO then offered to leave Lebanon, but only if it would 
be allowed to retain there its political offices and a symbolic brigade of the 
PLA. That too was refused. Arafat's final demand-not subject for 
negotiation-was that the Palestinian forces would leave without any 
conditions, provided that an "American-international guarantee for the 
security of the civilians in Beirut" was issued. 46 This guarantee was issued in 
a document, subsequently published by the US State Department, which set 
the parameters for the evacuation and the deployment of the multi-national 
force under whose auspices the evacuation would take place. The document 
stated: 
43 For details of the invasion, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 522-37. 
as Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 122 
45 Anonymous Palestinian source, quoted in ibid., p. 123. 
461bid. 
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Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants left behind in Beirut, 
including the families of those who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Government of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate guarantees of safety in the following ways. 
The Lebanese Government will provide its guarantees on the basis of having secured assurances from armed groups with which it has been in touch. 
The United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of 
assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in 
touch. 47 
The decision to finally evacuate was confirmed by Arafat on August 15, after 
a decision taken by the `unified leadership, ' that is, the PLO Executive 
Committee plus all fasa'il general secretaries that had remained in Beirut 
(which was all of them, apart form ALF and Sa'iqa, although the latter was 
represented by a second-level cadre). 48 The first contingent of PLO fighters 
set sail for Cyprus on August 21,1982, each fighter still carrying his personal 
arms as a sign that the evacuation was not equal to surrender. On August 30, 
the PLO chairman himself left and `the Beirut era' had come to an end. 
The worst was yet to come, however. A little more than two weeks 
later, on September 15, Israeli tanks surrounded Sabra and Shatila refugee 
camps. The following day, the LF entered the camps with Israeli logistic and 
intelligence support. Ostensibly to root out terrorists, the LF went on to kill 
some 3,000 civilians in the next 42 hours while the Israeli troops, whose 
commanders were fully aware of what was going on inside, were under strict 
orders not to intervene. Israel's Defence Minister Ariel Sharon was 
subsequently found to bear "personal responsibility" for the massacre by an 
independent Israeli fact finding commission, as was Chief of Staff Lt. General 
Rafael Eitan. 49 The effect of the massacres on the evacuated PLO fighters and 
leaders was traumatic. They had expected violence and vengeance from the 
47 US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, `Lebanon: Plan for the PLO Evacuation from 
West Beirut. ' Current Policy, no. 415 (August 1982), pp. 8-10. 
48 Farhan Abu al-Haija, May 21,2000. 
49 `The Kahan Commission Report, February 7,1983'; in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ). 
The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 272. 
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Israelis and their allies upon their entering Beiruts°, for which reason they 
had demanded that guarantees be given to prevent this. The US, however, 
had withdrawn its peacekeeping contingent on September io, satisfied that 
the evacuation was successfully completed, which prompted the Italian, 
British and French contingent to withdraw shortly thereafter, on September 
14.51 This left the remaining Palestinian civilians at the mercy of their 
enemies. Throughout the ranks of the PLO, the atrocities bred further 
despair, as well as entrenched pre-existing hatred for Israel and utter 
distrust for the US. 
The Reagan Plan 
While the PLO leadership was still at sea, on September 1, US President 
Reagan unveiled a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East. This was 
the first overall Middle East peace proposal that the US had backed since 
Camp David. The Reagan Plan did not call for a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from territories occupied in 1967, although it urged further substantial 
withdrawals. It ruled out the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state, but called for the establishment of a Palestinian entity in some form of 
confederation with Jordan. As a sign of good faith, Reagan appealed to the 
Israeli government to halt the establishment of further settlements in the 
occupied territories. 52 
Although it offered nothing to the Palestinians, Farouq Qaddoumi 
remarked on September 2 that the Reagan plan contained "positive 
elements" and, the following day, Arafat stated that "We do not reject 
Reagan's proposals, nor do we criticize them; but we are studying them. "53 
Not only did this response reflect the PLO's greatly reduced bargaining 
power, but also, apparently, its intention to secure Arab support for a 
counter proposal. A PLO Executive Committee meeting, held immediately 
upon arrival in Tunis, gave Arafat what one participant has described as a 
"carte blanche" on policy formulation. 54 The Arab counter proposal would be 
so Former PFLP-GC field officer, interview with author, Beirut, October 2000 
51 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 538. 
52 For the full text of the plan, see 'U. S. President Ronald Reagan: The Reagan Plan, September 1, 
1982, ' in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 257-63. 
53 Quoted in Helena Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 127. 
54 Ibid. 
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hammered out at the imminent Arab summit in Fez, due to open on 
September 7. 
The Fez summit was convened to debate a modified version of the so- 
called Fahd plan. On August 7,1981, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd had 
announced a peace plan to be sponsored by the Kingdom. The original plan 
contained eight points, which included a call for Israeli withdrawal from all 
Arab lands occupied in 1967; the dismantling of post-1967 settlements in 
occupied territories; an affirmation of the Palestinians' right to return or 
compensation; the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza; and-controversially-"that all states in the region should be able to 
live in peace, " a thinly veiled recognition of Israel. 55 
The proposal caused a stir and the original summit, held in Fez on 
November 25, had been adjourned and was now being reconvened. This time 
Fahd's plan had been amended to contain specific reference to "the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination and to exercise their firm and 
inalienable national rights, under the leadership of the PLO, its sole 
legitimate representative... " In a reshuffling of the controversial clause seven, 
it now read "The drawing up by the Security Council of guarantees for peace 
for all the states of the region including the independent Palestinian state. "56 
Arafat argued that this formulation made peace in the region contingent 
upon the establishment of a Palestinian state; its obvious corollary was that 
the PLO was willing to recognize Israel and negotiate on the basis on TJNSCR 
242. 
Originally rejected by both the PLO and Syria, the Fahd plan-which 
from then on became known as the Fez plan-was this time adopted by a 
consensus of all those attending the meeting, which included every Arab 
state except Libya. Hafez al-Asad, however, approved the statement with 
considerable reluctance. While Syria had in effect recognized Israel already 
in 1967, its worry was now that the Arabs were giving away an important 
bargaining lever ahead of negotiations. Also, Asad's longstanding distrust for 
Arafat, and sound political instinct, set off alarm bells when it emerged that 
ss For the full text of the original proposal, see Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel- 
Arab Reader, pp. 234-5. 
56 `Twelfth Arab Summit Conference: Final Statement, September 9,1982'; in Walter Laqueur and 
Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 264. 
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the latter was extremely eager to keep channels of dialogue open with the 
US. 57 This troubled Damascus, which began to emphasize that it dealt with 
the PLO as a political entity, not with its chairman. 58 
The PLO leadership's eagerness to accommodate the US and 
recognize Israel without a prior sign of good intent from either also aroused 
worries within the ranks of the PLO. Parallels between the emerging 
situation and the events surrounding the leadership's willingness to attend 
the Geneva conference were already being discussed in opposition circles. 59 
It was clear that they saw the leadership's position as a possible indicator of a 
dangerous sell-out ahead. 
There was also deep-rooted hostility among the various factions 
towards the Reagan administration. Ronald Reagan-before and since taking 
office-had repeatedly described the PLO as simply a terrorist organization, 
often referring to its supposed role within a Soviet-sponsored international 
terrorist network. 60Once president, he had added further preconditions for 
the opening of a US-PLO dialogue to the single condition of President Carter, 
that the PLO recognize of UNSCR 242. Reagan demanded that the PLO also 
renounce `terrorism' and that it explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist. The 
White House was subsequently forced to moderate its position after 
complaints from moderate Arab governments, and he effectively retreated to 
Carter's position. Even so, in Reagan's announcement of his plan for the 
region in September 1982 he made his base line abundantly clear: "I have 
personally followed and supported Israel's heroic struggle for survival ever 
since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago... America's 
commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad. And, I might add, so is 
mine. "61 
Syria and a growing number of PLO opposition figures were thus 
developing similar concerns, albeit for different reasons. On Asad's 
57 Syrian academic, interview with author, Damascus, July 2001. 
58 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 552 
59 Talal Naji, November 3,2000. 
60 This belief found intellectual support in the work of academic Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: 
The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981). While the 
books conspiratorial view of essentially all `terrorism' as instigated or sponsored by the USSR has 
been thoroughly discredited by more recent historical research, it served as a foundation for the 
Reagan administration's approach to a number of national liberation movements, including the PLO. 
61 Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 660,662 
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invitation, several opposition leaders attending the Fez conference 
accompanied him to Damascus, where the PFLP and PFLP-GC delegates, 
Ahmad al-Yamani and Talal Naji, signed a joint statement with the dissident 
Fateh central committee member Nimr Saleh, condemning article seven of 
the Fez statement. 
The Dialogue with Jordan 
A further concern for both the Syrians and the PLO opposition was Arafat's 
revival of dialogue with Jordan. The Reagan plan caused these concerns to 
gain some level of acuteness. Immediately upon Arafat's arrival in Athens, 
after being evacuated from Beirut, King Hussein sent envoys to offer 
renewed diplomatic coordination between the PLO and Jordan. On 
September 14, the king officially offered support for the Reagan plan and 
within the next few days stated that the dialogue with the PLO would resume 
"with the aim of formulating a confederal union between the Palestinian and 
Jordanian entities. "62 Arafat and King Hussein discussed these proposals in 
`Amman in early October, and agreed to form a joint committee to prepare a 
diplomatic strategy. During these talks, Arafat presented a peace plan that 
suggested negotiations for a Jordanian-Palestinian union, without making 
the venture conditional upon prior Palestinian independence. 63 Fateh's 
Revolutionary Council approved the principle of confederation with Jordan 
in Tunis on November 9.64 In order to facilitate its diplomatic initiative, the 
PLO leadership needed the good offices of Egypt, and renewed talks with the 
Egyptian government in early November. On November 21, a PLO delegation 
visited Cairo openly for the first time in five years. 
Arafat was given ample warning by the PLO opposition that he was 
pursuing a dangerous political line. The PFLP argued that the proposal for a 
Palestinian-Jordanian confederation was intended to "eliminate the PLO and 
the Palestine cause... and to destroy national unity within the PLO and create 
tension between it and Syria. "65 The DFLP lambasted the proposal as a 
62 Al-Safir, September 26,1982; as quoted in Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 
p. 552. 
63 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 553. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Al-Thawra Mustamirra, October 16,1982; quoted in ibid., p. 553. 
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revival, in a new guise, of the 1972 United Arab Kingdom proposal, while the 
PFLP-GC warned that giving Jordan a mandate to speak on the PLO's behalf 
would be a "brazen concession of legitimacy. "66 Arafat's dialogue with Egypt, 
which clung to its separate peace with Israel, further polarized positions and 
hardened attitudes. 
Throughout all of this, Syria was waging an ever-less discreet battle 
against the PLO leadership. It argued that the Jordanian-Palestinian 
confederation concept violated the 1974 Arab recognition of the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Syrian media 
launched a sustained attack against the concept, and stepped up contact with 
the PLO opposition. Asad was seen repeatedly on Syrian television together 
with Nimr Saleh, whose increasingly vitriolic attacks on Arafat from his 
Damascus base were soon being issued in unison with the PLO opposition 
factions. In addition, Syria invited the FRC to set up an office in Damascus, 
in a clear demonstration of contempt for the PLO leadership. This move 
troubled the PLO opposition, however, which strongly disapproved of Abu 
Nidal and his group; throughout the three years that the FRC was 
represented in Damascus, the other factions refused to undertake joint 
operations with it. 67 The rationale for inviting the FRC was, apparently, 
Syrian knowledge that while it could coordinate political and military 
positions with those PLO factions close to it, it would not be able to use any 
of them as `guns for hire. '68 For such tasks, which were to include the 
assassination of `Issam al-Sartawi in April 1984, Syria needed the FRC. 
The PLO leadership finally published its four-point agreement with 
Jordan on December 26, essentially based on the final statement of the Fez 
summit. It revealed that the PLO had opted for "integral coordination" with 
Jordan, going so far as to form a single delegation to any prospective peace 
process. The meaning of this was lost neither on Syria, nor on the PLO 
opposition: Arafat had secretly joined the peace process under US auspices, 
once again working by deception to circumvent a lack of consensus. 
66 Al-Safer October 17,1982; quoted in ibid., p. 553. 
67 Muhammad `Issa Abu Khalil, Damascus, July 28,2001. It should be noted, however, during the 
armed confrontations surrounding the 1983 split within Fateh, the FRC, PFLP-GC. PPSF and Sa'iqa 
coordinated field activities in support of Abu Musa. 
68 PFLP-GC central committee member, interview with author, Damascus, July 2001 
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Arafat was now drawing fire from the PLO opposition, Nimr Saleh's 
circle of Fateh dissidents, Syria and Libya. Colonel Qadhdhafi invited the 
general secretaries of all the major opposition factions to Tripoli in mid- 
January 1983, where a senior Libyan official suggested that they set up an 
alternative PLO, funded and supported by Tripoli. None of the factions were 
interested in the deal, wishing instead to offset Arafat's manoeuvres from 
within the PLO. Similar to the view that preceded the establishment of the 
RF in 1973, the PFLP in particular was keen to remain as a positive force 
inside the PLO, for as long as this was conscionable. As one opposition cadre 
would later remark: "The best way to stand up for the dignity of [Palestinian] 
politics was to dislodge defeatism [from the PLO], not ourselves. "69 Even so, 
the Tripoli meeting issued a declaration, on January 17, that rejected the 
Reagan plan, the Fez declaration, joint diplomacy with Jordan and relations 
with Egypt. "The signatories concluded with the `three noes' pronounced by 
the Arab summit conference of August 1967: no peace, no recognition, and 
no negotiation with Israel. "7° Rejectionism as a collective political strategy 
was back in the national movement. 
The Rebellion Begins 
On January 21,1983 Syria repealed its approval of the Fez declaration, and 
proceeded to step up contacts with the Palestinian opposition, especially the 
dissidents within Fateh. Nimr Saleh was still the most prominent of these, 
but Sa'id Maragha Abu Musa and Abu Khalid al-'Amleh, two senior military 
cadres stationed in the Biq'a' Valley, were quickly rising to prominence. 
During meetings in Damascus between Fateh dissidents and other factions, 
Sa'iqa, PFLP-GC and PPSF helped draft a memorandum that Abu Musa 
would present at a meeting of Fateh's Revolutionary Council in Aden, 
January 25 to 27. Wanting to encourage the militant trend within Fateh 
represented by Nimr Saleh, the opposition also wanted to make sure that 
their views were compatible. Abu Musa's eventual list of accusations against 
the Fateh central committee was extensive indeed. It had, he said, neglected 
the common soldiery since the evacuation from Beirut; failed to return forces 
69 Retired Fateh-Intifada officer. interview with author, Beirut, October 2000 
70 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 556. 
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to positions in the Biq'a Valley, which could have been facilitated by Syria; 
disregarded requirements to meet regularly and take decisions by collective 
agreement; spread lies about how the PLO had fought alone in Beirut, 
intended to encourage defeatist attitudes among the masses in order to pave 
way for an end to armed struggle; and accepted the Fez declaration, which 
threatened to end the state of war with Israel and thus destroy the PLO's 
raison d'etre. 7' 
This last remark was of key importance as it sought to emphasise the 
notion of Fateh and the PLO as the guardians of Palestine's future through 
armed struggle; after years of using armed struggle primarily for combat 
purposes, Abu Musa now reminded the Fateh Revolutionary Council-in 
coordination with the opposition factions-that armed struggle was more 
than just military schemes, it was the very foundation of the PLO. Any 
recognition of, or dialogue with Israel was therefore unacceptable, as was 
empowering Jordan to negotiate on the Palestinians' behalf, and renewing 
relations with Egypt. Abu Musa urged Fateh to regenerate its old alliance 
with Syria and the USSR. 
As the sixteenth PNC met in mid-February 1983, delegates' views as to 
the PLO's military and political options were wildly divergent and the 
atmosphere was antagonistic. 72 Arafat managed to get the council's support 
for the Fez declaration, but it ultimately refused to approve the Reagan 
plan. 73 Arafat felt emboldened enough to call for direct dialogue with the US 
in early March. In direct violation of the decisions of the sixteenth PNC, 
Fateh's Executive Committee released a working document, suggesting that a 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation be set up containing no official PLO 
members, negotiating on the basis of the Fez declaration, UNSCR 242 and 
"the principles of the Reagan initiative. "74 The Fateh central committee 
rejected this proposal. The Jordanian government, feeling snubbed, declared 
that its dialogue with the PLO had come to an end. The Fateh dissidents 
" Ibid., p. 556. 
'` Saad El-Shazly, The Arab Military Option (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1986), p. 
164. 
73 For the full text of the final statement, see Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab 
Reader, pp. 277-80. 
74 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 557-8. 
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considered this a vindication of their position, and the PLO opposition was 
relieved. 
The Fateh dissidents had already, quietly, commenced their rebellion 
and the failure of the leadership's dialogue with Jordan reinforced their 
sense of mission, rather than placating them. After its failure to influence the 
sixteenth PNC, the dissident trend had decided that a more radical approach 
was needed. The hard core of the rebels were the military men, Abu Musa, 
Abu Khalid and their circle of officers, many formerly of the Jordanian army. 
These men were able to feel neither respect nor trust for the Fateh 
leadership, especially after the reinstatement and promotion of al-Hajj 
Ismail and Abu Hajim, whose flight from the southern frontline during 
Israel's invasion the previous year was thought to have facilitated the Israeli 
advance on Beirut. 
Although engineered by senior and middle-ranking officers, the Fateh 
rebellion was based on widespread frustration and bitterness among the 
rank-and-file soldiery, particularly those in eastern Lebanon and Syria. Not 
only were they under heavy restrictions and confined to quarters by the 
authorities, but they were also feeling neglected by the exiled leadership. The 
atrocities in Sabra and Shatila fuelled, among other things, resentment of the 
US whose guarantees had proved worthless; when Arafat revived the Fez 
declaration and showed interest in the Reagan plan, this added insult to 
injury. Other groups within Fateh besides the military men rumbled. The 
heads of Fateh's Gaza and Nablus committees joined in issuing a 
memorandum, criticizing the leadership for its disregard for the Arab 
dimension and lack of focus on national unity. They also criticized the 
leadership's autocratic domination of decision making in political, military 
and financial affairs. 75 Senior leftist cadres complained that the leadership 
had precipitated ethical, moral and military decline within its armed forces 
by replacing the evacuated guerrillas with mercenaries, mainly 
Bangladeshis. 76 The transfer of specialized personnel to camps in other Arab 
states weakened the few effective armed units in Lebanon that were still 
75 Ibid., p. 559. 
76 Ibid. 
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operational. This was seen as a deliberate attempt to weaken the military 
organizations. One senior Fateh dissident later maintained: 
The leadership at the time.. . planned to remove all the fighters and 
strugglers from the Lebanese arena in order to more easily be able to 
abandon its stated aims, including armed struggle. [The transfers 
were] part of the leadership's reconciliation of differences with the 
Zionist enemy-77 
Fateh-The Uprising 
In March 1983, Abu Musa set up headquarters at Hammara in the Biq'a 
Valley, from which he coordinated contacts with sympathetic officers in 
various units, as well as continued his lobbying of the rank-and-file. The 
Syrian army facilitated his activities by allowing the free movement of 
personnel carrying passes signed by him. The Syrians' political and logistic 
support, in their own subsequent estimation, was a crucial catalyst for the 
rebellion. 78 Libya also contributed, pledging $5 million in monthly assistance 
to the dissidents after having been introduced to them by Jibril. 79 
Meanwhile, cadres Nimr Saleh and Hashim `Ali Muhsin provided the 
intellectual and ideological content of the rebellion, later joined by Elyas 
Shufani. 
In early May, Abu Musa, Abu Khalid, Abu Saleh and Abu Kwayk 
reached an agreement with the political and military leaderships of the 
PFLP-GC, PPSF and Sa'iqa to "correct the path of the revolution. "80 In order 
to do this they set up a joint military command and three military sectors in 
Lebanon, each led by a dissident Fateh officer and representatives of the 
other factions. 81 Arafat got wind of the plans and flew to Damascus in order 
to convene the military council and stave off the rebellion. He assigned al- 
Hajj Isma'il and Ghazi `Atallah as PLO force commanders in northern 
Lebanon and the Biq'a Valley, and ordered the transfer of a total of forty 
dissident officers, including Abu Musa and Abu Khalid, to Tunis and military 
camps in other Arab countries. The following day Syrian military intelligence 
'' Muhammad `Adili al-Khatib Abu Fakhr, October 30,1999. 
78 Former Syrian military intelligence officer, interview with author, Damascus, July 2001. 
79 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 561. 
80 Mahmud Hamdan, as quoted in ibid., p. 561. 
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delivered sixty tons of confiscated PLO arms to the rebels at the Masna' 
border crossing, and on May 9, Abu Musa seized the command posts of the 
ist and 2nd Battalions of the Yarmuk Forces, declaring the start of a 
"corrective movement in Fateh. "82 
To connect the epithet `intifada' to the name of the movement is a 
kind of differentiation between two sets of opinions within the 
Palestinian arena... The revolutionary movement within Fateh came 
about in May 1983. The leadership abandoned its aims and has also 
abandoned altogether the role of armed struggle, and went onto the 
path of reconciliation of differences with the enemy. We believe that 
the aim of this was to liquidate the Palestinian cause and to simply 
recognize the existence of the Zionist entity on Palestinian land... The 
motive behind the intifada of the year 1983 was to protect the 
Palestinian revolution, the continuation of armed struggle [in order 
to] confront the Zionist enemy that overtook Lebanon; the 
reorganization and reshaping of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization; and the continuation of struggle and conflict with the 
enemy until we achieve the objectives of our people as far as issues of 
liberation and return to our home are concerned. 83 
As the Fateh dissidents were forced to formulate coherent political and 
military positions, it became clear that the primary catalyst for the rebellion 
was their fear that the military forces were being ignored and abandoned in 
order to facilitate the leadership's diplomatic manoeuvres. At the time, not 
even Abu Musa was entirely opposed to the use of diplomatic instruments to 
regain occupied land, but refused to accept the notion that diplomacy could 
be successful without the backing of force. As one dissident veteran would 
later remark: "The negotiations after [the Battle of] Beirut lacked military 
[backing, and] got us nothing. Was it not the immediate lesson, that without 
armed struggle we cannot even negotiate? "84 Abu Musa and his comrades 
also abhorred the denigration of the military as a means of levelling the road 
towards diplomacy. Accommodation with the enemy was taking place at the 
cost of the military, which had always been "the national movement's most 
indispensable part, its core. "85 In fact, a profound sense of deprivation of 
social status had catalysed the rebellion. Routed by the Israelis and suffering 
821bid., p. 562. 
83 Muhammad 'Adili al-Khatib Abu Fakhr, October 30,1999. 
84 Retired Fateh-Intifada officer, interview with author, Beirut, October 2000. 
85 Abu Khalid al-'Amleh, November 3,2000; cf. Sayigh, p. 562. 
151 
intense post-war fragmentation and self-doubt, the military leadership in 
Lebanon now saw their traditional prominence within the organization 
threatened. Their political legitimacy had been based on their military might, 
which was now being undermined. 86 In order to shore up their own social 
status and the positive social identity of their men, the military forces needed 
to be restored to organizational prominence. 
In a statement on May 13,1983 the dissidents made clear that they 
believed that it was they themselves that were fending off a hostile onslaught. 
Arafat's recent transfer order for forty officers and several units from 
Lebanon, in conjunction with senior commissions being given to officers that 
were "deviationist, defeated and wanted for trial" constituted a "military and 
organizational coup in Fateh. " The purpose of this coup was to facilitate "the 
US settlement. "87 Later it was pointed out that "our principal enemy is the 
US, our immediate enemy is Israel, and our immediate foe is Arafat. "88 The 
dissidents demanded that the transfer order be rescinded and that `Atallah 
and al-Hajj Ismail be dismissed and court-martialed. 
In an interview on May 26, Abu Musa again made clear that his was 
not opposition to diplomacy per se, but to diplomacy without military force 
to back it up. Speaking about the rebellions' rationale, he said 
Fateh's leadership knows that the Palestinian cause is not an issue of 
an officer or a group of officers, or an issue of a military group of 
elements in the arena of conflict in al-Biqa' rebelling against military 
orders. Ours is a cry for correcting a mistaken political action that had 
begun to develop and emerge more clearly following our departure 
form Beirut. Frankly, there is a political conflict within Fateh that has 
been going on for years... 
Following the battle of Beirut, we should have... submitted a struggle 
plan that commits the Palestinian revolution to confront the U. S. plan 
on Lebanon's territory by virtue of the fact of the existing occupation 
and as a field of struggle through alliance with the nationalist 
movement... However, the leadership went to Fez, and we consider 
that the Fez plan is actually Fahd's plan which stems from Camp 
David and from UN Resolution 242, despite the inclusion of certain 
86 See Jamil Hilal, `Ishkilat al-Taghyir fi al-Nizam al-Filastini, ' Journal of Palestine Studies (Arabic), 
no. 15 (summer 1993), pp. 25-6. 
87 Hashim `Ali Muhsin, Al-Intifada Thawra Hatta al-Nasr (The Uprising: Revolution Until Victory), 
(Damascus: Dar al-Jalil, 1983), pp. 89-93. 
88 Dissident cadre quoted in Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 566. 
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points which at first glance appear positive... But we wonder who is 
capable of translating [into reality] this program or that plan. Are 
Arab summits capable of doing such a thing? 
And I answer: No, because from our experience in Lebanon no one 
moved to provide Beirut's children with a single drink of water. We 
realize that the establishment of the Palestinian state and the return 
of the refugees is an issue that requires several wars. When the 
United States and Israel feel that their interests in the region are 
threatened, it is only at that moment that our voice as a Palestinian 
revolution will be heard. Then the Arab countries can impose their 
plans... 
We are an indivisible part of Fateh. We are the conscience of Fateh 
who have raised their voice and thought aloud, and express the broad 
faithful base... Therefore it is necessary to stop and examine what we 
have achieved. What has this revolution achieved? ... What should I 
say to my father who fought in 1936 before the occupation of Palestine 
and the establishment of the Israeli state? What should I say to those 
who fought during these years in order to prevent the establishment 
of such a state? Are we fighting in order to recognize Israel? This is 
not reasonable... 89 
Responding to attempts at mediation by other officers within Fateh, the 
rebels demanded the return of all PLO forces to Lebanon and the 
establishment of a supervisory committee to monitor and regulate Fateh's 
finances; the latter demand was issued partly in order to halt the 
carcinogenic corruption within the organization, partly to stop Arafat from 
using funds for his own neo-patrimonial purposes. They also demanded that 
a general conference be convened to resolve the present impasse. 9° Fateh's 
central committee responded positively to these demands, although they 
refused to agree to the monitoring of finances. Taken aback by having most 
of their demands met, the rebels surmized that the central committee had 
rallied decisively around Arafat and that their response was a ploy. Libya and 
Syria encouraged Abu Musa to take a confrontational line vis-a-vis the Fateh 
leadership, while the latter continued to assert its impartiality. The rebels 
then demanded that an emergency leadership be set up within Fateh, 
dividing the revolutionary council between the two conflicting sides and 
89 `Said Musa: Interview on Internal Dissent, May 26,1983'; in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin 
(eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 290-1 (italics added). 
90 Muhammad `Adili al Khatib Abu Fakhr, November 8,2000; cf. Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and 
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restructuring the central committee, until such a time that a general 
conference could be convened. Arafat's counteroffer fell short of satisfying 
these demands. 
In early June a handful of Fateh officers joined the rebel camp, but the 
rebellion was not gaining any particular momentum. The effort being a 
primarily military effort, civilian support for the dissidents was low. Publicly 
supported by PFLP-GC, PPSF, Sa'iqa and FRC, the PFLP and DFLP were 
more cautious. 91 The PFLP was siding, in principle, with Abu Musa and held 
Arafat responsible for the troubles, while the DFLP was secretly but actively 
supporting Arafat's forces. 92 The PFLP was also keen that the national 
movement should forge closer links with Syria, for "both tactical and 
strategic reasons, " having identified Syria as the only Arab state capable of 
assisting the Palestinian endeavour. 93 Yet both the DFLP and PFLP insisted 
that the dispute within Fateh be settled peacefully and without causing a 
rupture, and on June 26, they established a "Unified Command" in order to 
safeguard their neutrality vis-a-vis the rebellion and autonomous decision- 
making process vis-a-vis Syria. 
Rejection Becomes Armed Struggle 
On June i8 and 19,1983 dissident forces attacked loyalist units near Ta'nayel 
and Ta'lbaya, backed by PFLP-GC armour. The following day, Syrian troops 
seized a Fateh training camp close to Damascus and shelled loyalist positions 
in the Biq'a Valley. On June 22, Syrian armour forced loyalists to evacuate 
their positions at Majdal `Anjar. After an attempt on Arafat's life on June 23, 
the Fateh leader, who was still in Damascus, accused Syria of having 
orchestrated the Fateh rebellion in order to bring the PLO to heel; Syria 
responded by expelling Arafat and declaring Khalil al-Wazir persona non 
grata. 94 On June 27 and 28, the PFLP-GC, PPSF and Sa'iqa threw their 
military weight behind the rebellion, engaging loyalist units at Rawda and 
91 "Abu Nidal's support was valuable, but caused plenty of resentment among all those who knew his 
reputation. " Retired Fateh-Intifada officer, interview with author, Beirut, October 2000. 
92 Muhammad Issa Abu Khalil, May 2000; Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 
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Kfar Zabah, leaving some 50 casualties. 95 Syrian commando units joined the 
effort to push the loyalists out of the Biq'a Valley. In spite of several goodwill 
gestures, which one Fateh dissident later referred to as "intended to lull the 
revolution into [contentment] with partial achievements, " the rebels 
renewed fighting on June 23, after a three-week truce. 96 Although pressured 
by Arab states and the USSR to disengage, Syria made clear to a PLO 
Executive Committee delegation in early July that a Syrian resumption of 
dialogue with Fateh required the latter to accept the dissidents' demands. In 
late July, Syria intervened militarily again, pushing the loyalist units out of 
Kfar Zabad and Jdita. 
Israel's announcement that it planned to withdraw its forces from the 
Shouf Mountains triggered fierce sectarian clashes between the various 
Lebanese actors for control of the soon to be evacuated area. All parties to 
the rapidly escalating Palestinian conflict saw political and military 
opportunities. The Fateh dissidents and the PLO opposition were openly 
satisfied with Syria's position of strength, bordering on hegemony, in 
Lebanon. Syria's position was facilitated by USSR support, prompting Abu 
Musa to remark that "the Soviets are here too, and it seems that many things 
have changed since last autumn. We are witnessing new realities. We can see 
now that the US role has become much less effective. "97 As Syria moved in to 
quell the unrest in Lebanon, the Fateh dissidents, PFLP-GC, Sa'iqa and the 
PPSF fielded forces in support of Syria, and Abu Saleh talked of a new 
"Soviet-Syrian-Palestinian alliance. "98 
The PLO leadership, meanwhile, perceived an opportunity to return to 
Lebanon and Beirut, and ordered its forces into battle. In mid-September 
Arafat surfaced in Tripoli to tour the refugee camps and drum up support for 
his leadership. His presence challenged Syrian plans for, and involvement in 
Palestinian affairs, the Syrian high command proceeded to order all loyalist 
forces down from the Matn Mountains on September 2o; on September 23 it 
95 Ibid., p. 565. 
96 Muhammad `Adili al-Khatib Abu Fakhr, October 30,1999. 
9' Interview with Abu Musa, published in al-Kifah al-'Arabi, May 30,1983; as quoted in Yezid 
Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 567. 
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forced the last remaining loyalists to leave the Biq'a Valley. The retreating 
convoy reached Tripoli on September 28. 
Meanwhile, the PLF had split again, this time into three factions. One 
faction, under Abu al-'Abbas, remained loyal to the PLO leadership; A 
second ultra-leftist faction under `Abd al-Fattah Ghanim supported the Fateh 
dissidents; and a third faction under Tal'at Ya'qub aligned itself with the 
PFLP and DFLP, seeking to remain neutral. According to the official account 
of the PLF's present secretary general, who at the time belonged to Ya'qub's 
faction, 
When the battles began in north Lebanon and Biq'a, we refused to 
participate and said we must have discussions to stop the war between 
Fateh and the other organizations. We resolved not to [side] with any 
participant in the Palestinian war. Abu Al-'Abbas chose to be with 
Arafat; he then left the Front... At the same time, `Abd al-Fattah 
Ghanim chose to be with Fateh Abu Musa; then he also left our Front. 
Our Front continued its [refusal] to participate in a Palestinian war. 
We were under the leadership of Tal'at Ya'qub. 99 
Arafat's forces strengthened their positions in and around Tripoli, and the 
dissidents responded by seizing Fateh's facilities in Syria. They were helped 
by the Syrian government's decision, on October 5, to confiscate all Fateh 
property in the country. The rebels also seized several PLO offices, including 
the WAFA news agency office in central Damascus, which to this day serves 
as Fateh-Intifada's central information office. By October ii, the dissidents 
had taken control of every Fateh office in the country and set about to push 
the loyalists out of Lebanon also. As Arafat was strengthening positions 
inside the perimeters of Tripoli, Syrian armour was in close proximity to the 
city. By late October Tripoli's defenders, some 4,000 strong, were faced with 
nine PLA battalions numbering 4,000 men, some 500 Fateh dissidents, 400 
PFLP-GC and Libyan troops and contingents from Sa'iqa and PPSF 
numbering some 100-200 men each. b00 The ensuing battle along the front 
line, which spanned a semicircle from Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in the 
north, southwards to just the Baddawi refugee camps, was fierce and largely 
static. A ceasefire, the conditions of which were negotiated by Saudi Arabia, 
99 Abu Nidal Ashqar, October 28,1999. 
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was called on November 24. The terms of the agreement included evacuation 
of all Palestinian forces from Lebanon and initiation of dialogue between the 
guerrilla groups. Arafat accepted the terms immediately, but Jibril 
demanded that Arafat should be charged with deviation and tried by a 
revolutionary tribunal. After further negotiations, the first loyalists were 
evacuated from Tripoli on December 17; the UN Security Council had 
approved-on December 3-a proposal to allow five ships provided by Saudi 
Arabia to transport the evacuees under the UN f1ag. 101 In all, some 5,000 
individuals shipped out in the following days, prisoners were exchanged with 
the Syrians and Fateh handed out the contents of its remaining arms caches 
to various sympathetic Lebanese forces, including Amal and Hizb'Allah. The 
Palestinian civil war precipitated by the rebellion in Fateh had cost 438 lives 
and 2,100 wounded. 102 
Arafat Strikes Back: The `Amman PNC 
On his way from Tripoli, Arafat stopped in Egypt for a meeting with 
President Husni Mubarak. Arafat suggested that the "imperatives of 
protocol" had dictated the meeting. 103 Its actual purpose was long a subject 
of debate, not unnaturally affected by fierce partisanship. Those who 
condemned the meeting, including the PLO opposition and even sections of 
the Fateh central committee, saw it as a further step to replacing, rather than 
augmenting armed struggle with diplomatic approaches. Those who took a 
positive or neutral stance to the meeting argued, conversely, that it was 
intended to encourage Mubarak to abrogate Camp David and return to the 
Arab fold. 104 The PFLP, DFLP and the ostensibly `independent' Palestinian 
Communist Party (PCP) representatives in the PLO Executive Committee 
failed to persuade the committee to condemn the visit. Arafat continued full 
steam ahead to insert the PLO into a peace process. On April 24,1984 Arafat 
reaffirmed the PLO's willingness to negotiate directly with Israel, soon after 
'oo Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 570. 
101 Saad El-Shazly, The Arab Military Option, p. 165. 
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which he suggested that the PLO and Israel should recognize each other and 
hold peace talks under UN supervision. 
While the Israeli government persistently rejected Arafat's overtures, 
they thoroughly alarmed the PLO opposition. The course Arafat was 
chartering for the PLO was seen as "political suicide. "105 As Abu Musa 
pointed out, in the above quoted interview, it would require massive 
amounts of military force in order to get a favourable negotiating position, 
and the thoroughly ideologically minded Shamir government appeared even 
less amenable to dialogue than that of Begin. Having been evicted from 
Lebanon, his troops virtually `quarantined' in camps throughout the Arab 
world, Arafat had no military option and no territorial base from which to 
construct one. Indeed, "his forces steadily dwindled, until he could not have 
exercised the military option even had he wished. "1o6 This fait accompli, the 
opposition had argued all along, had been Arafat's master plan, who, indeed, 
seems to have believed that "the loss of the territorial base in Lebanon had 
freed the mainstream leadership to undertake controversial steps... "107 
Even so, in need of legitimizing his manoeuvres, Arafat decided to 
convene a PNC session. Fearing a raucous session, and concerned that not 
enough delegates would attend to make the session quorate, Arafat made 
reconciliatory moves to the opposition. He managed to strike a compromise 
deal with the PFLP, DFLP, PLF and PCP; these four had joined together in 
the so-called Democratic Alliance (DA) on March 27,1984 intended to serve 
as a "front for militancy, [yet willing to engage in] dialogue. "1o8 While the DA 
refused to legitimize the PLO leadership's unilateral political manoeuvres, 
and continued to reject contact with Egypt, the Reagan plan and the 
formation of a joint negotiation team with Jordan, it nevertheless believed 
that interfactional dialogue was still possible and that the upcoming PNC 
would be a suitable venue. Fateh, in return, recognized the PCP as a formal 
member of the PNC and approved PLO Executive Committee seats to the 
PPSF, PLF and PCP. The PPSF joined with the PFLP-GC, Sa'iqa and the 
Fateh dissidents, however, refusing dialogue and criticizing the DA sharply 
105 Muhammad `Issa Abu Khalil, October 30,2000. 
106 Saad El-Shazly. The Arab Military Option, p. 166-7. 
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for approving the convening of the PNC before the PLO leadership had 
rehabilitated itself politically and organizationally. 109 These four groups 
formed the National Alliance (NA) on July 9, to "coordinate moves against 
deviation. "110 The NA considered the upcoming PNC as an attempt to split 
the PLO, alternatively to "eradicate the opposition. ", " Accordingly, PNC 
speaker Khalid al-Fahum, who resided in Damascus and maintained close 
ties to both the opposition and the Syrian government, believed that the PNC 
should not convene until a format for solving outstanding differences had 
been determined. He thus refused to convene the council. The PFLP then 
responded favourably to lobbying by the NA factions, primarily the PFLP-GC 
and PPSF, and made its attendance at the PNC conditional upon "completing 
the national dialogue. "112 
Arafat overrode Fahum and convened the council in his capacity of 
Chairman. As the PNC opened in the Jordanian capital on November 22, it 
was attended by 257 accredited delegates, out of a total of 374, in spite of the 
fact that only three factions sent delegates: Fateh, Abu al-'Abbas' PLF 
faction-and ALF. The other five refused to attend, which meant that 168 
delegates would be absent, 42 delegate short of achieving quorum. Prior to 
the meeting, however, Arafat had arranged to have 47 of the absent delegates 
formally expelled, which would enable the leadership to replace them with 
delegates loyal to the leadership. 113 The opposition complained that Arafat's 
ploy was illegal, but being absent they could not press their case. 
With a guaranteed majority for the leadership's positions, the council 
proceeded to take momentous political and organizational decisions. 
Politically, the PNC called for "dialogue and coordination" with Jordan, and 
renewed its support for an eventual confederation between an independent 
Palestinian state and the kingdom. 114 It praised Egyptian support for the PLO 
leadership during 1983 rebellion, and authorized renewal of bilateral 
relations between the PLO and Cairo. Moreover, the PNC endorsed a 
109 Khalid `Abd al-Mejid, May 25,2000. 
110 Talal Naji, November 3,2000. 
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diplomatic strategy based on "all UN resolutions relating to the Palestine 
question, " although it refrained from mentioning UNSCR 242 specifically. 115 
This was a major political victory for Arafat; he had pushed the PLO to the 
position he wanted it. 
Organizationally, Arafat was also able to score a major victory by 
having the council elect him chairman directly for the first time. 116 
Previously, the practice had been for the council to elect the executive 
committee, which then went on to select one of its number as Chairman. 
"That system... ensured that the leader was only the first among equals. 
Under the new system, by contrast, Arafat could claim a mandate to override 
the committee. "117 This new arrangement, then, was not only significant 
because it began the process of formalizing and institutionalizing Arafat's 
autocracy within the organization. More importantly at the time, it was a 
clear signal to the oppositional leaders-who all regarded themselves as 
Arafat's peers-that, for all intents and purposes, they had been made 
redundant. "The new procedures were humiliating to [the opposition] 
leaders, because he cut them out just like that. "118 
On February 11,1985, Arafat made use of his newly formalized 
powers, announcing a draft statement on principles for achieving peace with 
Israel, together with King Hussein. The `Amman Accord called for total 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied in 1967, in return for a 
"comprehensive peace as established in UN and Security Council 
resolutions, " which would include "all parties to the conflict. "119 In addition, 
the accord also specified that the 
Palestinians will exercise their inalienable right of self-determination 
when Jordanians and Palestinians are able to do so within the context 
of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan 
and Palestine. 120 
11s Ibid. 
116 Saad E1-Shazly, The Arab Military Option, p. 168. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Tahsin al-Halabi, October 26,1999. 
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Thus tying Palestinian statehood to a confederation with Jordan and, in 
another clause, committing itself to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation 
to attend the negotiations, Arafat brought down a barrage of condemnation 
upon himself. Attempts at justifying his actions by publishing a watered 
down and linguistically ambiguous version of the accord came to naught 
after King Hussein published the original text, and insisted that the reference 
to UN resolutions did, fact, imply UNSCR 242. 
In the Palestinian arena, the move antagonized every single faction. 
Even the DFLP and PCP, both of which had hoped for reconciliation and 
dialogue with the leadership rejected the accord harshly. In the regional 
arena, both Syria and Libya denounced Arafat's move as treasonous, as did 
Algeria and South Yemen. In late February, Syria took the lead in calling for 
the establishment of a Palestinian front that would confront Arafat's 
liquidationist schemes. 121 The parallels with the 1974 RF were apparent to 
those involved. "It was like [a flashback]: We are here again. This is once 
more the same confrontation [of deviationism]. "122 After negotiations 
between themselves about the new body's internal structures, the opposition 
announced the creation of the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) 
on March 25,1985; the new assembly was intended to confront Arafat's 
procedural modifications within the PLO leadership, as well as the political 
`deviation' that was likely to follow. 
The turnout for this new creation was, in terms of factions, massive. 
The PFLP, PFLP-GC, Sa'iqa, PPSF, Fateh-Intifada and PLF joined (Tal'at 
Ya'qub and `Abd al-Fattah Ghanim merged their competing PLF factions at 
this point). While operating on the primes inter pares principle, the political 
lead was taken by the PFLP and PFLP-GC, the former having decided to 
leave the DA. The PNSF was essentially a self-appointed steering committee 
for the PLO, the stated central aim of which was to protect national unity 
under the leadership of the PLO. This, then, was thought to require the 
overthrow of Arafat. Because it was seen as a safeguard for the PLO, rather 
than a replacement, the FRC was forced to stay outside the new structure, 
121 Al-Bath, February 27,1985. 
122 Muhammad `Issa Abu Khalil, October 2000. 
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although Fateh-Intifada was apparently keen to include them. 123 The PNSF's 
secretary general was Khalid al-Fahum, regarded in rejectionist circles as the 
legitimate speaker of the PNC despite the fact that he had been replaced at 
the meeting in `Amman. "Everyone felt cheated by Arafat, " one oppositionist 
later remarked. "124 
In the event, Arafat suffered a severe diplomatic setback on his 
Jordanian track when the loyalist Abu al-'Abbas Faction of the PLF hijacked 
the Achille Lauro cruise ship in early October 1985. The suspension of Abu 
al-'Abbas' membership of the PLO Executive Committee did not ameliorate 
international disapprobation; neither did the PLO's Cairo Declaration of 
November 7 in the same year, in which it strongly condemned all forms of 
terrorism and vowed disciplinary measures against all PLO members found 
to engage in such activities. These developments did, however, prompt an 
increasingly uncomfortable Jordan to distance itself from the PLO, instead 
seeking rapprochement with Syria. The two countries issued a joint 
statement on November 13, in which they stated their opposition to the 
conduct of separate peace talks with Israel, and on February 19,1986, King 
Hussein announced the suspension of its diplomatic and political 
coordination with the PLO. 125 
Conclusion: The Twin Results of the PNSF 
The PNSF failed to take any major policy initiatives and did not regenerate 
the spirit of militancy within the mainstream PLO. It also failed to topple 
Arafat, presumably related to the evident half-heartedness of the effort. In 
fact, despite having identified the need to rid the PLO of Arafat and his allies, 
the PNSF factions had been cooperating with Fateh in its incremental, 
clandestine build-up of forces in Lebanon, and their subsequent deployment 
against the Israeli occupation in the south. "After all, struggle [against Israel] 
was our main objective. "126 Just as the RF before it, the PNSF was intended 
to offset the leadership's deviationism and to demonstratively reject the 
`arrogance' with which it treated the opposition, thereby reasserting the 
' `3 Ghanim Saleh, interview with author, Beirut, November 10,2000. 
124 Muhammad `Adi1i al-Khatib Abu Fakhr, October 25,1999. 
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member factions' social and political status within the movement. Thus, in 
the confrontation between the pro-Syrian Shia Amal militia and Fateh, 
following the latter's military build-up, all Palestinian factions except Sa'iqa 
rallied to support Fateh, even Fateh-Intifada and the FRC127; this conflict 
came to be known as the Camps War. The PNSF and DFLP artillery signalled 
this unified position by shelling Amal positions on May 22,1985, infuriating 
Syria, which viewed this intra-PLO rapprochement as a way for Arafat to 
reassert his position without having to make the necessary policy 
modifications. 128 Syria thus ordered its clients to cease fire and proceeded to 
seal their offices, restrict the general secretaries' ability to travel, confiscate 
their assets, block their supply lines and suspend the publication of the 
PFLP, PFLP-GC and DFLP weekly magazines. 129 It also confronted 
demonstrations by Palestinian refugees in Damascus' Yarmuk and al-Thawra 
refugee camps, reportedly detaining as many as 2,300 demonstrators. 130 
Syria's measures against its clients were temporary, and good 
relations were soon restored on the basis of "converging [readings] of the 
political situation, " but only after the factions had contributed to the defeat 
of the Amal militia. 131 In fact, it was a resumption of shelling of Amal 
positions by PNSF factions in mid-June that forced the former to finally 
accept a cease-fire agreement on June 17. Syria was not pleased, but on June 
25, Syria and the PNSF issued a statement of joint political intent. In late 
July, the PNSF joined Amal and the Popular Nasserite Organization (PNO) 
in a joint security committee intended to track down "agents of Israel and 
members of the capitulationist Arafatist line, "132 which was followed over the 
next few weeks by the assassination of several leading Fateh military and 
political cadres by Fateh-Intifada and FRC operatives. 
127 Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics. 
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The PNSF persisted in contravening its official line whenever it 
perceived the PLO leadership to be unduly besieged by non-Palestinian 
parties, however, reflecting its member factions continued perception of the 
PLO as its first priority. For instance, the PNSF's Amal associates assaulted 
Shatila in late March 1986, blaming its attacks on provocations by PLO 
forces and claiming that Arafat was seeking "to create disturbances in the 
camps... in order to embarrass Syria. "133 Despite the imperatives of its Syrian 
patronage, the PNSF supported the position of the PLO against Amal and 
Damascus, arguing that Amal was the provocateur and the PLO the victim of 
aggression. 
At the time it was set up, the PNSF filled two primary functions. One 
was to demonstrate to Arafat that while he may have thought that his 
procedural modifications at the `Amman PNC were expeditious, he could not 
simply treat his fellows within the national movement just any way he 
wanted. In a period of intense political conflict, Arafat had unilaterally 
formalized his position as the head of the Executive Committee, discarding 
the longstanding primus inter pares principle. As we saw in chapter two, 
being head of an organization. implies a special position of honour. Simply 
assuming that position, within a cultural framework where honour is 
considered a limited resource, necessarily means detracting from the honour 
and social status of those who become subordinate. In concert with Syria, the 
Executive Committee's new subordinates responded to this outrage by 
setting up an alternative structure, challenging Arafat's control and the 
representative status of his PLO leadership. On the level of PLO politics, as 
described above, the PNSF might have been a political dud, but it was an 
important event on the sociocultural level, asserting the PLO opposition's 
honour and social status. 
On a political level, the PNSF tied Palestinian rejectionism to Syrian 
positions, a discursive home that it has kept to this day. While the post-RF 
rapprochement between Syria and the rejectionist trend may have started 
out as sheer power politics, it soon took on a deeper significance. In the early 
198os, Syrian and rejectionist politics converged on enough points for them 
133 Amal deputy leader `Akif Haydar, in al-Safir, April 9,1986; as quoted in Yezid Sayigh. Armed 
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to achieve discursive harmony; previously, compatibility between the two 
had been sporadic and laboured. Syria's rejection of Camp David and 
subsequently of relations with Egypt; of the Reagan Plan; the Fez 
declaration; separate Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations with Israel; and the 
`Amman Declaration demonstrated to the rejectionists that "this [was] a 
state that functioned as a bastion against Zionism and defeatism. "134 
More importantly, Syria's support for the dissidents within Fateh was 
a practical demonstration that Syria more than any other state would be an 
indispensable territorial and political bedrock for future confrontations with 
Israel, political or military. 135 Syria's support for Abu Musa-whose uprising 
would have almost certainly come to naught without it-afforded Damascus 
a firmer toehold in Palestinian politics than ever before. Fateh-Intifada not 
only retained all Fateh offices and assets in Syria and northern Lebanon, but 
was also honour bound to be supportive of Syria and its positions, a 
circumstance reflected in the group's alternating between supporting PLO 
against outsiders such as Amal, but assaulting it at the behest of Syria. This 
new lever was crucial to Syrian policy making, because 
In Asad's scheme of things, the Palestine problem was too important 
to be left to the Palestinians. It was much bigger than a disputed land 
or the fate of a few hundred thousand refugees. It was the rightful 
concern of all Arabs, and the way it was settled would determine 
under whose order the Arabs would live and what meaning was to be 
given to their independence. 136 
As the confrontation between Amal and the PLO demonstrated, Syria and its 
clients did not always see eye to eye on matters of tactics or strategy, or even 
on all issues pertaining to eventual solutions to the Palestinians' 
predicament. During the Camps War, "the alliance [between Syria and the 
Palestinian opposition] was sorely tested, "137 but it did endure. The extent of 
the PNSF's political marginality, but arguably also its importance as a device 
for cementing social relations between its constituent parties, is 
demonstrated by the fact that it has never been disbanded. It exists still 
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today as a formal structure, although now with only two members, the PFLP- 
GC and Sa'iqa. Its main function is to organize social functions and performs 
social services to Palestinians in Syria, such as endorsing visa and passport 
applications. "We meet, we perform some [social] services to the Palestinians 
in Syria and other places, but we do not have any political activity now. You 
can say it is nearly dissolved, nearly. "138 It nevertheless continues and 
remains under the symbolic leadership of the deposed PNC speaker Fahum, 
a faint symbol of Syria's claim on Palestinian politics. 
THE ALLIANCE OF PALESTINIAN FORCES: MEETING THE ULTIMATE 
CHALLENGE 
By the time of the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), the Oslo 
accord, on the White House lawn on September 13,1993, several regional 
and international developments beyond the national movement's control 
had impacted on its trajectory. The fall of the USSR was perhaps the most 
momentous, depriving as it did the leftist factions of not only a patron but 
also a source of intellectual credibility. Importantly, it also deprived Syria of 
its primary international ally and supplier of arms, puncturing Damascus' 
ability to maintain a credible military deterrent vis-a-vis Israel. Among other 
things, this prompted Syria to participate in the US-led war against Iraq, in 
return for greater freedom of action in dealing with the increasingly 
troublesome anti-Syrian stance of the Maronite forces in Lebanon. The fall of 
the USSR adversely affected the political status of Syria and the social status 
of the Palestinian leftists, the latter finding it difficult to provide a credible 
intellectual framework for their political positions. It was the straw that 
broke the camel's back as far as the PPSF, PLF and PRCP were concerned. 
Theirs were an already waning political existence, made much more difficult 
by the collapse of the primary sponsor of international socialism's. Also the 
DFLP, PFLP and PFLP-GC were hit hard, all three having ascribed to the 
view that, as expressed by the PFLP-GC, "[t]he Socialist system, led by the 
Soviet Union, represents the main ally of the national liberation movement 
in the world. "139 
138 Khalid al-Fahum, May 11,2000. 
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On the Palestinian arena, the intifada that erupted in 1987 had 
transferred the centre of activist gravity to the inside. The occupied 
territories had replaced southern Lebanon as the struggle's main 
battleground, and thereby dented the political and social status of the exile 
based fasa'il. It had also, importantly, transferred the struggle from the 
shoulders of guerrillas to the shoulders of ordinary civilians. While the 
factions were unanimous in their support for the uprising, it troubled some 
of them that the traditional role of the military was thus supplanted. 
The Emergence of the Islamist Trend 
With the intifada, Islamism had also come to the fore; Hamas and MIJ 
constituted a further challenge to the fasa'il, all of which now needed to 
contend with the Islamists for popular support. The Islamists thrived in the 
occupied territories and in the revitalized political environment of the 
intifada, and were attracting scores of supporters and members. 
Founded in Egypt in late 1979 by Palestinian students Fathi Shiqaqi, 
`Abd Al-'Aziz Al-'Awdah, and Bashir Musa, the MIJ is a derivative of Muslim 
Brotherhood thought, heavily influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran 
and the writings and -actions of Egyptian radicals. Due to close relations with 
those individuals responsible for the assassination of President Sadat, the 
leadership of the nascent MIJ was expelled from Egypt. The faction formally 
announced itself as the Movement of Islamic Jihad in Palestine, in the Gaza 
strip in 1981, under Shiqaqi's leadership. The MIJ's ideological position was 
based on the assumption that the liberation of Palestine is a precondition for 
the unity of the Islamic world. This liberation must be accomplished or, at 
least, initiated by an Islamic vanguard, envisaged as weakening Israel 
through attacks against which it cannot defend itself. The MIJ aims at 
establishing an Islamic state in all of Palestine, which would be loosely 
modelled on the Islamic Republic of Iran; the faction has always been 
attracted by Imam Khomeini's position on Islamic unity, and endorses the 
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concept of the velayat-efaqih, the `guardianship of the jurisprudent. '140 The 
faction has also been a recipient of Iranian funding since 1981. 
Active inside the occupied territories-primarily in the Gaza Strip- 
until the Intifada in 1987, the MIJ was thought to have numbered between 
20o and 30o activists. In August 1988, the group's leadership was expelled 
to Lebanon, curtailing the faction's ability to operate inside Palestine. While 
in Lebanon, however, the faction's leaders worked ardently on establishing 
good relations with the Hizb'Allah, as well as with Iran through 
Revolutionary Guards units stationed in the Biqa valley. It also came into 
close contact with Fateh-Intifada and PFLP-GC, and established a political 
rapport with these two factions. In 1993, MIJ formally set up its 
headquarters in Damascus. 
Official Hamas historiography claims that the movement was 
established on December 8,1987, coinciding with the eruption of the 
Intifada. Hamas' emergence was certainly catalysed by the Intifada, although 
it first announced itself in February 1988. It claimed to be the military wing 
of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Palestine; Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, the 
movement's spiritual leader, was a long-standing leading figure within the 
MB in Palestine. Until the Intifada, the MB had concentrated on matters 
cultural and spiritual, eschewing violence and political activism. With the 
Intifada, however, the MB was faced with a choice: "forgo its de facto 
accommodation with the occupation or lose the Palestinian street, where 
legitimacy was born less of piety than national resistance. "141 Hamas chose 
resistance and did so with considerable success; in June 1989 the Israeli 
Defence Forces outlawed the movement. Although it pledged unity with the 
forces and aims of the PLO, Hamas operated independently throughout the 
Intifada and managed to build a relatively wide support base, establishing 
itself as a significant force in Palestinian politics. A series of political events, 
including the Madrid negotiations, pushed the movement from its initial 
40 See Fathi Al-Shiqaqi, `Al-Khomeini: al-hal al-islami wal-badil' in Al- `umal al-kamila al-shahid 
al-doktor Fathi Al-Shigaqi: Al-maialad al-awwal (Markaz iafa lil-dirasat wal-abhath, Cairo), pp. 457- 
534. 
141 Graham Usher, Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process (Pluto 
Press, London, 1999), p. 19. 
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relative moderation towards increasing militancy. By late 1992 it had come 
to unequivocally embrace armed struggle. 142 
The signing of the DOP was perhaps the most dramatic watershed in 
the Palestinian national movement's post-1967 history. Formally launching 
the `Oslo peace process' in which the State of Israel and the PLO were 
committed to peaceably negotiated solutions to their differences, the DOP 
constituted a fundamental change of the struggle's parameters and 
objectives. It also imposed specific timeframes on these new parameters and 
objectives, increasing the sense of urgency among those who opposed it. In 
fact, even those movements, factions, and individuals vehemently rejecting 
the DOP would find that it defined Palestinian political reality from that 
point onwards. "Oslo was the achievement that Arafat had aimed for during 
all these years, " remarked a senior Hamas cadre. "A fait accompli against 
which resistance would be powerless. "143 To its supporters the accord was a 
historic step towards reconciliation and peace between two peoples that had 
seen too much suffering and enmity. To its critics it was a shrewd neo- 
colonialist manoeuvre whereby Israel made the PLO leadership its 
subservient enforcer in the. occupied territories. To the Palestinian 
opposition, it constituted the greatest political sell-out of all times-a 
betrayal of the Palestinian people and a formidable threat against their own 
political survival. 
Imposing Israeli Objectives 
The negotiations leading up to the DOP consisted of a series of thirteen 
secret meetings in the vicinity of the Norwegian capital. These commenced in 
December 1992 and were conducted in parallel with the open Israeli- 
Palestinian dialogue in Washington. 144The two channels were not linked, 
however, and unbeknown to the Washington negotiators Haidar `Abd al- 
142 For detailed accounts of the emergence of Hamas, see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The 
Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), chaps. 1-3; Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute 
for Palestine Studies, 2000), pp. 36-40. 
143 `Irrad al-`Alami, June 7,1999. 
144 For first hand accounts of the secret process, see Mahmoud `Abbas (Abu Mazen), Through Secret 
Channels (Garnett, 1995); Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace (Orion, 1995). For an account of the 
parallel Washington negotiations and an `insider criticism' of Oslo, see Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of 
Peace (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
169 
Shafi, Hanan Ashrawi, and Faysal al-Husseini, their activities were largely 
diversionary from early 1993 onwards. Only Arafat, Mahmoud `Abbas, Yasser 
`Abd Rabbu, Bashir al-Barghuti and "a handful of their closest colleagues"145 
were fully appraised of the secret dialogue, which on the Palestinian side was 
conducted by Ahmad Qray` Abu `Ala and Hassan `Asfur. 
Because the Israeli government disapproved of direct contacts with 
the PLO, it initially dispatched two academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron 
Pundik, to serve as the Palestinians' interlocutors. By mid-May 1993, Yitzhak 
Rabin was satisfied that the PLO was serious about the Oslo negotiations and 
authorized the inclusion of government representatives in the Oslo 
delegation. Shimon Peres proposed Israeli withdrawal from `Gaza first' in 
early June, which was well received by the Palestinians. This proposal came 
against a background of increasing violence in the occupied territories, 
particularly in Gaza. Graham Usher observes that 
By April 1993, the occupied territories were hovering on the brink of 
anti-colonial war, with military forms of resistance replacing the 
uprising's earlier modes of mass protest and civil disobedience. Nor 
did it escape Israel's notice that the armed struggle was being led not 
by the PLO but by Hamas... 146 
Israel was as eager to get rid of the burden of administrating Gaza, as Arafat 
was to assume it. Arafat saw the offer as a useful opening but needed more, 
however, than just the Gaza Strip. On li June, Arafat answered Peres 
through an interview published in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz: 
Give me the Gaza Strip. I can restore order there as I did in Lebanon 
where the situation was far more complicated. The situation is simpler 
in Gaza and will improve because we will receive financial aid. This 
would be a good start for the whole peace process.. .1 also need 
somewhere in the occupied West Bank. It could be Jericho or 
elsewhere. I cannot let it be said that I sold out the West Bank for 
Gaza. Obviously a corridor would have to be set up between the two 
areas under international control. 147 
145 Yezid Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 653. 
146 Graham Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, p. 9. 
1 47 Quoted in Harold Cubert, The PFLP's Changing Role in the Middle East, p. 84. 
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The `Gaza-Jericho first' formula was thus formulated to the mutual 
satisfaction of Israel and the PLO leader. "From this point onwards, " Sayigh 
tells us, "the PLO chairman obstructed the official talks in Washington with 
even greater insistence, to the dismay of `Abbas and other colleagues who 
preferred to progress on both tracks... "148 
The two delegations hammered out the minutiae of a basic agreement 
on which they hoped to be able to base a subsequent overt and 
comprehensive dialogue. This agreement provided, first of all, for the 
establishment of a self-governing authority in Gaza and Jericho, controlled 
by the PLO. In a second phase, Palestinian authority would be extended to 
remaining Palestinian population centres on the West Bank. This second 
phase was set to coincide with general elections for a governing council, the 
nature and powers of which would be subject to further negotiations. These 
interim agreements were to last for five years, but further "permanent status 
negotiations" would start after the first two years of autonomy. These 
negotiations were to decide those issues that were too complex to be settled 
promptly-the fate of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem and the 
future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, borders, and security 
arrangements. Once ' agreement had been reached on these thorny final 
issues there would be a permanent peace settlement in Palestine. 
The existence and substance of this secret dialogue leaked to the 
media in late August. Journalists-not Arafat-informed the humiliated 
Palestinian negotiating team in Washington about the substance of the Oslo 
dialogue on August 27.149 The existence and substance of the Oslo channel 
precipitated immediate hostility from within the PLO. Independent 
executive committee member Mahmoud Darwish resigned and Shafiq al- 
Hut-widely regarded as the `voice' of Palestinians resident in Lebanon- 
suspended his participation in protest. Faysal al-Husseini, one of the 
negotiators in the Washington talks, called for the establishment of a 
"Palestinian government of national salvation that would arrest the all-out 
collapse of the Palestinian institutional network. "15° Farouk Qaddoumi, 
148 Yezid Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 656. 
149 Said Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (London: Bloomsbury, 1998) p. 255. 
150 Quoted in Meir Litvak, `The Palestine Liberation Organization, ' Middle East Contemporary 
Survey, no. 17 (1993), p. 168. 
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director of the PLO's Foreign Relations Department, voiced angry criticism 
against Arafat and his circle for having kept him in the dark about the 
substance of the dialogue. 
Arafat submitted the accord to the Fateh central committee during a 
session on September 3 to 5, and then to the PLO Executive Committee, 
which debated the proposition for two days, September 8 to 9. The proposal 
faced "spirited resistance at [the] Fateh central committee meeting, " but 
eventually won "grudging ratification. "151 Five members of the eighteen- 
member PLO executive committee boycotted the proceedings and out of the 
thirteen participants, Arafat was eventually able to secure nine votes in 
favour of the accords, exactly half of the total number of committee 
members. This was far from a resounding approval but all that was needed to 
press ahead. 
Within hours after the adjournment of the executive committee 
meeting, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin exchanged letters of recognition. 
In his letter, as explained in chapter one above, Yasser Arafat conceded to 
"the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. " More far- 
reachingly, he renounced "the use of terrorism and other acts of violence, " 
and assumed "responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to 
assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators. "152 
Furthermore, Arafat stated that "the PLO undertakes to submit to the 
Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in 
regard to the Palestinian Covenant. "153 Prime Minister Rabin responded that 
"in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of 
Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the 
Middle East peace process. "154 Four days later the two leaders met in 
Washington for the ceremonial signing of the DOP. After a further seven 
months of negotiations, Arafat and Rabin met in Cairo on May 4,1994 to 
sign the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, also known as the 
Cairo accord. The first PLO military personnel entered Gaza on May lo and 
1 51 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 658. 
152 Letter from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin, dated 9 September 1993. 
' 53 Letter from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin, dated 9 September 1993. 
154 Letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Yasser Arafat, dated 9 September 1993. 
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Jericho on May 13; Arafat arrived triumphantly in Gaza on July 12 "to lead 
the nascent Palestinian Authority in person and start an entirely new phase 
in the Palestinian striving for statehood. "155 
Opening Pandora's Box 
"Yasir Arafat's reception at the White House, " commented one observer, "has 
signalled both his acceptance into `the new world order' and also his formal 
departure from Palestinian national consensus. "156 Arafat had barely 
managed to push the Oslo concept through the Fateh central committee and 
had not the opposition succumbed to its counterproductive practice of 
boycotting `offensive' committee meetings, the PLO executive committee 
would, in fact, have been equally split between those in favour and those 
against. As the accord was signed, the pro-Oslo camp was far from 
representative of a Palestinian political mainstream: There were angry 
demonstrations in virtually every Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, 
Syria, and Jordan (by those whom the accord consigned to indeterminate 
dispossession), in the West Bank and Gaza (again, primarily by the refugees), 
and all Palestinian factions except Fateh, the PPP, FIDA, PPSF-Ghosheh, and 
ALF opposed the agreement. 157 Oslo carried the day due to Arafat's skills at 
manipulating his custom-made system of political patronage and it was clear 
from the beginning that in order to fulfil his duties as stated in the accord he 
would have to steamroll his opponents, and wrest authority from the 
emerging independent political trends in the occupied territories. "As he 
inched towards signing the second Cairo Agreement, the one which gave 
Oslo the worst possible interpretation, he was already isolated from 
mainstream Palestinian thinking. "158 
While the international political response to the Oslo accord was 
overwhelmingly favourable-measured in, for instance, the flood of financial 
aid to the fledgling PA and official invitations to Arafat from capitals around 
55 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 659. 
156 Lamis Andoni, `PLO: The Role of Arafat's Opponents' in Middle East International, no. 459.24 
September 1993, p. 8. 
157 For an early survey on refugee attitudes in Lebanon, see Hussein Sha`ban `What do the 
Palestinians in Lebanon Want? ' in Journal of Palestine Studies (Arabic), no. 19 (Fall 1993), pp. 176- 
87. 
158 Said Aburish, Arafat, p. 272. 
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the world-a host of critical voices were immediately raised against it. These 
voices were not confined to the rejectionist PLO factions and Hamas, but 
came most forcefully from Palestinian, Israeli, and Western intellectuals and 
academics. Much has been produced by way of commentary on the Oslo 
accord and process; it is instructive to look at some of the main criticisms 
from outside the Palestinian national movement, as well as the logistics of 
Arafat entering Gaza, before examining the opposition's response. 
Criticisms of the DOP 
There were strong resemblances between the DOP and previous proposals 
for Palestinian autonomy. The crucial differences lay in the official role of the 
PLO, its responsibility for internal security, and the economic arrangements 
through which the PLO leadership could now assume control of the 
territories' financial affairs. That is to say, the DOP ensured continued 
political survival for the PLO as an organization and for Arafat as its leader. 
The absence of funding from the Gulf States and the international pariah 
status that resulted from PLO support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait meant 
that the alternative to reaching an agreement via Oslo and taking an active 
part in peace negotiations was the collapse of the PLO. "Arafat had 
committed himself to reaching agreement in Oslo at any price, " commented 
Said Aburish. "[T]he PLO's financial problems were affecting his 
bureaucracy in Tunis and resulting in complaints, defections, paralysis and 
disintegration. "159 "I could see in 1991, " Edward Said was later to remark, 
not only that the gains of the intifada were about to be squandered but 
that Arafat and a few of his closest advisors had already decided on 
their own to accept anything that the United States and Israel might 
throw their way, just in order to survive as part of the `peace 
process. "'160 
It was not the objective of survival per se that seemed to disturb observers 
and commentators, but the way in which that survival had been safeguarded. 
Many saw the secrecy that had been necessary to ensure the success of the 
159 Ibid., p. 253. 
160 Edward Said, Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process 
(New York at alibi: Vintage Books, 1996), introduction. 
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Oslo dialogue as conspiratorial backhandedness designed to make this 
Arafat's victory not only against occupation but also against his opponents 
within the Palestinian arena. Edward Said, again, noted that in setting the 
PLO up for this "Palestinian Versailles, "161 
the Palestinian side had no legal consultants to help it conclude a binding international agreement, that its tiny handful of secret 
negotiators were untrained, poorly educated, and unmandated `guerrilla' leaders who ignored Palestine National Council resolutions 
as they set about dismantling the whole structure of Palestinian 
resistance... I am aware of no more than a handful of people including 
Arafat who, with scant legal background or experience of ordinary 
civilian life, holed up in Tunis, hatched these decisions affecting 
almost 6 million people. 162 
The reliance on inexperienced negotiators was the price that the PLO team 
had to pay for secrecy and, thus, success, albeit Pyrrhic. Their poor calibre 
relative to the Israeli negotiators eventually got them a deal so far from the 
objectives of the National Covenant that the Israeli writer and commentator 
Amos Oz referred to it as "the second biggest victory in the history of 
Zionism"163, while Ilan Pappe. called it "a wholly Israeli formula. There is 
nothing Palestinian in it. "i64 
A direct consequence of the asymmetrical relationship between the 
parties during the dialogue in Norway was the asymmetry of the resultant 
documents-the letters of recognition and the DOP itself. The mutual 
recognition contained in the exchange of letters made PLO-Israeli dialogue 
possible and the two parties "humanized" their opponent. 165 Arafat's letter 
contained much more than recognition and humanization of Israel, however: 
It made the PLO accountable to Israel on specific issues of policy, tactical 
means, and strategic objectives. Arafat guaranteed Israel's security in the 
occupied territories, promising to prevent and punish those who did not toe 
the Oslo line. In his letter, Rabin committed only to recognition of the PLO 
161 Ibid., p. 7. 
162 Ibid., p. 5. 
163 BBC interview, 14 September 1993. 
164 Ilan Pappe quoted in Graham Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, p. 35. 
165 Ilan Pappe, quoted in Graham Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, p. 34. 
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as representative of the Palestinians and an interlocutor in forthcoming 
negotiations. 
Arafat also pledged that the provisions of the National Covenant that 
were inconsistent with the commitments of his letter of recognition were no 
longer valid. Not even the reluctant approval of the PLO executive committee 
could have authorized Arafat to make this unilateral commitment, as it 
would require a PNC session to amend the National Covenant. The view that 
Arafat was simply steamrolling his opponents by forcing the PLO into a 
situation from which it could not turn back was not uncommon among 
observers. "The contents of the letters of recognition were irreversible, "166 
and the process was destined from that point onwards to be asymmetrical, 
stacked against the PLO. "He was determined that this time we would not 
have any say [whatever] in his affairs, " a rejectionist leader later 
commented. 167 
The structure of the negotiation process was also found offensive, in 
particular the relegation of virtually every issue of importance to the 
Palestinians to eventual permanent status negotiations. While this procedure 
was ostensibly supposed to . aid 
dialogue, its indeterminate character 
impacted heavily on the essence of the issues. Three areas were particularly 
affected by their postponement-borders, settlements, and refugees. 
By making borders-which entails issues of land rights and 
sovereignty-a matter for later discussion, the Palestinians in effect 
surrendered their internationally acknowledged legitimate claims to the 
West Bank and Gaza. "[T]hese have now at most become disputed 
territories, " wrote Edward Said. "Thus with Palestinian assistance Israel has 
been awarded at least an equal claim to them. "168 This innocuous procedural 
detail effectively removed the concept of `occupation' from the political 
equation, thus depriving the Palestinians of the legitimacy of struggling-by 
any and all means-to repel an occupation force. It also rendered UN 
Security Council Resolution 242, calling for Israeli withdrawal from lands 
occupied in 1967, inapplicable to the West Bank and Gaza. As of September 
166 Said Aburish, Arafat, p. 259. 
167 Talal Naji, November 7,2000. 
168 Edward Said, Peace and its Discontents, p. 11. 
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13,1993 Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip became 
an `Israeli-Palestinian land dispute. ' 
The deferment of borders was connected to the issue of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories, also designated a permanent status 
issue. The settlements were launched shortly after the 1967 war as a means 
of expropriating Arab land, ear marking it for Jewish use, thus making sure it 
would never be anything but `Israeli soil. ' Far from being pioneer 
homesteaders breaking virgin ground, as their euphemistic appellation 
might imply, `the settlers' have always been politically motivated, 
government funded paramilitary outposts designed to expand the territorial 
claims of the Israeli state, most commonly through confiscation of Arab 
property. Because the DOP deferred the fate of the settlements, the Israeli 
government was under no obligation to halt the construction of new 
settlements, nor curtail the expansion of existing ones. By creating and 
expanding settlements, Israel would be in a better position to claim more 
land come the final round of negotiations. From a Palestinian standpoint, 
this state of affairs was simply preposterous-but Arafat nevertheless signed. 
Even though it lies at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the 
issue of refugees was' also postponed to the last round of negotiations. At the 
time of the DOP a majority of the Palestinian people were in the diaspora, of 
whom most were refugees. For decades the Palestinian struggle had pursued 
two primary objectives: the retrieval of occupied lands and the refugees' right 
to return. Not only did the DOP relegate the refugee issue to permanent 
status negotiations, thereby opening the refugees' right of return in 
accordance with UN resolution 194 up for discussion-those 8oo, 000 
individuals displaced in 1948 (and their descendants) were not even going to 
be discussed. The Israelis persisted in the official fallacy that the original 
1948 displacement of some three quarters of the Palestinian people was no 
fault of Israel's, and consequently saw no reason to allow for their return . 169 
Israel's only commitment vis-a-vis the refugees was to consider "the 
169 A brief elucidation of the official Israeli view on the right of return is given in an article by Judith 
Lapidoth, `Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to Israel? ', posted on the Israeli Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs website, http: //www. israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOj8rO. For the first (and 
to date most lucid) `new historian' refutation of this view, see Benny Morris, The Birth of the 
Palestine Refugee Problem, 1947-49 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
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modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and 
disorder. "170 This, in effect, amounted to no commitment at all. "The Israelis 
refused any reference to Palestinian national rights, " Abu Mazen, the 
architect of the Oslo dialogue, was later to complain. 171 
Arafat had committed to the PLO to recognition of, and peaceful 
coexistence with Israel, as well as agreed to enforce Israeli security- 
requirements in Gaza and Jericho. Israel, in turn, had committed itself to 
none of the core demands of the Palestinian national movement. "It's clear, " 
commented Hanan Ashrawi, "that the ones who initialled this agreement 
have not lived under occupation. "172 
Entering the Occupied Territories 
The Oslo process was a renewed lease on political life for Arafat and his PLO 
hierarchy, a tour de force of Arafat the Survivor, and the people of the 
occupied territories greeted the return of Arafat and other leading PLO 
cadres with massive demonstrations of support. The transferral of PLO 
institutions from Tunis to the occupied territories meant, however, that the 
rudiments of popular democracy that had emerged during the intifada, and 
which constituted power structures distinct from those of the PLO, were 
crushed under foot. It also meant that it became necessary for Arafat to 
extinguish the intifada itself, partly to enforce his own order, partly to fulfil 
the terms of the Oslo agreement. 173 The international approbation that 
followed in the wake of the Oslo accord confirmed the primacy of the PLO 
over independent formations, and within the PLO it confirmed the primacy 
of Arafat's statist power elite over the revolutionary fasa'il. By late summer 
1994, Arafat was in full personal control of political and financial affairs in 
the Gaza strip and Jericho area. This in turn meant that he controlled the 
rudiments of the new, territorially based Palestinian political system. 
170 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Israel Information Service. 
1993), article XII. 
Mahmoud Abbas, Through Secret Channels, p. 163. 
Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 260. 
173 On PLO's assumption of power in the occupied territories, see Glenn E. Robinson. Building a 
Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University 
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Arafat speedily transplanted what has been referred to as his "three 
sources of power" into the occupied territories: the 7,000 men from the PLA 
who were to form a Palestinian police force, the loyal Tunis bureaucracy, and 
the financiers and notables "who owed their loyalty to the chief and not to 
the Palestinian cause. "174 Among these `money men, ' incidentally, were Abu 
Mazen and Abu `Ala, the architect and the coordinator of the Oslo 
negotiations, respectively. 
Upon arrival in Gaza, Arafat assumed the role of president of the 
council of the PA. Because elections for the council were not due until the 
end of the initial two-year period, Arafat's presidency entailed absolute 
power pending elections. The three areas of greatest concern to Arafat were 
to form a PA executive, to establish the security apparatus, and to assume 
control of all aspects of propaganda. 175 Having created an executive made up 
primarily of Tunis officials, he purged the city councils by replacing their 
elected or independent leaderships with loyalists, thus forestalling 
independent power bases. Trade unions and professional associations were 
purged of leaders that had opposed the Oslo accord. 
The 7,000 PLA soldiers. that began to arrive in Gaza on May io were 
to form the nucleus of the Palestinian Security Service (PSS). Arafat 
appointed al-Hajj Ismail to command the first contingent to enter Jericho, 
the man who had abandoned his field command during the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982, and whose 1983 reinstatement and promotion served as 
one of the catalysts for Abu Musa's rebellion. The PSS was "empowered to 
arrest or imprison people because they belonged to particular political 
groups, opposed PNA policies or spoke against the terms of the Oslo and 
Cairo agreements. "176 It became Arafat's first anti-dissident strike force, 
although several more were to follow. 
As a sign of things to come, Colonel Jibril Rajoub, in charge of PSS in 
the Jericho area, and Colonel Muhammad Dahlan, his counterpart in the 
Gaza strip, promptly held a series of meetings with Yacov Perry, head of 
Israel's internal security service, Shin Bet, and General Amnon Shahak, 
Israel's deputy chief of staff and chief negotiator vis-a-vis the Palestinians. 
174 Said Abunsh, Arafat, p. 275. 
175 Ibid. 
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As a result of these meetings the Israelis allowed Rajoub's companies to 
operate throughout the West Bank in pursuit of suspects and oppositional 
elements, even though this ran counter to the terms of the Cairo accord. 
These operations were undertaken with considerable brutality and "a short 
time later the first reports of Palestinians dying under torture began 
surfacing. "177 Ironically, the PLA had thus become a tool of Israeli national 
security. 
Such abuses notwithstanding, the international media support for 
Arafat and the Oslo process was massive. "Within a matter of days, " Edward 
Said commented in October 1993, 
the `independent media' had totally rehabilitated Arafat. He was now 
an accepted, even lovable roly-poly figure whose courage and realism 
had bestowed upon Israel its rightful due. Anyone who opposed, or 
criticized what he had done was either a fundamentalist like the Likud 
settlers, or a terrorist like Hamas. 178 
Also, the PA promptly went to work on the propaganda and information 
aspect of proto-statehood. PA radio, known as Radio al-Quds, was launched 
on July 12 1994, the day that Arafat arrived in Gaza. As television was added 
to its activities six months later, PA media services adopted the formal name 
of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC). Radio al-Quds used the 
same long-wave frequency as the PFLP-GC's al-Quds Palestinian Arab 
Radio, as "Arafat was determined to deny his people the benefit of the 
opinion of others. "179 PBC conducted a massive propaganda barrage against 
all Palestinian opponents of the DOP, denouncing them as "enemies of 
peace" and "terrorists. " 
Understanding the Opposition's Reaction 
The DOP and the commencement of the Oslo process were monumental, 
fearsome and drastic developments as far as the Palestinian opposition was 
concerned. They were seen as shameful compromises on Palestinian rights 
and honour, and Arafat's hard-line attitude towards the opposition made it 
16 Ibid., p. 281. Yezid Sayigh disputes the veracity of Aburish's statement [oral communication]. 
177 Ibid., p. 282. 
178 Edward Said, Peace and its Discontents, p. 14-5. 
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clear that they were given a choice of total acquiescence or total 
ostracization. Riled and frightened, the opposition chose total rejection, and 
refused to have any dealings with the DOP's political and institutional 
derivatives; even so, the Oslo process would set the framework for their 
activities after 1993. While their vociferous refusal to acquiesce dented the 
authority with which Arafat could proclaim his manoeuvres to express the 
will of the PLO and the Palestinian people, they could not stop the process. 
"The Oslo agreement marked a new stage in our struggle, " PFLP cadre Leila 
Khaled later remarked. "It is a difficult time because the whole issue of our 
aim has been diverted in a different direction. "180 
Total rejection notwithstanding, three of the major secular opposition 
parties-PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP-had already voiced clear unilateral 
support for a peace settlement, based on relevant UN resolutions and the 
primacy of the PLO as the Palestinians' representative. The PNSF- 
representing the PFLP-GC, Fateh-Intifada, PRCP, and DFLP-had also 
indicated in 1991 that they would support peace negotiations in which the 
PLO was accorded a well-defined representative status. 181 However, they 
demanded that any peace with Israel recognized and righted the wrongs that 
had been perpetrated against the Palestinians as a people, restoring their 
collective honour. The recognition of the PLO as head of the Palestinian 
people was also crucial. While they participated in and sustained the intifada 
inside the occupied territories, and carried on the guerrilla war against Israel 
from their bases in southern Lebanon, they were not inherent enemies of 
peace; rather, they were enemies of a dishonourable peace. Given the 
primacy of honour as a pivotal social value in the ambient Eastern 
Mediterranean culture, it was only natural that the opposition should yet 
again have taken this stance. Their reaction to Oslo thus included wholesale 
and uncompromising embrace of armed struggle, refusal to deal with the 
PLO/PA leadership, and total dismissal of Israel's right to exist. 
`Peace with honour' had been a longstanding theme with the 
opposition. `Abd al-Hadi Nashash, spokesman for Fateh-Intifada, stated in 
19 Said Aburish, Arafat, p. 282 
180 Leila Khaled, 23 October 1999. 
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April i99i that it is necessary for Palestinians to work in order to "preserve 
the unity of the PLO as a sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people, " and continued: 
There are Arab lands occupied by Israel and there are resolutions 
demanding Israeli withdrawal from these territories. All we want is 
implementation of UN resolutions. We wish this could be done 
through peaceful means. 182 
This statement constituted part of a PNSF initiative to unify the PLO, and 
was significant in that is was not accompanied by previous demands that 
Arafat be removed and armed struggle against Israel intensified. "The peace 
that we understand is our return to the Palestinian homeland-to Haifa, 
Jaffa, Jerusalem-not to the land that was occupied in 1967, " stated Ahmad 
Jibril some months later, as preparations were being made for a 
comprehensive intra-factional dialogue in Sana', based on the PNSF's call. 
Jibril continued: 
We told [the PLO leadership] very frankly, `If you are speaking about 
a peace conference, then peace is our right to return to Palestine, the 
right to self-determination, the right to establish a Palestinian state. 
Without this, there will be no peace in the region. ' 
... This leadership 
has over the past few years offered concessions that 
the enemy never dreamed of. These misled people in the PLO 
leadership thought that if they offered such concessions, such as 
recognizing the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine, they would 
have a seat at the peace conference. They offered them all these 
concessions. Finally they asked this leadership to do one final thing; 
namely, give itself the coup de grace. They asked it to give itself up as 
a concession, to cancel itself, to cancel the PLO. 
Therefore, we say if the PLO leadership remains on this course, it will 
end up conceding the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. Who concedes the land will concede his symbolic 
name. This is our understanding of these issues... We believe that the 
Palestinian leadership should be firmer and more adhering to 
Palestine and Jerusalem than all Arabs, all Muslims and all those 
rulers. Regrettably, we see that those leaders are making more 
concessions than all parties. 
182 Issam Hamza, 'Radical Palestinians Call for Dialogue with Arafat, ' Reuter Library Report, April 
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... We say in advance [of the Sara` conference]: `No concessions on Palestine. ' And the minimum level that we might accept as a PLO 
program is the right to repatriation, the right to self-determination 
and the right to establish an independent Palestinian state. We 
cannot accept anything but this. And this also means that we have 
made many phased concessions in this regard... 183 
This clear indication of willingness to negotiate was not a one-off statement 
by an unpredictable and erratic revolutionary; as this chapter has repeatedly 
indicated, the rejectionist current within the Palestinian national movement 
has shown far greater constancy and predictability in its political position 
and behavioural patterns than the PLO leadership. Jibril's speech was a 
signal among many that the opposition was prepared to negotiate but not to 
humiliate itself. In early October 1992, Jibril restated the same position, in 
the context of rejection of the Madrid formula: 
Brothers: Some people ask `Since things are in this state of chaos, and 
we know that they are in a bad state, what is the alternative? What is 
the alternative for our people and our nation? ' First of all, we have to 
agree that what is presented to us is surrender, not a just or 
honourable peace, as some claim, and that the United States wants to 
bring us to our knees and raise the Israeli flag over all Arab and 
Islamic capitals. First of all, we have to agree on the amount of 
damage we will sustain if we travel to Washington to conclude a dirty 
deal. 
As for the alternative, I tell you from this forum-and I am being 
honest with you-we do not have a magic alternative. We say, 
however, that the will of nations can work miracles ... 184 
Not only did this statement indicate the perception of a dishonourable 
settlement as unacceptable, but also that armed struggle was not "a magic 
alternative" that could solve all political problems. George Habash 
elaborated on the alternative: 
If the [Madrid] negotiations fail, the slogan or political position that 
we as Palestinians and Arabs must adopt is this: `Resorting to 
183 `Speech by Ahmad Jibril at a graduation ceremony for youth and vanguard classes' as broadcast 
by Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, August 13,1991 (italics added). 
184 `Speech by Ahmad Jibril in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners held in Zionist Jails, in the 
Yarmuk camp, ' as broadcast by Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, October 9,1992; BBC SWB. 12 
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183 
international legitimacy. ' If the negotiations fail, we cannot now say 
that we want to liberate Palestine from the river to the sea. The 
international situation, the official Arab situation, and perhaps the 
situation of the Arab masses at this stage do not enable us to raise 
such a strategic slogan. However, it must remain our true, long-term 
and strategic slogan with regard to the conflict between us and Zionist 
invasion and domination. The slogan we can raise, and which I 
believe will be acceptable to the international community and to 
Arab officialdom, is this: `Resorting to international legitimacy. ' We 
want a solution of our issue via international legitimacy, its 
resolutions and institutions. We do not want our issue to be settled by 
a U. S. solution, because the United States is Israel's strategic ally. All 
experiences have shown that the United States cannot be a neutral 
mediator in this conflict ... 185 
The increase in militancy, exaltation of armed struggle, and implicit threats 
against Oslo and its supporters were responses to what the opposition saw as 
Arafat's breach of the honour code, his underhanded methods, which had 
slighted the opposition and exacerbated the gravity of the Palestinians' 
political quandary. "Walk out, walk out, walk out of the quagmire of 
treason, " Jibril had exhorted the PLO leadership, "because the Palestinian 
land is not for sale! "186 
Responding to the Challenge 
The opposition shared the wider criticisms of Oslo-the clandestine and 
bungled negotiations, the asymmetrical commitments in the letters of 
recognition, the lack of reference to Palestinian rights in the DOP, and the 
incremental process that left the most important issues for last. Arafat's 
interview in Ha'aretz had appeared to the opposition as a plea to be made an 
Israeli enforcer against fellow Palestinians. 187 They were also resentful about 
the fact that Arafat had negotiated in Oslo as the Israelis launched `Operation 
Accountability, ' a massive bombardment of PFLP-GC, Hizb'Allah, and 
civilian targets in Lebanon during the summer of 1993. The most crucial 
issue for the opposition, though, was Arafat's unilateral cancellation of parts 
of the National Covenant. Not only did this `divert the struggle' in a way they 
185 'Interview with Dr. George Habash' as broadcast by Voice of the Mountain (Lebanon), October 7, 
1992 (italics added). 
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Yarmuk camp. ' 
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felt to be entirely unacceptable, but it was simply not Arafat's personal 
prerogative to do so. This usurpation of rights was a blatant challenge to the 
structurally and power politically subordinate opposition factions. Moreover, 
it demonstrated to them that Arafat was interested in the PLO only in so far 
as it could be used to legitimate the policies formulated by him and his circle. 
They were not surprised, however. 
We have known Abu `Ammar for many decades. We knew that when he 
would be in a situation of power he would make sure that we could not 
affect him... he would humiliate us as members of the PLO if it would be good for his political goals. 188" 
Khalid al-Fahum further emphasized how the disgrace of Arafat cancelled 
out his legitimacy as head of the PLO: 
The recognition is a shameful move. This is the least that can be said 
about it. He recognized the Zionist entity, which occupies all of 
Palestine, part of Syria and part of Lebanon. What has the Zionist 
entity offered in return? It offered nothing but recognition of an 
organization as the representative of the Palestinian people. In other 
words, the Zionist entity did not talk about an independent state, the 
right to self-determination and a sole, legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. Israel offered nothing. Arafat offered everything... 
The charter is within the jurisdiction of the Palestine National 
Council. The charter was not prepared offhand; it is the product of in- 
depth studies and lengthy debates. It is the product of hard work. 
Therefore, the pledge to change the charter is illegitimate. By his 
action, Arafat is not considered a legitimate leader of the Palestinian 
people ... i89 
Since even the oppositional factions not affiliated to the PLO shared a 
significant measure of loyalty to the organization's function as the 
Palestinian people's legitimate representative-including, as of the early 
199os, Hamas-Arafat's behaviour offended the whole opposition across the 
board. Their continued commitment to the representational primacy of the 
PLO thus came to imply the duty to struggle against the organization's own 
leadership. 
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Although the Oslo negotiations were a closely guarded secret until 
their public disclosure on 20 August 1993, a steady stream of news reports 
throughout the summer had suggested that significant Israeli-Palestinian 
transactions were going on outside the open channels. 19° Arafat's dispatch of 
a Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference, after the tumultuous PNC 
session in Tunis in September 1991, had been branded by the PFLP-GC as 
"another thoughtless step, which will have great negative results, " giving "an 
open endorsement to the elimination of Palestinian rights. "191 Khalid al- 
Fahum had commented that "this is not a delegation for negotiations [but] a 
delegation invited to accept capitulation. "192 
The opposition remained committed to armed struggle from bases in 
Lebanon, and to the intifada in the occupied territories; some had sought to 
orchestrate the militarization of the intifada, moving gradually towards 
guerrilla and eventually conventional warfare. 193 These activities-apart from 
their direct function in combating the enemy-were intended to 
communicate three distinct messages to three distinct audiences: To the PLO 
leadership, that the opposition could wreck any peace deal that was not `just 
and comprehensive'; to Israel, that while it may have found a pliant partner 
in Arafat he did not call all the shots; and to their Palestinian constituents, 
that the opposition would continue to constitute a bastion of steadfastness 
and resistance. In this context, they were understandably anxious about the 
media's suggestions of a `secret deal. ' Due to their continued commitment to 
the armed struggle and the intifada, the opposition factions' intellectual and 
discursive context remained an essentially military-strategic one and the 
trickle of news about secret Israel-PLO channels did nothing but promote 
further militancy. 
The PFLP-GC in particular intensified the armed struggle in early 
1993. On i8 December 1992 the Israelis had deported 413 Palestinian 
'90 See, for instance, `Peres Said to Hold Secret Peace Talks with a PLO Leader, ' Agence France 
Presse, July 16,1993; `Israel Studying PLO Idea on Peace Talks-Peres, ' Reuters, July 29,1993; 
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Islamists to Lebanon, most of them members of Hamas, in reaction to the 
capture and execution of an Israeli border guard by Hamas. Lebanon refused 
to receive them, and they ended up in the Marj al-Zuhour camp inside the 
southern Lebanon security zone. On 7 March 1993 the PFLP-GC captured 
and executed another Israeli soldier in "retaliation for the daily crimes 
committed against our defenceless Palestinian people and in response to the 
Zionist enemy's procrastination in returning the mujahidin deportees to 
their homes. "194 Against this background, border skirmishes continued 
throughout the spring, and eventually, on July 8 to 9, joint PFLP-GC and 
Hizb'Allah operations resulted in the deaths of five Israeli soldiers inside the 
southern Lebanese `security zone. ' Israel retaliated, on July 25, with a seven 
day bombardment of civilian targets throughout the `security zone' and in 
southern Biqa, naval shelling of an area north of Tripoli, and air raids 
against Syrian positions in Lebanon. `Operation Accountability, ' resulted in 
some 130 deaths, 450 injuries, and in excess of 300,000 internal refugees-195 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was quoted as saying that "Israel would 
make south Lebanon uninhabitable" if attacks by Hizb'Allah and its allies did 
not stop, and that he would "flood Beirut with refugees. "196 
Against the backdrop provided by these attacks, the Oslo negotiations 
went on regardless; their public disclosure came less than a three weeks after 
the last Israeli air force sorties into Lebanon. Faced with the news, the 
opposition was thrown into a state of shock and disarray as the apparent 
deadlock in the Washington negotiations had encouraged the opposition to 
relax its attitude. 197 It took until 31 August for a formal statement to emerge, 
in which the PNSF commented: 
News agencies and media organizations have disseminated reports on 
feverish political moves and activities concerning measures to 
implement autonomy on the Palestinian track, called the Jericho- 
Gaza First option. These moves, which seek to liquidate the 
193 Graham Usher, Dispatches from Palestine, p. 9. Cf. Al-Thawra al-Shabiyya Al-Filastinivaa, vol I- 
III (Beirut: Fialstin al-Tahwra, 1990,1991,1992) 
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Palestinian cause and harm the Palestinian people's rights, are a humiliating overt conspiracy against all the objectives, martyrs, and 
struggle of the Palestinian people, and against their dignity and future. At the same time, these moves are a retraction and a 
relinquishment of the unity of the Palestinian people and land, the 
Palestinian people's right to repatriation and to national independence, and an abandonment of holy Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine, with all the emblems of dignity and steadfastness that it 
represents for our people and nation... This conspiratorial agreement is being concluded on the basis that Zionist security stipulates the 
liquidation of the intifada... While we warn against this destructive 
scheme and this conspiracy, which greatly harms Palestine and its 
people and the militant relationship that binds the Palestinian people 
to their nation, we appeal to all the nationalist factions, figures, forces, 
and the honest and militant Palestinian masses to responsibly and 
courageously oppose this defeatist scheme. 
In light of the seriousness and gravity of the requirements of the 
current stage, our people no longer accept compromising stands by 
this or that party, not to mention the state of continued indifference, 
impotence, and silence. These stands-no matter how they are 
justified-are a cover for the conspiracy and the results that are taking 
place... These agreements and appellations, which take place in the 
name of the PLO whose leadership has become a tool in the hands of 
U. S. and Zionist policy, do not represent our people, express their will, 
bind them, or detract from their determination to pursue the struggle 
to attain their. national rights, primarily their right to return to their 
homeland. Our people are more determined than ever to pursue the 
liberation of their land and regain their rights in spite of all the 
conspiracies. Our people will remain the people of heroism and 
bountiful offering, and the militant vanguard of the Arab and Islamic 
nation. It is not fair that the militant Palestinian people are taken to 
account for the humiliating behaviour of this leadership and these 
collapsing and defeatist figureheads. 198 
At the World Conference in Support of the Islamic Revolution in Palestine, 
convened in Tehran October 22-24,1991, ten Palestinian military-political 
organizations had announced the formation of the Ten Forces Resistance 
Organization (TFRO). 199 The formation had been intended to coordinate 
opposition against the Madrid conference, which was convened earlier that 
month. However, the TFRO remained a chimera because the groups failed to 
198 'PNSF Statement Denouncing Gaza-Jericho Plan and PLO Leadership' broadcast on Al-Quds 
Palestinian Arab Radio, August 30,1993. 
199 Its membership was the same groups that later formed in the APF, with the exception that instead 
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FRC by saying: "Everyone who was against the Madrid conference was invited to sign the statement. 
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erect any form of organization structure. 20° On receiving news of Oslo, the 
rejectionist leaders wasted no time in convening meetings between the 
factions belonging to the TFRO, scrambling to ascertain the politically 
possible. They also set about investigating the positions of Syria, Libya, and 
Iran in order to ascertain what moves would receive their endorsement and 
support. On September 2, Jibril, Fahum, and Abu Musa met separately with 
the Iranian charge d'affaires in Damascus. Regional support was seen as 
crucial because, as Khalid al-Fahum observed, 
This draft plan also creates a new axis, that is, a Palestinian-Israeli 
axis antagonistic to the Arab world and Muslims. This is because the 
two parties will make agreements on water, water desalination, 
environment, the economy and everything. Since Israel is the stronger 
party, it will be the dominating party. This draft agreement strikes 
deep at our relations with Arab and Islamic countries, which do not 
expect the Palestinians to be the first party to embark upon a 
liquidation and capitulation process... This agreement also isolates the 
other Arab countries, makes things more difficult for them, and places 
new obstacles before them should they opt for a certain solution. 201 
There was also the pressing practicality of every major rejectionist faction 
apart from Hamas being based outside Palestine. No one among them 
harboured any illusions about Arafat allowing political pluralism inside the 
occupied territories, nor could they now afford to be seen as subjecting 
themselves to his authority. Syria in particular was seen as a crucial ally due 
to the large amount of Palestinians living under its authority, in Syria proper 
as well as in Lebanon. While they were loath to accept any division of the 
Palestinian people, they recognized at this early stage that the diaspora was 
likely to become their primary constituency. 202 
The three potential state sponsors were well disposed towards a 
renewed rejectionist project, although each took a very different view of its 
own prospective involvement. Iran, for its part, seized the moment to rush to 
the defence of the Islamic shrines, largely to improve its image as an Islamic 
we would never stop anyone from doing that, but [because] the alliance was a failure there was never 
any cooperation with Abu Nidal. " Tahsin al-Halabi, July 16,2001. 
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rather than a Shia state. Ayatollah Khamenei called for Muslims to mobilize 
against the Oslo deal. "The enemies of Islam think they have taken a step 
forward, but the Islamic world should launch a counter-attack and push 
them back. "203 Khamenei denounced Arafat as a "disgraced individual, " and 
within days Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Sheikholeslam met with, 
among others, representatives of the PFLP-GC, DFLP, and Hamas in 
Damascus. Although he assured them of Iran's continued support for the 
intifada, no funds were pledged. The opposition had to take heart in the fact 
that the Islamic Republic offered its moral and political support. 
Syria was appreciative of Tehran's sympathetic position; while 
Damascus was furious by the Oslo deal, it remained committed to the wider 
peace process in accordance with the Madrid formula. Through its bilateral 
nature, Oslo had reduced the Syrian demand for a comprehensive peace to a 
chimera and thereby struck a heavy blow against its negotiating position. 
According to Zuheir Jannan, the spokesman for Syria's Madrid delegation, 
"Oslo [was] a bomb that undermined the whole peace process, or-at 
least-the first step towards undermining it... All Arab delegations 
were saying that they didn't want just to regain their [own] occupied 
territories but that they also wanted a just solution to the Palestinian 
issue... When Arafat accepted Oslo he undermined the positions of all 
the other Arab states... The attitudes of Arafat and his group have 
weakened the Arab stance vis-a-vis Israel. It was the starting point 
that weakened the whole Arab position"204 
Seeing itself as the guardian of `the Arab position, ' Syria was nonetheless 
forced to realize that the impending establishment of a Palestinian Authority 
would render its forays into internal Palestinian politics impossible. The 
larger context of this realization was the thawing of Syria's relations with the 
West in general, and the U. S. in particular. "Damascus would not want to be 
seen as actively sponsoring the `no' camp, " one Western diplomat remarked 
at the time. "It wants to keep its lines open to Washington in the hope of 
regaining its occupied lands. "205 Especially, if its role in the war against Iraq 
was to be translated into political capital, Syria could not afford to squander 
203 As quoted in Youssef Azmeh, `Iran's opposition to peace deal raises 
fears of violence'; Reuters. 
September 19,1993. 
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it on getting involved in a new phase of Palestinian rejectionism. Yet Syria's 
ties with the rejectionist trend had long since developed into much more 
than mere tactical convenience. Syria therefore viewed increased Iranian 
patronage of the opposition as an opportunity for itself to adopt a stance of 
`benevolent non-interference' towards the opposition, allowing them to 
maintain offices and camps in areas under its control, conduct its political 
and military activities (the latter subject to national security considerations), 
but supplying them with neither arms or funds. This remains the Syrian 
policy to this day. 206 
Libya, on the other hand, was unenthusiastic about getting involved in 
the rejectionist project. It had sharply reduced its interest in Palestinian 
politics in 1987, following the US bombardment of Tripoli. It was now under 
intense international pressure to hand over two of its intelligence agents 
accused of the Lockerbie bombing, for which the PFLP-GC had also stood- 
briefly and spuriously-accused. While it still expressed rhetorical sympathy 
for the Palestinian oppositional position, it was not willing to get involved, 
thereby running the risk of strengthening its circumstantial ties to the PFLP- 
GC. Thus, Libyan support for the new rejectionist effort was not 
forthcoming. 
By the time Arafat had gotten around to seeking endorsement for the 
DOP from Fateh's central committee, Ahmad Jibril announced that an 
oppositional riposte was imminent: 
The active Palestinian, national and Islamic forces are holding 
successive meetings. In a few hours, an important statement will be 
issued by those factions calling for the establishment of a national, 
democratic and Islamic front to assume the responsibility of 
confrontation in the coming stage. This front will call for regional 
conferences in every country, to be followed by a general conference 
attended by those forces together with sincere and patriotic figures, to 
take up the responsibility of continuing the struggle against the 
Zionist entity. This is our program for the near future. 207 
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By the time that the DOP had become a reality, a statement was issued to the 
effect that the ten factions within the TFRO would upgrade themselves into a 
new front intended specifically to struggle against the DOP. Negotiations 
between the factions turned out to be difficult. The main difficulty hinged on 
the incompatibility of secular and Islamist visions for the new grouping. The 
new alliance was intended to extend beyond the secular leftist nationalism of 
the fasa'il that had been involved in previous rejectionist efforts, by 
developing the secularist-Islamist modus vivendi of the TFRO. The 
secularists wanted to take advantage of the Islamists' growing importance 
and support inside the occupied territories, their aggressive stance on, and 
reputation for, armed struggle and their powerful and wealthy patrons in the 
Gulf States and Iran. The Islamists in turn were aware that their popular 
mandate in Palestine was based more on their ability and willingness to 
engage in armed struggle than on their Islamic principles, and felt a need to 
partake in what they hoped to be a functional national alliance . 208Hamas' 
strict Islamic social agenda was in fact becoming increasingly unpopular in 
the occupied territories, which added urgency to a partial reinvention. 
Alignment with the fasa'il was thought to be a remedy as Hamas felt it could 
drop some of the more unpopular elements of its social doctrine in the name 
of `national unity. '209 
No sooner had negotiations about the new alliance begun than 
divisions over the internal balance of power ensued. Hamas proposed 
"rebuilding the institutions of the Palestinian people, first and foremost the 
PLO, on a fair and democratic basis. "210 The secular factions were naturally 
receptive to this proposal, but Hamas went on to demand forty percent of the 
delegates to the proposed central committee, with the other factions 
collectively making up another forty percent and the remaining twenty 
percent being made up of independents. The other factions opposed setting 
up a quota system, just as they had long opposed quotas within the PLO. 
Eventually, by December a formula was agreed upon whereby each faction 
regardless of actual size would have two delegates in the alliance's central 
committee. 
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The alliance was a product of the primacy of `national interest' over 
ideology. Even so, "the backgrounds of this combination of forces", the PIJ's 
secretary general Ramadan Shallah was later to comment, "ideologically, 
politically, practically... inside and outside Palestine... there is a great 
difference. There is a lack of trust between the parties that form the 
alliance. "211 The dispute over the internal balance of power was compounded 
by the continuing intense distrust between the secularists and Islamists, in 
spite of two years coexistence within the TFRO. It took almost two months of 
intensive negotiations just to settle on a name for the new grouping, the bone 
of contention being whether to include the epithet `democratic' or `Islamic', 
or neither. Eventually they settled on using neither, adopting the politically 
neutral name under which they held their founding session on January 5, 
1994, the Alliance of Palestinian Forces. While their leaders were negotiating 
the APF framework in Damascus, Hamas and PFLP members clashed in the 
streets in the West Bank and Gaza, causing frequent injuries and occasional 
deaths. "We tried to find a common ground but failed", a senior PFLP cadre 
later remarked. "Hamas was shouting slogans like `The people of the book 
[i. e. the Jews] are closer to us than the reds! ' They also killed our cadres. "212 
"The longer the delay in announcing their plans, " commented Gerald 
Butt at the time, "the harder it is likely to be for Arafat's opponents to stop 
the momentum of the Israel-PLO dialogue. "213 The intra-factional wrangling 
meant that no constructive oppositional alternative to Oslo had emerged by 
the time the PLO Central Council met to ratify the Oslo deal on October io, 
1993. The unified leadership of the PFLP and DFLP decided to boycott the 
session, claiming that it was "illegitimate because the party calling for it has 
lost its legitimacy. "214 A spokesman for the unified leadership said that "this 
meeting had been called to secure a facade of legitimacy for the Gaza-Jericho 
agreement after the agreement had failed to obtain a majority of votes in the 
PLO executive committee. "215 This was patently untrue since the executive 
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committee did in fact vote in favour of it, but the two fronts simply wished to 
have nothing to do with the PLO leadership; their opposition had come to 
necessitate total rejection. A statement issued by the PFLP-GC at the 
conclusion of its central committee meeting in late September pledged to do 
"all in its power to abort this agreement" and "rally every resource towards 
that end. "216 It stressed the importance of rallying the broadest spectrum of 
the Palestinian ranks and of creating an Arab-Islamic front in order to 
mobilize the masses to topple the agreement, and escalate the intifada and 
64 all forms of struggle" until liberation. 
The PLO opposition's lack of constructive counter proposals, together 
with the fact that it was now closely associated with Hamas and the MIJ (at 
this stage more a matter of public perception rather than actuality) turned 
out to have profound effects when the Palestinian National Council was 
convened to ratify or reject the Oslo deal. It endorsed the Oslo accord by 63 
votes to 8; ii delegates abstained and a further 25 had boycotted the 
meeting. The majority of those voting in favour were "swayed by the 
opposition's failure to provide a viable alternative or even an opposition 
platform, as well as fear of Hamas, an argument used by Arafat's aides to 
carry the opinion of independent members. "217 Oslo had become a political 
reality, due at least in part to the opposition's failure to constructively 
confront it. The Central Council session, commented one observer at the 
time, 
marks the most serious split in the [PLO's] history and means that the 
Palestinian institutions have lost their role in the decision-making 
process. In addition to the fact that the various strands of opposition 
have formed a `new rejectionist front' with the Islamists, the Central 
Council meeting indicated that the PLO has been transformed from a 
popular national liberation movement into a struggling regime, even 
before the establishment of a state. 
The long consultations that preceded the negotiations, including the 
PCC meetings, have revealed disintegrating institutions and a de facto 
acceptance that Israel dictates the rules of the game. Moreover the 
leadership used all methods to extract the `ratification', including 
implicit warnings that opponents, especially Fateh members, could 
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lose their posts and institutions their funding, which threatens the 
lavish lifestyles that some have grown accustomed to. 218 
Not one Fateh delegate had voted against the proposal, and anti-Oslo `hawks' 
such as `Abbas Zaki and Sakhr Habash instead chose to abstain. In fact,. some 
representatives of political committees affiliated with the opposition parties 
endorsed the deal, apparently due to disillusionment with the opposition's 
prospects. 219 
The PFLP, DFLP, and PFLP-GC, to underscore their refusal to 
acquiesce, intensified their guerrilla raids from southern Lebanon in the 
week leading up to, and coinciding with the PNC sessions in Tunis. "Arafat 
would be weakened when attacks continue as it would be made clear that he 
does not control the ground... Any Israeli reprisals would reflect that Israel is 
not committed to real and just peace. "220 They also struck against military 
and settler targets in the West Bank, and the PFLP-GC orchestrated a wave 
of arsons in northern Galilee. "These attacks are only the start, " said one 
senior Palestinian dissident in Damascus. "All factions have agreed to 
escalate the armed struggle, our alternative to the peace process, against 
Israel where ever possible, namely from Lebanon and inside [the occupied 
territories]. 99221 
This defiant posturing did not help their political cause, however. Fateh 
Central Committee member `Abbas Zaki, a moderate critic of the DOP, was 
dispatched by Arafat to Damascus for talks with the opposition leaders in 
December. He met with Habash, Hawatmeh, and al-Fahum, and made contact with 
lower level officials from the other factions. Zaki failed in his mission to convince 
the opposition of the virtues of moderate condemnation of the agreement. 
According to the oppositionists, however, Zaki conveyed "a picture of the confused 
state of affairs the PLO leadership" derived from the difficulties inherent in the 
agreement with Israel, in conjunction with the development of considerable 
opposition within the Fateh movement in the occupied territories. 222 If anything, 
the Damascus factions took heart from Zaki's visit. 
218 Ibid. 
219 `PFLP-GC members reportedly support accord with Israel at Central Council meeting', broadcast 
on Radio Monte Carlo, October 12,1993; BBC SWB, October 14,1993. 
220 Nadim Ladki, `Radical Arabs step up guerrilla war against Israel'; Reuters, October 10.1993. 
«1 Ibid. 




RHETORIC, SYMBOLISM AND POLITICAL PRACTICE IN THE 
ALLIANCE OF PALESTINAN FORCES 
... a mistake only becomes an error when one cannot extricate oneself from it. There are periods of decline when the purpose assigned to us by life becomes indistinct. Then, we stumble like beings 
with a bad sense of balance. We are hurled from bleary joy into bleary pain; the constant awareness 
of something lost makes the future and the past more appealing. We live in times gone by and in distant utopia, while the moment passes us by. Ernst Jünger' 
THE ILLUSION OF MILITARY MIGHT 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Palestinian opposition, when 
confronted with the reality of Oslo, responded with belligerent rhetoric and 
symbolically charged violence. Ahmad Jibril, when asked about the 
forthcoming anti-Oslo alliance's stance on violence declared: 
We do not call it violence. We call it legitimate struggle and jihad. As a 
front, we will not abandon the armed struggle programme, and we are 
still in a state of war with the Zionist existence on the land of 
Palestine. This struggle and fighting will continue until we return to 
our homeland from which we were expelled 44 years ago... I am not 
exaggerating by saying that we have thousands, and even tens of 
thousands, of youths who are enthusiastic about fighting with us in 
this phase. These youths are not just Palestinians, but also Arabs and 
Muslims. They are extremely enthusiastic about fighting, and they 
were not influenced by the agreement signed in Washington. On the 
contrary, this agreement has increased their insistence on fighting 
and martyrdom. 2 
Jibril was, in fact, exaggerating. Yet, in order to distance themselves from, 
and defy Arafat, the opposition factions issued statement after statement 
claiming variously that a popular war of liberation, jihad, or intifada- 
directed by the opposition or erupting spontaneously-was imminent. These 
statements included claims to having received petitions to assassinate Arafat, 
such as Jibril's assertion that 
' Auf den Marmorklippen (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1960) 
2 'Interview with Ahmad Jibril, ' broadcast on Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, October 21,1993. 
Thousands of martyrs' sons, wives and families were at the top of the list of those wishing to do so before we did the same. We are not in a forward position for this mission... It is a public trend and no one can 
stop it... We don't know when they will hunt down Arafat. 3 
This statement, incidentally, became commonly misinterpreted as a- death 
threat. Jibril also told al-Wasat that it was only a matter of time before 
Arafat was assassinated for signing the deal with Israel, by any one of 
"hundreds of Arab men and women" that had written to him. 4 The repeated 
references to Arafat's imminent assassination by ordinary Palestinians 
served to underscore the DOP's lack of popular support. References to 
organized military activity were intended to underline the steadfastness of 
the opposition, its refusal to acquiesce in the denigrating sell-out that they 
perceived the DOP to be, and to contrast Arafat's position to their own. 
These were a far cry from Jibril, Habash and Fahum's previous talk of 
seeking to achieve a minimum of their demands through international 
diplomacy. 
From the outset, however, these claims to engage in or plan armed 
struggle proved problematic. "We never had a military option after Oslo. It 
was a myth and everyone [in the opposition] was aware of that, " Fahum was 
later to recall. "Some factions and individuals persist in this myth, and they 
do so for many different reasons. "5 Two of the factions, the PLF and PRCP, 
had no armed capabilities whatever by 1993. "Our last armed attack was in 
1991, " PLF's Abu Nidal al-Ashqar later explained. "Since 1993... we have no 
armed units... all our fighters, officers and military command are still with us 
[but] they have [to prioritize] their own circumstances and have to work to 
earn a living. "6 The PRCP has had no military capabilities in the post-Oslo 
period. Refusing to acknowledge this embarrassment, `Arabi `Awwad claims 
that the organization's military wing is "not disbanded, but due to difficulties 
we could not participate in [armed struggle] since Oslo. "7 These difficulties 
have included a lack of arms and the non-existence of training camps. 8 Until 
3 Ibid. 
4 'Jibri1 says hundreds of Arabs want to kill Arafat, ' Reuters, October 19,1993. 
5 Khalid al-Fahum, May 11,2000. 
6 Abu Nidal al-Ashqar, October 28,1999; May 30,2000. 
`Arabi `Awwad, October 27,1999. 
"Arabi `Awwad. May 10,2000. 
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the present, the PPSF has maintained a small military hierarchy parallel to 
its political leadership, but it has no practical use or value and is "ineffective 
as an instrument" of struggle-9 The military shortcomings of these three 
factions stem primarily from their financial situations. 
PFLP and DFLP maintained military infrastructures in Lebanon until 
1996-nominally under the direction of their Unified Command-at which 
point Syria ordered an end to Palestinian operations against Israeli forces in 
the southern Lebanese `security zone'. Until then, both factions had 
participated in operations together with the Hizb'Allah in that area. "After 
that, the Syrians wanted that only the Lebanese should attack [in the security 
zone]. "10 "Today, we have nothing outside, " explained Abu Khalil. "All our 
armed struggle capabilities are now inside. "" Sa'iqa, Fateh-Intifada and 
PFLP-GC's military infrastructures in exile are intact to this day; Sa'iqa has 
consistently operated around a half-dozen military training camps in Syria, 
while the PFLP-GC and Fateh-Intifada runs a similar number of camps 
divided between Syria and Lebanon, primarily in the Biq'a Valley. These 
units were indeed viable fighting forces at the time of the DOP, as evidenced 
by fasa'il activities during Israel's `Operation Accountability. ' Enforced 
idleness, however, caused these forces' stagnation over time, even though 
both Fateh-Intifada and the PFLP-GC have maintained a "strategic 
partnership" with the Hizb'Allah since 1993. Both have intermittently joined 
the Lebanese resistance in cross-border raids. The PFLP-GC has, 
importantly, also supplied the Lebanese resistance with arms and 
ammunition, most notably its Katyusha 1o7-millimeter artillery rockets. 12 
Hamas and MIJ have never possessed significant military capabilities 
in exile, although both have had strategic partnerships with the Hizb'Allah 
similar to those of the PFLP-GC and Fateh-Intifada. Both have lost fighters 
in joint operations with the Lebanese resistance, and their limited military 
infrastructure in exile has been based in Lebanon, centring on access to 
PFLP-GC and Hizb'Allah training grounds. 13 The Syrian government, 
9 PPSF cadre, interview with author, Damascus, October 2000. 
10 Abu Ali Hussein, `Ayn al-Helwa, May 15,2000. 
" Muhammad `Issa Abu Khalil, July 28,2001. 
12 Tahsin al-Halabi, November 2,2000; Talal Naji, November 7,2000. 
13 `Imad al-`Alami, June 7,1999. 
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cognizant of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) roots of both groups, refused 
from the beginning of the APF to allow either Islamist group to build up 
military strength or to stockpile significant amounts of arms inside Syrian 
borders. The fear of its potential uses for domestic MB activism overrides 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and there have been no training of 
Hamas or MIJ operatives taking place in Syria. Both groups' military 
infrastructures are based inside Palestine, although training, as mentioned 
above, has taken place in Lebanon. 
THE ROLE OF SYRIAN PATRONAGE 
The alliance's rapport with Syria has fuelled imaginations and generated 
conspiracy theories. To be sure, Syria's political support has been crucial to 
the APF effort, enabling the organizations to work among their refugee 
constituents. In return, the organizations have displayed their gratitude and 
respect toward Syria through their rhetoric and symbolism-partly because 
public displays of regime adulation are part of the Syrian political order 
within which they function, 14 partly because they are genuinely appreciative 
and bound by honour to confirm the status of their patron. Because of this 
close relationship-about the nature of which both Palestinians and Syrians 
are generally taciturn-elements within Western scholarship have continued 
to recycle outdated analyses of pre-Oslo patron-client relations, erroneously 
ascribing the rejectionists a role as `Syrian proxy terrorists. '15 
In fact, Oslo had a profound impact on Syria's role as patron of the 
Palestinian opposition. Having been involved in patron-client relations for 
over a decade, Syria and the opposition factions were brought closer still by 
shared outrage over Oslo. The accords devastated the Syrian position in the 
Madrid negotiations, which had proceeded in parallel with the covert Oslo 
negotiations. Oslo severed the Palestinian track from that of Syria and the 
14 For an analsyis of the Asad cult, see Lisa Wedeen Ambiguities of Domination. 
'S See, for instance, Ilan Kass and Bard O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace, pp. 238 (n. 7), 275-6, and 
passim; Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics, pp. 151-3; `The Future of 
Palestinian Politics, ' passim; Eyal Zisser, Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2001), chs. 5-7, passim; Decision Making in Asad's Syria: Policy Focus No. 35 
(Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, February 1998), p. 30; Daniel Pipes, Syria Beyond the 
Peace Process: Policy Paper No. 40 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 1995), passim. For 
a brief critique and refutation of this belief, see Anders Strindberg, `Realism and Restraint among the 
Palestinian Rejectionists, ' Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 10 (August 2000), pp. 23-6. 
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other Arab states. It reduced the theme of `Arab unity' to a chimera, 
rendering obsolete Syrian demands for a comprehensive and just peace, and 
thus weakened Syria's negotiating position. Hafez al-Asad's longstanding 
animus towards Arafat and the PLO leadership was further reinforced, and 
the APF-whose complaints against the DOP were similar to those of Syria- 
received Damascus' endorsement as the true representatives of the 
Palestinian struggle. 
On the other hand, the creation of the PA forced Syria to recognize 
that its traditionally intrusive policies towards the Palestinian national 
movement could not continue. For several years, Syria had been the only 
Arab state to which the Palestinian issue had remained militarily, politically 
and discursively central, which is why it attracted large parts of the PLO 
opposition. The advent of the PA meant that political reality had moved on, 
however, and that the traditional relationship between Syria and the 
rejectionists was no longer viable. Because of the dishonour Hafez al-Asad 
would bring on himself and his country if he simply disavowed them, he was 
in no position to terminate the modus vivendi with the rejectionists, 
particularly as the post-Oslo phase of Palestinian politics meant they needed 
Syria more than ever. Furthermore, the patron and its clients had grown 
politically close over the years and very real political loyalties had developed 
on both sides. Damascus' solution was to leave the factions entirely to their 
own political devices after Oslo, but continue to offer political support within 
its discursive universe. 
Wishing to move closer to the West in the wake of the Cold War-and 
not wanting to prejudice its own, separate peace negotiations with Israel- 
Syria adopted a stance of "benevolent noninterference" towards the APF. 16 It 
allowed the alliance to organize itself politically in Syria and Lebanon, but 
ceased all active support and sponsorship of individual groups and, after 
1996, effectively proscribed the last of the armed activities of the factions 
closest to it. "Not one Kalashnikov nor one single dollar ever passed to us 
from Syria [after Oslo], " remarked PFLP-GC central committee member 
16 Anders Strindberg, `Realism and Restraint among the Palestinian Rejectionists, ' p. 23. 
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Tahsin al-Halabi. "They don't expect anything from us and we don't expect 
anything from them... They keep us here to observe us... and to protect us. "1: 
If revolutionary and subversive militancy was really the APF's 
intended response to Oslo, alignment with Syria showed uncharacteristically 
poor judgment. The received view, based (yet again) on perceived Cold War 
realities, maintains that Syria is a notorious, if increasingly weakened, 
sponsor of international terrorism and that the APF factions are notorious 
international terrorists-hence, the two parties are perfectly matched. While 
this has been an expedient and politically valuable image in the black and 
white world of agenda driven threat assessments, the `patronage as 
proximity of discourse' model suggests a subtler, more credible rationale for 
Syrian-APF rapport. Syria has never intended for the APF or its constituent 
members to act as its proxy combatants, as suggested by the fact that 
Damascus has supplied them with neither funds nor arms since the early 
199os. Syria had affirmed to Israel's right to exist for fully thirty years and 
participated in the Madrid negotiations based on the `land for peace' formula 
contained in UNSCR 242.18 It countenances no armed activity in its 
neighbourhood that it cannot fully control, and aligning with Syria was thus 
a virtual guarantee that there would be no APF instigated armed struggle, 
and certainly no revolution. Furthermore, the rejectionist factions 
themselves were neither willing to, nor interested in waging war against 
Israel, an issue returned to in the following section. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, several rejectionist leaders had made cautious yet repeated 
public remarks in the two years preceding the DOP to the effect that they 
were willing to sit down to negotiate an honourable peace with Israel. Syria 
and the rejectionists were thus working within the same discursive and 
strategic parameters. 
Added to this, Syria saw that the alliance's potential political appeal 
among the refugees could be of regional political significance. The presence 
and politically free reins of the APF among the refugees in Syria and 
Lebanon highlighted the PA's vulnerability and demonstrated the fragility 
inherent in PA-Israeli negotiations. It was an ever-present warning to Arafat 
" Tahsin al-Halabi, Damascus, May 28,2000. 
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not to concede too much, not to cave in further to Zionist demands and not 
to continue to compromise Arab honour. Arafat had chosen to defy and 
humiliate Syria on the issue of a unified Arab negotiating position in 1993; 
Syria's refusal to discontinue its patronage of the rejectionist current was, in 
a sense, payback. If the APF could successfully stand up to Arafat and 
humble him on account of the Oslo process, this could only validate Syria's 
argument that separate Arab tracks are doomed to failure. If the APF did not 
succeed, the failure would not be Syria's. 
Syria and the rejectionists, according to a senior Syrian civil servant, 
exercise "coordination and consultation on many issues, including political 
issues. "19 Even so, both parties have considered the matter of Palestinian 
military mobilization and deployment-in Syrian service or otherwise-a 
"non-issue. " Astutely manipulating the excessively apprehensive threat 
assessments of terrorism scholars and policy analysts, Syria created a 
strategically beneficial myth in the knowledge that the optimal use of the 
`Palestinian card' is its implication. By patronizing the factions and then 
merely hinting at its abstention from deploying them, Syria has been able to 
show good will at no effort. This gambit has, however, reinforced perceptions 
in the West of the rejectionists' being a 'terrorist card' up Syria's sleeve. 
Since Oslo, Syria has been aware that its ability to influence 
Palestinian politics is sharply reduced, on pain of international 
disapprobation, and in 1996, Syria and the Lebanese government apparently 
agreed that the only party allowed to undertake cross-border operations into 
Israel should be the Hizb'Allah. 20 Knowing full well that isolated Palestinian 
incursions into Israel would be militarily useless, have no nominal 
internationally based legitimacy-as opposed to Hizb'Allah's struggle to 
implement UNSCR 425-and bring down the full wrath of the IDF upon 
Syrian and refugee targets, Syria seems to have never considered allowing 
the Palestinians military latitude. Alignment with Syria in 1993 was a virtual 
guarantee that there would be no military struggle, let alone revolution. 
There is also the issue of despondency. "Why should the Palestinians in 
'$ For a critical overview of Syrian foreign policy objectives, see Henrv Siegman, `Being Hafiz al- 
Assad: Syria's Chilly but Consistent Peace Strategy, ' Foreign Affairs (May/June 2000), pp. 2-7. 
19 Bath Party official, interview with author, Damascus, May 2000. 
`0 Abu Ali Hussein. May 15,2000. 
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Lebanon struggle militarily when those inside only negotiate? " remarked 
DFLP's Suheil al-Natur. "They have the hardest lives anyway, why make it 
worse by encouraging Israel to bomb us? "21 
THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF MILITARY SYMBOLISM 
Given the pitiful state of military preparedness and capability from its exile 
positions, and Syria's restraining role, it is not feasible to argue that the APF 
was intended as a forum for armed struggle. On the issue of `terrorism, ' it 
should be noted that the alliance never established a bureau or even a 
working group for the implementation or coordination of military 
operations. Instead, "every organization works alone on military matters. 
There [has been] no cooperation until now on military matters, but of course 
there is cooperation politically. "22 These facts corroborate the hypothesis 
that militaristic hyperbole has filled a primarily symbolic political function. 
Indeed, asked directly whether the founding rationale of the APF was to 
coordinate political or military struggle, Khalid al-Fahum later stated that it 
was 
political. How can we know this? Because it never carried out any 
joint military operations, ever... [Its aim was] political activities... 
opposition, you know. To criticize, not to accept the policy of Yasir 
Arafat and his colleagues, to preserve the [Palestinian National] 
Charter, to make the whole world see that Yasir Arafat doesn't 
represent all the Palestinians. He represents some, but not all the 
Palestinians. This is essentially political activity within the PLO, all of 
them are with the PLO. 23 
The APF's militarily charged defiance of the PLO/PA leadership, which it was 
unable to sustain in practice, was gradually filled with constructive 
substance. "We saw that the alliance [was] important because it [gave] the 
Palestinian people the hope that their cause will not perish. "24 The APF 
framework thus evolved into a forum for discursive competition with the 
PLO/PA leadership, the rejectionists' collective bid to impact on Palestinian 
national identity. Seeking to tap into-in a generative sense-Palestinian 
21 Suheil al-Natur, May 18,2000. 
22 Talal Naji, May 28,2000. 
23 Khalid al-Fahum, May 11,2000. 
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national consciousness, the APF factions slowly set about trying to 
manipulate the refugee communities' public discourse and manage its 
meanings and perceptions, thereby strengthening the militancy that had 
become entrenched in Palestinian identity over the preceding decades. 
Rather than a military base, then, Syria has functioned as "a base 
among our people"25 and a "media base" for the purpose of "public 
relations. "26 The political liberties afforded the factions by Syria far exceed 
those on offer in neighbouring Arab countries. The consistent official Syrian 
line since Oslo has been to view the rejectionist factions as "political groups 
who have the right to express their own views on their own fate and future, 
no more than so. "27 That the official Syrian attitude is earnest has repeatedly 
been corroborated by the Palestinians themselves, as is the rejectionists' 
awareness that their ability to connect with the refugees depends on Syria. 
For instance: 
Here we have freedom of assembly, of press, and of speech. Syria 
offers sympathetic political support only... most importantly, access to 
the communities of refugees. They don't intervene in our activities 
among the Palestinian refugee communities whether in Lebanon or 
Syria... This has been [Syria's] absolutely crucial role. 28 
The primary purpose of the APF was always propaganda as it sought to 
propagate the necessity of armed struggle in an attempt to yet again extract 
militant Palestinianism out of already militant Palestinianness. As we have 
seen in the preceding chapters, a number of authors have pointed to armed 
struggle as a foundational element in modem Palestinian national identity. 
Specifically, prior to 1973, armed struggle confirmed Palestinian national 
identity and reasserted the existence of an autonomous national will, even 
though the military capabilities of the fasa'il compared to their Israeli enemy 
were negligible. It has been noted that in its early days, 
24 `Arabi `Awwad, October 27,1999. 
25 Abu Nidal al-Ashqar, May 30,2000. 
26 Ramadan Shallah, June 10,1999. 
`7 `Adnan `Umrah, November 14,2000. 
28 Talal Naji, May 28,2000. 
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The PLO, unable to resolve the inside-outside dichotomy, experienced 
a constant tension between its two wings reflected in the contrasting forms of struggle adopted by each. The military action used by the 
outside was an essential means to assert a distinct Palestinian identity 
within the wider Arab identity and to carve out and define the 
Palestinian entity amidst the Arab state system. Armed struggle was 
also the most effective means of mobilizing the scattered diaspora... 
the Palestinian leadership based its legitimacy on its role in the armed 
struggle against Israel... 29 
Thus, it seemed not only reasonable but imperative to the APF factions that 
armed struggle should continue to be the rallying point against Arafat and 
the peace process, as it had been during the time of the RF, the creation of 
Fateh-Intifada and the establishment of the PNSF. Their Damascene media 
base would be used to not let the Palestinian public lose sight of the nation's 
honourable past and the ignominious present imposed upon it by the 
leadership. This effort, then, crystallized into the alliance's collective bid to 
impact on Palestinian national identity in competition with the PLO/PA 
leadership; seeking to manipulate public discourse and manage its meanings 
and perceptions, thus strengthening the spirit of steadfastness. 
Opting for this tactic built on failure to anticipate the full effect on 
Palestinian politics Of the PLO/PA leadership's successful shift of the 
political centre to the inside. It also involved a miscalculation of the 
international reaction, as the factions had hoped to harness the international 
support for the Palestinian cause generated by the Intifada. Instead, in terms 
of international politics, the APF's rhetoric and activity came to contrast 
sharply against that of Arafat, thereby legitimizing his reform project further; 
no international or regional support to make the APF "a serious Arab or 
Islamic alternative to stand fast against Arafat and his project" was ever 
forthcoming. 3° 
As a political alliance whose focus has not been on military issues, it 
mattered little, then, that the alliance's members have never been able to 
agree on the efficacy of various tactics of armed struggle. 31 Limited attempts 
were made in throughout 1994 by PFLP-GC, Hamas, MIJ and Fateh-Intifada 
to coordinate military efforts; these were bilateral efforts, however, and not 
29 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 22-23. 
30 Ramadan Shallah, June 10,1999. 
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part of the APF framework. While they cemented the strategic partnership 
with the Hizb'Allah, they failed to produce a joint military programme 
among themselves. Furthermore, the Islamists' dispatch of suicide bombers 
against civilian targets inside Israel has generally met with revulsion in leftist 
ranks, particularly within the PFLP and DFLP, who have tended to view such 
attacks as morally reprehensible and politically counterproductive, and have 
even, in off-the-record discussions, condemned them in very strong 
language. 
All APF factions have vociferously proclaimed their aim to be the 
deliverance of all of Palestine from Zionist control, that armed struggle is a 
fundamental element of that enterprise, and that a negotiated settlement 
with the enemy is unequivocally unacceptable. The APF's determined 
persistence in the patently impracticable rhetoric of armed struggle has not 
been due to inflexibility or irrationality. Rather, it has been a primary feature 
in the alliance's attempts at manipulating the refugees' public discourse. 
Thus, the alliance has hoped to thus provide guidelines for politically 
acceptable behaviour, speech, and thought. Within these guidelines, each 
organization has been free to formulate policy in pursuit of its own distinct 
strategy. 
Thus, there have been significant differences between the various 
organizations as to how they have viewed the discursive struggle with the 
PLO/PA leadership-and how they are prepared to talk about it to 
researchers. The APF's collective discursive parameters in fact encompass a 
multiplicity of discourses, each of which is in part determined by inter- and 
intra-group relationships-with fellow oppositionists, with constituencies 
and with external actors. This claim is nothing more than a reiteration of the 
fact that discourse is conditioned by the social and political contexts in which 
it arises. The upshot of this is, however, that while some organizations are 
quite frank in discussing armed struggle as a discursive device, others insist 
that commitment to armed struggle means just that-end of story. The 
hypothesis that the post-Oslo rejectionist struggle has centred on the use of 
rhetoric for discourse manipulation should not give us reason to doubt the 
sincerity of some rejectionist factions' continued calls for the "complete 
31 Ibid. 
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destruction of the racist, colonial Zionist project, and the total liberation of 
our homeland, from the river to the sea. "32 As stated earlier, some factions 
are clearly sincere in their rhetoric and fully committed to Israel's 
destruction through the force and arms; there is no contradiction between 
being engaged in a `rhetorical struggle, ' on the one hand, and being sincere 
about what one utters and does, on the other. Some factions, however, have 
come to acknowledge Israel as a fait accompli beyond the reach of their 
military capability. None are prepared, however, to ascribe to Israel's 
legitimacy and de jure recognition. Very different from the APF's unified 
facade of 1993, the factions' increasingly divergent attitudes to armed 
struggle and other instruments of national struggle have developed as a 
result of their different ideologies, abilities, social status and interaction with 
constituents. The APF has never been a monolith and understanding the 
situation and agenda of each factional part is crucial in understanding the 
development of the collective whole. Some have worked extensively within 
the fields of media and propaganda while others have planned and 
conducted acts of violence against Israeli targets. Some have done nothing 
more than issue pamphlets or newsletters, not coincidentally those whose 
position on armed struggle is most intransigent. In so far as these activities 
have served the purpose of the rejectionist agenda, they have met with 
collective approval. 
INSTRUMENTS OF DISCOURSE MANIPULATION 
Being primarily intended to coordinate activities within general parameters 
provided by rejectionist principles, the alliance's members have generally 
attempted to control refugee discourse unilaterally. Each has emphasized 
different aspects of the political whole, ostensibly complementing each other. 
However, the emphasis on different messages and on different modes of 
communication has led, in the long run, to political incompatibility, likened 
by one rejectionist cadre as "an unhappy family, getting on each others' 
nerves. "33 The primary instruments of discourse manipulation have been 
32 `Arab `Awwad, May 10,2000. 
33 Hamas cadre, interview with author, Damascus, October 2000. 
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print, broadcast and electronic media; social, cultural and educational 
organizations and the conduct of political rallies. 
Print, Broadcast and Electronic Media 
With the exception of the PLF and PPSF, all member factions have been 
engaged in information and propaganda dissemination through the printed 
media. In addition, the PFLP-GC has been responsible for operating al-Quds 
Palestinian Arab Radio. While the various magazines and newsletters have 
primarily sought to supply the factions' own members with a source of 
political analysis and information, al-Quds Radio, by contrast, has sought to 
bring the rejectionist viewpoint to a wider audience. Importantly, al-Quds 
Radio is received in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where it is a popular 
channel of discontent and apparently has a large audience. 34 
Six of the leftist-nationalist factions have published magazines 
principally available to a diaspora audience, while the two Islamist factions' 
regular publications are printed and distributed primarily in Palestine. 
Hamas' organ al-Watan (The Homeland') seems to have a negligible 
circulation in the Syrian and Lebanese refugee camps, its main market being 
the `inside. '35 Its editorial board, headed by `Irrad Faluji, is located in Gaza 
City where it also finds most of its readership. Similarly, MIJ's periodical 
publications are scarce outside Palestine. As the present thesis' main focus is 
`outside politics, ' it will not deal with the Islamist media. 
The DFLP's Al-Hurriyya (The Freedom'), PFLP's Al-Hadaf (The 
Target'), PFLP-GC's Ila al-Amam (`Forwards')36 and Fateh-Intifada's Fateh 
('Conquest') have in some aspects been very similar publications. They all 
serve primarily to highlight and analyse current events, promulgate official 
doctrine and print statements and communiques by the organizations' 
military and political wings. They all include coverage of cultural affairs and 
34 This was suggested to the author during a telephone conversation with a UNDP official stationed in 
Ramallah. 
35 `Imad al-`Alami, October 27.1999. It is important to note that the following is not an attempt at 
formal content analysis, only a generalized description of the various media's editorial content and 
how they relate to the factions' social and political position. 
3611a al Amam was discontinued in 1999 for lack of funding. In the ten years prior to being closed 
down, its circulation had diminished drastically. Libya had cut off financial support in 1987. As a 
direct result, the magazine went from an estimated 15,000 weekly copies in the mid-1980s, to a mere 
5,000 monthly copies by 1999. Tahsin al-Halabi, September 23,2001. 
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events among the refugee communities in Lebanon and Syria, as well as 
inside Palestine. 
All four magazines have filled internal functions by informing 
members of current events and seeking to reinforce their commitment to the 
struggle. They have also filled external functions in two main ways: By 
indicating policy and announcing political or military initiatives, and by 
seeking to signify to the Palestinian communities the implications of 
Palestinian identity. The latter has been attempted either through 
discussions of the dynamics of armed struggle or of the various imposed 
aspects of Palestinian life, such as suffering and sacrifice. Poetry and other 
art that stresses return, suffering, sacrifice and armed struggle are also 
recurrent in all three magazines. 
Beyond these basic similarities, however, the magazines have closely 
reflected not only the political lines but also the social situations of their 
respective factions. The absence in al-Hurriyya and al-Hadaf, relative to 
Fateh, of armed struggle hyperbole reflects not only the more moderate 
political line that they take, but also the higher social status and political 
significance of these factions. With political networks around the globe, and 
with significant support both inside and outside Palestine (while Fateh- 
Intifada's main support bases are among refugees in Syria and northern 
Lebanon), neither the DFLP nor the PFLP have been in urgent need to use 
their organs to reinforce the positive connotations of ingroup identity 
through emphasizing armed struggle-especially since this would only 
damage their international standing. 
Al-Hurriyya has been published by the DFLP since the PFLP leftists 
held on to that organization's editorial offices in Beirut during the 1969 split. 
Since Oslo, discussions of international law, the relevance of UN resolutions 
to the fulfilment of Palestinian objectives and the need for Palestinian 
national unity have been prominent recurrent features. 37 Al-Hurriyya's 
pages, virtually free from the persistent armed struggle rhetoric that has 
characterized most other rejectionist publications, is part of the DFLP's 
distinct profile since inception, combining ideological radicalism with 
37 Statements about al-Hurriyva's contents are based on readings of various issues from 1995,1996, 
1997,1998,1999 and 2001. 
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political pragmatism. In fact, it appears that a strong focus on the specific 
issue and mechanisms of the right of return has offered an alternative-and 
possibly more effective way-to grab the refugee communities' attention and 
imagination. A significant section of al-Hurriyya's pages are also devoted to 
cultural affairs, particularly to events organized by the many DFLP-affiliated 
NGOs. 
Al-Hadaf is very similar to al-Hurriyya in terms of balance of content 
and `general tenor, ' but the PFLP's greater suspicion of international law and 
UN resolutions is evinced by a greater emphasis on Palestinian and Arab 
self-reliance and a greater readiness to call for armed struggle. 38 In addition 
to al-Hadaf, which is published in Damascus and inside Palestine, the PFLP 
also puts out an English language newsletter, Democratic Palestine, which 
aims to inform foreign audiences of policy initiatives. 
Fateh-Intifada's Fateh is edited and printed in Damascus, at the PLO 
news agency offices seized by Abu Musa in 1983.39 The editorial content of 
Fateh naturally reflects the faction's more militant orientation, as well as its 
continuing firm foundation within the Syrian political orbit. Its main 
recurrent themes since Oslo have been the necessity for a renewed popular 
struggle in the West Bank and Gaza, the need for armed resistance from 
Lebanon and recent and historical services rendered the Palestinian cause by 
Syria. Still living relatively well off sound investments, Fateh-Intifada has 
been able to put considerable more money into its magazine than any of the 
other factions. As a result, the magazine is of excellent editorial and graphic 
quality, yet its circulation is only in the region of 3,000 copies per issue. 
With virtually no circulation in Palestine, Fateh's primary target is its own 
membership and the various exile communities. Fateh-Intifada's claim to 
represent the real Fateh has little credibility beyond its own membership, 
however, and even among the exile communities, the magazine is sent to 
sympathizers and members rather than `Palestinians at large. ' 
Sa'iqa's biweekly Al-Tala'i` (The Pioneers') stands out among the 
rejectionist publications not only for its lack of graphic and editorial quality, 
38 Statements about al-Hadaf's contents are based on readings of various issues from 1993,1994, 
1996,1998,1999,2000 and 2001. 
39 Statements about Fateh 's contents are based on readings of ten consecutive volumes, spanning 
issues no. 219 (September 15,1990) through 447 (October 2,1999). 
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but also for its political contortionism. 4° Of all the factions within the 
rejectionist camp, Sa'iqa's political position has arguably been the most 
complicated since Oslo, which is reflected in its tangled and perceptibly 
uncomfortable discourse. As has been demonstrated above, Syria finally gave 
up any and all claims to jurisdiction within internal Palestinian politics in 
1993. This left Sa'iqa in 'a very difficult position: As a well-funded and 
historically important part of the Palestinian national movement, Sa'iqa has 
been compelled to be seen to contribute to Palestinian politics by engaging in 
constructive activities for the furtherance of the national movement's 
objectives. However, as an integral part of the Syrian political establishment, 
Sa'iqa is neither disposed, nor authorized to actually impact on the 
Palestinian political environment. Syria's outrage over Oslo made Sa'iqa an 
obvious APF candidate, but since it signed the APF's founding statement, the 
faction has been immobilized by its Syrian connection, causing failure to 
conduct activity both in the diaspora as well as inside Palestine. The horns of 
Sa'iqa's dilemma are its organic linkages to both Palestinian and Syrian 
politics, which it has been unable to reconcile. 
It is interesting in this context to note that al-Tala'i` is replete with 
searingly maximalist rhetoric that fundamentally opposes the legitimacy of 
the PLO/PA leadership, calls for the complete dismantling of Israel and 
occasionally lapses into anti-Semite derision of Jews and Judaism. Just as its 
inactivity does not square with its APF partnership and commitment to the 
PLO, the editorial content of al-Tala'i` does not square with its commitments 
to Syrian policy. Although diluted with adulation of Hafez al-Asad and 
analyses of Israeli politics, PLO-Israeli agreements, Zionism and so forth 
that carefully duplicate Damascus' polices, the incongruence is evident. It 
seems that while the other rejectionists engage in the discourse of armed 
struggle in part for reasons of social creativity, it is possible to infer that 
Sa'iqa's discourse is simply frozen in a pre-Oslo time warp for lack of the 
ability and opportunity to construct an alternative. This is also suggested by 
the fact that in interviews, Sa'iqa cadres have consistently circumvented any 
and all questions concerning contemporary and practical issues by launching 
40 Statements about al-Tala 'i "s contents are based on readings of issues 1224 (September 2,1998) 
through 1276 (November 2,1999), and various issues from 1994,1995,2000 and 2001. 
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into theoretical abstraction, historical analysis and total rejection of "that 
entity, which they nowadays call `Israel. '"41 Hamstrung by its dual 
commitments, Sa'iqa's intense post-Oslo political crisis is reflected in the 
pages of al-Tala'i'. 
The PRCP's al-Mugawama al-Sha`biyya (`The Popular Resistance') is 
a brief newsletter of, on average, less than ten black-and-white pages. 42 
While no number is available for how many copies are printed, it is very 
small as its main readership is internal. "No one ever reads that thing, " 
commented a cadre from a fellow rejectionist faction. "It is only read by the 
party's own, and there are less than thirty of them. "43 The newsletter is also 
dispatched to the offices of sympathetic communist organizations in other 
Arab countries. Apart from commentary and analyses of current events in 
Palestine and the fortunes of world communism, the newsletter's editorial 
board spends considerable effort hammering home the notion that 
communism did not cease being a viable political force at the end of the Cold 
War. Never aligned with the USSR, the PRCP has consistently refused to 
acknowledge the fall of the USSR as anything more than an inconvenience. 
The sole purpose of the. newsletter, then, is to enhance the collective 
identity that comes with PRCP membership, the positive connotations of 
which were seriously dented by a number of events throughout the 199os. 
The fall of the USSR-regardless of PRCP official aloofness-was a serious 
intellectual problem. As the PRCP split from the PCP in 1982, the latter 
became Soviet clients while the former remained independent. The PRCP 
thus never received funding from Moscow, but-problematically-neither did 
it receive funding from any other communist state. Consequently, the faction 
ran out of funds when its membership drastically receded, towards the mid- 
199os. After briefly being funded by the PFLP until 1997, Fateh-Intifada has 
since then footed the PRCP's bills and put its leadership on the payroll in 
order to maintain the appearance of a broad factional front against Arafat. In 
addition, as mentioned above, the faction lacks an armed wing within a 
political environment that places a premium on armed struggle. Together 
41 Farhan Abu al-Haija, May 21,2000. 
42 Statements about al-Mugawama al-Sha `biyya's contents are based on readings of various issues 
from 1998,1999,2000 and 2001. 
43 PFLP-GC cadre, interview with author, Damascus, October 2000. 
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these three factors have seriously affected the self-esteem attached to PRCP 
membership. Al-Mugawama al-Sha`biyya appears to primarily be an 
instrument to compensate for these shortcomings by insistence on continued 
ideological superiority, as well as unflinching commitment to armed 
struggle. 
In this context, FRC's newsletter Filastin al-Thawra (`Palestine The 
Revolution') deserves to be mentioned, even though the faction is not a 
regular part of the rejectionist spectrum. 44 Due to its mercenary nature, the 
FRC is easily the most detested of Palestinian factions-among the refugee 
communities in general as well as among other factions-and entirely 
obsolete in terms of impact on practical Palestinian politics. The FRC has 
thus been faced not only by the structural problems imposed by Oslo on the 
opposition as a whole, but also by the practical and emotional problems of 
isolation within the Palestinian opposition. While it signed the TFRO's 
founding statement in October 1991, the FRC has not been in political 
communion with any other faction since it was forced to leave Damascus in 
1987.45 
As with the PRCP's newsletter, Filastin al-Thawra closely reflects 
factional lack of positive social status within the national movement and 
attempts to shore up a punctured social identity. Throughout the mid to late- 
199os, the main themes of its editorials were the necessity for national unity 
and the need for armed struggle against not only Israel but also the PLO/PA 
leadership. The blame for deficiency in both these areas was then routinely 
put on other rejectionist factions, particularly the DFLP and PFLP. This 
cerebral contrivance has allowed the FRC to claim that while it is both ready 
44 Statements about Filastin al-Thawra's contents are based on readings of various issues from 1995, 
1999,2000 and 2001. 
' When mentioning my forthcoming interviews with FRC personnel in Lebanon to a PFLP-GC cadre 
in Damascus, I was told "stay away from them, they are nothing but homicidal maniacs. " Another 
senior PFLP cadre told me "Personally, I hate Abu Nidal al-Banna and his scum more than anyone 
else. " I was repeatedly told, by a number of rejectionists in Syria, about "the hideous crimes" of the 
FRC. They also reiterated the theory that Abu Nidal is an employee of the Mossad, because "no other 
Palestinian has done so much damage to our cause. He has killed many more Palestinians than 
Israelis. " Fateh-Intifada cadres, while negatively disposed to the FRC, have generally employed far 
fewer invectives and been able to discuss the FRC as a bona fide faction within the national 
movement 
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and able to build national unity and engage in armed struggle against the 
"twin-enemy", its supposed partners are lax and decrepit. 46 
The PFLP, DFLP and Fateh-Intifada also maintain a presence on the 
World Wide Web, publishing online versions of their magazines. 47 The 
reason for bringing the magazines online is to be able to better reach the 
diaspora communities, and also to establish a `positive presence' on the web. 
"Do a search on PFLP, " noted on of the PFLP's information officers, "and 
nine out of ten hits refer to terrorism. This is not good at all. "48 In addition, 
both PFLP and a group affiliated to Fateh-Intifada operate mailing lists 
through which they supply subscribers with political analyses and news 
updates via e-mail. 49 
Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio is of a different order than the 
factions' printed media, and has consistently served as the opposition's only 
collective mouthpiece. Established in 1987 by the PFLP-GC, which still 
operates and funds it, it broadcasts over five different frequencies, each of 
which has its own transmitter. With a network of correspondents throughout 
the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in the refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan, al-Quds Radio has. developed a proficiency in broadcasting news 
speedily. 
From its establishment in 1987, the station has sought to propagate a 
"national line", rather than a narrowly focused PFLP-GC position; while by 
no means a secret, the PFLP-GC has chosen to never explicitly state its 
ownership of al-Quds Radio on air, seeking to use it as a rallying point also 
for those who might be adverse to the PFLP-GC, yet supportive of 
oppositional and militant activity. This attitude became an important base 
for the APF at its foundation in 1993, when al-Quds Radio became the `voice 
of the opposition, ' having previously styled itself the `voice of the intifada. ' 
According to Fadl Shururu, al-Quds Radio's senior editor, 
46 Particularly instructive are Al-Thawra al-Sha'biyya Al-Filastiniyya, vol I-III (Beirut: Filastin al- 
Tahwra, 1990,1991,1992). These special compilations are designed to demonstrate the FRC's 
continued relevance to Palestinian politics by implying that it, more than any other individual faction 
and the intifada leadership, organized the events of the 1987-1993 Intifada 
47 For al-Hurriyya, see http: //www. athourriah. org/; for Democratic Palestine, see http: //revolt. st/dp/; 
for Fateh, see http: //www. yafa-news. com/. 
48 `Ali Nasser, Damascus, July 24,2001. 
49 Fateh-Intifada's virtual mouthpiece is the Free Arab Voice (http: //www. fav. net/), while al-Hadaf 
operates its own mailing list from the PFLP's Damascus offices. 
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the message of this radio is national, Palestinian national and, of 
course, the message of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces... Maybe one day you [might] think the radio belongs to Hamas, another day to Jihad al-Islami. Everybody who makes a movement, we speak about them and for them. But always in a position of opposition to the [Palestinian] Authority and Abu `Ammar. 5° 
The main purpose of the radio station has been to maintain a cognitive unity 
between inside and outside communities, seeking to "maintain and foster a 
unity of struggle in all our people. "51 One way to achieve this has been 
interfactional broadcasts, recurrently airing all the various factions' political 
and military statements, interviews with the rejectionist general secretaries 
and sympathetic coverage of any and all armed activity against Israel. 
Another attempt to achieve this unity has been made by using the al-Quds 
Radio news network to create the illusion of oppositional omnipresence: 
We apply some measure of division (infisam) in our broadcasts. When 
we write the news, or stories, or reports, we write it as if we were 
inside... So, in Damascus, when we want to say what Teshreen or al- 
Thawra writes, we say `our editors from Damascus sent to us so and 
so. '... So we have a division of location (infisam fi al-makaan), two 
places. The actual location of the editors who write everything is in 
Damascus, but inside ourselves we live in Palestine. Just when you 
arrived here, I was writing some news from Bait Sakhum in the name 
of `our editor in Beit Sakhum'. This way everybody hears that we are 
there, with them. 52 
Apart from news coverage and political analysis, al-Quds Radio also 
broadcasts general encouragement to struggle as well as practical 
suggestions for how to take direct action such as acts of sabotage, and also 
advice on which roads are least dangerous or congested for travel. As for 
militant propaganda, the core rationale of the station is apparently that 
people must be encouraged to think in new ways, provided with new 
information, and that this in itself will enable maintenance of a Palestinian 
consciousness of struggle. "It is very difficult to explain what you want in 
brief broadcasts, " explains Shururu, "to make the listener believe in what you 




are saying. So, we have a way to make him think, then to believe. To take 
[our information] and then be free to begin to think, or not. In this way, we 
can keep the struggle going. "53 
The refugee communities and the residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip are given widely different advice on how to struggle, reflecting an 
awareness of the lack of militant capability on the 'outside. ' While the latter 
has received practical advice for action since 1987, the message for the 
refugee communities is one centred on intellectual and emotional 
perseverance and sacrifice with a long-term objective of not "surrender[ing] 
the people's historical rights. "54 Broadcasts have discouraged the refugee 
communities from armed activity. More significantly, since around 1990, al- 
Quds Radio has encouraged younger refugees, particularly those resident in 
Lebanon, not to reject the offers of work permits, education and health 
benefits extended to them by a number of Western states, particularly 
Australia and Canada. This was a dramatic reversal of the PFLP-GC's 
previous policy, which viewed such disintegration of the refugee 
communities as a political offence because it weakened the Palestinian 
refugee communities and potentially complicated the right of return. "We 
learn our lessons... We saw that this will be good for the future, to learn 
technology, to let the children and the families receive good health care, 
education, information... But they will remain Palestinians inside [their 
hearts]. "55 With the majority of the other APF factions opposed to this 
`dilution' of the Palestinian refugee communities, this has been al-Quds 
Radio's most severe editorial bone of contention. 
This discouragement of armed struggle and encouragement of moves 
to other countries seems to further bolster the hypothesis that armed 
struggle has been a rhetorical device, not an actual intention. Likening the 
Palestinian struggle to "relay running, where you take the stick and run, and 
later you give the stick to another, " Shururu suggested that 
The Palestinian revolution continues like this. In every situation, in 





struggle. The overarching important aim of the opposition is to 
continue the struggle-by stone, by word or by fire, but always to 
continue the struggle. And we, in al-Quds Radio, our [intended] 
contribution is to prolong that struggle. 
Thus, while the printed media have sought to either promulgate formal 
statements and communiques, or to shore up ingroup cohesion by enhancing 
the positive connotations of belonging to those groups, al-Quds Radio has 
sought to broadcast an interfactional message of resistance and struggle to 
the Palestinian communities in and around Palestine. Senior cadres of 
Hamas, MIJ, PFLP-GC, Fateh-Intifada, and PPSF have all emphasized the 
value of al-Quds Radio as not only a launch pad for the opposition's ideals, 
but as an instrument of interfactional cohesion and solidarity. "Al-Quds 
[Radio] has allowed us to come together and speak as one, " remarked Khalid 
`Abd al-Mejid, "which has been important for the Palestinian people and for 
us ourselves. "56 
Social, Cultural and Educational Activities 
Each rejectionist faction has engaged in social and educational activities in 
Syria and Lebanon. -Each faction-with the exception of PLF, PPSF and 
PRCP-operate women's and youth organizations and cultural sections, 
which organize a wide range of events. Cinema evenings, art exhibitions, 
poetry recitals and traditional craft fairs are some elements of these 
organizations' programmes, intended to provide meaningful leisure time and 
political education simultaneously. Thus, for instance, when the DFLP's 
youth organization screened the film version of Ghassan Kanafani's al- 
Mutabaqqi ('Those Staying Behind') in November 2000, it was both 
preceded and followed by lectures on what the film taught about Zionism, 
Judaism, 1948 and the right of return. 57 
Rather than mixing politics and pleasure, the poetry and prose recitals 
recurrently organized by Fateh-Intifada in association with various 
Palestinian cultural clubs in Syria-often attended and addressed by Abu 
Khalid al-'Amleh-are attempts to appropriate expressions of Palestinian 
56 Khalid 'Abd al-Mejid, May 25,2000. 
57 The screening took place in the DFLP's Palestinian Cultural Centre, Yarmuk camp. November 23, 
2000. 
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culture and infuse them with a militant content. In this context it is 
interesting to note that the magazine Fateh as well as its affiliated website 
the Free Arab Voice both emphasize poetry and art as mode of expressing 
Palestinian aspirations: Fateh regularly contains three to four pages of 
poetry and other artistic efforts, and the Free Arab Voice contains an 
extensive selection of nationalist poetry, which tend to emphasize traditional 
Palestinian `virtues' such as suffering, sacrifice and unfulfilled dreams, as 
well as armed struggle and revenge. 58 While not expressed thus by the 
rejectionists themselves, the apparent centrality of poetry to expressions of 
rejectionist resistance echoes the notion of Nietzsche and Heidegger that a 
people's soul can be found in, and accessed through its poetry. 59 
An indispensable element of the rejectionist effort to manipulate the 
refugee's political conscience and discourse has hinged on their links with a 
host of faction-affiliated NGO's, the daily activities of which bring them into 
contact with the populace to an extent that is beyond the capability of the 
factions themselves. These NGOs' activities include the management of 
orphanages, kindergartens, healthcare centres and cultural clubs, areas 
where children and youths receive formative impressions of the world 
around them. The various factions have been able to use their NGO 
linkages-which often amount to direct control-to bring these formative 
impressions into line with their ethos of struggle, sacrifice and return. 
Two points of clarification need to be made at this juncture: First, the 
PLO and its various factions have operated and supported a range of NGOs 
within these and other areas for several decades. Indeed, prior to the PLO 
leadership's expulsion from Lebanon in 1983, such NGOs were part of the 
backbone of the Palestinian social infrastructure. Thus, it must not be 
inferred from their use by the rejectionist factions that their existence is 
somehow an organizational innovation for the purpose of discursive 
resistance. Second, these organizations generally do conduct valuable social 
work among the communities in which they exist, and this has remained 
their primary task and function. They must thus not be thought of as political 
groups masquerading as, or concealed within NGOs; rather, they are bona 
58 See http: //www. fav. net/Rhythms0frheStorm. htm 
218 
fide social and educational organizations that also perform political 
functions. Each NGO's factional affiliation appears to produce identifiably 
different `discursive effects. ' 
Each rejectionist faction-with the exception of the PRCP, PLF and 
PPSF-have either operated social and educational NGOs directly, or closely 
coordinated their political agendas with independent NGOs in the post-Oslo 
period. As with most other endeavours undertaken by the APF factions, each 
has promoted its own line within the general parameters of an anti-Oslo and 
anti-PLO/PA leadership agenda. Hence, the political substance of the various 
NGOs' activities has differed greatly. These organizations include the DFLP 
affiliated al-Najdeh Association, which organizes a range of social, 
educational and cultural activities; the PFLP-operated Ghassan Kanafani 
Association, which organizes cultural events for children and adults; the 
PFLP-GC affiliated al-Khalsa Association, which organizes cultural and 
social events primarily for children and youths; the Hamas and MIJ affiliated 
AI Aqsa and Al-Shaheed Associations, both of which provides medical and 
financial services in the refugee camps; and the Sa'iqa affiliated Palestine 
Association, operating kindergartens and pre-schools, primarily in Syria. 
Fateh-Intifada is particularly energetic in this sphere of activity. After the 
expulsion of the Fateh/PLO leadership from Lebanon in 1983, Fateh-Intifada 
seized Fateh's and PLO's assets and infrastructures in Syria and Lebanon, 
which included financial and political ties to a number of NGOs. These 
included the Palestine Martyrs Works Society (Samed); the National 
Foundation for Health, Social & Educational Services; the Handicapped 
Social Association; and-until early 1998-the National Institution of Social 
Care and Vocational Training-BeitAtfal al-Sumud. 
Several of these organizations operate on a non-discriminatory basis, 
but many of them refuse to, for instance, admit orphans whose parents were 
not members of the faction to which the NGO is affiliated. 6° This has been 
the case with, for instance, with al-Khalsa and Palestine Associations. Each 
of these organizations instils a "different sense of being Palestinian, " and 
inculcates a distinct brand of Palestinianism into the children and youths 
59 See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays; trans. W. Lovitt 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 25f, 33f. 
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with whom they work. 61 An interesting case in point is the contrast in 
political conscience developed by the children processed by Beit Atfal al- 
Sumud and those processed by al-Najdeh. 
BeitAtfal al-Sumud was established in August 1976 at the initiative of 
the Secretariat of the General Union Of Palestinian Women with the 
objective of providing substitute homes to the children who were orphaned 
by the Tal al-Za'tar massacres. 62 It is presently the largest Palestinian NGO 
in Lebanon in terms of resources and geographical areas of operation, with 
activities in ten of Lebanon's twelve officially recognized refugee camps and 
sponsors from a range of charitable organizations around the world. 63 Its 
initial Fateh and PLO affiliations were taken over by Fateh-Intifada in 1983, 
and the two remained affiliated until early 1998. A split-apparently 
precipitated by financial differences64-caused the Beit Aal al-Sumud's 
disaffiliation from Fateh-Intifada, but the two organizations have 
nonetheless continued their political communication and coordination. 
According to UNRWA staff and other aid workers who have had first hand 
experience of the kindergarten and literacy programmes of Beit Atfal al- 
Sumud, its curricula "seem devised to propagate a very narrow and 
particular view of their social and political situation" that "match closely Abu 
Musa's positions... they are indoctrinated, learning to hate Arafat. It is very 
political and very sad. "65 First hand contact with children that have passed 
through the organization's "Family Happiness Project -a programme that 
seeks to offer homes and human contact to orphans regardless of their 
parents' factional affiliation-evidences not only the children's absorption of 
highly militant rhetoric, but also their ascription of a register of horrific 
qualities to the PLO/PA leadership and to Arafat personally. "This is part of 
what [Belt Atfal al-Sumud] teach[es] them... they say to the children `you 
60 Olfat Mahmoud, October 25,2000. 
61 Annika Hampson, UNRWA field worker, Beirut, June 2000. 
62 For background, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and Search for State, pp. 400-1. 
63 For the organization's own list of sponsors, see http: //www. socialcare. org/ets 
64 Muhammad `Adili al-Khatib Abu Fakhr, November 8,2000. 
65 UNRWA field worker, whose duties included contact with Beit Atfal al-Sumud during 1999: 
interview, Beirut, October 1999. 
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must curse Arafat, you must curse the [Palestinian] Authority. This is 
connected directly with their political basis... [which is] Abu Musa's. "66 
By contrast, the DFLP affiliated al-Najdeh Association-set up in 1978 
as a Lebanese social organization and working in areas similar to those of 
Belt Atfal al-Sumud-devises curricula that are less militant and less 
aggressively anti-PA. Al-Najdeh's central cognitive themes instead appear to 
be the right of return, principles of legality and struggle through suffering, 
themes that accord with the exact issues emphasized by the DFLP. These 
topics would be difficult to ignore, but when taught about Palestinian history- 
and politics, and in particular about current affairs, the children processed 
by al-Najdeh are, in the judgment of one UNRWA worker, "given a more 
balanced and less aggressive view of the world... It is clear that [al-Najdeh 
and Belt Atfal al-Sumud] have different political lines. It is clear, above in 
the children's different awareness of politics and the world around them. -117 
This is not to suggest that these NGOs' activities have yet had, or will 
have discernible or demonstrable socio-political repercussions, although 
work in the field of sociology of education would suggest this to be the 
probable case. 68 The long-term effects of such different socialization 
experiences are not at all clear and lie beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
What is interesting for our present purposes, however, is the way in which 
the APF factions have sought to use the NGOs in the camps to perform the 
same educational and socializing functions on their behalf, as the PA 
approved school system in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has done on behalf 
of the PLO/PA. As one NGO organizer put it: 
Without the NGOs, they [the rejectionist factions] couldn't do 
anything. They don't have that kind of membership or party 
structures... We [the NGO's] can benefit from the margin of freedom 
that exists in this country [Lebanon]. 69 
The APF factions' use of NGOs in their political struggle against the PLO/PA 
leadership has aimed at maintaining a militant ethos as an integral 
66 Olfat Mahmoud, October 25,2000. 
67 Annika Hampson, UNRWA field worker 1999/2000, Beirut, June 2000. 
68 See, for instance, Jeanne H. Ballantine, The Sociology of Education, 2°d ed. (Englewood Cliffs. NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1989). 
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component and pivot of Palestinian political consciousness. As each faction 
has promoted its own variety of Palestinian nationalism through its affiliated 
NGOs, the intended collective effort has been to articulate the nature of 
Palestinian identity and prescribe its implications, to define the limits of the 
socially and politically acceptable. This effort, aimed at extracting a viable 
and active Palestinianism out of a unified heritage of Palestinianness based 
on struggle and sacrifice, has been of a long-term nature. 
Political Rallies 
A more short-term instrument for impacting on the political consciousness 
of the refugee communities has been the conduct of political rallies and mass 
meetings. Organized by every faction-with varying degrees of 
professionalism and attendance rates-these events have taken place 
regularly in all camps in Syria and Lebanon. As each faction has its own 
anniversaries and notable dates in addition to the various national holidays- 
such as, for instance, Land Day-political rallies are frequent and it is hoped 
that, sustained over time, rallies may impact on the attendees' conceptions of 
their community and their role. within that community. 7° 
Among the APF factions, major factional anniversaries and holidays 
have tended to be occasions for shows of political unity and strength, 
generally attended by senior members of all factions. In addition, external 
dignitaries such as PLO cofounder Bahyat Abu Gharbiyya or Hizb'Allah's 
Secretary General Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah are recurrently invited to attend 
and speak, thus enhancing the importance of the meetings and of the 
organizing and participating factions. 71 
Political rallies are political propaganda spectacles, allowing elites to 
communicate directly with a potentially mobilizable populace, disseminating 
their conceptions of political realities, obstacles, and challenges. The 
problem is that unless one is already predisposed to the message that is 
preached, one is unlikely to attend. However, as social identity theory 
suggests, social movements often need to `preach to the converted' in order 
69 Qassem `Aina, October 26,2000. 
70 This was suggested by 'Munir', one of the main organizers of MIJ's rallies in Damascus. 
" The author has attended four major rallies in Damascus during the course of this research, two of 
which were organized by MIJ, two by Fateh-Intifada. 
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to enhance morale and the positively charged self-esteem that goes with 
ingroup membership. Thus, political rallies are essentially introvert 
occasions. 
The present discourse of rejectionism builds directly upon the 
collective, national Palestinian discourse of the pre-Oslo period. If only by 
dint of repetition, the various Palestinian refugee communities have thus 
become fluent in the language of rejectionism. Thus, what is said at political 
rallies-as well as what is printed in the rejectionist media, broadcast by al- 
Quds Radio and taught by NGOs-could be said to be the discursive `default 
setting' of Palestinian refugee communities in Syria and Lebanon, which 
have been excluded by the PLO/PA leadership's state building efforts. At 
rallies, the various secretary generals attend and deliver speeches with the 
aim of producing political legitimacy, not primarily for themselves as 
individuals or their factions-although given the pride and honour attached 
to the national project, this is clearly a part if it-but for `traditional' 
Palestinian politics and its ethos: A PLO-centric political system 
encompassing the Palestinian people rather than the Palestinian territories, 
the pivot of which is all forms of struggle including armed struggle. This sort 
of project accords with Seymour Martin Lipset's understanding of legitimacy 
as "the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. "72 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
While the APF factions seem to have intended to produce meanings and 
manage discourse without engaging in dialogue with their constituencies, 
their position in the midst of refugee communities made such a `clinical' 
approach impossible. Thus, the APF engaged in a dynamic process of 
interaction with the refugee communities. Through the factions' media 
activities, social and cultural work, educational organizations, political rallies 
and so forth, they were in fact affected themselves. By late 1996, after almost 
three years in the same essentially passive and defensive track, the various 
factions had begun to seriously assess and question the repercussions of 
72 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Press, 1960), p. 77; as quoted 
in Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, p. 9. 
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their relations with, and performance among their people. This in turn 
prompted each faction to incrementally revaluate and redefine its identity 
and role-conception within the APF collective. Each faction's distinct 
combination of political and armed struggle abilities, ideology, social status 
and mode of relations with the refugee constituents, combined to affect its 
political trajectory. Thus, the alliance did not change as a whole, but, instead, 
its parts began to diverge. 
It was in this atmosphere of collective and factional self-doubt that the 
DFLP announced an end to its opposition to the peace process and the 
PLO/PA leadership in February 1997. The faction had never been 
comfortable under the APF umbrella, having joined solely out of opposition 
to the DOP, with very little affinity for its APF partners. Over time, the 
DFLP's activities among the refugee communities and inside Palestine 
suggested to it "total rejection of everything leads nowhere. "73 In a joint 
statement with Farouk Qadoumi, head of the PLO's political department, 
Hawatmeh suspended the DFLP's membership of the alliance and urged all 
factions to join in a comprehensive national dialogue with the PLO/PA 
leadership. Seeing its collective existence threatened, the alliance's reaction 
was immediate and sharp: 
The readiness of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
which responded to Arafat's call [to promote the Oslo and Hebron 
accords] to relinquish armed struggle and to participate in the so- 
called final status negotiations, clearly exposes and makes us recall 
the role it played at past stages as an advance reconnaissance platoon 
for the opportunistic and defeatist current in the Palestinian arena. 74 
The rejectionists were correct in that the immediate catalyst for the DFLP's 
defection was indeed the Hebron accords of January 15. These accords 
specified a range of new PA responsibilities vis-a-vis Israel, including 
completion of the process of revising the national charter, strengthening of 
security cooperation, and a range of anti and counter-terrorism measures 
directed against the opposition, including the prevention of "hostile 
propaganda. " It also specified the terms and schedules for hand-over of land 
'3 Naif Hawatmeh, June 16,1999. 
74 `APF statement' broadcast on Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, February 26,1997. 
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in the West Bank. 75 The Hebron accords as seen from the APF vantage 
point-especially its specifications for security cooperation-constituted a 
direct assault by the PLO/PA leadership on the Palestinian opposition and 
people, carried out in concert with the `primary enemy. ' It was a very real 
threat, however. Deeply concerned about their collective political future, the 
APF construed the DFLP's call for unity and national dialogue as brazen 
support for the Hebron accords. This was far from a correct reading of the 
DFLP's actions, however, which deplored the accords, but saw them as a 
lamentable result of Palestinian weakness vis-ä-vis Israel. The DFLP had 
come to believe that the only remedy for that weakness was national unity, 
not continued rejection and division. If the other factions did not come 
together to bolster the PLO/PA negotiating position, so DFLP reasoning 
went, Palestinian land and rights would surely be squandered. More could be 
achieved by rallying behind Arafat than by simply rejecting his authority and 
legitimacy. 76 Consequently, the DFLP's third General National Congress in 
January 1998 approved a complete review of the Oslo agreements; its fourth 
General National Congress in April and May 1998 presented and approved a 
political report entitled `Spreading the sovereignty of the Palestinian State 
over all of the Palestinian territory occupied in the aggression of 1967, ' which 
called for greater unity on both popular and factional levels-77 
The PFLP also suspended its APF membership in February 1997, but 
for very different reasons; the PFLP shared the other factions' outrage over 
DFLP moves to support the PLO/PA leadership. Since June 1996, however, 
the PFLP had boycotted APF meetings after being subjected to a barrage of 
criticism from its alliance partners-primarily Fateh-Intifada, Sa'iqa, PRCP, 
PLF and PPSF-for having attended the 1996 Gaza PNC, a meeting that 
ratified changes to the National Charter despite strenuous PFLP objections. 
The subsequent boycott and suspension of APF membership was symbolic 
politics, however, as the PFLP circumvented both through bilateral relations 
,5 For the full text of Dennis Ross' `Note for the Record' appended to the Hebron Protocol. see 
Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 522-3. 
76 Naif Hawatmeh, June 16,1999. 
"See Qays `Abd al-Karim et al, Khams Sanawat `ala Itifag Oslo (Beirut: Dar al-Taqadam al-`Arabi 
li-l-Sihafa, 1999) 
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with the other factions. 78 Its status as a leading rejectionist faction thus 
remained intact. 
Importantly, its formal withdrawal from the alliance together with 
that of the DFLP reinforced the other APF factions' existential angst. 
Revising their post-Oslo activities and agendas, the APF factions were faced 
with the painful realization that their potential long-term impact on 
Palestinian political consciousness was not a pro-active enough approach. 
The Hebron accords underscored the fact that Israel and the PLO/PA 
leadership were drastically changing facts on the ground, and that the latter 
was now committed to actually engaging them in political and possibly 
violent combat. "Our thinking about tactics was necessarily shaped by the 
changing circumstances, " one rejectionist cadre later recalled. "The question 
was how to continue resistance in a constructive way. There is only one law 
of struggle, and that is resistance... [but] we must be a positive force. "79 
Neither prepared for, nor able to wage armed struggle, the APF and its 
agenda existed as if in a political vacuum. The alliance had no possibilities to 
respond effectively to the political developments inside Palestine, as a 
collective. The APF's crisis of self-confidence became further aggravated 
when the PA and Israel signed the Wye River memorandum on October 23, 
1998. The memorandum provided, among other things, a far-reaching 
blueprint for tripartite security cooperation between the United States, Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority. In the event, the Wye River memorandum 
precipitated substantial crackdowns on mostly Hamas and MIJ 
infrastructures inside the West Bank and Gaza, and to a lesser extent it also 
affected the PFLP's ability to operate. 
Characterizing the Wye River memorandum as a "disgrace [to] the 
Palestinian people's honour and dignity, "80 it is interesting to note that in 
calling for action to oppose it, the PFLP-GC, for one, did not call for armed 
struggle. Al-Quds Radio noted that 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
has said the Wye River Agreement `dealt a treacherous blow' to the 
'$ Muhammad 'Issa Abu Khalil, June 5,1999. 
79 Muhammad `Adili al-Khatib Abu Fakhr, May 27,. 2000. 
80 Radio Monte Carlo, December 6,1998. 
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Palestinian struggle. It said the agreement gave the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency and Israeli Mossad `the right to hound' 
Palestinians and would `serve the strategic interests of the Zionist 
enemy. ' It called on Palestinians `to close ranks, escalate popular 
resistance in Palestine, activate the opposition, mobilize the public' 
and `embark on a political and media campaign of incitement to 
expose and foil this agreement. '81 
As the APF's key player after the DFLP and PFLP had suspended their 
memberships, the PFLP-GC's tenor was significant, as well as an indicator of 
further changes ahead. All factions shared grave concerns about the 
situation. When PNC Chairman Salim al-Za'nun issued a call for a meeting of 
the Palestinian Central Council to be held in Gaza on December io, 1998, set 
to discuss the final repeal of several articles of the national charter, the APF 
factions saw an opportunity for collective and decisive action. 
Seeking yet again to demonstratively challenge the status and 
legitimacy of the PLO/PA leadership, the APF called for a National 
Palestinian Conference to be held in Damascus the day after the scheduled 
Central Council session in Gaza. On November 8, the APF's general 
secretaries held an initial preparatory meeting, followed on November 19 by 
a second meeting -attended by a number of independent Palestinian 
personalities. In a press statement prior to the closed-door proceedings, 
Khalid al-Fahum-the convener-explained: 
... The most recent of these setbacks was the 
Wye Plantation accord, 
which dealt a fatal blow to our Palestinian people in several respects, 
particularly regarding their land. Arafat's leadership has relinquished 
as much as 82 per cent of the West Bank land and 35 per cent of the 
Gaza Strip land to the enemy... The second tragedy is the security 
issue. The US and Israeli insistence on the issue of security was highly 
noted by all of us in the Alliance of Palestinian Forces. This means 
combating the legitimate struggle of all the opposing factions. They 
even went a step further when they began to combat media, press, 
cultural and speech instigation... The third tragedy is the [Palestinian] 
Charter. The charter is of paramount importance. It constitutes the 
backbone of the PLO... 82 
81 Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, November 18, [998. 
82 Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, November 19,1998. 
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As the proceedings were concluded, al-Fahum emerged to issue another 
statement containing the rejectionists' renewed counterchallenged the 
PLO/PA leadership's hegemony: 
... it was agreed to set up a preparatory committee representing our 
people inside and outside as a prelude to hold an expanded national 
conference. In this conference, national decisions can be taken to 
confront the current stage and the challenges of the future... It was 
also agreed to set up an emergency committee in all Palestinian camps 
and communities to mobilize the masses and rally the efforts to 
prevent the Palestinian [National] Authority from holding any 
meeting for the PNC, or from infringing upon the PLO charter... 83 
Activity preceding the conference was hectic, particularly as it related to 
attempts to draw up a working document. "At this stage our differences were 
evident, " one senior cadre would recall. 84 As mentioned above, each faction's 
tactical objectives and preferred instruments had begun to take its own 
route, and the factions' attitudes were becoming difficult to harmonize. The 
Palestinian Central Council convened in Gaza on December io, 1998, and 
voted by 8i to 7 to reaffirm changes to the national charter removing 
references to Israel's right to exist. 85 At the insistence of the Israeli 
government-who sought water tight assurances that the Palestinians would 
not at some later point deny the validity of the decision-the Palestine 
National Council was set to convene the following week to ratify the decision 
with a formal vote. 86 That PNC session, scheduled for December i6, was to 
be attended by President Clinton; an enormous PR victory for Arafat, it was 
an equally massive blow to the APF's self-esteem. 
In what possibly amounted to the greatest show of rejectionist might 
ever mustered, the Palestinian National Conference-held in Damascus 
December 12-13-was attended by 382 delegates, which included all 
Palestinian rejectionist factions, representatives of the various refugee 
communities, independents and intellectuals, Arab statesmen and 
as [bid. 
84 Talal Naji, May 28,2000. 
85 BBC World Service, December 14,1998. 
86 BBC World Service, December 14,1998. 
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sympathetic political movements from throughout the Arab world. 87 During 
the two days of the conference, fifty-five speeches were delivered and thirty- 
six letters and twenty telegrams were read out. Rather than producing a 
fresh action plan or innovate the instruments of rejection, which were the 
conference's ostensible objectives, the meeting turned into a show of support 
for the Palestinian cause and its `true representatives, ' the rejectionist 
factions of the APF. The alliance's leaders sought to present this event to 
their members and to the refugee communities as a victory for their cause, a 
positive development in which representatives from all over the Arab world 
had affirmed the righteousness of rejecting the PLO/PA path. Much was 
made of the attendance of the former Algerian President Ahmad Ben Bella, 
whose attendance was some measure of comfort in the face of President 
Clinton's address to the PNC in Gaza, scheduled for the following week. 
What the factions wanted and needed, however, was innovation, and 
the only tangible political instrument to emerge from the conference was a 
follow-up committee mandated to investigate the most efficacious ways in 
which to recapture the structures of the PLO. ' "The Palestinian people 
strongly oppose the cancellation of the Palestinian National Charter, " said 
the closing statement, and "those who cancelled the charter... have lost their 
national and legal legitimacy. "88 Even that follow-up committee was 
stillborn, however, as its members were divided on the issue of just what 
their mandate implied. Was a parallel, or anti-PLO to be set up? Should the 
existing PLO be brought around to the APF standpoint, and if so, how? The 
disparity between those who believed that the existing PLO was sacrosanct- 
even though corrupted and twisted by Arafat-and those who believed that a 
new structure erected on the basis of the APF would be preferable, was 
simply too great. 89 In the former camp were the PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC and 
Sa'iqa, as well as Hamas and MIJ; the remainder took the latter view. 
87 A complete attendance list can be found in the conference proceedings, Filastin min al-Nahr ila al- 
Bahr: al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Filastini (Beirut: Dar al-Kanun al-Adabiyya, 1999), pp. 9-15. 
88 Filastin min al-Nahr ila al-Bahr, p. 325 
89 Tahsin al-Halabi, November2,2000. 
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MAKING AN EXAMPLE OF THE DFLP 
Despite the best efforts of the 1998 conference in Damascus, the APF 
structure was now set to cave in on itself due to its increasingly evident 
internal differences over how to deal with the PLO/PA in the long term. The 
divide between those who had decided to practice limited cooperation with 
Fateh and those that could' not bring themselves to do so was becoming ever 
more paralysing. In early 1999, however, none of the factions would openly 
admit to this deterioration. In order to demonstrate continued unity and 
resolve, the factions seized the opportunity, in March 1999, to make 
themselves look `more steadfast' by making an example of the DFLP's 
increasingly `liquidationist' policies. Although it had left the APF already in 
1997, the DFLP's continued presence in Damascus and attendance at the 
1998 conference made it de facto a continuing part of the rejectionist block. 
It also remained within the Unified Command that it had set up together 
with the PFLP in 1984, which structurally, if not politically, tied it to the 
alliance bilaterally. In fact, the DFLP found itself in a political limbo, caught 
between the APF-with which it no longer wished to be associated-and the 
PLO/PA leadership, which did not seem to want to be associated with the 
DFLP. When Hawatmeh attended the funeral of King Hussein in March 
1999, he met with Ezer Weizman. 
I was in my rooms after the funeral when Weizman entered. We shook 
hands and exchanged assurances that we both wished for peace and 
historic reconciliation between our two peoples. [Yitzhak] Mordechai, 
[Shimon] Peres and Lea Rabin also came into the room and I shook 
Peres' hand too. I told [Peres] that he was wrong to refuse me entry to 
Palestine for the elections in 1996. Then they left... that was it. 9° 
The symbolic handshake with Weizman caused an immediate and massive 
uproar in Damascus. The day after the funeral, the PFLP dissolved the 
Unified Command. "We consider it a fatal mistake by Comrade Hawatmeh, 
and it is clear to us that the Democratic Front is on its way to join the Arafat 
camp, probably within the next few months. "91 The PFLP-GC, Fateh-Intifada 
90 Naif Hawatmeh, June 16,1999. 
91 Muhammad `Issa Abu Khalil, telephone interview, March 1999. It was claimed that a further 
reason for the PFLP's harsh reaction was a claim by DFLP cadres that George Habash's wife. Hilda 
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and Sa'iqa, meanwhile, resorted to arms, attacking DFLP offices in the 
refugee camps adjacent to Damascus, Hama and Dera', injuring one DFLP 
member. As the clashes in Syria petered out after two days, they intensified 
in the camps of northern Lebanon. The three assailant organizations set 
upon the DFLP-operated Palestinian Cultural Centre in Nahr al-Barid, 
killing one DFLP cadre and injuring two of its members. 
That Sa'iqa participated in these attacks was as a signal of Syrian 
displeasure with Hawatmeh's increasingly unilateral manoeuvres. At any 
rate, the clashes could not have occurred had not Syrian military intelligence, 
which is responsible for security and order in the camps, turned a blind eye. 
"No one can do anything [in Syria and northern Lebanon] without the 
mukhbarat's acceptance... These groups particularly can do nothing without 
encouragement and support from some of the Syrian authorities, " remarked 
Hawatmeh. 92 In the aftermath of the clashes, Syrian authorities apparently 
caused "administrative, political and practical problems" for Hawatmeh 
"personally, and for the organization. "93 
The clashes caused an outrage among refugees, in Lebanon in 
particular, less out of sympathy for Hawatmeh's manoeuvres than from 
memories of the Camps War. 94 At the time, Hawatmeh was convinced that 
the attacks were due to the rejectionists' failure to supply their organizations 
with a positive collective identity based on actual political achievements "The 
rejectionists are in fact reactionary; they look to the [past] and not to the 
present and future. They want things to be the way they once were, which is 
not possible.... They are punishing the Democratic Front [on the outside] 
because they are powerless in Palestine, while we are making constant 
progress. "95 Violation of physical space was, indeed, a way of shaming the 
DFLP, whose apparently increasing importance detracted from the others 
social status. 
While Hawatmeh seems to have been correct in his analysis of the 
immediate reasons for the attack, describing the DFLP's political path as one 
(Umm Maysa), received funds from Egypt on one of her visits there. The source of this information 
was a central committee member of the PFLP-GC, corroborated by a senior PFLP cadre. 
92 Naif Hawatmeh, June 16,1999. 
93 'Ali Badwan, June 15,1999. 
94 Suheil al-Natur, May 18,2000. 
95 Naif Hawatmeh, June 16,1999. 
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of `constant progress' proved overly optimistic. Driven by Hawatmeh's firm 
belief that peace between Syria and Israel was imminent-his estimation was 
"within two years"-and that the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
looked favourably on the DFLP's promotion of Palestinian national unity as a 
necessary prerequisite for lasting peace also with the Palestinians, the 
attacks did nothing but entrench the DFLP's sense of being right. Events in 
Syria and Lebanon made dialogue with Arafat and the PNA easier by 
removing the last structural and political restraints from its APF partnership, 
as well as adding a sense of urgency. The DFLP-Fateh dialogue, carried out 
by second tier officials from both parties, had in fact been going on since 
1997. Undeterred by events in Syria and Lebanon, Hawatmeh met with 
Arafat during the first weekend of August 1999. Regardless of the political 
fruitlessness of the actual proceedings, the summit encouraged the US State 
Department to remove the DFLP from its list of terrorist organizations in 
September. This, in turn, prompted Israeli authorities to communicate to the 
PA, in mid-October, that Hawatmeh would be permitted to return to 
Palestine. Anxious to not be seen to surrender or defer to Israel, Hawatmeh 
gave a series of interviews in. which he stressed the legitimacy of armed 
struggle as long as " the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
continued. His remarks caused uproar in Israel-where the memory of the 
DFLP's botched Ma'lot operation in 1974 is still fresh96-and two weeks after 
the Israelis had decided to allow Hawatmeh back, Ehud Barak personally 
intervened to revoke his visa. Structurally and politically, the DFLP was to 
remain in this halfway position, wedged between the opposition and the 
PLO/PA leadership until the outbreak of the intifada. 
THE PFLP CHANGES COURSE 
Meanwhile, in Damascus, relations between the PFLP and the other factions 
were also getting tenser. On the last weekend in July-one week before 
Hawatmeh met Arafat in Cairo-PFLP Deputy Secretary General Abu All 
Mustafa Zibri had also met the PLO chairman in Cairo. George Habash had 
96 In 1974, in the Israeli town of Ma'lot, a DFLP unit seized a school building and took some 30 
students hostage. In the ensuing gun battle with Israeli security forces, twenty-two of the students 
were killed. There are several Israeli NGO's that work to continuously keep this event in the public 
eye. 
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made his attendance of the meeting conditional on the reinsertion into the 
PLO charter of the clause demanding the destruction of Israel. This, of 
course, made a meeting impossible, but Habash was concerned that 
acceptance of Arafat's invitation might be perceived as a quasi-endorsement 
of his authority, and an endorsement of the Gaza Conference the previous 
December. 97 Abu `Ali Mustafa, conversely, distanced himself somewhat from 
Habash's rhetoric, and while denying that the PFLP was joining forces with 
Fateh in the PNA he welcomed moves towards "improved relations" with 
Fateh, and called for greater national unity, indicating a preference for 
dialogue between rejectionists and the PLO/PA leadership. Leila Khaled later 
explained: 
Five years have passed [since the DOP] and a new question has 
emerged-'How are we going to deal with the Palestinian Authority? ' 
... There has been a big discussion within the PFLP about this issue, but that does not mean we are divided. If we [enter into] dialogue with 
the Palestinian Authority this doesn't mean we agree with them. It 
simply means that reality necessitates dialogue... The dialogue is not 
going to go smoothly because we are opposed to many of the points 
that the Palestinian Authority works for-98 
The other Damascus-based groups were angered and worried by Abu All 
Mustafa's performance, however, and proceeded to demonstratively ignore 
the PFLP. After the popular rumblings following the attack on the DFLP, 
they could not afford another PR setback. Besides, all APF factions have far 
greater esteem for the PFLP and its leadership than they have for the DFLP 
and Hawatmeh, primarily because of the PFLP's unimpeachable history of 
rejectionism and Habash's personal stature. Even so, on the issue of PFLP, 
Fateh-Intifada's Abu Fakhr remarked: 
They left us. Where are they now? They have gone to Arafat's camp... 
all the participants [at the 1998 Damascus conference] agreed that 
Arafat will not represent our people after the Gaza conference. The 
Popular Front did not honour this agreement. In such a situation, 
what is there to negotiate with the Popular Front about? They have 
gone to Arafat, let him speak to them ... 99 
97 Leila Khaled, October 23,1999; Muhammad `Issa Abu Khalil, October 30,2000. 
98 Leila Khaled, October 23,1999 
99 Muhammad `Adili al-Khatib Abu Fakhr. October 25,1999. 
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As with the DFLP, the deterioration in relations with the other APF factions 
facilitated policy shifts that were already in the PFLP pipeline. Habash had 
decided earlier that year to resign at the upcoming 6th National Congress, 
and Abu `Ali Mustafa-Habash's deputy since the Front's foundation-was 
set to succeed him. In fact, Habash resignation was brought on by not only 
increasingly poor health, but by awareness that he may no longer have been 
the best man to head the organization. In September, he formally announced 
his intention to resign. Refusing to compromise his personal convictions, 
Habash preferred to hand over the leadership, which earned him great 
respect in the middle and lower tiers of other Damascus-based factions. 
This is how it should be done, I am telling you! He knows that he has 
done all he could do for our struggle and that he must not be a 
political burden... I wish these other people-Jibril, Abu Musa and the 
others-would do the same, let a new generation take over. But they 
believe they are secretary general[s] for life. 100 
This sort of reception likely compounded the perception among the 
remaining APF factions that the PFLP's internal political developments were 
a profound threat to themselves. At any rate, the PFLP's Political 
Department had seen the necessity to launch into a process of self-criticism, 
which would be one of the main tasks of the upcoming congress. As Habash 
put it: 
We have to consider our struggle now after fifty years. We have not 
been victorious, not yet. Our main task that we have to face today is to 
explain why we failed. Our cause is very just, our masses are 
enthusiastic to struggle but until now we have not succeeded. We have 
to ask ourselves `why? 'loi 
When the Diaspora round of the Congress 102, which was postponed several 
times, eventually convened in late April 2000, Habash not only tendered his 
resignation but moreover used his speech to criticize sharply both the 
activity of the PFLP and himself. Habash argued that the defeat of the Arab 
1 00 Central committee member of the PFLP-GC, interview with author, Damascus, June 1999. 
'o' George Habash, June 15,1999. 
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Nationalist effort had not been inevitable, and that "objective factors, " while 
significant, were not decisive. Rather, he argued that the primary factors 
leading the revolution to defeat was the "absence of rationality and 
objectivity" in the slogans raised by the movement. 103 Habash's speech 
contained searing criticism of the PFLP's post-Oslo activities, which implied 
criticism of the APF project to use "slogans" as symbols, rather than practical 
guides to action. The speech also emphasized the positive connotations of the 
PFLP's social and political identity through its achievement in the face of 
adversity, its ideological traditions, ethics and history. The speech is worth 
reiterating in some detail, and it is worthy of note that the last remark in the 
quoted passage rests on the assumption that honour and righteousness is 
vindicated not by a successful counterchallenge, but by the mere existence of 
a counterchallenge, as suggested by the challenge-response game. 
A basic question that beats upon the wall of our reality, that comes 
from our past to reach our present and travel into our future is: Why 
have we been defeated-as a Front, as a liberation movement, as Arab 
states, and as the Arab Nation as a whole? In spite of all the sacrifices, 
pain, and suffering? 
And although This is an important question, for it means a readiness 
to look critically, to review ourselves, and re-read our history; that 
only takes us half of the way. Preparing to respond to the question is 
what will pave the rest of the way... 
[On the subject of women, ] how can we attain real progress and 
approach the attainment of our national goals while we enslave and 
ignore half the energies of our people? ... The youth constitute another field where our program, institutions, and practice are to be tested. 
Will we be able to meet the needs of this vital group, do you imagine? 
Let us now look at our situation in the Front. Let us try to assess the 
proportion of our members who are young and the extent that they 
are reflected in the leading bodies. What do we see? Comrades, both 
men and women, do not ever allow the party to grow old, for that 
really means death and the end... 
Now, as I come to the end of my speech, I would like to remember 
martyrs of the Front, the martyrs of Palestine and of the Arab Nation. 
I remember Wadi' Haddad, Ghassan Kanafani, The Guevara of Gaza, 
Shadia Abu Ghazzala, and Abu Jihad Khalil al-Wazir. I remember 
102 There were three separate proceedings-for Diaspora, West Bank and Gaza Strip residents-with 
the two latter convening in May 2000. 
103 Al-Safer Beirut, April 28,2000. 
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each of the martyrs, one by one, and without exception; those martyrs 
to whom we are indebted, for whom we must continue the struggle, 
holding fast to the dream and hope, and protecting the rights of the 
people for whom they shed their blood. Their children and their 
families have a right to be honoured and cared for. 
I know well what material [the Front's] members are made of, the 
value and the depth of its traditions, and the ethics and values that the 
Front has planted all these years. I have faith that you will not 
squander these national treasures, for the generation of the future 
that will carry the banner and continue the march forward will be able 
to attain its goals.... 
One last word I say to you is that I know well that the goals for which I 
worked and struggled have not been attained. And I cannot say how 
or when they will be attained. But on the other hand I know in light of 
my scientific study of the march of history in general, and Arab and 
Palestinian history in particular, that they will be attained. In spite of 
this bitter truth I leave my task as General Secretary of the Front with 
a contented mind and conscience. My conscience is content because I 
did my duty and worked with the greatest possible effort and with 
complete and deep sincerity... 
And my aim, again and again, is to emphasise the need for you to 
persist in the struggle in the service of our masses, for the good of our 
Palestinian and Arab masses. The good of the masses that lies in the 
just and legitimate cause, as it does in the realization of the good of all 
those who are oppressed and wronged. You must always be of calm 
mind, and be of contented conscience, with a strong resolve, and a 
steel will for you have been and are still in the camp of justice and 
progress, the camp whose just goals will be attained and which will 
inevitably attain its legitimate rights. For these are the lessons of 
history and reality, and no right is lost so long as there is someone 
fighting for it. 104 
DISSOLUTION AND ATTEMPTED RESTORATION 
The DFLP's political limbo act and the PFLP's process of self-criticism 
deprived the APF of its two largest and most respected members; with the 
exception of Hamas, these were the only factions with a significant following 
inside Palestine, as well as considerable diaspora support. In the words of 
one rejectionist cadre, 
104 Excerpts from the speech, as published in al-Safir, May 4,2000. 
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We went from being the [Alliance of Palestinian Forces] to being `the 
Palestinian opposition without Habash and Hawatmeh. ' This was so bad for us... as a front against [Arafat]. 105 
At some point during November 1999, the remaining eight APF factions 
decided to dissolve the alliance and regroup themselves. This coincided not 
only with the departure of the DFLP and PFLP, but also with the 
commencement of the final status negotiations between Israel and the PA, as 
well as with the renewal of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. On July 20,1999, 
Syria's then Vice President `Abd al-Halim Khaddam summoned Abu Musa, 
Ahmad Jibril and Sa'iqa's general secretary `Issam al-Qadi to "suggest" that 
"armed struggle was no longer a viable option" and that "the emphasis 
should be placed on political work. "1o6 The meeting, commonly interpreted 
in Western media at the time as Syria instructing the Palestinians that "it is 
time to end the armed struggle" was Damascus' way of signalling good will to 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in order to get the Syrian-Israeli peace 
talks under way. 107 The following day, eight of the APF factions issued a joint 
statement vowing to continue the armed struggle regardless, the PFLP and 
DFLP withholding their signatures. With that, the episode was over; Syria 
had shown good will and the factions went on with their work as usual; there 
were no active arms to lay down. While their ability to carry on political work 
in some form was never in doubt, the episode nevertheless unsettled the 
factions because it indicated a potential reorientation in Syrian objectives. 108 
Followed, as the episode was, by the PFLP and DFLP's meetings with Arafat, 
the need to formulate a strategy that could somehow constructively challenge 
the peace process, as well as maintain a level of militancy high enough to 
place it in contradistinction to the reconciliatory attitudes of the PFLP and 
DFLP, became acute yet again. 
The smaller factions-PRCP, PLF and PPSF-took a hyper-militant 
line By this time, these three were using the alliance essentially as a life 
105 Former Fateh-Intifada officer, interview with author, Beirut, October 2000. 
106 This rendition of the conversation, which is Talal Naji's, has been cross-corroborated by several 
individuals close to the participants, including Abu Khalid al-'Amleh, Farhan Abu al-Haija and 
Tahsin al-Halabi. 
107 See, for instance, `Middle East new drive for united Palestinian Front, ' BBC Online, August 23. 
1999. 
1os Tahsin al-Halabi, November 2,2000. 
237 
support machine: All of them had `moderate mirror groups' inside 
Palestine-the PPP, PLF-Abu al-'Abbas and PPSF-Samir Ghosheh, 
respectively-and were well aware that they would not survive as factions 
without the conflict with the PLO/PA leadership. Also, they were aware that 
as parts of a collective their existence was magnified, with constant speaking 
engagements, interviews on al-Quds Radio, and so forth. Fateh-Intifada also 
took a radical position, not because its existence was threatened by the 
absence of a collective, but because at the heart of its raison d'etre, as we saw 
previously, lies the necessity to encourage and maintain resistance against 
the Fateh leadership. While the other rejectionist factions could not accept 
dialogue with Arafat as head of the PA, Fateh-Intifada, by contrast, was 
compelled to oppose dialogue with Arafat as leader of Fateh. In this context 
it is worth reiterating that the hyper-militant factions, with the exception of 
Fateh-Intifada, were also those that were least suited to urge armed struggle, 
given their lack of armed capabilities. Yet, in order to make up for this 
deficiency, their principled position on armed struggle was all the more 
categorical. The PFLP-GC, Hamas, MIJ and Sa'iqa, were those least 
interested in being seen to intend confronting Arafat head-on, each for its 
own reason (returned to below). 
Although all eight factions joined in the motions, the four radical 
factions were mainly responsible for the development of a provisional 
`compound strategy' for the new grouping, the working name of which was 
the Palestinian Coalition (Tahaluf al-Filastini). 109 "They are preparing a new 
aspect of struggle", claimed Imad Al-Alami, Hamas' representative in Syria, 
in reference to the radical secularists. "There is a project under study within 
the alliance to oppose what is developing on the political side [inside 
Palestine] ... We, all the factions, are awaiting that new proposal. "Ilo 
The draft proposal was three-pronged, but so routine and un- 
innovative that it was politically dead on arrival: Resurrection of the Intifada, 
renewal of cross-border military operations, and rebuilding the institutions 
of the PLO on the basis of the APF. For each of these proposals, its 
proponents failed to answer the question `how? ' Instead, they resorted to 
109 Abu Nidal al-Ashqar, October 28,1999. 
110 `Imad al-`Alarm October 27,1999. 
238 
hollow rhetoric. Rather than the generalized and abstract defence of the 
principles of armed struggle that had been the hallmark of the APF, militant 
rhetoric was now used to urge specific courses of action. Within the model of 
social identity theory, the proposals and their justifications were clear 
attempts at social creativity in the face of a challenge to social status, yet they 
seemed-politically speaking-merely desperate, strained and ill defined. 
Resurrecting the Intifada 
The action plan's main elements were apparently a compromise, each 
reflecting the preferences of various groups within the alliance. Actively 
resurrecting the intifada found its strongest advocates in the PPSF and the 
PRCP. With no mobilized or mobilizable cross-border guerrilla capacities, 
these two argued that "We need to practice all possible pressures on the plan 
of Oslo in order to prevent the signing of the final status agreements. 
Therefore we will work in order to revive the intifada, militant upheaval 
inside West Bank and Gaza, to resist all forms of occupation. ""' The proposal 
was also supported by Fateh-Intifada. "We believe in all means of struggle", 
explained Fateh-Intifada's Abu Fakhr, "If the situation is right... if the road 
has been paved for the Intifada, then it will happen. " It was clear that Fateh- 
Intifada was interested in paving that road, hoping to make use of those 
sympathizers it apparently has within Arafat's Fateh organization. 112 
While fanning flames of discontent inside Palestine need not have 
been a complicated matter, the proposal was nevertheless extraordinarily 
confused. The intifada was variously supposed to thwart a final status 
agreement; variously it was thought that the final status agreement would be 
the intifada's catalyst. 113 Also, several factions were categorically opposed to 
the idea, most notable the PFLP-GC, Hamas and the MIJ. They feared that in 
a new intifada, popular pressure would be brought to bear not only on the 
Israeli authorities, but also, and more directly, on the PLO/PA. This was 
"' Khalid `Abd al-Mejid, October 18,1999. 
'' 2There are allegedly several `closet' Abu Musa supporters within Arafat's ex-PLA PSS hierarchy. 
unwilling to confess their allegiance out of salary considerations. This is a claim that cadres from 
several organizations, both sympathetic and averse to Fateh-Intifada, have made. 
13 These conflicting accounts emerged in interviews with `Arabi 'Awwad, October 27, and Khalid 
'Abd al-Mejid, October 18,1999. 
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something that all the larger groups wanted to avoid. MIJ's Ramadan 
Shallah had expressed it thus: 
We keep a low profile, we don't feel we are in a hurry because 
eventually our existence will bring us into conflict with the authorities 
themselves. But we don't want a new Algeria. We don't want someone 
with an interpretation of the sharia` saying, 'they co-operate with the 
Israelis, we must fight them in the same way. ' This would be of benefit 
to no one but the Israelis. 114 
Renewal of Cross-Border Raids 
In the light of regional and international developments, this proposal seemed 
simply surreal. With whatever guerrilla capabilities they possessed being 
confined to barracks by the Syrians-and following as it did on the meeting 
between Khaddam and the three principal rejectionist leaders-the factions 
knew that they would have no opportunity to attack Israel from either Syria 
or Lebanon; any other base was equally unfeasible. "[Despite restrictions] we 
still train our militants", said Abu Fakhr, "it is very important for us to 
continue the struggle. " "[A]rmed struggle has not fallen from our minds", 
agreed Abu Nidal Al-Ashqar. "When we can, we will do it again. " 
What seemed- mere posturing in order not to lose face had a more 
significant dimension, resting on a long-term analysis of regional politics 
that all eight factions seem to have agreed upon. "They are waiting for an 
Arab revival in neighbouring countries", explained Tahsin Halabi. "But there 
are no forces there to accomplish such a change. It is not on the agenda. They 
must understand-finita la musica! "115 Halabi's suggestion was borne out 
time and again by articles in Fateh-Intifada's magazine, and by statements 
on the PFLP-GC's al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio. "It is a fact that the 
Palestinian people and organizations cannot by their own means and forces 
achieve their goal of liberating their homeland and returning home", argued 
`Arabi `Awwad. "This goal demands the potentialities of the Arab countries, 
especially those neighbouring Israel-Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, 
Iraq. "116 "The struggle with the Zionists is a struggle of the whole Arab nation 
against Israel, " Khalid `Abd al-Mejid agreed. "Based on that belief the 
114 Ramadan Shallah, June 10,1999. 
115 Tahsin al-Halabi, October 26,1999. 
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Struggle Front maintains good relations with other Arab and Palestinian 
progressive and national forces... We don't feel that we are unrealistic. "117 
While it was pure fiction to claim that the Damascus-based PPSF (as 
opposed to Samir Ghosheh's Ramallah-based PPSF) pursued regional 
networking, it is worth noting that this entrenched pan-Arabism, shared by 
all secular rejectionist factions, came to the fore in their political work after 
the outbreak of the intifada. At the time, however, the smaller factions 
hypothesized that pivotal changes among the region's heads of state-not a 
grand systemic overhaul-might afford them the opportunity to rearm and 
revive the guerrilla struggle. The relatively fluid succession mechanisms of 
most Arab regimes procedures mean that there is no way of predicting who 
will succeed any given present head of state, nor if that person would stay on 
the path of `normalization'. The issue of a successor to President Assad was a 
particularly crucial issue as the personal world-view and power-base of a new 
Syrian leader would redefine their license and ability to operate from Syria 
and Lebanon. "Asad is old, what is there to say that the next president will 
control these groups in the same way? "118 It was further hypothesized that a 
moderate leader with a weak power base-a description thought at the time 
to potentially fit Bashar Al-Asad-could also be advantageous to a guerrilla 
revival as issues of `solidarity with Palestine' and `confrontation with 
Zionism' are among the habitual rhetorical devices of Syrian politics. 
Capturing the institutions of the PLO 
The inventors of the proposal for rejectionist `renewal' had intended the new 
organizational structure to contain representatives of Palestinians living in 
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza in addition to the diaspora, and that not only 
the factions but also independent unions and professional associations 
should be invited to join. 119 This inclusion of `independents' was a sign that 
the Palestinian Alliance was intended as a means of capturing or replacing 
the PLO. The APF, like the RF and PNSF before it, had aimed at correcting 
the positions of the PLO leadership by exerting political pressure. Apparently 
116 `Arabi `Awwad, October 27,1999. 
Khalid `Abd al-Mejid, October 18,1999. 
"g Senior rejectionist cadre, interview with author, Damascus, May, 2000. 
119 `Arabi `Awwad, May 10,2000. 
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believing that they were failing to impact significantly on the PLO/PA 
policies-and seeing their long-term discourse manipulation being thwarted 
by the shifting policies of the PFLP and DFLP, the rejectionists now 
considered the back-up option of creating parallel PLO institutions. It is 
clear that the reconstructed PLO was envisaged to function as, among other 
things, a support network for the regenerated armed struggle, both the 
intifada and cross-border operations. Asked to elaborate on the plans, 
however, the lack of concrete ideas was painfully evident: 
We consider PLO under Arafat to be nothing... the PLO must be 
rebuilt to once again represent all Palestinians wherever they are. 
When we rebuild the PLO we will take the program they cancelled. 
Then we will call representatives from all the places where 
Palestinians exist... we will reconstitute the Palestinian National 
Council, which will re-elect a leadership that accepts the [National 
Charter]. When we have this [chain of] command... we will be able to 
say that we are the official representative of the Palestinian people. 
After that, we will be able to put the Arab nation and the whole world 
in front of their responsibilities [vis-a-vis] the Palestinian cause. 120 
All eight remaining factions publicly agreed to this project, and went to great 
pains in pointing out the primacy of this goal. 121 Indeed, at their December 
1998 Damascus conference, the factions vowed to restore the PLO. 122 Yet, the 
PFLP-GC, Sa'iqa and the two Islamist factions were not, in fact, seriously 
interested. By the early months of 2000, the Syrians were seeking some sort 
of long-term rapprochement with the PLO/PA, and the PFLP-GC and Sa'iqa 
both considered the institutions of the original PLO sacrosanct. The 
Islamists, whose infrastructures in the West Bank and Gaza were already 
badly damaged by the joint anti-terrorist campaigns by the PA, CIA and 
Mossad that followed on the Wye River agreement did not want to give 
Arafat further reason to clamp down on them; they had for several years 
stuck to the position that they were not challenging the PLO, and were not 
about to change it. In addition, due to their relatively larger followings, they 
were forced into a greater awareness of the structural and political realities 
that would impede the effort. The four radical factions' inability to 
1 20 Abu Nidal al-Ashqar, October 28,1999. 
121 See, for instance, Fateh, no. 430 (December 26,1998), pp. 10-3 
122 Filastin min al-Nahr ila al-Bahr, pp. 326 
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operationalize their ideas, partly due to the obstruction of their four more 
moderate partners, kept the rejectionist current in a limbo until the breakout 
of the intifada in September 2000. 
THE DEATH OF HAFEZ AL-ASAD 
The second half of 2000 was a period of momentous events and significant 
change for the rejectionist organizations. On June io Hafez al-Asad died, 
temporarily plunging the Damascus-based factions into political and 
organizational uncertainty. While the factions had received no active support 
from Syria since Oslo, the value and importance of the political succour and 
comfort provided them by Syria's policy of benevolent non-interference 
could not be overestimated. Syria was the rejectionists' political lifeline, 
enabling them to exist among their people in the camps, and affording them 
the opportunity to print their propaganda and broadcast their agendas. 
Moreover, over the almost two decades since Syrian and rejectionist 
objectives had begun to converge-a process that began in the wake of Camp 
David-the two had come to coexist within the same discursive universe, 
each reinforcing the ethical righteousness and political correctness of the 
other. The Palestinian cause and its symbols had been adopted by official 
Syrian rhetoric-evident for instance in the emblem of the Ba'th Party, which 
carries a Palestinian, not a Syrian flag just as Syrian official discourse had 
been adopted and internalized by the Palestinian organizations; even Hamas 
and the MIJ had come to join in this process, referring to Asad as al-akh al- 
kabir ('the great brother') and al-ra'is al-munadil ('the president struggler'), 
stock phrases in the Syrian political dictionary. 123The Islamists had realized 
the value of Syria when, in late 1999, the Jordanian government cracked 
down on Hamas activity, expelling its leaders and dismantling its 
infrastructure. Syria took Musa Abu Marzouk, head of Hamas politburo, and 
a number of other senior Harnas functionaries under its wing, making 
Damascus the new hub of Hamas exile leadership. To the entire rejectionist 
current, then, Syria continued to be a "bastion of the liberation struggle"124 
123 Speeches by Musa Abu Marzouk, head of Harnas politburo, and MIJ's secretary general Ramadan 
Shallah, respectively, on the fourth anniversary of the death of MIJ founder Fathi al-Shigaqi; Yarmuk 
camp, Damascus. October 23,2000. 124 Talal Naji. May 28,2000. 
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and the "last citadel to stand firm against Zionism. "125 Reciprocally, to Syria 
the rejectionists continued to be part of a "mutual alliance among national 
liberation movements in their struggle with imperialism, Zionism and 
racism... "126 
Even so, since the rejectionists' meeting with Khaddam described 
above-in which it was suggested to them that they should lay down arms 
and concentrate on political work-there had been some question marks as 
to what their future in Syria might hold. The rejectionists' confidence in 
continued Syrian support for their political efforts was nonetheless borne out 
by developments in the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. Most importantly, 
Syria's refusal to expel, or even take steps to limit the activity of the 
Damascus-based factions was apparently a central bone of contention that 
contributed to the breakdown of the Syria's negotiations with Israel in 
Shepherdstown, in January 2000.127 "We know this and we are of course 
very grateful for this position, " remarked Talal Naji at the time. 128 
After the death of Hafez al-Asad, however, all bets seemed to be off. 
As his oldest surviving son, Bashar, assumed the presidency there was 
widespread speculation among Western commentators that the new 
president's more `Westernized' and ostensibly liberal worldview would cause 
him to seek rapprochement with the West at the expense of traditional 
Syrian friends and interests, among others the Palestinian rejectionists. 129 
Such suggestions hinged on the hypothesis that Bashar al-Arad harboured 
fundamentally different views of Syria's national interest and mission than 
his father, and were contradicted by a number of factors, to begin with the 
agenda specified by the new president himself. 13° In his inaugural speech to 
the National Assembly, Bashar al-Arad stated 
The political strategy which [Hafez al-Asad] laid down and supervised 
in both its implementation and development proved a great success 
125 `Arabi `Awwad, May 10,2000. 
126 `Adel Reda, Al-Tarikh la taharrakahu al-sudafah (Cairo: Akhbar al-Yom Press, n. d), p. 431 
127 Interview with a senior Bath Party official, Damascus, May 14,2000. 
128 Talal Naji, May 28,2000. 
129 See, for instance, Michael Eisenstadt, `Bashar and the `Alawite Barons, ' Jane's intelligence 
Review, vol. 12, no. 8 (August 2000), pp. 32-3. Cf. Eyal Zisser, Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition 
(London: Hurst & Company, 2001), pp. 207-13. 
130 See Anders Strindberg, `Growth with Strength: Syria's Hardline Reformer, ' Jane's Intelligence 
Review, vol. 13, no. 2 (February 2000), pp. 30-3. 
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until this very day... today we need economic, social and scientific 
strategies that may serve both development and steadfastness... 
[The Israelis] have betted on many things... The only betting that may 
succeed is to bet on the will of the people to return to their rights 
through the return of their complete territories to the line of June 4, 
1967. Only then can we proceed towards a just and comprehensive 
peace. We call upon the United States to play its full role as an honest 
broker and a co-sponsor of the peace process. Pressure has to be 
exerted in order to implement the resolutions of international 
legitimacy with all the legitimate rights they dictate for the Lebanese, 
the Syrian and Palestinian people. 131 
Following Bashar's accession there were repeated signals from the US that 
cutting ties with the Palestinian rejectionists would go some way towards 
facilitating a Syrian-US rapprochement and contribute to an eventual 
reopening of the Syrian-Israeli peace track. Also, Washington made clear 
that Syria's need to procure and improve finances, technology, and 
industry-essential to the new administration's domestic reform program- 
could be thus facilitated. However, it was relations with the US that came to 
turn sour, while relations with the rejectionists remained on a steady course. 
In March 2000, Hafiz al-Asad had met with US President Clinton in 
Geneva to explore avenues of reopening the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. Asad 
had refused to compromise on Syria's territorial demands and the summit 
was an abject failure. Washington proceeded to openly side with Israel, 
squarely blaming Syria for the summit's failure. On the subject of the 
rejectionist factions, the US was relentless. "We know they only get safe 
haven here, but that's still unacceptable, " remarked a US diplomat in 
Damascus in March 2000. "If the Syrians want to show good will they need 
to kick those people out. "132 Shortly after assuming the presidency, Syria 
recalled its ambassador to the US, Ghassan al-Mu'allem; one of Syria's top 
diplomats, al-Mu'allem was replaced by a lower level apparatchik whose 
"primary function seems to have been to make US-Syrian relations more 
difficult. "133 This move was in part a result of the new president's need to not 
be perceived as `selling out to Zionism, ' which could threaten his domestic 
131 
Address by HE Dr Bashar Hafez al-Assad, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, to the 
Syrian Parliament, Monday July 17,2000 (Damascus: Ministry of Information, 2000), pp. 10,21. 
132 Political officer at the US Embassy, Damascus, March 2000. 
133 US State Department official, Washington, DC, November 2000. 
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power base and hurl Syria into political instability. There was also the issue 
of ideological principles and integrity. The shared Syrian-rejectionist 
discourse appeared to have solidified to the extent that safeguarding the 
integrity of the patron-client relationship had become an integral part of the 
Syrian national interest. As noted in chapter two above, patron-client 
relationships are only enforceable through a shared sense of obligation based 
on honour; arguably this has never been more palpable than in Bashar al- 
Asad's refusal to act against the Palestinian rejectionists despite numerous 
incentives and pressures in favour of such a move. In fact, socioculturally 
contingent honour and integrity on the ideological level appear to have 
become integral elements of the Syrian raison d'Etat. 134 This, then, gave the 
rejectionists reason to rejoice, as they came to understand that the new 
Syrian administration was unwilling, "for reasons of political steadfastness 
and for reasons of national honour, " to alter its position vis-a-vis the 
Palestinians. 135 "Bashar is a man of political principles, " remarked Talal Naji. 
"We have nothing to fear from him because he believes in our cause, just as 
his father did. "136 
RETURN TO THE TERRITORIES-BUT ONLY FOR SOME 
On September 28,2000, the then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon 
visited al-Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount compound, by special 
permission of the Israeli government and with a massive military and police 
escort. To Palestinians, Sharon's name is indelibly connected to the 1982 
atrocities in Sabra and Shatila, and his visit sparked an outbreak of violent 
demonstrations. It soon became obvious that the unrest was not transient; 
the new intifada grew in strength and intensity by the day, and soon the 
collective despondency of the people of the West Bank and Gaza was 
transformed into popular struggle. Confrontations between Israeli security 
forces and Palestinians escalated, as did the body count. 
The rejectionists were caught as unawares as the PLO/PA leadership 
by the outbreak of the intifada, although they were quick to deploy their 
media -most importantly al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio-in its support. 
'3a Anders Strindberg, `Growth with Strength, ' p. 33. 
135 Tahsin al-Halabi, October 22,2000. 
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Like Arafat, the rejectionists resolved to attempt to harness this outpouring 
of popular anger and, also like Arafat, they knew that a considerable part of 
the people's discontent was this time directed against the PA. This, the 
rejectionists quickly concluded, was an indictment against the Oslo process 
and the utility and legality of the PA. 
Arafat now needed to bolster his position after coming under 
increasing pressure from the US and Israel after the breakdown of the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process. In July 2000, having made very slow 
progress ahead of the September deadline for final status negotiations, 
Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Barak had enlisted the support of the US in 
an attempt to move matters forward. Both Israel and Arafat refused to give 
up claims to sovereignty over Jerusalem, however, and the summit came to 
naught. In its aftermath, the US joined with the Israelis in laying the blame 
on Arafat's intransigence, notwithstanding President Clinton's remark that "I 
was not condemning Arafat, I was praising Barak. "137 The deadlock caused 
unease and frustration in Palestine, and an increasing disillusionment with 
the PLO/PA leadership. Sharon's excursion was the spark that set off the fire. 
Within the first two weeks of the outbreak of the intifada, a shell- 
shocked Arafat invited the PFLP, DFLP, the PFLP-GC, Hamas and MIJ-who 
thus far had shunned any association with the PA leadership-to join with 
him in directing and controlling the intifada; within another week Sa'iqa was 
also invited. The factions persistent refusal to have anything to do with the 
PA-"now exposed as a sham and an illusion"138-prompted the 
establishment of the interfactional National and Islamic Forces (NIF), within 
the framework of which they came to cooperate with Fateh. As a gesture of 
goodwill, the PA released Hamas, MIJ and PFLP-GC activists from its 
prisons. 
Arafat's invitation was exactly what the fragmented and increasingly 
dysfunctional rejectionist camp needed. On a political level, they realized 
that this was an opportunity to reinsert themselves into the political 
mainstream and thus have the opportunity to exert greater and direct 
136 Talal Naji, November 7,2000. 
137 `U. S. President Bill Clinton: Statement after the Camp David Peace Talks (July 25,2000), ' in 
Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds. ), The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 553. 
138 Farhan Abu al-Haija, November 10,2000. 
247 
influence on Palestinian affairs. On the less obvious level of sociocultural 
dynamics, Arafat's invitation was a significant gesture on behalf of the party 
that had challenged their honour and threatened their integrity by signing 
the DOP. Oslo, they had argued all along, had been a dead end leading 
neither to a lasting and equitable peace settlement, nor to the recovery of 
Palestinian rights; Israeli intransigence on the issue of Jerusalem was simply 
a case in point. As far as they were concerned, `Arafat the transgressor' now 
conceded defeat and humbled himself by reaching out to them. "Abu 
`Ammar's request is important, " remarked Talal Naji at the time, "because it 
shows that he understands the real implications of what is happening on the 
ground. "139 
The rejectionists lobbied hard to enlist Syrian support for the intifada. 
The Arab Extraordinary Summit convened in Cairo in late October to 
address the escalating violence inside Palestine was Bashar al-Asad's first 
significant international engagement as president. The summit was an 
opportunity to demonstrate that Syrian foreign policy remained intact, the 
shift in leadership notwithstanding. "This blood has not been shed so that we 
may come and stop it being shed, " he told the other delegates, "but to make 
Israel pay the price. "140 Syria's stance was predictably among the more 
uncompromising of those gathered in Cairo, and President Asad called for 
the severance of all Arab ties with Israel. More importantly, at the 
Conference of Islamic Heads of State in Doha in November 2000, the Syrian 
president reportedly suggested in private meetings with other delegates that 
the financial donations they had pledged in support of the intifada should 
benefit also the Palestinian rejectionists. 141 For the first time in many years, 
then, Syria may have actively solicited finances for the Palestinian 
rejectionist organizations. 
In return the Syrians had also exerted pressure on the rejectionists to 
take the opportunity afforded them by Arafat's gesture. With a new 
administration in Damascus that was attempting to mend fences with a 
number of neighbouring leaders, among them Arafat, Syria was keen to 
'39 Talal Naji, November 7,2000. 
140 President Bashar al-Asad's Speech at the Arab Extraordinary Summit, Cairo October 21-22.2000 
(Damascus: Ministry of Information, 2000), p. 8. 
'al This was alleged to the author by several Western diplomats in Damascus in November 2000. 
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promote Palestinian unity as this would not only enhance the rejectionists' 
position but also facilitate Syria's own overtures. Syria's Minister of 
Information remarked at the time that 
We hope to see all the groups united in one. We have done everything 
possible in the past, to bring them together... because unity is strength 
for all. But unfortunately unity is sometimes not easy [to achieve]. 
Although [I must stress] that this is an internal matter for the 
Palestinians. 142 
The six invited factions let go of their rejectionist foothold and joined forces 
with Arafat for the first time since the early 198os. This did not mean a 
change in tenor, however. "Oslo is now dead, " remarked Talal Naji, "and it is 
imperative that we cooperate within a joint national leadership to confront 
Israeli aggression. "143 On January 6, after repeated US requests that the PA 
leadership quell the intifada and return to the negotiating table, the NIF 
issued its first statement-entitled `The Call for Adhering to the Constants 
and Rejecting the US Proposals'-which read in part: 
Our great masses, at the time when the criminal Zionist attacks and 
aggressions executed by the Zionist occupation army and the settlers' 
gangs escalate against our masses, the US-Israeli conspiracy 
heightens! This conspiracy that aims to drag us into the trap of 
accepting the US proposals, which are nothing but a blatant 
expression of the Zionist scheme that aims to impose surrender on 
our people and aims to force the PLO to extinguish the torch of the 
great Intifada of al-Aqsa, Jerusalem, Independence and Return. The 
National and Islamic Forces affirm on their constant position that 
rejects the conspiracy and aggression; the forces stress on the 
following: 
Firm rejection and condemnation of the US Proposals and 
condemnation of any party that tries to exert pressure on the PLO to 
accept the proposals and affirmation of the position of the Executive 
Committee, which rejected these proposals in principle; affirmation of 
the clinging to the national constants that constitute the basis of our 
rights, firstly the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their 
homes and properties; affirmation of the Arab and Islamic nature of 
Jerusalem and rejection of the fragmentation of this sovereignty over 
this city, which is the eternal capital of the Palestinian state; rejection 
of any concessions on the borders and rejection of any exchange of 
142 `Adnan `Umran, November 14,2000. 
143 Talal Naji, November 7,2000. 
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lands; stress on the withdrawal of the occupation army and settlers' 
gangs from all occupied territories, and the establishment of the independent Palestinian state with al-Quds as its capital; rejection of a 
return to negotiations in the light of the oppressive Zionist aggression, 
and rejection of any security coordination with the murderers who 
aim to strike the Intifada and eliminate the cause of our struggling 
people; affirmation of the continuation of the intifada as a struggle 
option that develops and escalates through progress in its various 
activities. 
[... ] 
Victory to the Intifada and Defeat to the Conspiracy! 
Glory and Eternity to our Martyrs! 
Recovery to the heroic wounded and Freedom to the Courageous 
Prisoners! 
It is an Intifada till Victory! 
The National and Islamic Forces 
The State of Palestine, January 6,2001144 
This statement was historic, and very different from anything that the six 
rejectionist factions had previously put their names to. It indicated their 
adaptation to, and acceptance of prevailing political circumstances in 
Palestine. Behind the fierce and irreconcilable rhetoric there were subtle 
signs of actual political intent. Most importantly, the NIF statement clearly 
implied the signatories' acceptance of 1967 borders. Rejection of negotiation 
with Israel was only conditional, hinging on the "oppressive Zionist 
aggression" that accompanied the intifada. Signed in the "State of Palestine, " 
the statement also signalled commitment to Palestinian statehood in the 
West Bank and Gaza. 
It should be noted, however, that the statement was also very different 
from anything that Fateh had signed in several years. Its political tone and 
was unmistakably rejectionist, suggesting that Fateh had gone quite some 
way in order to placate the rejectionists. Be that as it may, the rejectionists 
had found an opportunity to reinsert themselves into the mainstream 
without losing face and without having to alter their rhetoric. In this context 
it should be recalled that as early as 1991, both Jibril and Habash had made 
explicit statements in which they accepted partition of Palestine as well as 
negotiation and coexistence with Israel. 
144 Statement by the National and Islamic Forces, January 6,2001; per facsimile from PFLP-GC, 
Ramallah. 
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Wanting to demonstrate its adherence to legitimate forms of struggle, 
the PFLP-GC initially opposed the use of firearms in the intifada. Talal Naji 
especially voiced strong concern and unease about the political and PR 
repercussions of the armed operations carried out by Fateh's Tanzim 
militia. 145 As violence escalated, however, the PFLP-GC leadership decided to 
change approach and at some point between February and April 2001, the 
faction began efforts to transfer its military infrastructure from Lebanon to 
Palestine. 146 The first step was transfer of small arms. 
It was apparently the PFLP-GC's decision to actively collaborate with 
Arafat that prompted a similar decision by the MIJ and by Hamas' external 
leadership in Damascus. The latter was also induced to soften its 
traditionally militant position, having long been of a considerably more 
militant hue than the Hamas leadership in Gaza. `Irrad al-'Alami, head of 
Hamas' Damascus delegation, stated in November 2000 that the 
organization has come to "accept the existence of Israel within the borders of 
1967, even if it is with a heavy heart. "147 Some measure of policy coordination 
between the PFLP-GC, Hamas and MIJ had come to be natural, as the three 
factions had grown close over the years, although through its mutual 
alignments with the Hizb'Allah rather than within the APF framework. 
Moreover, the PFLP-GC receives its entire social affairs budget-pensions, 
allowances for martyrs' families, etc. -from private donors in Iran, a 
connection with runs through the good offices of the MIJ and, to a lesser 
extent, Hamas. The PFLP-GC thus needs the Islamists for continued 
solvency. The Islamists, for their part, have come to depend on access to 
PFLP-GC military camps in Lebanon to train their activists in guerrilla 
warfare. 14S 
Fateh-Intifada, backed by the PPSF, PLF and PRCP promptly 
suspended cooperation with the six Damascus-based factions that had signed 
the NIF statement. These four were unable to participate in the general 
factional rapprochement that followed in the wake of the intifada. The 
145 Talal Naji, November 7,2000. 
146 According to a senior UN officer serving in Syria, Damascus, July 2001. 
147 `Imad al-`Alami, November 8,2000. 
gas Hamas' and NUJ's interest in guerrilla warfare, it has been suggested by one Hamas functionary, 
"may be a result of the Lebanese resistance's victory over the Zionists. " It is thus a relatively recent 
development. 
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reason was highly existential. In addition to the six rejectionist factions, the 
NIF statement had also been signed by, among others, the Palestinian 
People's Party (PPP), the PPSF-branch headed by Samir Ghosheh, the PLF- 
branch headed by Abu al-'Abbas and Arafat's own Fateh. 149 The participation 
of these four effectively precluded involvement by `Arabi `Awwad's PRCP, 
Khalid `Abd al-Mejid's PPSF, Abu Nidal Ashqar's PLF and Fateh-Intifada. 
These four former and the four latter were competing claimants to the same 
organizational heritage. The PRCP had broken off from the PCP in 1982 on 
the issue of armed struggle (the latter changing its name in 1991 to the 
Palestinian People's Party, PPP), the PPSF had split in two in 1991 over the 
issue of Madrid, the PLF had split in three in 1984 due to diverging opinions 
on the split in Fateh, which took place in 1983. Cooperation within the NIF 
would require recognition by each of these factions of their rivals. 
Several further issues prevented the Damascus-based factions from 
taking such a step. First, the PRCP, PPSF and PLF remain seriously 
committed to the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea-if only in 
an increasingly misguided effort to enhance their members sense of self- 
worth and social identity-and see no reason to compromise this position in 
return for a place among the mainstream factions. In addition, the PRCP, 
PPSF and PLF are tiny organizations of which the former two have virtually 
no financial resources (the PPSF is still able to live off sound financial 
investment plans made in the late 198os); they depend for their subsistence 
on Fateh-Intifada. Were they to `join the mainstream' they would be unable 
to compete with their well funded and relatively better organized rivals, and 
thus seriously puncture their own social status. "They would rather risk 
going under here in exile, " remarked a senior rejectionist cadre, "than face 
certain destruction inside Palestine. "15° These three factions simply could not 
compete with their rivals in a way that would allow them to maintain a 
positive social identity. In Damascus, they have concluded, they are at least 
without competition. 
A similar dynamic applies to Fateh-Intifada, although it remains 
financially solvent and well organized. Fateh-Intifada sees itself as the 
149 Also participating in the NW were the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA), the Arab Liberation 
front (ALF), the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF) and the Islamic National Salvation Party (INSP). 
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original Fateh. "The executive leadership inside the movement, " remarked 
Abu Fakhr, "defected from the principles that had already been agreed upon 
and cancelled the national program that had already been established... We 
do see ourselves as the Fateh movement because we believe in its principles 
and its aims and objectives... "151Since cooperation with `Fateh-Arafat' would 
imply recognition of his authority as a leader of Fateh, Fateh-Intifada is 
inherently unable to take such a step. While other factions have refused to 
cooperate with Arafat in his capacity as head of the PA, Fateh-Intifada 
cannot even afford to acknowledge him as head of Fateh, lest they deprive 
themselves of their raison d'etre. In addition, there is the issue of personal 
and factional pride: 
These are fiercely proud men... Abu Musa and Abu Khalid. They are 
military men. They have dedicated their entire lives to this path of 
struggle and they cannot now turn around and simply change [path]. 
Impossible, how could they? They could not do that and still keep 
their honour and pride. 152 
In late October 2000, Fateh-Intifada announced its deployment of the `Umar 
al-Mukhtar Forces, 
, 
its military wing, which soon began claiming 
responsibility for a number of car bombs inside Israel. Fateh-Intifada's 
military camps in Lebanon underwent "reorganization" between October and 
December, likely to facilitate the increasing activities of its military wing. 153 
Similar to the PFLP-GC, Fateh-Intifada has attempted, since early spring 
2001, to shift the balance of its military capabilities from its outmoded 
reliance on infantry and armour-which continue to predominate their 
training camps-to underground strike forces, and to transfer these 
capabilities from Lebanon to the West Bank. 
*** 
150 Tahsin al-Halabi, November 8,2000. 
151 Abu Fakhr, October 30,1999. 
152 Tahsin al-Halabi. May 28,2000. 
253 
At the time of writing, this is where matters stand for the rejectionist current. 
A possible bellwether for the four remaining rejectionist factions was 
provided by recent developments within the PPSF. As part of a PLO 
delegation, Samir Ghosheh visited Damascus in July 2001, and took the 
opportunity to meet with the cadres belonging to Khalid `Abd al-Mejid's 
faction. The latter remonstrated vehemently, but to no avail. At the meeting, 
which was facilitated by members of other factions, Ghosheh reportedly 
stated: "Oslo is now history, there is no longer anything to separate us 
politically. Come with me to Palestine and let us work together again, in the 
West Bank. There you have a chance to make a difference. "154 Thus, Samir 
Ghosheh was able to split Khalid `Abd al-Mejid's faction, bringing with him 
roughly half of its cadres who no longer saw any sense in separation. Those 
who stayed loyal to Khalid Abd al-Mejid did so primarily for personal and 
financial, rather than political reasons. Able to supply his followers with no 
political purpose-which is crucial to the positive social identity of a political 
organization-all but a handful left Damascus. "`Arabi `Awwad and Abu Nidal 
[Ashqar] are very worried now, just as much as Khalid `Abd al-Mejid is upset. 
None of them can give their members anything to do. They have no identity 
as groups. Without a strong identity-finita la musica! "155 
153 Abu Khalid al-`Amleh, November 3,2000. 
154 Samir Ghosheh, July 2001, as quoted by a non-PPSF participant in the meeting. 
155 Tahsin al-Halabi, July 16,2001. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT AND REJECTIONISM: SOME 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND REMARKS 
Conflict does not split, much less destroy unity. It constitutes unity, it is a binding-together, logos. 
Polemos and logos are the same. Martin Heidegger' 
"Political scientists, " according to Lisa Wedeen, "have generated 
neither precise concepts nor an adequate methodology for understanding the 
role of rhetoric and symbols in producing political power. "2 As the analytical 
narrative of this thesis has demonstrated, rhetorical speech and symbolic 
action have lain at the heart of rejectionism, and on a more profound and 
active level within its post-Oslo framework than at earlier stages. It is 
perhaps not surprising, then, that scholars and analysts have so profoundly 
missed the point of rejectionist efforts. 
On a deeply rooted cognitive level, the post-modern ethos that 
permeates contemporary Western scholarship is inherently hostile to belief 
in absolutes, such as adherence to `narrow' nationalism or religion. Groups 
and individuals' espousal of concepts such as the social value of honour and 
integrity are seen as being primitive or pre-modern. 3 When, in addition, they 
engage in violence or the rhetoric of violence to further their objectives, they 
become stereotyped as threats to modernity and civilization 4 Western 
political science has found it difficult to approach such social phenomena 
without superimposing ethnocentric judgment or unsuitable analytical 
frameworks; it then becomes an exercise in threat assessment rather than 
balanced scientific inquiry. `Terrorism studies' is an instance of this. Scholars 
1 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 
1987 [19591), p. 62. 
2 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, p. 5. 
3 For this argument, see Benjamin R Barber, Jihad Vs. McWorld (New York and Toronto: Times 
Books, 1995), esp. chs. 1-9. See also Christopher Hitchens' preface to Edward W. Said, Peace and its 
Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (New York, Vintage Books, 
1996), pp. xiii-xxii. Hadi al-Mudarrasi, La-illa yakun sidam hadarat (`There will be no clash of 
civilizations') (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1996) offers an insightful Islamic-Arab account of the political 
discourse of a globally dominant West. 
4 See Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, pp. 53-72. 
within that field have sought to understand what `terrorism' is-whom it 
attracts, why it occurs, and what causes it to thrive or decline. They have 
sought to extrapolate the essence of `terrorism' from a whole range of 
socioculturally specific instances and--with very few exceptions5-have 
rejected the explanatory capacity of the Emic. Often in obvious pursuit of 
political agendas, those groups who come in for scrutiny by terrorism 
scholars are prejudged as irrational and threatening, and the profound lack 
of primary research that characterizes the field serves to perpetuate these 
images. Schmid and Jongman have pointed out that 
... if it is assumed that nonviolent behavior in society is normal, those 
who engage in violence, criminal or other, are necessarily `abnormal' 
deviating from the rules of society. An outflow of this assumption are 
the many theories which regard the terrorist as a peculiar personality 
with clear identifiable character traits. 6 
As was made clear in chapter two, this thesis rejects the assumptions and 
methods of terrorism studies. Even so, mention must be made of them 
because they have come to form the basis for current academic orthodoxy on 
the subject of rejectionism, if only by default. In describing rejectionism as 
being simply "of little practical significance"? while their progenitors are 
"[e]vil itself... [b]rooding in their own, self-imposed darkness, "8 stereotypes 
are imposed, which are then further entrenched by a well-nigh complete lack 
of field research on the subject. 9 Scholarly assumptions about how politics 
ought to work according to formal models often obscures understanding of 
how it actually works on the ground; looking for a `terrorist threat' and 
patterns of `military strategic thought' will likely suggests to the researcher 
that the rejectionists are terrorist threats with an inability for military 
strategic thinking. Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill inadvertently summed this 
malpractice up when they used their observation that "a student of strategy 
5 See David W. Brannan et al., "Talking to `Terrorists", p. 8. 
6 Alex P. Schmid & Albert J. Jongman et at Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts. 
Theories, Databases and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1983), p. 142. 
Avraham Sela (ed. ), Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East, p. 637. 
$ Rana Kass and Bard O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace, p. 337. 
9 From their annotations and source index, Kass and O'Neill, for instance, appear to not have actually 
spoken with, or interviewed a single rejectionist leader, cadre or activist for their research, relying 
instead heavily on Israeli and Arab press reports. 
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who looks for a substantive elaboration of such statements [in a speech by 
George Habash]... will do so in vain" to conclude that there was no processes 
of strategic thought within the PFLP, only "generalities and slogans. "10 
In attempting to remedy these shortcomings, the present thesis has 
applied a socioculturally sensitive framework that emphasises the 
explanatory capacity of Emic perspectives and beliefs; this has evinced the 
depth of misrepresentation pertaining to the rejectionist current within the 
Palestinian national movement. Situating it within a political context that is 
internal to the Palestinian national movement, and within a sociocultural 
framework that draws on the salient features of the ambient eastern 
Mediterranean culture, previously unexplained incongruence between 
rhetoric and action-and between rhetoric over time-falls into place. In the 
early 1970s, consenting to a phased solution and the use of diplomatic 
instruments to achieve Palestinian objectives by signing the ten-point 
agreement, the PFLP, PFLP-GC, PPSF and ALF then went on to vehemently 
reject that agreement as well as negotiations and diplomacy in any and all 
forms. In the early 199os, having made cautious but repeated remarks about 
accepting that a "minimum". of Palestinian demands be met through 
principles and mechanisms of "international legitimacy", the PFLP, PFLP- 
GC and Fateh-Intifada greeted Oslo with total rejection of peace negotiations 
and co-existence with Israel. In both instances, the rejectionists were 
brought back to the `mainstream' only after the diplomatic processes 
collapsed. 
Social identity theory, anchored within a sociocultural framework that 
is meaningful to the Emic and comprehensible to the Etic through 
anthropological research and primary understanding, gives us the tools to 
understand this seemingly erratic behaviour. The theory suggests that 
groups need to supply their members with a positively connoted group 
identity in order to continue to exist. If a group cannot make its members see 
its value-and internalize that value to the point where it becomes a part of 
the individual's own identity and self-worth-that group will perish. Arafat's 
behaviour in each of these instances has been perceived as affronts to 
10 Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, The Deadly Embrace, p. 244 (n. 34). 
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national and factional honour; this can not pass without response lest group 
identity and cohesion suffer. Herein lies the importance of culture. 
Any group's attempt to supply members and constituencies with a 
positive social identity must take into account ambient `background 
expectancies, ' the collective cognitive mechanisms through which individuals 
typify their experiences and comprehend the world. Alfred Schuetz proposed 
that group membership may be understood in terms of a collective sharing a 
set of common background expectancies by which the world was to be 
properly typified and understood. " Such a group, then, could be anything 
from a political faction to a nation. Background expectancies are 
"intersubjective norms which are shared by members of a socio-cultural 
milieu; not only socially derived, they are also socially approved, controlled, 
maintained and institutionalised. "12 Perhaps foremost among social pivots in 
the agonistic cultures of the eastern Mediterranean is honour, and, as was 
noted in chapter two, a number of significant social norms and cues revolve 
around this concept. With specific reference to the Palestinian context, 
notions such as steadfastness, sacrifice and suffering have constituted other 
elements of collective background expectancies. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, the award, withdrawal, control, maintenance and 
institutionalization of honour, and the practice, preservation and 
institutionalization of steadfastness, sacrifice and suffering, have been the 
pivots of rejectionism. 
Resistance against Israeli occupation has been part of the agenda of 
every fasa'il by virtue of its being a part of the Palestinian national 
movement; on this level of analysis, Israel has undeniably been the 
continuous `significant other' against which Palestinian political and military 
efforts have been exerted. On this level--whether they accept Israel's 
existence or not-their positions have been divergent, ambiguous and fluid. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the fact that the rejectionists 
have been engaged in a rhetorical battle is not an indicator of their 
underlying and concrete political objectives. As Lisa Wedeen has pointed out 
with reference to the `Arad cult': 
11 Alfred Schuetz, Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action, ' Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. 14, no. 1 (1953), p. 1-37. 
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Sometimes the rhetoric is patently absurd; sometimes it blends 
consensual understanding with obviously false statements, 
appropriating meanings... And sometimes, too, the official discourse 
represents widely shared convictions about political life, albeit in 
stark Manichean terms that simplify the range of complex differentiated visions expressed... in private. '3 
For the rejectionists qua rejectionists, however, the significant other has 
always been the PLO/PA leadership and Israel has not been a focus, but a 
cognitive backdrop. Their political efforts have been part of their ongoing 
struggle to compete with the national leadership for social status, to 
determine and maintain a correct course within the Palestinian national 
movement and to provide a distinct input into the process of filling 
Palestinianness with content capable of turning it into Palestinianism. 
The aim of this thesis has not been to essentialize Palestinian or 
eastern Mediterranean cultures, nor to suggest that rejectionism is somehow 
`Palestinianness in fine focus. ' Moreover, it has not sought to suggest that the 
rejectionist current is somehow comprised of individuals that are `better 
Palestinians' or more `culturally aware' than the PLO/PA leadership with 
which they have been locked in competition. Rather, it has sought to 
demonstrate that in order to resonate, rejectionism-like any other social or 
political phenomenon-must operate with reference to the immediate 
sociocultural milieu within which it exists; this applies also to the PLO/PA 
leadership. But if the two camps exist within the same cultural context, how 
can context explain their differences? The answer is that it does not, it 
merely explains the manifestation of their differences, allowing outsiders to 
give sense to otherwise perplexing speech and behaviour. The Fateh- 
dominated PLO/PA leadership and the rejectionists have had conflicting 
opinions on, and perceptions of the purpose of armed struggle; the correct 
ideological approach to resolving the national predicament; the 
circumstances under which diplomacy is an appropriate instrument; and the 
efficacy of alignment with certain external actors (e. g. Syria, Egypt, Jordan, 
the United States). Sharing a cultural framework obviously does not preclude 
individuals or groups from having conflicting opinions. The practical 
12 Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, Social and Cultural Anthropology, p. 58. 
13 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, p. 7. 
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consequences of such conflicts, however, are played out within a behavioural 
and cognitive framework that derives from the ambient culture and its 
background expectancies. To be sure, rational actors by definition take 
rational steps, but-as Clifford Geertz has argued on the related subject of 
common sense-the immediate socio-cultural milieu limits and defines what 
an actor finds reasonable and rational to do and say. 14 It defines the 
parameters of speech and behaviour. 
Given the pivotal position of honour within the cultural milieu of the 
fasa'il, then, it has only been natural that the very public and politically 
significant conflicts of opinion between the PLO/PA leadership and the 
rejectionists would become matters of honour. It was also natural that those 
factions that were to form the core of the various rejectionist assemblies- 
primarily PFLP and PFLP-GC-would come to attach greater importance 
than Fateh to the defence of factional honour because of their pre-existing 
social status deficit. They have found themselves in a position of structural 
disadvantage relative to Fateh ever since the fasa'il took over the institutions 
of the PLO, yet had sizeable memberships and constituents to provide for 
and organize. In order to remain viable social movements, they thus needed 
to continuously and actively compete with Fateh for -social status. 
Consistently being the dominant faction within the national movement, 
Fateh never needed to worry too much about its ability to provide members 
and constituents with a positive social identity. Fateh was the principal actor 
and it was up to others to challenge its position. Since the opposition was 
unable to alter structural relations within the. PLO, they needed to ascertain 
other connotations that would resonate positively within the ambient 
sociocultural framework; their response was a socially creative emphasis on 
honour and integrity, intended to balance out Fateh's political dominance. 
Arafat has consistently sought to impose his and Fateh's preferred 
courses of action on the national movement as a whole. Repeatedly, however, 
this has been done in ways that the rejectionists have perceived to be 
dishonest and dishonourable, challenging their social status and threatening 
their honourability. The establishment of the three rejectionist assemblies 
examined in chapter five's analytical narrative, as well as Abu Musa's 
14 See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 
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rebellion within Fateh itself, should be understood in this context, as 
culturally embedded responses to Arafat's challenges to these groups' honour 
and social status. 
With regard to the break-up of the APF in early 2001, social identity 
theory is yet again able to provide significant insights. The groups that saw a 
way of enhancing their own and their members' sense of self-worth by 
returning to the `mainstream' accepted Arafat's invitation; their honour had 
been satisfied. Those smaller groups, however, that would face certain 
destruction within the `mainstream' due to inability to compete for status 
with their larger, better entrenched rival factions, chose to stay behind. They 
knew that their appeal would be limited and that they would risk losing the 
last of their members within the PA-centric political system. Their distinct 
group identities would consequently dissolve and they-`Arabi `Awwad, 
Khalid `Abd al-Mejid and Abu Nidal al-Ashqar, would be consigned to 
history. Within the framework of culturally embedded social identity theory, 
they thus made a rational choice to stay behind and take their chances. Some 
scholars have made distinctions between rejectionists and pragmatists, 15 and 
"the politics of resistance" has been separated from "the politics of realism. "16 
This thesis, in contrast, submits that rejectionist resistance against 
`deviationism' and `liquidationism' has been decidedly pragmatic as well as 
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